Double Standards: An Empirical Study of Patent and Trademark Discipline

Jon J. Lee
University of Minnesota Law School, jonlee@umn.edu

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DOUBLE STANDARDS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PATENT AND TRADEMARK DISCIPLINE

JON J. LEE

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JON J. LEE*

Abstract: Our legal system is built on the foundation that lawyers have a number of coexisting and sometimes conflicting duties—to their clients, to others who might be affected by their practice, and to the effective and equitable administration of justice. Although most lawyers fulfill these duties ethically, invariably some fail to live up to these expectations. For this reason, all states have created disciplinary authorities to regulate and sanction lawyer misconduct. Interestingly, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is one of the few agencies to have developed its own disciplinary system for policing the conduct of those who practice before it. The USPTO’s need to regulate the conduct of trademark attorneys and patent practitioners is largely due to the critical role that these professionals play in the provision of intellectual property rights. Yet the existence of this analogous disciplinary system is little more than window dressing if the USPTO does not leverage its authority to ensure that those it regulates conform their conduct to the ethical standards of the profession. Through innovative empirical methods marshalling data over sixteen years from disciplinary authorities throughout the country, this Article shows that the USPTO is not only failing to discipline bad actors with regularity, but also overlooking the types of misconduct that threaten to undercut the provision of intellectual property rights that are in the public interest.

INTRODUCTION

Intellectual property is often one of the most valuable—and hotly contested—assets of a corporation.1 A utility patent provides its holder with twenty

© 2020, Jon J. (McClanahan) Lee. All rights reserved.
* Jon J. (McClanahan) Lee is a Professor of Practice at the University of Minnesota Law School. The author wishes to thank Tom Cotter, Deborah Gerhardt, Garry Jenkins, Bert Kritzer, Bill McGeveran, Chrystal Tomblyn, and the participants at the 19th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at DePaul University College of Law.
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years of exclusive use over the patented invention, during which time the holder can choose to sell the invention itself or license the right to make use of the invention to others for a sizeable fee. For example, Lipitor, the cholesterol-lowering drug, generated approximately $130 billion for Pfizer just during the fourteen years it was sold under patent protection. Following expiration, its sales dipped from more than $10 billion annually to just over $2 billion—a dramatic hit to be sure, but still likely allowing Pfizer to benefit from the consumer recognition of its established brand.

Though “patent wars” may grab headlines in the popular media, trademarks arguably have even greater influence because they may exist in perpetuity and are ubiquitous in their reach across industries and sectors. At the 141st Annual Meeting of the International Trademark Association in 2019, Andrei Iancu, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Director, touted the power of trademark protection in building a brand, noting that “trademark applicants have, on average, 34% higher employment and 24% greater revenue in the period following first filing, compared to a control group of non-filers.”

Indeed, a 2011 study found that Google’s trademark was worth an estimated
$44.3 billion, just inching out Microsoft’s trademark that was estimated to be worth $42.8 billion.9

But there exists an even broader perspective on the reach of intellectual property, one that extends beyond the immediate profit potential for those who hold its rights.10 Scholars long have advanced the argument that intellectual property rights may themselves serve as conduits to advancing public interests.11 Under this theory, patents are awarded to inventors so that inventors will share their inventions with others—thereby benefitting the public interest.12 Trademarks are valuable because they provide consumers a “shortcut to finding the products they desire,” while the federal registration system simultaneously provides protection for businesses that wish to carve out a space for themselves in the marketplace.13 Although this theory is not without criticisms,14 the USPTO itself has repeatedly posited that all of its decisions affect the public interest.15

At the same time, the implications for under-regulation of intellectual property rights may be far-reaching. On the heels of the catastrophic implosion of Theranos, the infamous health company that falsely claimed to have developed revolutionary blood tests, the media called out the USPTO for its role in granting Elizabeth Holmes the credibility she needed to attract investors and business partners through the issuance of several patents.16 Even after the details of the Theranos scam came to light, the USPTO issued the already-defunct company five additional patents.17 On the trademark side, recently


10 Because copyright law falls under a different regulatory mechanism than the USPTO and does not have a disciplinary arm, it is omitted from this Article.


12 Tushnet, supra note 11, at 96.

13 Id. at 103.

14 See id. at 103–04 (identifying arguments to the contrary).


there has been a dramatic increase in the number of reported fraudulent trademark applications from China, a country from which one-ninth of U.S. trademark applications originate.\(^{18}\) Addressing this phenomenon, Director Iancu noted that without an accurate register, businesses cannot reliably use the register to determine whether marks would be available for protection. This uncertainty could in turn lead businesses to alter their strategies and increase costs.\(^{19}\)

The USPTO is the federal agency charged with ensuring the accurate issuance of U.S. patents and the federal registration of trademarks. In many ways, the patent and trademark functions at the USPTO are entirely separate—each has its own office that is responsible for examining applications, and each has a separate board that hears appeals and other challenges.\(^{20}\) That distinction is not surprising, however, given the significant differences between the two species of intellectual property in terms of the relevant legal doctrines, procedural requirements, and subject matter expertise involved.\(^{21}\) But when it comes to the regulation of practitioners who are authorized to practice before the USPTO, both fall under the purview of the USPTO’s Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED), which is part of the Office of General Counsel.\(^{22}\)

It is this latter commonality that presents an opportunity to examine the current state of professional discipline across patent and trademark practice, along with a potential mechanism for comprehensive reform. On account of the technical and legal expertise required in order to successively navigate the respective application processes, patent and trademark applicants alike routinely rely on specialized practitioners to prosecute their applications.\(^{23}\) All practitioners—whether patent agents, patent attorneys, or trademark attorneys—are subject to identical USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct (USPTO Rules) that require them to conform their practices to the ethical standards contained therein.\(^{24}\) Even though there are some differences between the OED and other

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19 Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association, supra note 8.


21 See discussion infra Part I.


23 See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B.

disciplinary authorities, the USPTO’s disciplinary process is styled after the ABA Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement and its rules are largely modeled after the ABA Model Rules for Professional Conduct (ABA Rules).

So, the question arises: how does the OED compare to other state disciplinary authorities in its imposition of discipline on patent and trademark practitioners, given the unique functions of the USPTO and its corresponding concerns for those who practice before it? Surprisingly, there have been no in-depth longitudinal empirical studies of professional discipline in the scholarly literature—much less any that have touched on USPTO discipline. This Article begins to fill that gap. It provides a comprehensive analysis of USPTO discipline spanning sixteen years (2003–2018) and crossing two sets of ethics codes, examines the disparities between patent and trademark discipline, and identifies the types of misconduct that are being regulated—or missed—by USPTO authorities. It then explicitly links these findings to the purposes of professional discipline and concludes with recommendations so that the USPTO can realign its disciplinary work in accordance with its private and public constituencies.

Part I describes the patent and trademark application processes, focusing on the duty of candor and the roles of the practitioner in maximizing the likelihood of success. Although theoretically litigants can navigate both systems pro se, the systems are designed for those who have the requisite subject matter and legal expertise. Indeed, the duty of candor requires the person filing the application to understand what information must be disclosed to the USPTO and how to respond to the inevitable USPTO inquiries and objections.

Part II outlines the regulation of USPTO practitioners, both with respect to the requirements for admission and disciplinary investigations. Although patent practitioners need not be licensed attorneys, all must satisfy a similar set of criteria to ensure they have the requisite competence and moral character associated with a person who is entrusted to be both a legal representative and a fiduciary. With the exception of reciprocal discipline, which merits special attention for USPTO practitioners, the USPTO’s disciplinary process bears

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25 See discussion infra Part II.C.
26 Compare 37 C.F.R. § 11.24 (outlining the OED’s process for imposing reciprocal discipline), with MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (providing for reciprocal discipline).
27 See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing and contrasting the USPTO Rules and ABA Rules).
28 See discussion infra Part I.
30 See discussion infra Part II.
resemblance to that of a state disciplinary authority in terms of the course of the proceedings and the possible sanctions that may be imposed.

Part III introduces the two sets of USPTO ethics codes in force at various points during the time period under examination.31 Although the USPTO Code of Professional Responsibility (1985–2013) was loosely modeled after the ABA Code of Professional Conduct, it also contained a number of specific provisions that were exclusive to USPTO practice. On the other hand, the USPTO Rules, adopted in 2013, largely mirror the ABA Rules. The differences between USPTO Rules and ABA Rules highlight the ways in which the USPTO purports to take candor seriously. The USPTO’s stance is arguably accounted for by its view that its decisions have an impact that extends beyond the immediate applicant, to competitors and ultimately to the public at large. This Part concludes with the first mapping between the various sets of ethics codes in order to facilitate a comprehensive analysis.

Part IV provides a theoretical framework for understanding practitioner discipline in the intellectual property context.32 Drawing on the work of several prominent ethics scholars,33 this Part explores the primary purposes of practitioner discipline and the role of sanctions in carrying out those purposes. It then focuses on the role of the USPTO as the regulator of the provision of valuable intellectual property rights, in order to further understand and prioritize among the various purposes that have been identified.

Part V presents the findings of a groundbreaking empirical study of all public discipline imposed by the USPTO between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2018.34 After describing the methodology used to compile the data, this Part focuses on the frequency and types of USPTO-imposed discipline, in comparison to its state disciplinary authority counterparts. It finds that the USPTO disciplinary rates, though increasing slightly over the sixteen-year period under study, lag far behind state disciplinary authorities. This Part then delves more deeply into patent and trademark practitioner discipline, finding that there are vast discrepancies between the two. Although it appears that the imposition of both patent and trademark discipline is primarily limited to the types of misconduct that are easily identified and ultimately have less impact on the public interest, patent practitioners are disciplined more frequently, more severely, and more publicly than their trademark counterparts. This Part also identifies and describes four commonly observed patterns of misconduct.

31 See discussion infra Part III.
32 See discussion infra Part IV.
34 See discussion infra Part V.
that trigger discipline across commonly cited and highly correlated ethics rules.

