Court-Side Seats? The Communications Decency Act and the Potential Threat to StubHub and Peer-to Peer Marketplaces

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COURT-SIDE SEATS? THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO STUBHUB AND PEER-TO-PEER MARKETPLACES

Abstract: In 1996, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides broad immunity to websites from vicarious liability for the content produced by its users. Despite this broad immunity, a website will be liable for its user’s content when it is deemed to be an “information content provider” itself. In 2008, in *Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a website is an information content provider and thus loses immunity when it “materially contributes to the alleged unlawfulness” of the content. Although most courts have followed this “material contribution test,” the test has lead to diverging opinions as to immunity for peer-to-peer marketplace websites, such as StubHub. This Note proposes a new test in line with Congress’s intent to provide broad immunity under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

INTRODUCTION

Walking around Yawkey Way near Fenway Park, an observer will hear “buying tickets, selling tickets?” along with the cries of the sausage and game-day program vendors.1 In open disregard for rarely enforced anti-scalping laws, brokers resell tickets, creating a secondary market that is now a five billion dollar industry.2 Traditionally, brokers meander through the crowds attempting to profit off the economics of supply and demand.3 Increasingly, however, these on-site brokers are struggling to compete with the lower information costs and absence of geographic constraints on the Internet.4

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3 See Mays, supra note 1; Rovell, supra note 1.
Through peer-to-peer marketplaces, such as StubHub, buyers and sellers now have access to the secondary ticket market without having to leave their living rooms.\(^5\) StubHub does not buy or sell tickets itself but simply connects buyers and sellers, charging a service fee.\(^6\) As the leader in the online secondary ticket market, StubHub generated $500 million in revenue in 2013, with $3 billion worth of tickets sold on its site.\(^7\) By providing tools like historical pricing data, virtual seating maps, and seamless payment, StubHub offers an experience that is unlike the traditional on-site marketplace.\(^8\)

With no maximum or minimum price restraints, StubHub lets the economics of supply and demand run their course.\(^9\) For high-profile events, like the Super Bowl, demand greatly exceeds supply, resulting in ticket prices on the secondary market more than ten times their face value.\(^10\) The imbalance of supply and demand can be affected by a number of factors, including the weather, the opponent, or the potential for a record-breaking moment.\(^11\) Con-

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\(^8\) See [perma.cc/J3KN-QKHM]; Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining the basic economic tenets of supply and demand); Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing dynamic pricing with the CEO of StubHub).


\(^10\) See Brandon Formby, *Novelty of First College Football Playoff Championship Isn’t Driving Ticket Demand*, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2015), http://sportsday.dallasnews.com/collegesports/collegesheadlines/2015/01/06/novelty-of-first-college-football-playoff-championship-isn-t-driving-ticket-demand [perma.cc/MX5B-JPFE] (describing the influence of factors like travel and in-state interest on ticket prices); Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing the impact of supply and demand on the secondary ticket market). For example, shortly after Derek Jeter announced he would be retiring at
versely, when the supply of tickets greatly exceeds the demand, StubHub is home to ticket prices that are far below face value.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the increasing popularity of websites like StubHub, most states still have anti-scalping laws.\textsuperscript{13} These laws usually focus on physical scalping around a stadium, or reselling over a specified price above face value.\textsuperscript{14} These tactics and other regulatory measures are harder to enforce online, where identity and physical presence are masked.\textsuperscript{15}

The rise of the online peer-to-peer marketplaces creates new issues of legal liability.\textsuperscript{16} The core issue is whether the host of a peer-to-peer marketplace could be vicariously liable for the actions of its users.\textsuperscript{17} Plaintiffs have attempted to hold StubHub liable for scalping violations, unfair trade practices, or tortious interference with contractual relations.\textsuperscript{18} Websites generally succeed in


\textsuperscript{15} See Kaufman, supra note 14 (explaining how anti-scalping laws are outdated); Nocera, supra note 4 (describing a new era of online scalpers).


\textsuperscript{17} See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 551–57; Doty, supra note 16, at 126; Weslander, supra note 16, at 177–79.

defending claims for vicarious liability under the Communications Decency Act ("CDA" or "the Act"), but there has been uncertainty as it pertains to StubHub.  

The CDA gives a website immunity from vicarious liability for the actions of its users, unless the website is responsible "in whole or in part, for the creation or development" of the information that is the focus of the lawsuit. Courts have split on how to define "development." In 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals proposed a now popular definition, which denies a website immunity if it "materially contributes to the alleged unlawfulness" of the information. When this test has been applied to StubHub, however, courts have reached different conclusions as to StubHub's liability for its users' actions.

This Note argues that a new test is needed to eliminate the ambiguity in applying CDA immunity, in line with Congress's test. Part I discusses the CDA, the courts' diverging interpretations of its key terms, and StubHub's reliance on immunity. Part II examines the conflicting opinions on StubHub's liability and the threat to other peer-to-peer marketplaces. Part III argues that a new test is needed and proposes a clearer test for CDA immunity.

I. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO STUBHUB

To understand the effect of section 230 of the CDA on StubHub, this Part explains the Act's purpose, statutory text, and the courts' application of its key terms. Section A of this Part discusses the undesirable outcome that results from applying offline notions of third-party liability to the Internet, prompting

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19 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554 (holding that StubHub is not liable vicariously for the anti-scalping law violations of its users); Doty, supra note 16 at 126 (noting that most courts have found for broad immunity for websites). But see NPS, 25 Mass.L.Rptr. at 485 (holding StubHub liable for unfair trade practices violations).

20 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f) (2012); Doty, supra note 16, at 128.


22 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1667–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting development to mean "materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness," such as contributing to the defamation).

23 Compare Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554 (holding StubHub immune from anti-scalping law violations), with NPS, 25 Mass.L.Rptr. at 485 (holding StubHub liable under the CDA for its "knowing participation" in unfair trade practices).

24 See infra notes 239–256 and accompanying text.

25 See infra notes 28–123 and accompanying text.

26 See infra notes 124–170 and accompanying text.

27 See infra notes 171–256 and accompanying text.

the need for section 230 of the CDA.\textsuperscript{29} Section A then explores the statutory text of the CDA and its litigated terms.\textsuperscript{30} Section B introduces the Roommates.com “material contribution” test and summarizes the two different approaches courts have taken when applying this test, leading to ambiguity affecting StubHub.\textsuperscript{31} Section C explains StubHub’s business and reliance on CDA immunity.\textsuperscript{32}

A. A Fix Is Needed: A Threat to Online Actors Prompting the Birth of the CDA, and the Lingering Question of When a Website Is Deemed to Be an “Information Content Provider”

Prior to the CDA, liability for Internet service providers of third-party content depended on offline notions of publishers versus distributors.\textsuperscript{33} Under this distinction, publishers, such as newspapers, were liable for any defamatory comments they published and over which they had control.\textsuperscript{34} In contrast, distributors, such as bookstores, were immune from liability if they had no knowledge of the defamatory material they circulated.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, if a website or Internet forum exhibited control or knew of alleged defamatory statements, it became liable for those statements as a publisher.\textsuperscript{36}

The offline analogy of publishers and distributors encouraged online companies to refrain from monitoring the content their users posted.\textsuperscript{37} For ex-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} See infra notes 33–58 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{30} See infra notes 33–58 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{31} See infra notes 59–109 and accompanying text. If a website “materially contributes” to a content’s unlawfulness, it will lose immunity under the CDA under the test announced in Roommates.com. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1667–68; see Doty, supra note 16, at 129–30 (describing the court’s holding in Roommates.com); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46; Weslander, supra note 16, at 269 (detailing the court’s holding in Roommates.com). The point at which an interactive computer service also becomes an information content provider is the point at which the interactive community service loses immunity under the CDA. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1667–68; Doty, supra note 16, at 127–28; Weslander, supra note 16, at 279.
\item \textsuperscript{32} See infra notes 110–123 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{33} See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that publishers become distributors if they have knowledge or reason to know of defamatory content).
\item \textsuperscript{34} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{35} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{36} See id. at 139–41; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding Prodigy liable for the defamatory statements of its user because it exhibited control over the content).
\item \textsuperscript{37} See Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1016 (explaining the downside that existed if a website monitored its users’ content); Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 211–13 (2002) (describing the outcome of the Stratton Oakmont case). In 1991, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a host of an online journalism forum, CompuServe, was immune from liability because it acted as a distributor. See 776 F. Supp. at 141. The journalism forum hosted a specific publication called “Rumorville” over which it exercised no control. See id. at 137. CompuServe allowed users to contribute their own unedited content and did not have knowledge of the alleged defamatory statements posted by a user. See id. at 137–38. The district court noted that CompuServe lacked control over the content before being disseminated, and that imposing liability otherwise would result in
\end{itemize}
ample, in 1995, in *Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.*, the New York Supreme Court held that a host of an online bulletin board was liable for the defamatory statements of its user because it exercised editorial control.\(^{38}\) Prodigy hosted a network of two million subscribers communicating over various topic-specific forums.\(^{39}\) Prodigy marketed itself as a family-friendly service due to its editorial control, which was accomplished through automatic screening software and board leaders overseeing the content.\(^{40}\) The court held that these actions made Prodigy a publisher and thus liable for the content its users post.\(^{41}\) In this way, Prodigy’s good faith efforts to monitor its bulletin boards resulted in liability.\(^{42}\)

In a response to the *Stratton Oakmont* decision, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.\(^{43}\) Congress provided protection for websites in § 230 by unequivocally declaring them immune from civil liability for the content of a user as long as the website is not “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development” of that information.\(^{44}\) The Act further grants immunity to any website that attempts to monitor and filter the content of its users.\(^{45}\) This includes “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to re-

\(^{38}\) *Stratton Oakmont*, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.

