The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has interpreted section 113(f)(3)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and Liability Act, or CERCLA, to only allow a party to seek contribution for claims resolved under CERCLA itself, rather than claims resolved under a state statute. In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit broke from Second Circuit precedent by holding that section 113(f)(3)(B) does not require a settlement under CERCLA to permit a contribution action pursuant to CERCLA. This Comment argues that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B) is a more accurate reading of the plain language of the statute, a better interpretation of the legislative history of the contribution provision, and more consistent with the policy goals of the CERCLA regime than the interpretation put forth by the Second Circuit.
Sarah M. Gordon,
Positive Contribution: Why the Second Circuit’s Understanding of CERCLA § 113 Should Make Way for the Third Circuit’s Pro-Settlement Holding in Trinity Industries,
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev.
E. Supp. 41