Finally, Part VI sets forth three recommendations for future legal and procedural reforms to improve the effectiveness of USPTO discipline in fulfilling its role. These recommendations include developing a trademark practitioner registration process to facilitate the monitoring of their work and communications; instituting a strategic practitioner audit program that includes extensive examiner input; and broadening the dissemination of information on USPTO discipline and expectations of its practitioners. Part VI concludes and offers thoughts on additional ways in which this empirical work can be leveraged and implemented.

I. PATENT AND TRADEMARK PROSECUTION

It is not easy to navigate the required steps to obtain a patent or register a trademark (collectively referred to as “prosecution”). Even if an application contains the required components, there are still many legal and procedural hurdles awaiting the unsuspecting inventor or brand manager. It is for that reason and others that the majority of applicants choose to leverage the expertise of a patent or trademark practitioner—which increases the likelihood that they will successfully receive federal protection of their intellectual property. This Part identifies the primary hurdles and describes the duty of candor that runs throughout all interactions with the USPTO during the application process and beyond.

A. Patent Application Process

To be granted a patent, which gives the patent holder the right to exclude others from practicing a patented invention, the patent claims must adequately notify the public of the invention’s scope. The patent statute requires that the invention consist of eligible subject matter that is sufficiently disclosed in the patent application. Additionally, the invention must be novel (i.e. not previously known or used by others), useful, and non-obvious to one who is

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35 See discussion infra Part VI.
36 See discussion infra Part I.A.
37 Cf. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding patent disclosing a process to make polyethylene terephthalate (PET) yarn, used as reinforcement for automobile tires, was indefinite and thus invalid).
38 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
39 See id. § 112(a)–(b) (describing the requirements for the specification of a patentable invention).
40 See id. § 102(a)(1) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the
skilled in the relevant field. If these criteria are met, a patent may be awarded to the applicant as long as other administrative requirements are satisfied.

Patent applications may be filed by mail or, more commonly, online. The application must include a written description and the claim(s) that describe the scope of the protection that will be afforded by the patent. In addition, the application must include the inventor’s name along with an oath or declaration that the inventor believes that he or she is the original inventor or joint inventor of a claimed invention contained in the application. Although not required at the time the application is filed, an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) must be submitted by the applicant in a timely fashion. The IDS must contain information about all known prior art, i.e. information that suggests that the invention may not be original, and other information that is material in determining patentability. Further discussion of this obligation, known as the duty of disclosure, will follow in the next Section.

The filing of the application is only the beginning of a lengthy and involved patent prosecution process. Once submitted to the USPTO, the application will be assigned to a patent examiner based on the technical field of the patent. The examiner will evaluate the application and issue one or more office actions containing grounds of objection or rejection. An applicant must

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41 Id. § 103. The statute notes:

A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.

Id.


44 Id. § 115.


46 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97–.98.


submit an acceptable, timely response or else the application will be deemed abandoned. An abandoned patent application can only be reinstated in limited circumstances; otherwise, the applicant may lose all claims to the now-disclosed invention.

Once a patent is granted, the holder receives exclusive rights to the disclosed invention for twenty years from the date of filing provided that maintenance fees are paid during the active patent life. If maintenance fees are not paid by the stated deadline, the granted patent will be deemed abandoned. Again, just as in the prosecution process, this determination is typically fatal to the patent, and the patent holder’s rights to the disclosed invention will most likely be lost.

A patent practitioner is key to successfully navigating the patent prosecution process and thereby protecting the value of an applicant’s invention. Patent applications not only must conform to the formal requirements and adequately disclose the invention with properly constructed claims, but there must also be persuasive responses to an examiner’s findings of obviousness or lack of novelty to avoid the final rejection of the application. Although there are a number of online resources that explain the process, these resources may provide a false sense of ability to navigate the process, proving to be a trap for one who is inexperienced in patent prosecution because the process in fact requires significant expertise.

The USPTO puts it best in its strong recommendation of securing patent representation: “Inventors may prepare their own applications and file them in the USPTO and conduct the proceedings themselves, but unless they are famil-

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49 37 C.F.R. § 1.134–.135.
50 Id. § 1.137; see Abandoned Applications, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/abandoned-applications [https://perma.cc/95ZM-Y67T] (describing abandonment and the revival process). Note that if the abandonment occurs before the USPTO publishes the pending application (generally eighteen months after filing), the invention may remain a trade secret. See 35 U.S.C. § 122.
52 See id. (“Maintenance fees are required to keep in force all utility and reissue utility patents . . . .”).
53 See id.
55 See How to Conduct a U.S. Patent Search: A Step-by-Step Strategy, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/video/cbt/ptrcsearching (providing a guide to conducting a patent search). The USPTO also has a Pro Se Assistance Program. See Pro Se Assistance Program, supra note 29 (providing some assistance to pro se applicants but recommending the use of registered patent practitioners).
iar with these matters or study them in detail, they may get into considerable difficulty.” It further warns that, even if a pro se applicant were to be successful, there is no guarantee that the patent obtained would actually cover the invention the applicant intended it to.

The USPTO’s stance on practitioner representation is in line with the available data on the subject. One frequently cited empirical study examining applications filed by pro se inventors versus their practitioner counterparts reported that 76% of pro se applications became abandoned, in comparison to only 35% of practitioner-represented applications. Among those that were successful in obtaining patents, the pro se claims were narrower—and thereby less valuable—than those claims that had practitioner representation. The researcher hypothesized that the observed differences were due to the typical pro se applicant’s lack of understanding of the formal filing requirements or the need for timely responses, as well as the apparent lack of desire to engage in a lengthy exchange with examiners.

Perhaps surprisingly, there is no precise way, based on the publicly available data, to determine the percentage of all patent applications that are filed with practitioner assistance. The USPTO, for its part, simply states that “most” inventors do so. One scholar, who thoroughly examined a large sample of patent applications from 2011, found that approximately 92% were represented by a patent practitioner. To check the accuracy of the 92% estimate, this study examined a complete patent application dataset from 2000 to 2018.

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57 Id.
60 See id.
61 The publicly available data on attorney docket number and customer number do not exactly track the frequency of practitioner filings. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
62 General Information Concerning Patents, supra note 56.
64 See Patent Examination Research Dataset, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://bulk.data.uspto.gov/data/patent/pair/economics/2017/ [https://perma.cc/3VKK-HZ2G] (containing data on all application filings). The USPTO has made much of its data available for researchers through the Bulk Data Storage System and is a fruitful source for future research. See generally Bulk Data Storage
focusing on the attorney docket number and customer number fields. The attorney docket number is a self-selected designation that patent prosecutors (most likely, practitioners) may use to track their applications. The customer number is another tracking mechanism, but it is issued by the USPTO and requires the prosecutor to take the additional step of completing a form. Over this time period, 96% of the applications contained an attorney docket number, whereas 87% included a customer number. These two values lend support to the 92% statistic, which will be used in Part V of this Article to estimate the percentage of applications that are filed by a patent practitioner.

B. Candor in Patent Prosecution

One of the most important roles of patent practitioners is to ensure that proper disclosures are made to the USPTO during the application process, or else they risk having the patent refused or later invalidated. Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, “[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability . . . .” Patent practitioners are included among those individuals to which this duty applies. The duty of disclosure rests on the principle that a patent “is affected [by the] public interest” and that “[t]he public interest is best served” when the USPTO knows all of the information material to patentability, including information that undercuts the applicant’s claim.  

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65 See Crouch, supra note 63.


69 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2019).

70 Id. § 1.56(e)(2).

71 Id. § 1.56(a).
This duty of disclosure is enforced in two ways. First, as described in Part III, the USPTO Rules mandate compliance with the duty of disclosure and subject non-compliant practitioners to discipline. Second, and arguably even more dramatic, patents in which there has been a violation of the duty of disclosure may be rendered unenforceable through application of the inequitable conduct doctrine. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2011, in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., somewhat circumscribed the scope of the inequitable conduct doctrine, it still retains vitality today.

In order to show inequitable conduct, a challenger must demonstrate both that the “applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the PTO,” and that the USPTO would not have “allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference,” applying a “but-for” standard for materiality of the non-disclosure. The materiality prong may also be satisfied, however, where there has been “egregious misconduct,” such as the filing of a clearly false affidavit. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has recently expanded its view of how intent may be shown, allowing an inference of intent based on “a pattern of lack of candor” such as repeated factual representations that turn out to be contrary to information in the declarant’s possession.

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72 See discussion infra Part III.
74 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). There have been several articles on the impact of Therasense, Inc. on findings of inequitable conduct. See generally Robert D. Swanson, Comment, The Exergen and Therasense Effects, 66 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2014) (adding data to the debate over Therasense, Inc.).
75 See, e.g., Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming the lower court finding of inequitable conduct on the part of Regeneron that rendered its patent unenforceable).
76 Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1287.
77 Id. at 1291; see Amy Semet, Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C. L. REV. 519, 524 (2019) (noting that inequitable conduct arises and a patent is found unenforceable when the patent prosecutor commits fraud in the patent prosecution process).
78 Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1292.
In addition to the duty of candor in patent prosecution, there are also obligations of candor and good faith in post-grant proceedings, similar to those codified in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 2016, these provisions were amended to add that filings must comply with 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b) that requires that the declarant certify the truth of all statements that are made within his or her own knowledge. The regulation further requires the declarant to certify, to the best of her knowledge, that there is evidentiary support, and that there is a bona fide legal basis for her arguments.

At the time of these amendments, some were concerned that the additional certifications went beyond those in the patent prosecution process and would lead to additional disciplinary proceedings against practitioners. In its response, the USPTO noted that there had not been many investigations prior to the amendment and that it “d[id] not expect this situation to occur.” Nevertheless, 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(d) explicitly provides that a practitioner who violates § 11.18 may face disciplinary action.