\(^{39}\) *Id.* at *1.

\(^{40}\) *Id.* at *2.

\(^{41}\) *See id.* at *5.

\(^{42}\) *See id.*; *see also Shiamilli*, 952 N.E.2d at 1016; Joshua Dubnow, *Note, Ensuring Innovation as the Internet Matures: Competing Interpretations of the Intellectual Property Exception to the Communications Decency Act Immunity*, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 297, 299 (2010) (noting that imposing liability upon good faith efforts to monitor has the potential to chill both laudatory business decisions and user speech on the Internet).


\(^{44}\) *47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)* (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).

\(^{45}\) *Id.*. CDA immunity is not confined to defamation claims; rather, the immunity also applies to all civil claims. *See, e.g.*, Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 38, 41–42 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting the applicability of the CDA to contract claims). The CDA also provides explicit exceptions as to criminal and intellectual property law. *47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)–(2).*
strict access to or availability of” objectionable material. Section 230 of the CDA does not encourage websites to monitor, but simply removes the legal downside of monitoring.

Section 230 of the CDA distinguishes between “interactive computer services” and “information content providers,” providing civil liability immunity to computer services, but not to information providers. An interactive computer service means any host that enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, like a website. The term “interactive computer service” also incorporates the term “access software providers,” which includes any website that offers functions that “filter, screen, allow, or disallow content . . . pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.” On the other hand, an “information content provider” is any person or entity that is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information.”

The focus of litigation involving section 230 of the CDA is when an interactive computer service is simultaneously an information content provider, thus causing it to lose the immunity that the CDA provides. Although it is clear when a website engages in the “creation” of information, defining what constitutes a website’s “development” of information has been far more difficult.

Congress explained its findings and the policy reasons behind the CDA in the statutory text. Congress intended to preserve the Internet as a robust medium for communication and to remove the disincentives for hosts to self-

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47 See id. § 230(b)(4), (c)(2)(B); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163 (“In other words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation of content . . . .”); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (explaining that in response to Stratton Oakmont, the CDA removes the disincentives to monitoring).
49 Id. § 230(f)(2).
50 Id. § 230(f)(4).
51 Id. § 230(f)(3). Litigants argue that although a website is an interactive computer service, it is also an information content provider when it contributes to the information in part, thus losing CDA immunity. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165–66.
52 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165–66; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the relationship between interactive computer services and information content providers); Doty, supra note 16, at 128 (describing the application of CDA immunity); Weslander, supra note 16, at 279.
53 See Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“While an overt act of creation of content is easy to identify, determining what makes a party responsible for the ‘development’ of content under § 230(f)(3) is unclear.”); Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1017 (stating “no consensus has emerged concerning what conduct constitutes ‘development’”).
54 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b). Specifically, the Act has two goals: “to promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material.” Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122. The CDA has also been interpreted to specially overrule Stratton Oakmont. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; see Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
regulate.\textsuperscript{55} Congress chose to promote the development of the Internet by removing the potential for a host to be liable for the content of its users.\textsuperscript{56} At the motion to dismiss stage, websites can seek CDA immunity from civil liability, preventing expensive discovery costs.\textsuperscript{57} Originally applied predominantly to defamation cases, CDA immunity has been interpreted to apply to any civil suit claiming vicarious liability for websites.\textsuperscript{58}

\section*{B. Ambiguity from Adjudication: The Roommates.com Definition of “Development of Information” and the Resulting Uncertainty as to When a Website Is Also an “Information Content Provider”}

This section discusses the seminal case law that resulted from the enactment of section 230 of the CDA.\textsuperscript{59} It first explains the initial response of courts to provide broad immunity to websites, followed by a major holding that limits this immunity.\textsuperscript{60} This section then explains two approaches that courts have taken in determining when an interactive computer service loses immunity.\textsuperscript{61}

1. Initial Attempts at Interpreting “Development of Information” and the Roommates.com “Material Contribution” Test

Recognizing Congress’s intent and explicit policy towards website immunity, most courts initially interpreted “information content provider” very narrowly, making it hard to find a website contributorily liable for its users’ content.\textsuperscript{62} Some courts held that websites profiting from illegal content could

\textsuperscript{55} 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31.

\textsuperscript{56} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); Carafano, 339 F.3d 1122–23; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.

\textsuperscript{57} Andrew Bluebond, \textit{When the Customer Is Wrong: Defamation, Interactive Websites, and Immunity}, 33 REV. LITIG. 679, 689–90 (2014) (explaining that CDA immunity provides grounds for a motion to dismiss, a time at which there has been little opportunity for pertinent facts to be discovered).

\textsuperscript{58} See Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41–42 (holding that the CDA extends beyond defamation to any civil claim besides the exceptions enumerated in the statutory text); Zac Locke, Comment, \textit{Asking for It: A Grokster-Based Approach to Internet Sites That Distribute Offensive Content}, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 151, 159 (2008) (noting the expansion of CDA applicability beyond defamation law). The CDA, however, does not provide immunity from criminal and intellectual property claims. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)–(2).

\textsuperscript{59} See infra notes 59–109 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{60} See infra notes 62–83 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{61} See infra notes 84–109 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{62} See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (explaining that CDA immunity has been applied broadly). In 1997, in Zeran v. American Online, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that America Online (“AOL”) was not the information content provider of alleged defamatory comments on an AOL bulletin board and thus immune from liability for the comments. 129 F.3d at 332–34. An unidentified user posted insensitive t-shirts for sale relating to the Oklahoma City bombing, with Zeran’s information as the point of contact as a prank. See \textit{id.} at 329. Zeran contacted AOL, who agreed to take the post down but would not post a retraction. See \textit{id.} After AOL took down the information, it was immediately reposted, snowballing into harassment, death threats, and public humiliation for
still receive CDA immunity.\textsuperscript{63} Courts also rejected assigning liability even if a website received notice of alleged defamation because it would impose monitoring costs and burden websites, contrary to Congress’s intent.\textsuperscript{64} These courts took a hardline approach in protecting CDA immunity, noting that Congress chose to immunize an “active, even aggressive” role for interactive computer services.\textsuperscript{65}

In contrast to these broad views of CDA immunity, other courts applied a strict textual interpretation of the language “responsible . . . in part, for the . . . development” of the information and thereby limited CDA immunity.\textsuperscript{66} In 2008, in \textit{Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC}, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com was not immune from liability under the CDA.\textsuperscript{67} Roommates.com connected people looking for roommates with those seeking vacancies.\textsuperscript{68} Users were required to fill out a questionnaire asking their preferences as to a roommate’s sex, sexual orientation, and renting to those with children.\textsuperscript{69} Roommates.com then displayed these preferences and comments in the form of a user’s profile page and provided a search function based on these preferences.\textsuperscript{70} Plaintiffs sued Roommates.com for violating the Fair Housing Act

\textsuperscript{63} Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51–52; Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 557. Courts also held that a website’s knowledge of illegal content did not foreclose CDA immunity. See Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51–52; Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 557.

\textsuperscript{64} See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (noting that if an interactive computer service provider is dealt with a multitude of take-down notices, it will simply remove the content in question without examining the legality of the content because there is no liability for removing content, and in doing so will avoid monitoring costs). Requiring websites to monitor its users’ content stifles the free flow of information. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.

\textsuperscript{65} Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51–52 (“If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs. . . . But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.”). In 1998, in \textit{Blumenthal v. Drudge}, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held AOL immune from the defamatory comments written by Matthew Drudge on a popular gossip website called the “Drudge Report.” \textit{Id.} at 50–52. Drudge licensed the “Drudge Report” to AOL for $3000 per month. \textit{See id.} at 51. Under the agreement, Drudge e-mailed AOL his articles, which AOL subsequently posted. \textit{See id.} at 47. AOL reserved the right to remove and request changes to certain content that it deemed necessary. \textit{See id.} AOL also advertised the availability of the Drudge Report as a draw for customers to sign up with AOL. \textit{See id.} at 51.

\textsuperscript{66} 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–69 (interpreting “development” to mean “materially contributing” to the alleged unlawfulness of the information).

\textsuperscript{67} See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69, 75; Doty, \textit{supra} note 16, at 129–31. The point at which an interactive computer service also becomes an information content provider is the point at which the service loses immunity under the CDA. See Doty, \textit{supra} note 16, at 127–28 (explaining the applicability of the CDA); Weslander \textit{supra} note 16, at 279.

