Critical Legal Scholars argue that judges are unable to make truly objective decisions. This view gained strength in 2000 in Bush v. Gore, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the presidential election largely along partisan lines. This Note, however, argues that Critical Legal Scholars fail to provide positive, constructive answers to the problems of objective decision making. Alternatively, the Note examines these problems through the philosophies of Bernard Lonergan and Ronald Dworkin. The Note explains both philosophers' approaches to objective decision making, then examines those approaches in the context of Bush v. Gore. The Note concludes that Lonergan's philosophy, though not designed specifically for legal thinking, provides the stronger means for understanding and achieving objective judicial decision making.
Robert Hanson, Objective Decision Making in Lonergan and Dworkin, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 825 (2003), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol44/iss3/4