C. Trademark Application Process

A trademark may be registered either in a particular state or nationally through the USPTO. Although federal registration is not required to enforce a trademark through an infringement action—and indeed, trademarks may be enforced without being registered at all—Federal registration has several strategic advantages. First, it constitutes prima facie evidence that the mark is valid and owned by the registrant. Second, it allows a registrant to secure nationwide exclusive rights rather than just in those geographic locations where the mark is currently used. Third, it puts all others on notice of the regis-

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80 37 C.F.R. § 42.11 (2019); Dolak, supra note 68, at 3.
81 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b).
84 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(d).
86 Compare Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365, 369 (2d Cir. 1959) (denying injunctive relief after finding no likelihood of confusion but clarifying that “the plaintiff may later, upon a proper showing of an intent to use the mark at the retail level in defendant’s market area, be entitled to enjoin defendant’s use of the mark”), with United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101, 104 (1918) (estopping the plaintiff from seeking an injunction to prevent the defendant from continuing to use a similar mark in a geographic location where the plaintiff had no business).
trant’s claim of ownership of the mark.87 Trademark applications and registrations may be searched online through the USPTO website,88 and the existence of a registered mark can serve as an effective deterrent to organizations searching to create a distinctive brand.89

In comparison to patent prosecution, obtaining a federal registration appears to be a simple process. The application forms are available online and are expected to take less than an hour to complete.90 The application requests information on the owner of the proposed mark, identification of the goods or services the applicant uses or intends to use in connection with the mark, the date on which the mark was first used in interstate commerce, and whether an attorney is filing the application.91 A specimen illustrating the mark as used must also be submitted prior to registration, either with the application (if claiming that it is currently being used in commerce) or after publication (if claiming an intent to use the mark in commerce).92

After a trademark application is submitted, there are two barriers to registration. First, the USPTO will assign an examining attorney to review the application and potentially refuse registration.93 The most common grounds for refusal are likelihood of confusion (that consumers may confuse the proposed mark with another business)94 and descriptiveness (that consumers do not view the symbol as a distinctive mark).95 If the examining attorney finds a defect in

87 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (“[T]he filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration . . . .”).
89 Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 58, at 587.
92 Id.
94 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (providing that a mark may not be registered if it “so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”).
95 See id. § 1052(e)–(f) (providing that a mark may not be registered if the mark “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive” or “is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of [the applicant’s goods]” unless the mark “has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce”).
the trademark application or otherwise believes that it may not be suitable for registration, the examiner may issue an office action identifying the problem.96 In response, the applicant—or more often, the attorney on behalf of the applicant—may amend the application to fix the defect or submit additional materials to demonstrate that it should register. If the examining attorney approves the application, the mark is published in the Official Gazette, a USPTO weekly publication.97

After publication, third-parties who believe they have legal grounds to oppose the registration have thirty days to prevent the impending registration by filing an opposition proceeding.98 If no opposition is filed, or if there is an opposition and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) sides with the applicant, the application will proceed to the next step in the process. Marks already being used in commerce will be placed on the Principal Register immediately, whereas those filed on an intent to use basis will register once the applicant provides evidence that he or she has begun using the mark in commerce.99

Although the trademark registration process may be accomplished without legal counsel, over three-quarters of all applications are prosecuted by attorneys.100 Moreover, having a trademark attorney is correlated with higher rates of publication and registration success. A comprehensive empirical study on trademark applications found that trademark applicants were 37% more likely to succeed in publication and 43% more likely to succeed in registration than their pro se counterparts.101 Among trademark attorneys, experience prosecuting trademark applications was correlated with even higher success rates—a significant finding given that those attorneys likely take on more challenging cases.102

There are a number of reasons posited for the higher trademark attorney success rates. First, attorneys have a greater understanding of the underlying trademark doctrine and can draft responses to avoid legal landmines.103 Second, they may be less conflict-averse than their pro se counterparts, choosing to respond to an examining attorney’s objection rather than abandoning the application at the first sign of trouble.104 Third, their higher success rates might reflect selectivity in which applications to prosecute, as they may be counsel-

97 Id.
99 Id. § 1051.
100 See Gerhardt & McClanahan, supra note 58, at 600.
101 Id. at 607–08.
102 Id. at 611, 617.
103 Id. at 597, 617.
104 See id. at 617–18.
ing their clients at the outset that they will be unable to register a descriptive mark and thus should avoid the time and expense related to filing.\textsuperscript{105}

The USPTO, for its part, has gone back and forth on the degree to which it encourages pro se applications. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the USPTO made several changes to make it easier to file applications and included more information online to assist non-attorneys who wished to file.\textsuperscript{106} More recently the USPTO website is emphasizing the advantages of attorney assistance in filing trademark applications,\textsuperscript{107} perhaps in recognition of the disparity in success rates and other anecdotal evidence of the benefits of legal representation.

\textbf{D. Candor in Trademark Prosecution}

As compared to patent prosecution, scholars and intellectual property attorneys pay significantly less attention to the duty of candor in trademark prosecution.\textsuperscript{108} The phrases “duty of disclosure” and “inequitable conduct” are ubiquitous in the patent literature, and nearly every practitioner knows of \textit{Therasense, Inc.}\textsuperscript{109} But as described below, similar concepts are carried into trademark practice and arguably should have similar force.\textsuperscript{110}

At the end of the federal trademark application form, there are a number of statements that must be acknowledged and signed.\textsuperscript{111} These statements include that “[t]he signatory believes that the applicant is the owner of the trademark/service mark sought to be registered,” that the mark is either being used in commerce or that the applicant has a bona fide intention to do so, and that the facts set forth in the application are true.\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, the signatory must acknowledge that “[t]o the best of the signatory’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,\

\textsuperscript{105} Id. at 592.


\textsuperscript{109} See, e.g., Ojemen, \textit{supra} note 68, at 669 (discussing the duty of candor and the doctrine of inequitable conduct).

\textsuperscript{110} See McLeod & Bald, \textit{supra} note 108, at 374.

\textsuperscript{111} For a PDF version of the application, including the statements that must be signed by the applicant, see \textit{Trademark/Service Mark Application, Principle Register}, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/TEAS_Plus.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW7U-EWNT].

\textsuperscript{112} Id.
the allegations and other factual contentions made [in the submitted application] have evidentiary support.” The acknowledgements conclude with a warning that “willful false statements” could “jeopardize the validity of the application or submission or any registration resulting therefrom” or may lead to criminal prosecution.

Although rare, the TTAB has invalidated federal trademark registration where there is clear and convincing evidence that the applicant committed fraud in the procurement of the registration. Such fraud may occur by, among other things, fabricating specimens in support of applications or by making false statements related to the use of the mark in commerce. Persons committing such fraud are also liable for damages to those who have been harmed. Although the leading trademark fraud case, *In re Bose Corp.*, seemed to heighten the standard for proving fraud from a showing of negligence to evidence of an intent to deceive, the Federal Circuit left open the question of whether fraud could also be found based on a high degree of recklessness. Indeed, *In re Bose Corp.* and *Therasense, Inc.* espouse very similar views as they relate to misrepresentations made to the USPTO, yet only the latter has endured in the practitioner lexicon.

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113 Id.

114 Id.

115 See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Ahmad, 112 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361, 1376 (T.T.A.B. 2014) (invalidating use of “Nationstar” in connection with real estate business when it was clear that applicant had not been using the trademark in commerce).


119 See *In re Bose Corp.*, 580 F.3d at 1246 n.2 (“The PTO argues that under *Torres*, making a submission to the PTO with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity satisfies the intent to deceive requirement. We need not resolve this issue here.”); see also Theodore H. Davis Jr. & Lauren Brenner, *Allegations of Fraudulent Procurement and Maintenance of Federal Registrations Since In re Bose Corp.*, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 933, 936–43 (2014) (describing the various tests used for determining fraud following *In re Bose Corp.*).
II. REGULATION OF USPTO PRACTITIONERS

Although most attorneys are familiar with the general workings of state bar admissions and discipline, the USPTO’s system operates somewhat differently. In fact, the USPTO is one of the few federal agencies to which Congress has given explicit authority to regulate the admissions and ethical conduct of those persons who practice before it.120 The USPTO established the OED in 1985 and administers both functions through it.121 This Part will describe the regulation of practitioners before the USPTO. It will begin by identifying the requirements for admission to practice that differ significantly between patent and trademark practitioners.122 It will then turn to a brief discussion of the OED’s disciplinary process, highlighting the key decision points and possible outcomes.123

A. Admission to Practice in Patent Matters

 Patent law is somewhat unique in that both lawyers (patent attorneys) and non-lawyer professionals (patent agents) are eligible to practice, provided that those individuals meet the requirements and successfully apply for admission.124 Other than the fact that patent attorneys must be actively licensed attorneys in good standing with a state bar, there are no other differences between patent attorneys and patent agents, either in relation to admission requirements or in the scope of permissible patent practice before the USPTO.125 The USPTO collectively refers to both groups as “patent practitioners,”126 and it is for that reason that this Article uses the term “practitioner” rather than “attorney” when collectively referring to individuals who practice before the USPTO. All patent practitioners, including patent agents, are subject to the OED’s disciplinary authority.127

The requirements to become a registered patent practitioner are analogous to those for state bar admission. First, an individual must show that he or she

122 See discussion infra Parts II.A and II.B.
123 See discussion infra Part II.C.
124 37 C.F.R. § 11.6(a)–(b) (2019).
127 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.19(a).
“[p]ossesses the legal, scientific, and technical qualifications necessary for him or her to render applicants valuable service.”\textsuperscript{128} Ordinarily, an individual will demonstrate these qualifications through receipt of a bachelor’s degree in a recognized scientific or technical field or a bachelor’s degree in another field along with a specified number of credit hours in a scientific or technical field.\textsuperscript{129} This requirement is analogous to that of most state bars, which require the successful completion of a Juris Doctorate degree, often from an ABA-accredited law school.\textsuperscript{130} Second, an individual must show that he or she is “competent to advise and assist patent applicants in the presentation and prosecution of their applications before the Office.”\textsuperscript{131} This is generally accomplished by achieving a passing score on the patent registration examination, akin to passing a bar admission test.\textsuperscript{132} Third, an individual must show that he or she “possesses good moral character and reputation.”\textsuperscript{133} Ultimately, the OED Director makes a determination of an individual’s moral character and reputation pursuant to a character and fitness inquiry, similar to that which would be conducted by a state bar.\textsuperscript{134}