\textsuperscript{68} Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161.

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Id.} at 1161–62, 67.
(“FHA”), which makes it illegal to rent housing or refuse to rent housing on the basis of race, gender, and familial status.\(^{71}\) The Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com could be liable for its display of user preferences and their use of a search function based on those preferences because these actions constituted “development,” in part, of information.\(^{72}\)

The Ninth Circuit announced a test for determining when an interactive computer service is also an information content provider, interpreting “development” of information to mean “materially contributing to its unlawfulness.”\(^{73}\) In adopting this test, the court looked towards Wikipedia for the definition of “web development,” which included “gathering, organizing and editing information” in its definition.\(^{74}\)

The dissent criticized the majority for formulating a test related to the underlying claim of illegality because the issue of illegality is decided only after a website is deemed to be an information content provider.\(^{75}\) The dissent argued that immunity should be determined by the degree to which the website contributed to the information, regardless of whether the information itself is illegal.\(^{76}\)

Moreover, the dissent expressed frustration with the majority’s inconsistent and ambiguous language in its test for determining whether a website “materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness” of the content.\(^{77}\) The dis-

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\(^{71}\) Id. at 1162. The Fair Housing Act prohibits discriminatory or preferential rentals, or sales based on protected categories. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).

\(^{72}\) Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166–67, 1175. The Ninth Circuit also held that Roommates.com could be liable for the questions it poses because it is providing that information. Id. at 1164. Roommates.com also provided a comments box for users to write additional information. Id. at 1161. The Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com is immune from liability for the additional comments section because it merely provided an open space for users. Id. at 1173–74. At this stage the Court only discarded CDA immunity, remanding for further consideration as to whether the content violated the FHA. Id. at 1175.

\(^{73}\) Id. at 1167–68 (interpreting development to mean “materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness,” such as contributing to the defamation); see Doty, supra note 16, at 129–31 (explaining the requirement test as a “solicitation” standard and the encouragement test as an “inducement” standard); Dyer supra note 16, at 845–46.

\(^{74}\) See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69. The functions of gathering, organizing, and editing information are similar to the traditional publisher duties protected by the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority’s definition of “web development” includes terms explicitly protected under the statute); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (stating that claims that attempt to hold websites liable for traditional publisher functions are meritless).

\(^{75}\) See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting that there is no reference to unlawfulness in the text of the CDA and thus the majority is conflating an issue of immunity with an issue of substantive liability).

\(^{76}\) See id. (noting that websites could be information content providers of harmless information, and the determination of illegality is made after the CDA analysis).

\(^{77}\) See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (stating that a website loses immunity for encouraging or requiring illegal content). In Judge McKeown’s dissent he criticizes the majority for leaving websites “wondering where immunity ends and liability begins.” Id. at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissent-
sent observed how although the majority seemed to emphasize that Roommates.com required users to answer unlawful questions as a condition of service, throughout the opinion, the majority substituted “requirement” for words like “collaborate,” “force,” “design,” “induce,” “encourage,” “elicit” and “urge.”78 To the dissent, the majority was ironically at its most ambiguous when it attempted to be the most clear, for the majority opinion stated: “the message to website operators is clear: if you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”79

The Ninth Circuit’s expansive definition of “information content provider” was novel, for a website’s design could now make a company responsible in part for the development of its users’ content.80 Most courts have accepted the Roommates.com “material contribution” test for determining when a website “develops” information “in part.”81 Some have criticized the decision, however, arguing that it conflicts with Congress’s broad grant of immunity.82 Moreover, when determining CDA immunity under this framework, it is unclear whether encouragement or requirement is the standard.83

2. Different Standards for Determining Immunity Under Section 230 of the CDA: The Encouragement Test and the Requirement Test

Under the umbrella of the “materially contributing to its unlawfulness” test from Roommates.com, courts have adopted two different approaches to
determining when a website materially contributes to the information in question.84 Some courts have held that if a website encourages users to produce illegal content, then it materially contributes to the illegal act, whereas other courts have applied a heightened standard that a website must require the information at issue in order to be held liable for its illegality.85

Under the encouragement test, a website that encourages or induces illegal content, rather than employs “neutral tools,” is considered a developer, in part, of that content.86 Thus, if the website specifically encourages allegedly unlawful content, it is deemed an information content provider and loses immunity under § 230.87 In 2009, in FTC v. Accusearch Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted this interpretation of the material contribution test.88 There, the FTC brought an unfair trade practice claim against Accusearch, Inc. for selling confidential phone records.89 Accusearch paid researchers to collect personal phone record information and advertised access to these confidential records.90 The Tenth Circuit held that because Accusearch specifically encouraged requests for protected information and paid researchers to obtain the information, it materially contributed to the unlawfulness of that information and was therefore liable for it.91

Under the encouragement test, a website will be responsible for the development of information if it has an “active role” and instructs users to post certain content.92 In 2004, in MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, the

85 See Doty, supra note 16, at 126–27, 130–31, 136 (explaining the requirement test as a “solicitation” standard and the encouragement test as an “inducement” standard); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46. The holding in Roommates.com leaves open the possibility for two different interpretations. See 521 F.3d at 1175 (“The message to website operators is clear: if you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”); Doty, supra note 16, at 126–27, 130–31, 136 (noting that the Roommates.com majority used different terms and descriptors in describing the conduct); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46.
87 Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1190.
90 Id. at 1191–92, 1201.
91 Id. at 1200–01 (noting that Accusearch went further when it “affirmatively solicited” the content).
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that Badbusinessbureau.com was liable for the allegedly defamatory statements of its users.93 Badbusinessbureau.com hosted a consumer complaint forum that enabled customers to get revenge for unsatisfactory experiences through public web-posts and class action lawsuits.94 Additionally, an operator of Badbusinessbureau.com emailed users, directing them to gather photos and collect detailed information.95 This encouragement was enough for the district court to hold that Badbusinessbureau.com was a developer of the content and thus not immune under the CDA.96

Other courts have held that encouragement is not enough to find that a website operator materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness of information and is thus responsible for the development of it.97 These courts narrowly interpret the Roommates.com “materially contributing to its unlawfulness” test, emphasizing that the requirement of the questionnaire as a condition of service was essential to that holding.98 Compared to the encouragement test, the requirement test is more likely to lead to immunity under section 230 of the CDA.99 These courts rely heavily on Congress’s explicit policy choice in section 230 of the CDA to provide robust immunity to websites, regardless of ethical considerations.100

Under this test, a website will lose its CDA immunity and be responsible for allegedly illegal content only if it requires users to post that content.101
In Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that encouragement is not enough to make a website an information content provider.\(^{102}\) TheDirty.Com enabled users to post gossip-related content by asking them to provide the “who, what, when, where, why.”\(^{103}\) The website operator then added one line of his own commentary to supplement the user’s post.\(^{104}\) In holding TheDirty.Com immune from a defamation suit, the Sixth Circuit noted that the tools provided were neutral and did not require users to publish illegal content.\(^{105}\) Further, the Sixth Circuit held that even the website’s additional commentary did not materially contribute to the alleged unlawfulness because it was published after the user’s original defamatory statements.\(^{106}\)

Opting for broad CDA immunity is met by critics, who argue the CDA goes too far in protecting those who harbor others violating the law.\(^{107}\) They

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102 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–17.
103 Id. at 402–03.
104 Id. at 403.
105 Id. at 415–17.
106 Id. Despite this court’s holding, the CDA is clear that websites are information content providers with respect to the content it directly writes, like the questions in Roommates.com. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(c); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164. But the fact that the plaintiff did not allege the website’s own comments to be defamatory may have been the deciding factor. See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 416. Under the requirement test, if a website does not require illegal content, it will be immune from third-party liability as long as the user ultimately provides the content in question. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171, 1175 (clarifying the holding in Carafano); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (holding the website immune “so long as the third party willingly provides the essential published content”). Many courts have explicitly followed the Carafano court’s test. See, e.g., Ascentive, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 474; Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1198; Global Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 933. In 2003, in Carafano v. Metrospalsh.com, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an online dating website’s questionnaire and display of profile did not make it an information content provider. 339 F.3d at 1124–25. The plaintiff attempted to hold the dating website liable for another user’s fake profile of the plaintiff, a famous actress. Id. at 1121–22. Unlike in Roommates.com, the dating website’s questionnaire did not require illegal content; rather, the user ultimately provided the illegal content. Compare Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (requiring content that violated the Fair Housing Act), with Carafano, 339 F.3d 1123–26 (requiring general information, to which the user entered defamatory statements). See Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–98 (explaining that tools are neutral “so long as users ultimately decide what content to post, such that the tool merely provides a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes”) (quoting Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172)). Although both Roommates.com and Carafano dealt with websites that contained questionnaires and displays of preferences, the Ninth Circuit in Carafano ruled for a broad grant of immunity. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171–72 (clarifying the holding in Carafano); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125.

propose that stricter limitations on retaining CDA immunity will provide fairer legal remedies for victims of cyber harassment and revenge pornography, among other civil violations. Some alternate tests include accepting an encouragement or inducement standard for determining contributory liability, or demanding the content to be removed upon request.

