Document Type



The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 in 1999 in response to rising apprehension of a surge of terrorist activity within Afghan territory. Notably, the Sanctions Committee charged with enforcing the Resolution provisions did not impose asset freezes, arms prohibitions, or travel bans on entire nations suspected of supporting the Taliban. The 1267 regime instead subjected individuals and entities to these sanctions. Based on information provided by U.N. member states, such targets found themselves on the Security Council’s terrorist “blacklist,” known as the Consolidated List. The targets were neither warned of this listing nor afforded a method by which they could effectively appeal their inclusion. This Article discusses the due process concerns inherent to the 1267 regime, which have been increasingly emphasized at both the regional and national court levels, leading to invalidation of some regulations implementing the regime. It then evaluates alternative solutions to the procedural status quo against a proposed set of criteria, ultimately advocating for an independent tribunal capable of hearing complaints from targets and issuing binding delisting decisions.