Once a practitioner meets these requirements, he or she is assigned a unique registration number and added to the USPTO’s register of attorneys and agents. As of April 8, 2020, there were 48,000 active patent practitioners: 12,385 active patent agents and 35,615 active patent attorneys.\textsuperscript{135}

\textit{B. Admission to Practice in Trademark Matters}

In contrast to patent practice, the requirements to practice before the USPTO in trademark matters are much more streamlined. With very limited exceptions, only active licensed attorneys in good standing with a state bar

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\textsuperscript{128} Id. § 11.7(a)(2)(ii).
\textsuperscript{131} 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(iii).
\textsuperscript{132} See OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, supra note 129, at 20.
\textsuperscript{133} 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(i).
\textsuperscript{134} See, e.g., Character and Fitness Requirements, MINN. ST. BD. L. EXAMINERS, https://www.ble.mn.gov/character-and-fitness-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/MD2Y-9CS5] (identifying the character and fitness requirements for the Minnesota bar and providing resources for applicants).
\textsuperscript{135} Practitioner Roster, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/practitionerRoster [https://perma.cc/3G3Q-XQQZ]. The OED continually updates these numbers, which makes it difficult to have a comprehensive historical understanding of active practitioners. Id.
\end{flushleft}
may represent others in trademark matters before the USPTO. Notably, non-lawyer patent agents generally are not eligible to practice trademark law before the USPTO.

Perhaps because the USPTO does not impose additional substantive requirements on those individuals who wish to represent others in trademark matters, it does not require an attorney to apply for recognition to practice before the USPTO nor does it assign that person a registration number when prosecuting trademark applications on behalf of a client. For these reasons, it is difficult to ascertain the number of “active” trademark practitioners because an attorney might prosecute a single application on behalf of a client and thereafter not do so again. The USPTO first learns of the involvement of a trademark attorney when an application is filed because the application asks whether an attorney is filing it. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the USPTO asks for basic contact information and will then communicate solely with the listed attorney regarding the application.

C. OED Disciplinary Process

The OED disciplinary process may be triggered whenever the OED Director receives information that warrants an investigation. That information can come from a variety of sources, including “a client, an examiner, or another member of the USPTO, through published decisions and news articles, or opposing counsel during an inter partes proceeding.” At that time, the practitioner will be notified that an investigation has begun. The OED then conducts a preliminary screening of the alleged violation that will often involve sending a request for information (RFI) to the practitioner. The practitioner is required, pursuant to the USPTO Rules, to respond accurately and completely to the RFI or face additional ethics charges.

There are four possible outcomes of an investigation. First, the OED Director may close the investigation without further action, presumably because

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137 Id. § 11.14(b). There is a limited exception for non-attorneys who were permitted to prosecute trademarks prior to 1957, but that class of individuals is likely very small. Id.
139 Id.
140 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(a).
141 DAVID HRICIK & MERCEDES MEYER, PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION § 1.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2016).
142 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(c).
143 Id. § 11.22(f)(1)(ii).
144 Id.; HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 141, § 1.03.
there are no grounds to proceed.145 Second, a warning letter may be issued to the practitioner. A warning is not public and not considered a disciplinary sanction, but it reminds practitioners of their duties under the USPTO Rules.146 Third, the OED Director and practitioner may enter into a settlement agreement. Settlement agreements are a common method of disposition,147 particularly for practitioners who wish to maintain an uninterrupted practice before the USPTO.148 Fourth, the OED Director may find that there has been a violation of the Rules and convene the Committee on Discipline (COD), a three-member panel appointed by the USPTO Director.149 The COD will then independently determine whether there is probable cause to proceed in the disciplinary matter and make a recommendation to the OED Director.150

Formal disciplinary hearings are conducted by an administrative law judge, who serves as the hearing officer for the proceeding.151 Assuming that the complaint is not dismissed, there are four possible sanctions that may be imposed: (1) exclusion from practice, (2) suspension, (3) public reprimand, or (4) probation.152 The first three sanctions, however, are mutually exclusive: “[p]robation may be imposed in lieu of or in addition to any other disciplinary sanction.”153 In determining the appropriate sanction, a hearing officer is required to consider the following factors:

(1) Whether the practitioner has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; (2) whether the practitioner acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; (3) the amount of actual or potential injury caused by the practitioner’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors.154

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145 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(h)(1).
147 Of the 410 public disciplinary actions between 2003 and 2018, 206 (50.2%) involved a settlement agreement.
148 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(h)(4); see, e.g., In re Guth, No. D2010-37, at 6 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 11, 2011) (final order) (using cooperation with OED and related reconciliation as a mitigating factor).
149 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.22(h)(3), 11.23(a).
150 Id. § 11.23(b).
151 See id. § 11.39 (referencing regulation authorizing appointment of administrative law judge to serve as hearing officer).
152 Id. § 11.20(a).
153 Id. § 11.20(a)(4).
154 Id. § 11.54(b).
A disciplined practitioner has the right to appeal the initial decision first to the OED Director, and subsequently to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.\footnote{35 U.S.C. § 32.}

Special attention must be paid to the imposition of reciprocal discipline at the USPTO, given its prevalence and the differences in how discipline is imposed in such cases. Lawyers who practice before the USPTO have an affirmative obligation to notify the OED Director when they have been disciplined by another jurisdiction or federal agency.\footnote{37 C.F.R. § 11.24.} But even if they fail to do so, the OED itself proactively searches state lawyer disciplinary records and identifies anyone within its purview who has been disciplined.\footnote{HRICIK & MEYER, supra note 141.} In either case, the OED director will file a complaint with the USPTO Director, without COD involvement, based on the other discipline.\footnote{See 37 C.F.R. § 11.24(a).} Even though a practitioner is requested to respond to the complaint, there are extremely limited grounds on which the practitioner may challenge the imposition of an identical sanction by the USPTO.\footnote{See id. § 11.24(d)(1)(i)–(iv).} Acceptable challenges to reciprocal discipline include:

(i) The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; (ii) \[t\]here was such infirmity of proof establishing the conduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Office could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; (iii) \[t\]he imposition of the same public censure, public reprimand, probation, disbarment, suspension or disciplinary disqualification by the Office would result in grave injustice; or (iv) \[a\]ny argument that the practitioner was not publicly censured, publicly reprimanded, placed on probation, disbarred, suspended or disciplinarily disqualified.

\textit{Id.}


\footnote{USPTO Presentation, supra note 146, at 8 (acknowledging the straightforward nature of its reciprocal discipline cases).}

about the practitioner’s misconduct and sanction are also published in the *Official Gazette*.

### III. USPTO ETHICS RULES: A PRIMER

This Article aims to empirically study the imposition of USPTO discipline between 2003 and 2018. As a preliminary matter, therefore, it is necessary to identify and understand the USPTO’s ethics rules. This is not a straightforward task. The USPTO transitioned from the Patent and Trademark Office Code of Professional Responsibility (USPTO Code) to the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct (USPTO Rules) on May 3, 2013. Accordingly, this Part first describes the structure and features of the prior USPTO Code. It then turns to a discussion of the USPTO Rules, focusing on the reasons for the transition and the key differences between the USPTO Rules and the ABA Rules. The Part continues with a proposed mapping between the USPTO Code, USPTO Rules, and ABA Rules, which will become the basis for the analysis presented in Part V.


The USPTO Code was based on the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code) that was adopted in 1969 but replaced in 1983 by the ABA Model Rules. Indeed, the ABA’s transition from the Model Code to the Model Rules likely precipitated the creation of the USPTO Code, because the USPTO had previously just incorporated the ABA Code by refer-

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166 See discussion infra Part III.A.

167 See discussion infra Part III.B.

168 See discussion infra Part III.C.


170 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).

171 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
ence and applied those provisions to practitioners.\textsuperscript{172} Like the ABA Code, the USPTO Code contained nine canons that were “statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of practitioners in their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.”\textsuperscript{173} These canons had no real disciplinary force—indeed, there were no USPTO disciplinary orders in the years under study that had been predicated on the violation of a canon—but they were used as guiding principles under which the disciplinary rules were organized.\textsuperscript{174}

Although the USPTO Code was based on the ABA Code, it also included a multitude of rules that were specific to practitioners’ work before the Office. Indeed, the section labeled “misconduct” contained six subsections and further listed an additional twenty categories of behavior that constituted misconduct before the USPTO.\textsuperscript{175} Included among these categories was 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(c)(3) that proscribed “[m]isappropriation of, or failure to properly or timely remit, funds received by a practitioner or the practitioner’s firm from a client to pay a fee which the client is required by law to pay to the [USPTO] Office.”\textsuperscript{176} The specific conduct identified in these categories would have otherwise violated other enacted rules (for example, the prohibition on neglecting a legal matter),\textsuperscript{177} but they provided clear examples of the types of misconduct that could occur in the course of USPTO practice.\textsuperscript{178}

In a few instances, the USPTO Code was more permissive than the ABA Code. For example, the USPTO Code carved out an exception to the general prohibition on practitioners acquiring a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the representation, under which they were permitted to “take an interest in the patent as part or all of his or her fee.”\textsuperscript{179} This provision condoned a long-standing practice between patent applicants and practitioners, analogous to a contingency fee that lawyers had traditionally been permitted to collect.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{172} See Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. at 5,158 (describing the adoption of the USPTO Code).
\textsuperscript{173} Id. at 5,175.
\textsuperscript{174} See id.
\textsuperscript{175} 37 C.F.R § 10.23(b)–(c) (2012) (repealed 2013).
\textsuperscript{176} Id. § 10.23(c).
\textsuperscript{177} See id. § 10.77(c) (proscribing “[n]eglect[ing] a legal matter entrusted to the practitioner”).
\textsuperscript{178} See, e.g., id. § 10.23(c)(15) (prohibiting the act of “making a scandalous or indecent statement in a paper filed in the [USPTO] Office”).
\textsuperscript{179} Id. § 10.64(a)(3).
\textsuperscript{180} See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly accepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims.”).
The USPTO Code was clear that it did not preempt the authority of states to regulate attorneys who practiced before them.181 What this meant for attorneys, at least, was that they were subject to at least two disciplinary authorities—the state disciplinary authority and the OED—each potentially having significantly different ethics rules. Although practitioners were required to conduct themselves according to the more restrictive standard, “sometimes the rules were so different, it was hard to know which standard was more restrictive.”182