C. Modern Marketplaces: StubHub and Its Reliance on the CDA

Capturing the inefficiency of supply and demand pricing on the primary ticket market, StubHub allows consumers to buy or resell tickets on the secondary market. For a sold-out event, a customer can go to the secondary market and pay a premium price over face value. Conversely, for an event in which the primary vendor’s price exceeds demand, a lower price can be found on the secondary market.

StubHub provides an easy interface for sellers to list tickets to an event. The service allows sellers to upload tickets and input detailed information regarding the quantity, section, row, seat number, and various other features or commerce service). The concerns are primarily ones of privacy and harassment, but extend to any civil claim. See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90 (arguing for a “specific encouragement” standard for CDA immunity); Locke, supra note 58, at 159 (arguing for a Grokster “inducement” approach, similar to the court in NPS); Andrew Bolson, The Internet Has Grown Up, Why Hasn’t the Law? Reexamining Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, PRIVACY ADVISOR (Aug. 27, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/the-internet-has-grown-up-why-hasnt-the-law-reexamining-section-230-of-the/ [perma.cc/N6AV-HHJA] (arguing that the CDA is a threat to online privacy); Joe Mullin, Revenge Porn Is “Just Entertainment,” Says Owner of IsAnybodyDown, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 4, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/02/revenge-porn-is-just-entertainment-says-owner-of-isanybodydown/ [perma.cc/A86G-AVVU] (noting the over-protective tendencies of the CDA).

See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90; Locke, supra note 58, at 159 (calling for a stricter standard when applying CDA immunity); Logiurato, supra note 107 (detailing New York’s struggle to regulate Airbnb because of the protection that the CDA provides); Bolson, supra note 107 (arguing that changes are needed to the CDA because the Internet has grown in ways Congress did not originally foresee).

Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90 (arguing for a “specific encouragement” standard for CDA immunity); Locke, supra note 58, at 159 (arguing for an inducement standard); Bolson, supra note 107 (arguing for a notice and take-down process).

See Rovell, supra note 6; Cassidy, supra note 6 (explaining how StubHub works).

See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 479 (discussing how the majority of New England Patriots tickets sold on StubHub are in excess of their face value); Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26.

See Rubin, supra note 12 (finding StubHub prices to be cheaper on average than tickets on the primary market for New York Mets tickets); Sloane, supra note 12 (noting the availability of Yankees tickets on StubHub below face value); Brad Tuttle, Does Anybody Pay Face Value for Sports Tickets Nowadays?, TIME (June 12, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/06/12/does-anybody-pay-face-value-for-sports-tickets-nowadays/ [perma.cc/PD73-398U].

disclosures.\textsuperscript{114} StubHub’s seller interface provides data for how much other tickets are selling for in a section, including the lowest, median, and highest prices.\textsuperscript{115} StubHub also conducts a “LargeSellers” program where it offers fee discounts for high-volume sellers.\textsuperscript{116} The LargeSellers program also gives the high-volume sellers an exclusive opportunity to buy underpriced tickets, and a chance to resell them at a higher price.\textsuperscript{117}

In its user agreement, StubHub makes it clear that it does not own or control user data.\textsuperscript{118} The agreement places the responsibility of listing tickets on the seller and requires any listing to be in accordance with the law.\textsuperscript{119} According to the agreement, the user owns any content submitted, granting StubHub the right to use it freely.\textsuperscript{120}

Although originally applied to defamation suits, CDA immunity applies to all civil liability.\textsuperscript{121} Faced with anti-scalping law claims and business torts, StubHub and other peer-to-peer online marketplaces depend on § 230 immunity to shield their business models from liability.\textsuperscript{122} In the absence of § 230,

\textsuperscript{114} See Seller FAQ, supra note 113; see also Cassidy, supra note 6. The features or disclosures allow the user to indicate if the seat is an aisle, handicap accessible, or with an obstructed view. See Cassidy, supra note 6.

\textsuperscript{115} See Cassidy, supra note 6. These statistics will often produce prices that are above face value. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480; Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26; Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing dynamic pricing).

\textsuperscript{116} See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480, 485. StubHub also provides an online payment method, and discloses the fees it retains. See id. at 480; Cassidy, supra note 6.

\textsuperscript{117} See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480, 485.

\textsuperscript{118} See id. at 484 (discrediting StubHub user agreement); see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (upholding StubHub user agreement). See generally User Agreement, STUBHUB (last updated June 1, 2015), http://www.stubhub.com/user_agreement/ [https://perma.cc/D2GF-MC2G]. StubHub opens its user agreement by stating “because sellers set ticket prices, they may be higher than face value.” User Agreement, supra.

\textsuperscript{119} See User Agreement, supra note 118.

\textsuperscript{120} See id. In 2013, StubHub added an arbitration clause, which users can opt-out from by giving notice within thirty days of their initial use. Chris Morran, Now You Can No Longer File Class-Action Suits Against StubHub; Here’s How to Opt Out, CONSUMERIST (Feb. 22, 2013), http://consumerist.com/2013/02//now-you-can-no-longer-file-class-action-suits-against-stubhub-heres-how-to-opt-out/ [perma.cc/BGS3-ANHJ]. See generally User Agreement, supra note 118.

\textsuperscript{121} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2), (e)(3) (stating that CDA immunity applies to all civil liability and is not limited to tort claims); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41–42 (holding that the CDA extends beyond defamation to any civil claim besides the exceptions enumerated in the statutory text).

\textsuperscript{122} See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 485 (defending a claim for tortious interference with advantageous relations based on liability for a seller’s violation of anti-scalping law while using the website); see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 553 (defending a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices based on liability for a seller’s violation of anti-scalping law while using the website). Although the practice of ticket scalping, especially online, is trending largely towards deregulation, there are still state laws in place that prohibit the resale of tickets above face value. See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26. Massachusetts legislators are proposing bills to repeal their anti-scalping laws. See Lewontin, supra note 13 (noting that repealing current anti-scalping law would harmonize the law with the current state of the secondary ticket market).
marketplaces would likely face endless claims attempting to hold them liable for their users’ peer-to-peer communications.123

II. SOLD OUT: CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF CDA IMMUNITY
THREATEN THE INNOVATION OF StubHub AND PEER-TO-PEER MARKETPLACES

Diverging court opinions on whether the CDA grants StubHub immunity creates uncertainty as to the legality of StubHub’s practices and potentially chills innovation.124 Section A of this Part discusses the diverging opinions in the 2012 Court of Appeals of North Carolina decision in Hill v. StubHub, Inc., and in the 2009 Superior Court of Massachusetts decision in NPS v. StubHub, Inc.125 Section B of this Part analyzes the conflicting decisions, focusing on knowledge and willful blindness.126 Section C of this Part discusses how this uncertainty affects the business practices of StubHub and other peer-to-peer marketplaces going forward.127

A. The StubHub Split: Conflicting Applications of the CDA Cause Uncertainty About Immunity for StubHub

StubHub’s first attempt at claiming immunity under the CDA was exceptionally disastrous.128 In 2009, in NPS v. StubHub, Inc., a Superior Court of Massachusetts held that StubHub was not immune under the CDA for a tortious interference claim.129 The New England Patriots sought an injunction against StubHub enjoining resale of Patriots tickets on StubHub’s website.130 The Patriots alleged that StubHub interfered with their agreement with season ticket holders, which included a non-transferability clause.131 To show that StubHub interfered with its agreement by “improper means,” a necessary ele-

123 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171–72 (noting that, in close cases, websites should be granted immunity in line with Congress’s intent, or else websites will face “death by ten thousand duck-bites”); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 553 (defending a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices based on liability for a seller’s violation of anti-scalping law while using the website).
124 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008) (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting that websites are “left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity ends and liability begins”); Eric Goldman, Eric’s Blog, 16 No. 5 CYBERSPACE LAW. 20 (2011) (explaining that all marketplaces attempt to drive the market to equilibrium prices, and if this is viewed as “encouraging” content, all marketplaces are at risk); Doty, supra note 16, at 126 (describing StubHub’s lack of immunity under the CDA).
125 See infra notes 128–144 and accompanying text.
126 See infra notes 145–159 and accompanying text.
127 See infra notes 160–170 and accompanying text.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 478–79.
131 Id. at 478–80.
ment of a tortious interference claim, the Patriots claimed StubHub contributed to their users’ violation of anti-scalping law.132

Adopting a variation of the encouragement test, the Superior Court of Massachusetts in NPS held that StubHub materially contributed to ticket scalping because it induced others to violate the law.133 In denying summary judgment, the court discussed how StubHub’s pricing structure indicated it profited from above face value tickets and failed to disclose the face value of tickets.134 StubHub’s handbook encouraged “LargeSellers” to buy underpriced tickets, implying they could resell them for a higher price.135 In addition, StubHub provided the option for LargeSellers to “mask” their exact ticket location, making it hard for the Patriots to determine which season ticket holders are selling on StubHub.136 According to the court, this inducement or “knowing participation” amounted to material contribution towards illegal ticket-scalping, enough to lose immunity under the test announced in 2008, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.137

In contrast, in 2012, in Hill v. StubHub, Inc., the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that StubHub was immune from similar anti-scalping law violations under the CDA.138 In that case, a buyer used StubHub to purchase Hannah Montana concert tickets that exceeded the face value price by roughly three times.139 The buyer then brought suit alleging that StubHub was responsible for the development of the ticket price, violating North Carolina’s anti-scalping law.140

132 Id. at 485. Massachusetts scalping law prohibits the reselling of tickets at more than two dollars above face value, not including reasonable service fees. Id. at 479.

