Since the 1990s, “vulture” hedge funds have made fabulous returns by pursuing a controversial strategy: buying bonds issued by countries in or near default and then suing those countries for full repayment. Vulture funds’ investments have resulted in chaotic, drawn-out default episodes and an enormous redistribution of wealth from developing countries to billionaire investors. Despite the real benefits vultures provide to the secondary market for sovereign debt, something must be done to dull their talons. Lamentably, however, no viable solution currently exists. This Note argues that a nonprofit fund designed to compete with vultures could at least mitigate harm to developing nations during the next wave of defaults.
Daniel J. Brutti, Sovereign Debt Crises and Vulture Hedge Funds: Issues and Policy Solutions, 61 B.C. L. Rev. 1819 (2020), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol61/iss5/5