B. The USPTO Rules (2013–Present)

Given the confusion surrounding the differences between the USPTO Code and the ABA Rules, which had been adopted widely, the USPTO developed and eventually adopted a new set of ethics rules that drew heavily on the ABA Rules.183 In fact, the USPTO published a document on its website at the time of the transition comparing the ABA Rules to the USPTO Rules that is a helpful resource for attorney-practitioners who are already familiar with the former.184

In the Executive Summary that accompanied the new rules, the USPTO stated that it believed that practitioners would “benefit from modernization of the regulations governing professional conduct before the Office and harmonization of these regulations with corresponding rules adopted by bars in the States and the District of Columbia.”185 Although licensed attorneys still must adhere to two sets of rules—and may be subject to reciprocal discipline if they are disciplined in another state186—the new USPTO Rules were intended to

181 Practice Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 50 Fed. Reg. at 5,158. The Federal Register notes:

In issuing these rules, the PTO has made every effort to minimize preemption of State control over the practice of law. Thus, in § 10.1, second sentence, the new rules provide: Nothing in *** [these rules] shall be construed to preempt the authority of each State to maintain control over the practice of law, except to the extent necessary for the Patent and Trademark Office to accomplish its federal objectives.

Id. (alterations in original).


“clarify[,] and streamline[,] their professional responsibility obligations.” 187 The USPTO also anticipated that practitioners would benefit from disciplinary actions and judicial opinions from states that had adopted the ABA Model Rules, although it contemplated that eventually precedent specifically addressing practice before the USPTO would develop after the USPTO rules were implemented. 188

Given that the USPTO Rules were explicitly modeled after the ABA Rules, it raises the question of how—and why—the USPTO Rules diverge from the ABA Rules. One would expect there to be significant inertia around maintaining consistency between the two codes, meaning that changes would only be made on account of the unique features of USPTO practice or its priorities in regulating practitioners.

After a thorough review of both sets of codes, this Article identifies four primary categories of divergences. Each category is described below, together with relevant examples and commentary on the likely reasons for the divergence.

1. Practice Differences

The USPTO Rules contain a number of semantic changes that reflect the practice setting and the fact that those who practice before the USPTO are not necessarily attorneys. For example, USPTO Rules 11.102 189 and 11.105 (modeled after ABA Rules 1.2 and 1.5, respectively) 190 eliminated references to conduct in criminal or domestic relations matters, because those issues should not arise in patent or trademark litigation. 191 Whereas ABA Rule 7.4 contains general guidance on the way in which attorneys may hold themselves out to the public, USPTO Rule 11.704 contains detailed information on who may hold themselves out as patent agents and patent attorneys, as well as additional limits on non-lawyers holding themselves out as authorized to practice trademark law. 192

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188 Id.
189 Although the official citation to the USPTO Rules would be 37 C.F.R. § 11.XXX, this Article will hereinafter refer to the USPTO Rules in the following manner in the main text: USPTO Rule 11.XXX.
190 RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 4–5, 6–8.
192 RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 53–54. For another example, USPTO Rule 11.101, which governs competence representation, added “scientific” and “technical” knowledge to the legal knowledge required. Id.

Several USPTO provisions were crafted to further align the USPTO Rules with obligations under state ethics rules or other ABA guidance. For example, USPTO Rule 11.115, which governs accounting and recordkeeping, provides that lawyers will be deemed in compliance with the Rule if they otherwise meet the corresponding requirements for the state in which they are actively licensed. The Rule further provides that non-lawyer practitioners will be deemed in compliance if they are part of a firm that maintains records that meet the requirements in a state in which one of their practitioners is a licensed attorney. These rules have the effects of reducing confusion and streamlining compliance, which were two goals of adopting the USPTO Rules.

3. Non-Adoption of Ancillary Rules

The USPTO declined to adopt a number of rules that this Article is terming “ancillary,” meaning that they are not generally the subject of disciplinary proceedings because they are (1) explanatory, (2) aspirational, or (3) uncommon occurrences. An example of an explanatory provision is ABA Rule 1.2(b), which provides that legal representation “does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral activities.” ABA Rule 6.1 is an aspirational provision, encouraging lawyers to provide at least fifty hours of pro bono service annually. Two examples of uncommon occurrences include ABA Rule 1.8(j), which regulates sexual relations with clients, and ABA Rule 7.6, which proscribes political contributions for obtaining legal engagements or appointments. Even though these provisions were not formally adopted, the USPTO clarified that lawyer-practitioners would nevertheless be subject to these ancillary rules if they practiced in a jurisdiction that had adopted them, and that such conduct could very well violate one or more provisions of USPTO Rule 11.804, the general misconduct section.

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193 Id.
195 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
196 Id. r. 6.1.
197 Id. r. 1.8, r. 7.6.

Section 11.108(j) is reserved. The USPTO has declined to enact a rule that specifically addresses sexual relations between practitioners and clients. Because of the fiduciary duty to clients, combining a professional relationship with any intimate personal relationship may raise concerns about conflict of interest and impairment of the judgment of both practitioner and client. To the extent warranted, such conduct may be investigated under general provisions of the USPTO Rules. See § 11.804.
4. Substantive Deviations

The USPTO Rules contain several substantive deviations from the ABA Rules. Unlike the three preceding categories, each of these substantive deviations reflects a policy decision made by the USPTO to regulate practitioner conduct in a different manner than the ABA Rules would provide. These deviations could potentially have a significant impact on practitioner conduct, as well as on the OED’s disciplinary function.

a. Duty of Disclosure and Inequitable Conduct

As discussed in Part II.B, patent practitioners have a duty to disclose information that is material to patentability. In addition to the threat of having a client’s patent invalidated, a violation of the duty of disclosure may lead to USPTO disciplinary action. USPTO Code 11.303 mandates that practitioners “disclose to the Office information necessary to comply with applicable duty of disclosure provisions,” which is further reiterated in subsection 11.106(c).\(^\text{id:199}\) Furthermore, the USPTO Rules make it clear that a practitioner may not claim concerns of client confidentiality as a reason for non-disclosure. Subsections 11.106(a)(2) and (a)(3) both contain confidentiality exceptions for practitioners who reveal information to prevent or rectify injury caused by a client’s inequitable conduct before the USPTO. The explanation accompanying the final rule states that “[t]he practitioner’s responsibility to present the client’s case with persuasive force is qualified by the practitioner’s duty of candor to the tribunal,” exhibiting a preference for the duty of candor.\(^\text{id:200}\)

b. Fraud

The scienter required for fraud under the USPTO Rules is lower than that under the ABA Model Rules, as it may be satisfied by “intent to deceive or a state of mind so reckless respecting consequences as to be the equivalent of intent.”\(^\text{id:201}\) By contrast, the ABA definition of fraud looks to state substantive

\(^{199}\) Id. at 20,184–85.


\(^{201}\) 37 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2019) (emphasis added). “Fraud” or “fraudulent” is defined as: conduct that involves a misrepresentation of material fact made with intent to deceive or a state of mind so reckless respecting consequences as to be the equivalent of intent, where there is justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the party deceived, induc-
law, but also requires a showing that a lawyer has a “purpose to deceive.”

In support of its position, the USPTO cited a number of patent cases in which it had adopted the common-law definition of fraud. Interestingly, the USPTO did not identify any trademark cases that had adopted the standard (nor did it address the question left open in In re Bose about whether recklessness could suffice), but the fraud definition in the USPTO Rules applies with equal force in patent and trademark matters.

c. Disclosure in Ex Parte Proceedings

The USPTO Rules carry a heightened duty of disclosure for ex parte proceedings, requiring practitioners under USPTO Rule 11.303 to disclose both known legal authority and material facts that are directly adverse to their client’s position. Notably, the USPTO justifies this deviation by stating that “[a]ll decisions made by the Office in patent and trademark matters affect the public interest” and that many of them are made ex parte.

d. Misconduct

Although the USPTO’s misconduct section largely tracks the ABA version, it does contain two additional provisions of note. First, it includes a specific provision related to the imposition of reciprocal discipline. This provision provides that a practitioner (in this case, a lawyer) who is publicly disciplined by another authority will be deemed to have committed misconduct and

_id.

202 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(d) (“‘Fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’ denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.”).


206 See RULE COMPARISON CHART, supra note 184, at 56–57.
thus subject to USPTO discipline as well. This provision, though not included in the ABA Rules, is not a deviation from its spirit because it is included within another ABA-approved code, the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. Its presence is worth noting, however, given the high percentage of USPTO disciplinary actions that impose reciprocal discipline.