133 See id. at 483, 485. The court perhaps went even further in holding that liability could be shown for profiting from illegal conduct while “declining to stop or limit it.” See id. at 483 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)); see also City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the CDA does not create immunity at all, but just determines who is a publisher or not), certifying questions to 979 N.E.2d 844 (2011).

134 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 483. Because StubHub is not the seller of the tickets itself, it is not subject to anti-scalping laws. See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that the Massachusetts scalping statute only applies to ticket resellers). See generally User Agreement, supra note 118 (explaining that StubHub is not a seller of tickets, but simply a marketplace for sellers).

135 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480, 483. “LargeSellers” is a category of high-volume sellers to which StubHub grants special benefits. See id.

136 See id. at 480, 482.

137 See id. at 485. The Patriots wanted the names of the season ticket holders to see who violated their contract. See Bruce Mohl, Patriots Get StubHub Users’ Names, BOSTON.COM (Oct. 19, 2007), http://www.boston.com/sports/football/patriots/articles/2007/10/19/patriots_get_stubhub_users_names/ [perma.cc/U7X8-RF4M].


139 Id. at 552–53.

140 Id. at 554.
Adopting the heightened standard that encouragement of illegal content is not enough to lose immunity, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that a website must “effectively control” the content or “ensure the creation” of it to be liable.\footnote{Id. at 561 (interpreting the material contribution test from Roommates.com, focusing on the requirement of users to post unlawful content).} Explicitly declining to follow the test set forth in \textit{NPS}, the court interpreted the CDA and relevant case law to provide a broad grant of immunity.\footnote{See id. at 558; see also Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 16 A.3d 1113, 1126–27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010) (declining to follow \textit{NPS} for similar reasons).} Faced with similar facts as in \textit{NPS}, the court held that encouragement or inducement of market-based prices above face value does not constitute development of actual price information.\footnote{See \textit{Hill}, 727 S.E.2d at 551–54. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina overturned the decision of the Superior Court of North Carolina, which had held that StubHub’s tools and incentives encouraging users to reach market prices constituted the “development” of pricing, making StubHub at least willfully blind to the fact that its users’ prices were unlawfully above face value. \textit{See Hill} v. StubHub, Inc., No. 07-CVS-11310, 2011 WL 1675043, at *13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2011), rev’d, 727 S.E.2d 550.} Also, unlike the court in \textit{NPS}, the court held that knowledge of illegal content does not automatically remove a website’s CDA immunity.\footnote{See \textit{Hill}, 727 S.E.2d at 559.}

\begin{center}
\textbf{B. Determining StubHub’s CDA Immunity Based on Knowledge of, or Willful Blindness Towards, Ticket-Scalping}
\end{center}

A major difference in the holdings in \textit{NPS} and \textit{Hill} is the importance of knowledge as a factor for determining a website’s CDA immunity.\footnote{Compare id. at 557 (discarding knowledge as a factor for CDA immunity), with \textit{NPS}, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 485 (holding StubHub liable under the CDA for its “knowing participation”).} In \textit{NPS}, the Superior Court of Massachusetts considered StubHub’s increased profit from above face value ticket prices and fee waivers for LargeSellers to resell underpriced tickets at a higher price.\footnote{\textit{NPS}, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 483.} According to the court, StubHub knowingly induced illegal conduct.\footnote{Id. at 485.} The court held that knowledge or willful blindness of illegal conduct constitutes “materially contributing to its unlawfulness.”\footnote{See \textit{Hill}, 727 S.E.2d at 560.} Directly counter to the holding in \textit{NPS}, the court in \textit{Hill} held that StubHub is not an information content provider and retains immunity even if it knows of unlawful conduct by its users.\footnote{See \textit{NPS}, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480; see also \textit{Hill}, 727 S.E.2d at 562. Although in \textit{Hill} a buyer filed suit against his seller and StubHub, in \textit{NPS} the Patriots filed a larger-scale injunction to limit the}
one-time buyer filed a complaint against his seller and StubHub. In this transaction only StubHub’s basic middleman services were in question, including its guarantee, fees, and shipping services. Conversely, in NPS, the New England Patriots sought an injunction against StubHub prohibiting any resale of Patriots tickets. This larger scale assault on StubHub’s practices detailed its incentive program for “LargeSellers” and “masking” tool, limiting the Patriots’ ability to identify season ticket resellers. These features painted a picture of StubHub’s willful blindness towards its users’ conduct.

The holding in NPS, that knowledge is sufficient to “materially contribute” to illegal conduct, is unprecedented. Although the opinion in Roommates.com may be unclear as to what exactly constitutes “material contribution” to illegal content, there is no reference to knowledge in the Ninth Circuit’s holding or dicta. In fact, the Superior Court of Massachusetts in NPS borrows its knowledge analysis from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, a case that does not involve CDA immunity. Nonetheless, ambiguity in the Roommates.com decision

resale of Patriots tickets on StubHub. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 480; see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 552.

151 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 554–55.
152 See id. at 562. The facts also involved the StubHub recommended pricing tool, available to all sellers. Id.
153 NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 478–79.
154 See id. at 480. The court held that the masking ability was not sufficient to succeed on a common law misrepresentation claim because the seller did not mask any information from the buyer, just the Patriots. See id. at 482.
155 See id. at 482–85 (holding that willful blindness is not compatible with CDA immunity).
156 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561; Doty, supra note 16, at 136, 138 (explaining that the ruling in NPS was a departure from other interpretations of the material contribution test). The decision in Hill is more harmonious with the policy of section 230 of the CDA because Congress enacted the CDA in part to remove liability for knowledge of illegal conduct. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (a)–(c) (2012); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (N.Y. 2011); Schruers, supra note 37, at 212–13.
157 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164–70 (not considering knowledge as a factor for immunity). Liability upon notice or knowledge contradicts the CDA’s purpose. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (describing the negative effects that notice liability would have on interactive service providers).
158 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482–83; Doty, supra note 16, at 137–38 (noting that the inducement test from Grokster influenced the NPS decision). Even if knowledge is relevant for liability, StubHub simply knows the market prices, driven by the forces of supply and demand. See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561; Goldman, supra note 124 (explaining that StubHub is simply concerned with market price); Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining the basic concept of supply and demand). Imputing liability from StubHub’s price-dependent revenue model expands liability to new levels for CDA jurisprudence and potentially puts e-commerce websites at risk. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482–83 (holding StubHub liable for inducing the price in question); Doty, supra note 16, at 138–39 (describing the inducement test as a departure from previously narrow rulings). The court used the “inducement” standard, taken from contributory liability for copyright infringement in the Grokster case. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482–83; Doty, supra note 16, at 137–38. But see Locke, supra note 58, at 168 (arguing for an “inducement” test derived from Grokster).
leaves the door open for rogue decisions like NPS and results in uncertainty for StubHub.\textsuperscript{159}

C. CDA Uncertainty Threatens the Growth of StubHub and Other Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces

If StubHub is uncertain as to whether it will receive immunity, it may tailor its practices towards a less interactive experience, stunting growth.\textsuperscript{160} Congress enacted the CDA, in part, to give websites peace of mind with immunity.\textsuperscript{161} As a result of these split decisions, StubHub’s uncertainty as to its immunity is tantamount to having no immunity at all.\textsuperscript{162} In addition, rising legal fees for potential liability could stunt growth, contrary to Congress’s goals.\textsuperscript{163} The CDA serves as a procedural device at the motion to dismiss stage, allowing websites to stave off discovery costs if granted immunity.\textsuperscript{164}

Potential liability for facilitating peer-to-peer transactions threatens not only StubHub, but all online marketplaces that rely on CDA immunity for innovation.\textsuperscript{165} Companies such as Uber and Airbnb provide ancillary services, acting as the middlemen connecting drivers and riders, and homeowners and travelers.\textsuperscript{166} The users of these online marketplaces are increasingly looking for