Second, the USPTO Rules contain an additional subsection that covers “other conduct that adversely reflects on the practitioner’s fitness to practice before the Office.” This provision was carried over from the earlier USPTO Code and is analogous to a provision of the earlier ABA Code, which prescribed “conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” This provision somewhat fell out of favor, however, as challenges began to mount over the enforceability of the provision on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. Nevertheless, several state disciplinary codes have retained the provision despite its absence in the ABA Rules, which counsels against putting too much weight into the USPTO’s decision to retain it.


e. Conflict of Interest Fee Provisions

The USPTO Rules continue to allow practitioners to acquire interests in patents or patent applications as their fee in matters before the Office, as was permitted under the USPTO Code. Although this provision is more lenient than under the ABA Rules, it is still subject to the other conflict of interest limitations including 11.108(a), which requires that the transaction be fair and reasonable to the client and that the client give written informed consent to its

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209 See discussion infra Part V.B.
210 37 C.F.R. § 11.804(i).
212 See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Martin, 518 A.2d 1050, 1054 (Md. 1987); see also Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 276 (1970) (expressing “uncertain[ty of] what conduct will be held to reflect adversely on fitness to practice law”). But see generally Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527 (2003) (calling on scholars to reconsider their criticism of broad ethics rules, including the fitness to practice rule).
213 See, e.g., ALABAMA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019); MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(h) (2019) (proscribing “any other conduct that adversely reflects on his or her fitness to practice law”).
214 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.108(i)(3).
terms.215 The USPTO Rules also allow practitioners to advance costs and expenses in connection with proceedings before the Office,216 as well as fees that are “required to prevent or remedy an abandonment of a client’s application” due to practitioner misconduct.217

These lenient and flexible fee provisions appear to recognize that the types of matters before the USPTO differ from those at the root of the concerns behind the conflict of interest fee provisions that appear in the ABA Rules.218 Whereas patent and trademark matters are commercial enterprises (and the stereotypical client a sophisticated businessperson), the ABA Rules must be designed to cover a wider range of litigation and transactional matters and client bases.

Collectively, these substantive deviations from the ABA Rules largely reflect the heightened obligation of good faith expected of practitioners in their actions before the USPTO. For patent cases this obligation includes the so-called “duty of disclosure,” but all practitioners are expected to disclose adverse facts and law in ex parte proceedings and are subject to discipline for highly reckless misrepresentations, irrespective of the type of proceeding.219

C. Mapping the Various Ethics Codes

There is no definitive mapping that exists between the USPTO Code and the USPTO Rules. This study first aimed to develop such a mapping so that disciplinary actions could be analyzed across years. The table below presents the first ever mapping between those two sets of ethics codes for the disciplinary rules that have been the subject of public discipline, together with the corresponding provisions of the ABA Rules and a category description.

216 37 C.F.R. § 11.108(e)(3).
217 Id. § 11.108(e)(4).
218 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The comment notes:

Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation.

Id.; see also id. at cmt. 16 (“Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation.”).
219 See 37 C.F.R. § 11.303.
Nearly all of the USPTO Code provisions could be successfully mapped to a corresponding USPTO Rule section. The only exception was for USPTO Code 10.23(a), which provided that “[a] practitioner shall not engage in disreputable or gross misconduct.” In reviewing each of the disciplinary actions for which 10.23(a) was violated, however, it became clear that it was nearly always identified along with more specific rules that described the precise type of misconduct involved. There were two disciplinary actions that identified only 10.23(a) as the rule that had been violated, but in both instances there was clearly another specific provision that applied. Those two rules were recoded accordingly and 10.23(a) was omitted from the analysis in Part V.

In total, the study identified only thirty-three categories over the sixteen-year period. This finding suggests that the USPTO relies on relatively few rules as the basis for discipline, a topic explored later in the Article.

220 The initial plan was to map all the individual subsections of the USPTO Code and USPTO Rules, but that task proved intractable given the differences between the USPTO Code and USPTO Rules, as well as unnecessary given the low number of disciplinary actions. Thus, the provisions were generally mapped at the ABA Rules section level, with subsections mapped for general rules that included many disparate subsections (for example, misconduct and specific conflict of interest provisions). The only other exception was for the conflict of interest category, for which there were many differences between the USPTO Rules and USPTO Code.


222 See, e.g., In re Maiorino, No. D2004-11, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Aug. 9, 2004) (final order) (finding violations of 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.23(a), 10.23(b)(3), 10.23(b)(6), and 10.23(c)(1) for a sexual assault conviction).

223 In re Fuller, No. D2013-23, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Mar. 12, 2014) (final order) (finding that respondent illegally photographed other persons); In re York, No. D2013-19, at 8–9 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Nov. 18, 2013) (final order) (finding a violation of terms of fee sharing agreement with associated law firm).

224 See discussion infra Part IV.
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### IV. PRACTITIONER DISCIPLINE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To evaluate the extent to which the OED is successful in carrying out its responsibilities, this Part identifies and describes the purposes of practitioner discipline and sanctions to provide the standards by which its work may be judged. Although a complete treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article, several prevailing theories will be discussed. They will then be framed within the somewhat distinct setting of USPTO practice to determine the extent to which one or more theories should carry special weight.

#### A. Purposes of Practitioner Discipline

At the outset, it is important to note that disciplinary bodies and courts reviewing such cases rarely discuss the purposes behind imposing discipline outside of the context of a specific adjudication. This phenomenon has not been lost on those scholars, who argue forcefully that professional regulators should

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225 See discussion infra Part IV.
227 See Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2721–22 (2012) (noting that no U.S. jurisdiction has adopted regulatory objectives for the profession, and contrasting it with other nations).
more explicitly identify and prioritize the purposes behind discipline in order
to promote effectiveness and consistency.228 Indeed, the lack of such guidance
would make it difficult for those who impose discipline to know how to do so
when there are competing considerations at stake. Nevertheless, several themes
predominate.

The first purpose, and the one most often cited, is the “protection of the
public.”229 What is precisely meant by the phrase is up for debate, as it is
sometimes described in terms of the practitioner’s clients who have been di-
rectly affected by the misconduct.230 Such a narrow conception is not fully ex-
planatory, however, because discipline is imposed on conduct that has already
occurred and often does not include restitution to the client who has been
harmed. A second conception of “public” implicates protecting the practition-
er’s other clients or future clients.231 This purpose can be accomplished in one
of three ways: (1) by incapacitating the practitioner (through a term suspension
or exclusion), (2) by giving notice to others of the practitioner’s misconduct
and thereby affecting whether and how they engage with the practitioner, and
(3) by decreasing the likelihood that the practitioner engages in such miscon-
duct again. But there is still a third conception of the “public,” one that extends
beyond the immediate practitioner-client relationship to others who might be
harmed.232 This could include persons other than clients who would be ad-
versely impacted were this practitioner to commit this type of misconduct in
the future. It could even be extended to include others who would be adversely
impacted if another practitioner were to commit this type of misconduct, under
the theory that the imposition of discipline against one practitioner might deter
others from committing misconduct themselves.233

The second purpose behind lawyer discipline is the protection of the ad-
ministration of justice.234 This purpose is evident in many rules adopted by

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228 See Zacharias, supra note 33, at 733–34.
230 See Zacharias, supra note 33, at 695.
232 See Ogando, supra note 231, at 462 (directly linking lawyer discipline to the need for broadly conceived public protection).
234 Levin, supra note 226, at 17; see, e.g., In re Gortmaker, 782 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. 1989) (“The purpose of professional discipline is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to their clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.”).
disciplinary authorities, including ABA Rule 8.4(d), which explicitly prohibits lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” But its presence can also be seen through ABA Rules 3.1–3.9, which impose discipline for a variety of activities that may have an adverse impact on an adjudication, and in the Preamble to the ABA Rules that reminds lawyers that they are “officer[s] of the legal system and . . . public citizen[s] having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” Thus, this purpose pervades the ABA Rules and provides a lens through which they should be understood.

The third purpose behind practitioner discipline is to instill and preserve confidence in the legal profession. This purpose comes under fire by scholars on account of the legal profession’s insistence on self-regulation that leads some to question the degree to which discipline may be legitimately and accurately imposed. Nevertheless, proponents of self-regulation tout the disciplinary process, and in particular the public imposition of discipline, as essential for preserving public confidence. This purpose has led scholars such as Leslie Levin to argue in favor of increased transparency in disciplinary proceedings and broad publication of disciplinary proceedings. It has also fueled pushes for increased consistency, both across and within disciplinary bodies, in the imposition of discipline and sanctions imposed. Indeed, the ABA Rules have been adopted in whole or large part by forty-nine states (California being the only exception) and four U.S. Territories, which should, in

235 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
236 Id. r. 3.1–.9.
237 Devlin, supra note 229, at 939; Levin, supra note 226, at 17–18.
241 See Levin, supra note 226, at 71; see also Jennifer Carpenter & Thomas Cluderay, Note, Implications of Online Disciplinary Records: Balancing the Public’s Interest in Openness with Attorneys’ Concerns for Maintaining Flexible Self-Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 740 (2009).
242 See Ogando, supra note 231, at 464.
theory at least, serve to limit the variability across jurisdictions in terms of the types of misconduct that are subject to discipline.\textsuperscript{243}

\textbf{B. The Role of Sanctions}

With these three purposes in mind—protection of the public, promotion of the administration of justice, and the instilling of confidence in the legal profession—further attention to the role of sanctions is warranted. In many ways, disciplinary sanctions can be viewed as analogous to criminal sanctions, and professional responsibility scholars have looked to the vast criminal law literature in the area for guidance.\textsuperscript{244}

Yet there are important differences. Unlike criminal sanctions, disciplinary sanctions should not be grounded in retribution because the misconduct at issue is not necessarily morally blameworthy but rather professionally incompetent.\textsuperscript{245} To the extent that such conduct is simultaneously morally blameworthy, it can be vindicated instead through the criminal justice system. By contrast, disciplinary sanctions should be forward-looking and directed toward the goal of ensuring that such misconduct not recur.\textsuperscript{246} Furthermore, disciplinary bodies rarely impose restitutionary sanctions and, in theory, aggrieved clients or third parties would be able to pursue restitution through civil proceedings.\textsuperscript{247}

This Article will focus instead on five goals to be served by sanctions: (1) specific deterrence, (2) general deterrence, (3) incapacitation, (4) rehabilitation, and (5) expressions of disapproval. Sanctions that operate as specific deterrence will reduce the likelihood that the same practitioner will commit future misconduct.\textsuperscript{248} Although in theory any type of sanction could operate as specific deterrence, sanctions that include the imposition of probation should lessen the likelihood that a practitioner will commit misconduct during the probationary period. To the extent that prior misconduct will be considered an

\textsuperscript{243} See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ [https://perma.cc/EVK9-KJ8C]; see also John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 57 (2013) (noting the success of the ABA in creating rules that are uniformly adopted, but arguing that such rules have not kept up with changes in the profession).

\textsuperscript{244} See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 226, at 683. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010) (applying criminal law concepts to analyze and interpret lawyer disciplinary codes).

\textsuperscript{245} Zacharias, supra note 33, at 684.

\textsuperscript{246} Id. at 685–86.


aggravating factor in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, that fact could also serve to increase the deterrent effect on the practitioner.249

Sanctions that operate as general deterrence do so by virtue of their effect on other practitioners, who are aware of the sanctions and conduct themselves in a manner to ensure that they do not end up suffering the same fate as the sanctioned practitioner.250 But the effectiveness of sanctions as general deterrence is subject to a number of considerations. First, such sanctions must be publicized in a way that other practitioners are made aware of them; otherwise, they cannot operate as a deterrence to others.251 Second, the deterrent effect of sanctions should not be viewed in isolation. The public is likely only aware of the infrequent, highly publicized cases, whereas lawyers themselves probably change their actions in reaction to more frequent and commonplace prosecutions.252 Thus, it is the practitioner’s perception that he or she might likely face discipline that might deter him or her from committing misconduct, but such a perception will only be formed if the person is aware that a number of other practitioners have been disciplined for similar actions.253

Incapacitating sanctions prevent practitioners from committing future misconduct because the sanction prohibits them from representing clients or otherwise engaging in the profession.254 The two types of incapacitating sanctions are suspension and disbarment.255 Disbarment is termed “exclusion” when imposed by the USPTO.256 Although suspension generally lasts for a definite period of time,257 exclusion is theoretically permanent—subject to the practitioner successfully petitioning for reinstatement after a minimum period.


250 See Bené, supra note 248, at 935.

251 See Levin, supra note 226, at 72.


254 Bené, supra note 248, at 933–34; see DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 956 (4th ed. 2004) (noting incapacitation as one of the predominant justifications for lawyer discipline).


257 But see 37 C.F.R. § 11.25 (2019) (providing for interim suspensions that will last until there is an opportunity for a formal disciplinary proceeding).
of time, usually five years.258 Given the economic and professional impacts of incapacitating sanctions, they are to be limited to more egregious instances of practitioner misconduct.259

As with incapacitating sanctions, rehabilitative sanctions are aimed toward eliminating future misconduct, but they do so by imposing measures on the practitioner that promote ongoing conformity with the rules.260 Three common rehabilitative sanctions include probation (often with ongoing monitoring of client matters or funds), mandatory education in professional responsibility, and mandatory mental health or chemical dependency treatment.261 Often, these conditions are imposed in addition to more traditional sanctions and have become increasingly common even as rehabilitation has somewhat gone out of favor among criminal law theorists.262

Unlike the aforementioned types of sanctions, an expressive sanction is one that primarily expresses disapproval of practitioner conduct rather than imposing significant limitations or conditions on a practitioner’s future professional activities.263 There are two primary types of expressive sanctions: the private warning (sometimes called an admonition or a warning letter) and the public reprimand.264 Whereas the former sends an expressive signal only to the disciplined practitioner, the latter may send a signal to other practitioners or to the public that such conduct is disapproved and, if repeated, could be subject to more severe sanction.265

Of course, a particular sanction or set of sanctions could simultaneously serve multiple purposes. For example, a public reprimand could operate as specific deterrence (lessening the likelihood that the practitioner herself would commit future misconduct), as general deterrence (lessening the likelihood that other practitioners would commit similar types of misconduct in the future), and as an expressive signal that such conduct will not be condoned. That said, a sanction such as a public reprimand may have a stronger expressive effect than a deterrent effect. Part V will examine the imposition of USPTO sanctions in light of the degree to which they serve particular purposes.266

258 Id. § 11.60(b) (“An excluded practitioner shall be eligible to apply for reinstatement no earlier than at least five years from the effective date of the exclusion.”).
259 Hopkins, supra note 255, at 860; Levin, supra note 226, at 21.
261 See Levin, supra note 226, at 24.
262 Id. at 23.
265 See Levin, supra note 226, at 22–23.
266 See discussion infra Part V.
C. The USPTO Practice Setting

In comparison to the practice of law in a particular state, which varies widely among its licensed attorneys, practice before the USPTO is considerably more focused. This focus arguably should influence how the OED approaches practitioner discipline, in order to ensure that its work further promotes the USPTO’s ultimate mission.

As the federal gatekeeper for patent issuance and trademark registration, one of the USPTO’s primary responsibilities is ensuring accuracy while promoting innovation and enterprise. With many determinations being made on an ex parte basis, the application process, substantive requirements, and USPTO Rules all highlight the overriding importance of the duty of candor and good faith in dealings with the Office. Even in the years during which the empirical study was conducted, the USPTO promulgated additional rules and revamped its application forms to impress upon practitioners the seriousness of these obligations.

Ultimately, the USPTO justifies its focus on candor as being linked to the fact that its decisions affect the public interest—not just the immediate applicant’s rights, but those third parties that may rely on that recognition of intellectual property rights in conducting their own affairs. Those third parties may include future competitors, who decline to use a particular mark for fear of infringing on a pre-existing registered trademark. It may include investors, who use the issuance of a patent as an official stamp of approval on the viability of an invention. Viewed in this manner, protection of the public—broadly defined—is arguably paramount. Equally important, these third parties gener-


fostering innovation, competitiveness and job growth in the United States by conducting high quality and timely patent and trademark examination and review proceedings in order to produce reliable and predictable intellectual property rights; guiding intellectual property policy, and improving intellectual property rights protection; and delivering intellectual property information and education worldwide.

Id.

268 See discussion supra Parts I.A and I.C.

269 See discussion supra Parts I.B and I.D.

270 See discussion supra Part III.B.


ally are not participants in the prosecution process, for they have neither the relevant information nor the inclination to be involved at the early stages of an applicant’s commercial enterprise.

With regard to the administration of justice, the USPTO has suggested that it is especially interested in ensuring that practitioners are responsive to inquiries from its employees, including the OED itself. Again, without the benefit of a true adversarial process, the USPTO simultaneously serves as decisionmaker and healthy skeptic. Thus, it would be expected that its emphasis on the administration of justice be related to those activities that could thwart the ability of the USPTO to reach timely, impartial, and accurate decisions.

But what about instilling confidence in the profession? In contrast to the legal profession that is largely self-governing, USPTO practitioners do not regulate themselves. The disciplinary rules are initially enforced by USPTO employees, and the hearing officers are administrative law judges from a variety of fields. That separation should make it less likely that outsiders would view the system as a captured one—at least in comparison to the legal profession. Furthermore, although the popular media and general public sometimes have a low opinion of attorneys, that view is not especially prevalent when it comes to practitioners. That is not to say that the OED should ignore or overlook this purpose, but rather that this purpose may be secondary to the others discussed above.

A final point to raise is the relationship between OED discipline and that which may be imposed by state disciplinary authorities. At least when it comes to practitioners who are also attorneys, there are certain types of misconduct that arguably seem as or better suited to be investigated by a state disciplinary authority rather than by the OED. Such examples could include criminal acts that may reflect poorly on the practitioner-attorney’s character and fitness but that do not have any direct connection to the subject matter of their practice.

273 See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. at 20,193 (“A practitioner’s duty to cooperate fully with OED is vital to maintaining the integrity of the legal profession, which is an important duty owed by a practitioner to the public, the bar, the profession, and the Office.”).

274 See id. (“A practitioner’s compliance with the duty to cooperate has recently become even more essential to maintaining the integrity of the profession in light of the shorter statutory time allowed for the OED Director to complete a full and fair investigation of a practitioner’s alleged misconduct.”).

275 See, e.g., LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 6–8 (4th ed. 2016) (presenting public opinion data indicating that public perception of attorneys is low); Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx [https://perma.cc/X5N7-FZ6Q] (finding that 22% of the American public rate the honesty and ethical standards of lawyers as “Very High” or “High,” and 28% rate lawyers’ standards as “Low or Very Low”). These ratings are lower than those for nurses, medical doctors, police officers, and bankers. Honesty/Ethics in Professions, supra.
before the USPTO. Even client trust account violations, although indirectly related to attorneys’ USPTO practice, are quite likely more pervasive than among their trademark or patent clients (assuming that their practice is not so limited). By contrast, the OED would be the optimal disciplinary authority to investigate practitioners who have improper relationships with non-practitioners in prosecuting patents, prosecute fraudulent applications, or violate USPTO-specific rules such as the duty of disclosure.

V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF USPTO PRACTITIONER DISCIPLINE

With this theoretical foundation in place, this Article now turns to the critical practical question of how the OED is carrying out its responsibility to mete out discipline. To address this question, a comprehensive study was conducted of all public discipline imposed on practitioners between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2018. This Part begins with a discussion of the methodology employed, including the rationale behind the strategic coding and analytical decisions made. It then presents the results of the study and the implications that may be drawn, first for USPTO practitioners as a whole and then specifically comparing and contrasting the discipline imposed on patent and trademark practitioners. It concludes with a discussion of the ethics rules that form the basis of discipline, identifying four common patterns of misconduct and the inferences that might be made about the OED’s work and current focus.

A. Methodology

To evaluate the imposition of USPTO discipline, it was necessary first to compile all disciplinary actions for the time period of interest. The USPTO provides access to all decisions from disciplinary hearings through the OED Reading Room, a searchable database that compiles information online pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. In addition to disciplinary orders, the OED Reading Room contains a number of decisions related to practitioner admission that could be a fruitful topic for additional research.