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\item\textsuperscript{159} See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that through the majority’s decision almost any function can put a website at risk); Doty, supra note 16, at 130–31.
\item\textsuperscript{160} See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31 (explaining congressional intent to protect the growth of the Internet and free speech on the Internet); Brief for Appellant at 19, Hill, 727 S.E.2d 550 (arguing that a broad encouragement test would stunt e-commerce growth).
\item\textsuperscript{161} See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (a)–(b) (stating Congress’s findings); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31; Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 555 (noting the CDA has been interpreted to give websites broad immunity).
\item\textsuperscript{162} See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting websites are “left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity ends and liability begins”). If websites are unsure if their practices will be protected, they do not receive the peace of mind that comes with certain immunity. See Goldman, supra note 124 (explaining that the NPS decision could put every marketplace at risk); Doty, supra note 16, at 138, 141 (describing two standards of interpreting the Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46.
\item\textsuperscript{163} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (explaining Congress’s intent in enacting the CDA); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 555 (noting that the CDA has been interpreted to give websites broad immunity).
\item\textsuperscript{164} See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689–90 (explaining the use of the CDA as a procedural device).
\item\textsuperscript{165} See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1183 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority’s definition puts all websites at risk); Goldman, supra note 124 (describing how under an encouragement test, all marketplaces that drive prices to equilibrium supply and demand are at risk); Doty, supra note 16, at 138, 141 (explaining the two different approaches courts have taken in interpreting the material contribution test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46; Claire Cian Miller, When Uber and Airbnb Meet the Real World, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/upshot/when-uber-lyft-and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 [perma.cc/44H3-3L2U] (detailing attempts to regulate Uber and Airbnb).
\item\textsuperscript{166} See Lucas E. Buckley et al., The Intersection of Innovation and the Law: How Crowdfunding and the On-Demand Economy Are Changing the Legal Field, WYO. LAW., Aug. 2015, at 36, 38 (explaining how Uber and Airbnb are disrupting traditional markets through simplification); Molly Co-
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\end{footnotesize}
more data-driven and interactive user experiences and are moving away from a Craigslist.org white-pages approach. But, when courts impose liability on these interactive marketplaces, they encourage the services to be more like a barebones Craigslist. If legal liability outweighs the revenue benefits from interactive peer-to-peer tools, the growth of marketplaces like StubHub could be halted, depriving consumers of new e-commerce. This likely conflicts with Congress’s policy to limit government intervention and promote the growth of the Internet.

III. RESELLING THE CDA: FORMULATING A NEW TEST FOR “INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDERS” AND SECTION 230 IMMUNITY

This Part articulates a new test for CDA immunity, arguing that websites should only lose immunity when they take a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content. Section A focuses on a textual analysis of the CDA, including the findings, policies, and definitions that support a new test. Section B revisits the “material contribution” test, established in the 2008 U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision in *Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC*, argues that courts should use a requirement test if they are to use this framework, and then applies this test to StubHub’s practices. Section C explains why the *Roommates.com* test should be abandoned. Section D proposes a new, clearer test and applies it to StubHub’s practices.

A. The Plain Language of Section 230 of the CDA Supports Broad Immunity

In its findings and policy in the text of the CDA, Congress explicitly recognized the Internet’s increasingly important role in our society. The Internet increases the flow of information between its users and has allowed people to create communicative forums with user control. In order to promote and preserve these benefits, Congress called for minimum government regulation. Otherwise, when faced with liability and high monitoring costs, websites would simply limit user content at the outset, chilling speech. Therefore, Congress severely limited website liability for its users’ content. CDA immunity is not, however, absolute. A website will not be immune when it is actually an “information content provider” itself, meaning that it is responsible for “in whole or

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173 *See infra* notes 204–225 and accompanying text.
174 *See infra* notes 226–238 and accompanying text.
175 *See infra* notes 239–256 and accompanying text.
177 *See* 47 U.S.C. § 230(a).
178 *See id.* Section 230(a) states:

> The Congress finds the following: (1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens. (2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.

*Id.*

179 *See Zeran*, 129 F.3d at 330–31 (explaining that websites would not inquire into the merit of take-down notices, and simply remove content upon request, thus chilling speech).
180 *See* 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(c); *Zeran*, 129 F.3d at 330–31. The CDA has been interpreted to apply beyond just defamation cases. *See Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 31 P.3d 38, 41, 42 (2001) (holding that CDA immunity is not limited to tort claims and finding the defendant immune from a breach of contract claim).
181 *See* 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); *Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC*, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an interactive computer service loses immunity if it “materially contributes to the alleged unlawfulness” of the content).
in part . . . the creation or development” of information. Since the CDA’s enactment, courts have struggled to determine what the term “development means in this context. On the one hand it can mean “to make something new,” or more broadly it can mean “to make something available.” In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit looked towards Wikipedia for the definition of “web development,” finding it most relevant to the context of the CDA. But, courts should not rely on this definition of web development because this definition encompasses traditional publisher duties that are explicitly protected by the CDA, such as “gathering, organizing and editing information.”

Because “development” can be stretched in different ways, the term should be interpreted in accordance with legislative intent. The statute’s explicit findings and policy clearly show that Congress intended to immunize websites from liability. Strictly interpreting the term “development” in line with Congress’s intent leads to website immunity unless the website actually

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182 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162–63 (explaining how a website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider).

183 See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558–60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the vast majority of courts interpreting the CDA have held in favor of immunity); Doty, supra note 16, at 128 (noting that the majority of litigation around CDA immunity is about when an interactive computer service is also an information content provider so as to be responsible for the information). Unlike the clear findings and policy of Congress, the definition of “information content provider” is vague. See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. 2011); Doty supra note 16, at 126 (noting that the bulk of litigation concerns what constitutes “development” of information by an interactive computer service). In tackling the definition of “development” in part, some courts have looked towards the dictionary definition. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197–99 (10th Cir. 2009); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69 (looking to Wikipedia for the definition of “web development”). Yet the dictionary does not provide a consensus because “development” has many meanings. See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197–98 (construing two dictionary definitions of “develop”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69 (disagreeing with the dissent on the correct definition for “develop”).

184 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69.

185 See id.

186 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180, 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority’s definition of “web development” encompasses the type of functions that are explicitly associated with interactive computer services and protected under the statute); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (stating that claims attempting to hold websites liable for traditional publisher functions are meritless). These traditional publisher functions include analyzing, reorganizing, and filtering data. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168–69; id. at 1180, 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting).

187 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174; id. at 1882, 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining the majority’s definition is inventive and without relation to the statute); Village Voice, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (noting that Congress left no doubt in the policy behind CDA immunity).

188 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (explaining Congress’s policy to preserve and promote the growth of the Internet); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–32 (describing the congressional intent behind the CDA); Village Voice, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (following Congress’s explicit policy goals set forth in the CDA).
provides the content itself. But because the statute also included the terms “responsible” for, and “creation,” it would be redundant to interpret “development” to mean “to make something new.” Therefore, courts should interpret “development” to mean “require,” for such a definition ensures that the term “create” retains meaning while also providing broad immunity and protecting e-commerce growth.

Largely overlooked, the plain language of the CDA provides further insight into what types of activities should be immunized. The CDA definition of “interactive computer service” incorporates the term “access software provider.” The term “access software provider” is separately defined and includes any website that utilizes tools that “filter . . . analyze . . . digest . . . [or] reorganize” content. These actions are thus functions of an interactive computer service and are protected by the CDA. Under the plain language of the CDA, any attempt to assign liability for filtering or reorganizing data is misplaced.

As the central function of marketplaces is to reorganize user data, CDA immunity should extend to StubHub, Uber, Airbnb, and all marketplaces in line with a proper interpretation of the Act’s plain language. StubHub’s pric-
ing recommendation tool compiles historical sales data, showing the low, average, and high prices for similar tickets. According to the CDA, reorganizing user data is not “developing” the information in part, but rather a protected action of an “interactive computer service.”

Finally, in order to further Congress’s policy goals, StubHub and other peer-to-peer marketplaces should be protected under the CDA. Congress sought to encourage the growth of the Internet through unfettered speech and limited liability. Placing liability on these marketplaces imposes exorbitant monitoring costs and defeats the purpose of an interactive middleman service. Without CDA immunity, flourishing companies that offer tremendous value to customers and the economy may not exist as they currently do.

**B. Moving On: Deconstructing the Roommates.com Test to Eliminate Ambiguity**

Despite the shortcomings of the Roommates.com “material contribution” test, many courts rely on it to determine when a website “develops” infor-
information “in part,” losing immunity. Courts diverge, however, as to whether encouragement of information or requirement of information precludes immunity. In order to provide predictability for websites going forward, courts must reach consistent judgments on CDA immunity. This section argues that if courts are to use the Roommates.com “material contribution” test, they should use a requirement approach. This section then applies this approach to StubHub’s practices.

The Roommates.com “material contribution” test should be interpreted to mean that a website loses immunity if it requires unlawful content as opposed to encouraging or having knowledge of content. Despite its sporadic references to a broader standard, the majority in Roommates.com based its holding on the fact that Roommates.com required unlawful content as a condition of service. The holding was a direct response to the thrust of the Fair Housing Council’s claims, that Roommates.com is not immune for requiring its users to violate the law.

If courts continue to use the Roommates.com test, they should discard immunity only when a website requires content because this approach strikes the right balance between protecting innovation and limiting CDA immunity when the website is truly responsible for the content. Although the CDA should not overly protect invasive and abusive uses of the Internet, such as revenge pornography and cyberbullying, there are other laws in place that pro-

\[204\] See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 412–14 (explaining that the district court’s encouragement would be more broad than any previous decision); Doty, supra note 16, at 131, 136 (explaining the different routes courts have gone in interpreting the Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46.

\[205\] Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–78 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (stating that websites will be unsure of whether their actions are protected by the CDA); Doty, supra note 16, at 126–27 (describing how courts have taken different approaches in interpreting the Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46.

\[206\] See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–78 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting the unpredictability left as to whether an interactive service provider is immune under the CDA or not); Goldman, supra note 124 (noting the undesirable effect of split decisions on immunity); Doty, supra note 16, at 126, 30–31 (detailing two ways to interpret the Roommates.com test); Dyer, supra note 16, at 845–46.

\[207\] See infra notes 209–219 and accompanying text.

\[208\] See infra notes 220–225 and accompanying text.

\[209\] See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that a requirement test correctly illustrates what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (distinguishing the Roommates.com case because the website did not require information to be posted); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 559, 561 (holding a website loses immunity when they “ensure the creation” of the content).

\[210\] See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (agreeing with the plaintiff’s claim that requiring users to disclose sexual orientation makes Roommates.com an information content provider).

\[211\] See id.

\[212\] See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (relying on the fact that Roommates.com required responses to its questionnaire as central to the court’s holding); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (distinguishing Consumersaffairs.com from Roommates.com because Consumersaffairs.com did not require information to be posted); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1019).
vide legal remedies to such victims.\textsuperscript{213} Moreover, because the CDA exempts from its reach any criminal law claim or intellectual property claim, a website cannot assert the CDA as an affirmative defense when met with claims of these types.\textsuperscript{214} Additionally, CDA immunity is strictly about vicarious liability; the victim still has the opportunity to seek recourse against the user who violated the law.\textsuperscript{215} If a website requires illegal conduct, it will be responsible through vicarious liability, but any more relaxed standard potentially chills innovation and free speech.\textsuperscript{216}

An encouragement or inducement standard can always be manipulated to impose liability on a website for having some influence on a user’s content.\textsuperscript{217} This “but-for” analysis will cause websites and their users to be “joined at the hip” for legal liability.\textsuperscript{218} Instead, courts should discard CDA immunity only if the website requires the content.\textsuperscript{219}

Applying this interpretation of the \textit{Roommates.com} holding, StubHub should retain immunity under the CDA because it does not require users to post illegal content.\textsuperscript{220} StubHub’s LargeSellers program involving fee waivers

\textsuperscript{213} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (excluding criminal and copyright law from the CDA’s coverage); Franks, supra note 107 (noting the availability of criminal law and copyright law); Mullin, supra note 107 (noting the availability of copyright law).

\textsuperscript{214} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (exempting from the Act’s coverage criminal and copyright law); Franks, supra note 107 (describing how plaintiffs can pursue claims through criminal and copyright law); Mullin, supra note 107 (noting the possibility of pursuing a copyright law claim).

\textsuperscript{215} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (providing no immunity for an information content provider); Franks, supra note 107 (explaining that the CDA provides no immunity for an information content provider).

\textsuperscript{216} See \textit{Dirty World}, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates what was at issue for Roommates.com); \textit{Nemet}, 591 F.3d at 257 (discussing how the fact that the Rommates.com questionnaire was a required condition of service was essential to Roommates.com being found liable); \textit{Roommates.com}, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining Congress’s choice to provide broad immunity); \textit{Hill}, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting \textit{Shiamilli}, 952 N.E.2d at 1019); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–25 (arguing that an encouragement test chills e-commerce growth).

\textsuperscript{217} See \textit{Roommates.com}, 521 F.3d at 1174 (noting that close cases must be resolved in favor of immunity because a clever lawyer could argue that just about anything encouraged illegal conduct); \textit{id.} at 1183 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s definition of ‘development’ would transform every interactive site into an information content provider and the result would render illusory any immunity under § 230(c).”).

\textsuperscript{218} Id. at 1176–77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (arguing that an encouragement test is similar to a “but-for” analysis because a lawyer could always argue that something the website did influenced the third-party content).

\textsuperscript{219} See \textit{Dirty World}, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates what was at issue for Roommates.com); \textit{Nemet}, 591 F.3d at 257 (holding that Consumeraffairs.com did not require information, and is thus immune under the CDA); \textit{Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc.}, 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (discarding CDA immunity because defendant took clear act in establishing contract with third-party); \textit{Hill}, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (holding a website loses immunity when they “ensure the creation” of the content); \textit{Doty}, supra note 16, at 141 (noting most courts only discard immunity when the website explicitly requests the content in question).

\textsuperscript{220} See \textit{Hill}, 727 S.E.2d at 558. Additionally, the court in \textit{NPS} held that the masking ability given to LargeSellers was not sufficient to succeed on a common law misrepresentation claim because the
and location masking is not a requirement as a condition of service.\textsuperscript{221} Whereas the Roommates.com discriminatory questionnaire and answers automatically violated the FHA, StubHub’s users can still price their tickets under face value if they choose.\textsuperscript{222} StubHub’s suggested pricing tool is based on market prices, not face value prices, and ultimately allows sellers to enter any price they wish.\textsuperscript{223} Additionally, the CDA definition of a protected “interactive computer service” includes any tools that “filter . . . analyze . . . [or] organize” content.\textsuperscript{224} Thus, StubHub’s display of its user data into a market-based pricing tool is explicitly protected.\textsuperscript{225}

\textbf{C. Ejected: Why the \textit{Roommates.com} “Material Contribution” Test Should Be Abandoned}

The \textit{Roommates.com} test may be the most commonly used approach to determining CDA immunity, but it is fundamentally flawed and should be abandoned.\textsuperscript{226} Focusing on the alleged unlawfulness when determining CDA

seller did not mask any information from the buyer, just the Patriots. NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 25 Mass. L. Rptr. 478, 482 (Super. Ct. 2009).

\textsuperscript{221} See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 483 (holding that StubHub simply encourages LargeSellers to buy tickets with fee waivers).

\textsuperscript{222} See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558, 560 (distinguishing the facts from \textit{Roommates.com} because Roommates.com required certain content); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 4–5 (noting that StubHub simply aggregates market prices based on supply and demand).

\textsuperscript{223} See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558, 560 (noting that StubHub does not require users to input certain content, whereas Roommates.com does); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 4–5 (noting that StubHub just complies data, leaving the user the choice of which price to enter).

\textsuperscript{224} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); \textit{Roommates.com}, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that the actions taken by Roommates.com are explicitly protected under the CDA).

\textsuperscript{225} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4); \textit{Roommates.com}, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the CDA’s definition of “access software provider” explicitly protects the actions for which Roommates.com was held liable); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 28 (noting that StubHub only reorganizes user data). Even against a broader encouragement or inducement test, StubHub’s practices simply encourage market-based pricing, not necessarily in violation of scalping laws. See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 244; Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 4–5 (arguing that even applying an encouragement test, StubHub simply encourages market prices); Rovell, supra note 6; Rubin, supra note 12; Sloane, supra note 12 (noting the availability of Yankees tickets on StubHub below face value). For many markets, StubHub’s market-based pricing offers prices far below face value and thus not in violation of scalping laws. See Rovell, supra note 6; Rubin, supra note 12; Sloane, supra note 12; Tuttle, supra note 112 (noting that Miami Marlins tickets on StubHub sell for far less than from the team). Although StubHub’s omission of face value price and price-dependent revenue model could indicate willful blindness, Congress enacted the CDA to provide immunity stemming from even actual knowledge of unlawful content. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332–33 (rejecting liability upon notice because of the exorbitant monitoring costs Congress intended to remove); Doty, supra note 16, at 137–38 (explaining that holding interactive service providers liable for willful blindness is a departure from previous holdings).

\textsuperscript{226} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating Congress’s policy to promote the growth of the internet and limit government intervention); \textit{Roommates.com}, 521 F.3d at 1174 (holding “close cases . . . must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or en-
immunity is the wrong inquiry. \(^{227}\) Determining whether a website has “materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness” requires an analysis into the cause of action. \(^{228}\) Yet, the CDA simply focuses on information and whether that information can be attributed to the website, regardless of its alleged unlawfulness. \(^{229}\) Determining immunity by whether a website has “materially contributed” to the unlawfulness collapses two distinct questions of information development and substantive liability. \(^{230}\) At the motion to dismiss stage, unlawfulness has not yet been determined. \(^{231}\)

A new test for immunity should focus solely on how a website contributes to the information of a third party, regardless of the content’s alleged unlawfulness. \(^{232}\) The CDA says nothing about alleged unlawfulness, but simply focuses on whether the information in question can be attributed to the website. \(^{233}\) The ineffectiveness of the Roommates.com test’s focus on alleged unlawfulness can be highlighted by a simple example. \(^{234}\) If a website requires a user to post harmless information, like what the weather is like outside, it is immune. \(^{235}\) But, if a website requires a user to answer discriminatory questions

\(^{227}\) See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority combines the immunity analysis with substantive legal analysis).

\(^{228}\) See id.

\(^{229}\) See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b), (f) (lacking any discussion of alleged unlawfulness); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting the CDA says nothing about alleged unlawfulness).

\(^{230}\) See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1183 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (describing these two questions as “analytically independent”); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (explaining that the CDA prohibits courts from welcoming claims that attempt to place liability on an interactive service provider for traditional publisher functions).

\(^{231}\) See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the issue of immunity for content and substantive liability for that content are two separate issues).

\(^{232}\) See id. (explaining that there is no basis for focusing on the illegality of the content when determining whether an interactive computer service has contributed to that information in part); see also Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 416 (holding that although the plaintiff is responsible for the content he writes or requires, that content is not alleged to be defamatory).

\(^{233}\) See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b), (f) (lacking any discussion of alleged unlawfulness); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that whether the information in question is illegal bears no influence in CDA analysis).

\(^{234}\) See infra notes 235–238 and accompanying text.

\(^{235}\) See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (interpreting Roommates.com as holding the website liable because it required unlawful content); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167–68 (holding that a website loses immunity if it materially contributes to the content’s alleged unlawfulness).
violating the FHA, it is not immune.236 In either scenario, the website has “de-
veloped” the information “in part” by requiring that information and thus fits
the definition of an “information content provider,” but only one of the web-
sites is immune.237 CDA immunity should not depend on the alleged unlawfulness
of the information, but should instead be based on whether the website is an “information content provider,” as the statute clearly sets out.238

D. A Clear Act Guaranteeing the Production of the Content

A new test is needed to eliminate the ambiguity left by the Roommates.com “material contribution” test.239 A website should lose CDA immuni-
ty only when it takes a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content.240
This proposed test cements Congress’s policy to protect free-flowing infor-
mation and Internet growth while also discarding website immunity when the
website is truly responsible for the content.241 If a website writes the content

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236 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169–70 (holding Roommates.com liable for requiring users
to answer discriminatory questions in violation of the FHA); see also Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (ex-
plaining the holding of Roommates.com and noting that the website was not immune because it re-
quired users to input illegal information).

237 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 410 (arguing that the fact that Roommates.com required infor-
mation was most fatal in its losing immunity); Nemet, 591 F.3d. at 257–58 (interpreting Room-
mates.com as holding the website liable because it required unlawful content); Roommates.com, 521
F.3d at 1167–68 (holding that a website loses immunity if it materially contributes to the content’s
alleged unlawfulness).

238 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b), (f) (omitting any consideration of unlawfulness in Congress’s
framework for immunity); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1177–78, 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting)
(,arguing that immunity should depend solely on the degree of contribution to the information, regard-
less of its alleged unlawfulness).

239 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating the policy of Congress to promote the growth of the Inter-
net); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1176–78 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (stating “interactive service
providers are left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity ends and liability begins”);
Goldman, supra note 124 (noting the risk that a lack of immunity poses for e-commerce); Doty, supra
note 16, at 126, 30–31 (stating that “the case law seems to reflect two different approaches to defining

240 See Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that an encouragement test incorrectly illustrates
what was at issue for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (distinguishing the case at hand from the
Roommates.com case because Consumeraffairs.com did not require information to be posted);
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 52–53 (ex-
plaining Congress’s choice to provide broad immunity); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting Shiamilli,
952 N.E.2d at 1019); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–25 (arguing that an encouragement
test chills e-commerce growth).

241 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b) (stating Congress’s policy to minimize government intervention);
Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (noting that a requirement test correctly illustrates what was at issue
for Roommates.com); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (holding that Consumeraffairs.com is immune under the
Roommates.com test); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Drudge, 992
F. Supp. at 52–53 (explaining Congress’s choice to provide broad immunity); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561
(quoting Shiamilli, 952 N.E.2d at 1019); Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–25 (asserting that an
encouragement test threatens innovation in e-commerce).
itself, it is responsible for the “creation” of that content.242 If a website takes some other clear act guaranteeing the production of content, it directly causes that content and is responsible for the “development” of that content.243

Interpreting “development” to mean “a clear act guaranteeing its production” more clearly delineates between immunity and liability.244 Examples of clear acts guaranteeing the production of content include requiring content, but also sponsoring it, paying for it, or mandating it through a user agreement.245 When a website commits a clear act of this kind it loses its immunity because Congress enacted the CDA to protect websites from third-party liability, not from a website’s own conduct.246 By discarding CDA immunity for certain acts beyond just requiring content, this test strikes a balance for those concerned with privacy and harassment.247 Conversely, this test protects the plain language definition of “access software provider” because filtering or reorganizing data does not guarantee the creation of user content.248 Finally, this test

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242 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (holding Roommates.com liable for the content of its questions because it undoubtedly created the content); Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“While an overt act of creation of content is easy to identify, determining what makes a party responsible for the ‘development’ of content under § 230(f)(3) is unclear.”).

243 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); Dirty World, 755 F.3d at 414–15 (refusing to adopt an encouragement standard); Nemet, 591 F.3d at 257 (upholding CDA immunity); Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (opining that Accusearch should simply be held liable for its conduct); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1185 (McKeown, J., dissenting); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (holding a website is responsible for information if it “control[s]” or “ensure[s]” the creation of content).

244 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1187 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting the vagueness of the majority’s test for immunity).

245 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (opining that Accusearch should simply be held liable for its conduct in acquiring the information at hand); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107 (holding defendant liable as a promisor); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (holding Roommates.com liable for requiring unlawful answers). For example, under this proposed test, AOL would be responsible for the content in the “Drudge Report” because of its act of directly paying for the content. See Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 47, 51. Imposing liability for directly paying for content helps achieve a balance between free speech and being overprotective of speech that raises privacy concerns. See Franks, supra note 107 (voicing concerns about overprotection of CDA immunity for online abuse); Bolson, supra note 107 (voicing concerns about overprotection of CDA immunity for privacy).

246 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (distinguishing between the acts that the website took from their development of the content); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107 (holding defendant liable as a promisor); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 (holding Roommates.com liable for requiring unlawful answers).

247 See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1204 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (arguing that Accusearch should simply be held liable for its conduct); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107 (holding defendant liable in its actions as promisor, distinct from its development of content under traditional CDA analysis); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1664 (holding Roommates.com liable for information that it required its users to provide as a condition of service).

248 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), (f)(4) (including “access software provider” within the definition of “information content provider”); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that these actions are explicitly within the domain of information content provider and thus
continues to disregard knowledge as a factor because the CDA was intended to remove the monitoring costs stemming from liability upon knowledge.  

Under this test, a marketplace like StubHub will unambiguously be protected under the CDA because it does not commit a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content.  

StubHub does not require the price to be above face value or pay users to post prices above face value, nor does it mandate it through its user agreement.  

StubHub’s LargeSellers program involving fee waivers and location masking is optional, and does not guarantee a user will price above face value.  

StubHub’s reorganization of its users’ data is explicitly protected under the CDA.  

Any knowledge of a user’s scalping violation is irrelevant under CDA analysis because it imposes exorbitant monitoring costs, contrary to Congress’s intent.  

This test strikes the right balance between protecting innovation and limiting CDA immunity when the website is truly responsible for the content.  

CDA jurisprudence is predictable for most interactive computer services, yet it must be predictable for peer-to-peer marketplaces as well to protect growth and innovation.
CONCLUSION

Immunity under the Communications Decency Act should be applied broadly, supporting Congress’s intent to limit government intervention and foster the growth of the Internet. Although this generally has been the case, the vagueness of the Roommates.com holding leaves the door open for rogue decisions and a denial of immunity for StubHub and other peer-to-peer marketplaces. In the least, courts should interpret Roommates.com to mean a website loses immunity when it requires the content in question. To eliminate this ambiguity, Courts should adopt a new test that a website only loses CDA immunity when it takes a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content. Like the requirement test, this test provides predictability for websites claiming CDA immunity. Conversely, this test does not protect websites who pay for content or take other clear acts guaranteeing content, and thus strikes a balance for those concerned with the potential reach of CDA immunity. An unambiguous test that grants broad immunity is necessary for the growth of StubHub and other peer-to-peer marketplaces.

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Schruers, Symposium, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 301 (2002) (noting the general predictability of CDA application). Despite the general predictability for most websites, there is still uncertainty on its application to marketplaces. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 160, at 23–25 (arguing that an encouragement test chills e-commerce growth); Goldman, supra note 124 (opining that all marketplaces who encourage equilibrium market places could be liable under the NPS encouragement test); Geron, supra note 167 (describing the extreme growth of the sharing economy); Miller, supra note 165 (detailing the dependence of Uber and Airbnb on CDA immunity).