Initially, this project isolated only those disciplinary orders that were categorized as “Final Decision” or “Final Order,” because the USPTO website

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276 See discussion infra Part V.A.
277 See discussion infra Parts V.B and V.C.
278 See discussion infra Part V.D.
279 FOIA Documents, supra note 163.
280 Id.; see, e.g., In re Graham, No. D2013-09, at 3–4 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 17, 2013) (final order) (ordering respondent’s suspension and describing steps he must take prior to reinstatement to practice before the USPTO).
suggested that those designations would capture all disciplinary actions. But this was under-inclusive, as there were a large number of documents labeled “Initial Decision” that did not include a corresponding “Final Decision.” In inspecting those later documents, the reason became clear: each included language that the disciplined practitioner had thirty days to appeal the initial decision or else it would become a final decision. Accordingly, those decisions—the vast majority of which were default judgments—were included. There were also some decisions that were labeled in unconventional ways, such as “Memorandum and Order” or “Judgment.” Each of those was reviewed further to determine whether it should be considered a final judgment on discipline and categorized accordingly.

Once the complete set of disciplinary orders was retrieved, all were manually reviewed to determine whether they should be included in the dataset. Each document is titled in the following manner: “D[YEAR]-XX.” The year appears to generally correspond to the year in which the investigation was opened. Seven decisions corresponded to a year earlier than 2003 but these decisions were still included in the analysis because state disciplinary authorities likewise report their activities according to the year of decision and include any cases originating in an earlier year.

There were two types of discipline that were excluded from the analysis. First, there were twelve disciplinary orders that imposed an interim suspension, which is imposed when a practitioner has been convicted of a serious crime.

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284 See FOIA Documents, supra note 163.

285 See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2015 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 5–7 (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2015_sold_results.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7VP-N45V] (listing the number of ethics complaints pending from prior years). There were two decisions from investigations that began in 1999, one from 2000, two from 2001, and two from 2002.

later disciplinary actions that cover the misconduct at issue in these orders.287 Second, there were four disciplinary orders in which practitioners were transferred to inactive status on account of a disability that rendered them incapable to practice law.288 Though styled as a “disciplinary action,” these orders do not fall within the aim of this study and were excluded.

After this scrubbing was completed, each order was read and coded according to the type of practitioner who had been disciplined, i.e. patent agent, patent attorney, or trademark attorney. But of course, some lawyers prosecute both patents and trademarks, and the misconduct at issue might involve one or both of their practices. Accordingly, each order was coded by the practice area(s) in which the misconduct had occurred and whether the practitioner was an attorney at the time of the proceeding.289 In cases of reciprocal discipline, practitioners were coded according to their practice area(s) rather than the areas in which the underlying misconduct occurred, unless it was clear that the underlying misconduct was in fact related to one or both practice areas.

In addition to other variables related to the disciplinary process itself (for example, whether the practitioner had responded or entered into a settlement agreement), each order was coded according to the disciplinary rule(s) violated, sanction type, sanction length, and whether additional conditions had been imposed.290 Finally, a summary of the relevant misconduct was prepared in order to better elucidate some of the frequently occurring fact patterns in disciplinary cases.

Of the 410 “public” disciplinary orders in the final set, five practitioners received a “private” reprimand.291 These orders removed any identifying practitioner information but still provided insight into the misconduct at issue. In the analysis that follows, these orders are combined with the public reprimands when considered collectively but specifically identified when relevant to understanding the “public” nature of discipline imposed on a specific practitioner.

To contextualize the frequency and severity of USPTO discipline, a separate dataset was compiled of lawyer discipline by state authorities using information published by the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline.

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287 See id. § 11.25(b)(5) (“Upon entering a final order imposing interim suspension, the USPTO Director shall refer the complaint to a hearing officer to conduct a formal disciplinary proceeding.”).

288 See id. § 11.20(c) (providing for transfer to disability inactive status).

289 For patent disciplinary actions, individuals were denoted as an attorney if they were designated “patent attorney” or if the order stated that the individual was licensed to practice law.

290 Orders imposing suspensions required additional attention, as a significant number of them immediately stayed the suspension and instead put the practitioner on probation. For these orders, both the suspension and alternative disposition were captured.

291 See, e.g., In re [Anonymous], No. D2006-17, at 3 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Apr. 30, 2007) (final order) (stating that a patent attorney had reached a settlement agreement whereby they would be privately reprimanded).
Each year, this committee releases results from the Survey of Lawyer Discipline (ABA SOLD), which is completed by nearly all state lawyer disciplinary authorities.\textsuperscript{292} When necessary, the study was supplemented with additional data sources noted in the following analysis.

To provide an accurate comparison of the frequency of discipline among different disciplinary authorities, it was necessary to identify the number of practitioners or lawyers who were subject to such discipline. Although the ABA SOLD contains that information for each reporting state, there is no readily available comparable data for USPTO practitioners. The OED shares current information on the number of “active” patent practitioners, but there is no historical repository containing those numbers.\textsuperscript{293} Nevertheless, an estimate for patent practitioners was constructed based on several known years of data and the corresponding trends in the patent practitioner population.\textsuperscript{294}

An estimate was even harder to develop for trademark attorneys, because the OED has no registration process or other methods for identifying who is subject to its jurisdiction. The USPTO does compile historical data on each trademark application, which may include the name of the attorney who is prosecuting it.\textsuperscript{295} This field required considerable scrubbing, however, because many of the “names” are not in fact names of attorneys at all.\textsuperscript{296} After this data was scrubbed, attorneys were considered active for a particular year if they had prosecuted a trademark application sometime within the prior three calendar years. From there, the number of active attorneys was calculated for each year during the time period of interest.

\textsuperscript{292} See STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2016 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2016sold_results.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSH9-S96F] (providing the results of the 2016 survey); see also Historical ABA S.O.L.D. Surveys, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/historicalabasoldsurveys/ [https://perma.cc/3EZ6-HX84] (providing links to previous surveys from 1998 to 2016). Although survey data from 2003 to 2016 are available, estimates for 2017 and 2018 have been created by using a combination of the five year average and annual trend. For example, if the five year average was 100 but there had been a 20 point decrease during each year, the following year would be estimated at 80.

\textsuperscript{293} See discussion supra Part II.A.

\textsuperscript{294} The number of active patent practitioners was available for five of the sixteen years. These numbers were used as a starting point for constructing the estimate of active practitioners, with adjustments for the changes in the number of known patent application filings.


\textsuperscript{296} Many of the entries in this field were not names, but rather numbers or parts of addresses (e.g., WI 53202-4910). These were removed from the analysis, as it was unclear whether the application had been filed by an attorney and, in these cases, the identity of the attorney was also unclear.
B. Overall Results

As an initial matter, the frequency of practitioner discipline was calculated over time. Although the OED publicly disciplined twenty-six practitioners on average each year between 2003 and 2018, there was an upward trend over that timeframe. But, as Figure I illustrates, that trend was irregular and inconsistent, particularly with the large spike in disciplinary actions (fifty) in 2010.

Figure I: OED-Imposed Public Discipline by Year

Additional analysis sheds some insight on one reason for the disparity: reciprocal discipline. As Part II.C explained, the OED is vigilant in its imposition of reciprocal discipline for attorneys disciplined by another state bar authority. Figures II and III below demonstrate how reciprocal discipline shapes and impacts the OED’s work. It comprises nearly half of all public discipline imposed, and over two-thirds (23/34) of the discipline in 2018. Likewise, although there were fifty practitioners who received public discipline in 2010, only twenty of those were actually the result of an OED investigation and the rest were reciprocal discipline cases.
Although the small numbers of disciplinary actions suggest that the OED does not seem to frequently impose discipline, the question arises of how these numbers might compare to other disciplinary authorities—is the OED disciplining fewer practitioners than its state counterparts? Figure IV below demonstrates that it is indeed imposing less discipline, even though there has been a significant increase in practitioner discipline over the sixteen-year time period coupled with an overall decline in state attorney discipline during that same time frame.
On average over the sixteen years studied, just 4.0 out of every 10,000 practitioners were subject to public discipline by the OED, in comparison to 26.9 attorneys from their respective state authorities. Even this statistic overinflates OED discipline, because 45% of those were in fact reciprocal discipline already included among the state disciplinary statistics. Although there has been a general upward trend in OED discipline relative to state discipline, it has remained between 4.6 and 5.1 practitioners per 10,000 since 2015—a rate that is less than one-fourth of the rate of state discipline during that time.

Figures V and VI provide further insight into the relative distribution of public sanctions imposed, as well as the frequency of alternative dispositions. At first glance, these two figures may seem somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the OED imposes relatively more punitive sanctions than its state counterparts. On the other hand, the OED imposes considerably more private discipline and terms of probation.
But taken together, a theme begins to emerge in terms of the purposes these sanctions serve. Each of the heavily imposed USPTO sanctions furthers the goal of specific deterrence, in that they are limited to the knowledge of the practitioner (private warnings), they ensure that the practitioner conforms his or her future conduct to the USPTO Rules (probation), or they incapacitate a
practitioner who cannot conform his or her conduct to the USPTO Rules (exclusion, and to a lesser extent, suspension).  

At the same time, USPTO sanctioning practice does not appear to prioritize the goals of general deterrence or expressiveness to the same extent. As a general matter, the practitioner population will not know of the prevalence of private sanctions—indeed, it is not even published on the USPTO website—and it certainly will not learn of the specific conduct which led to it. Likewise, the existence of relatively few public reprimands means that the practitioner population will not learn of many examples in the mid-level category of misconduct falling below that which would operate as a suspension. This circumstance, coupled with the low number of disciplinary actions overall, means that practitioners have little available guidance on the boundaries of permissible conduct in their USPTO practice.

C. Comparing the Discipline of Patent and Trademark Practitioners

Although the preceding Section sheds some light on the degree to which the OED is using its disciplinary function to regulate practitioner conduct, it is only the beginning of the story. As was described in Parts II and III, patent and trademark practitioners are not situated similarly in relation to the USPTO. Whereas patent practitioners must satisfy several requirements to become registered, attorneys who wish to practice before the USPTO need only find willing clientele and they can begin a trademark prosecution practice. Moreover, there is a marked difference between the two in the way that the USPTO communicates practitioners’ obligations. The patent practitioners’ duty of candor and possible sanctions upon violation are well-known, but the same is not true for the obligations imposed on trademark attorneys. This Section explores whether that distinction carries through to the OED’s work, despite the fact that ostensibly it regulates both sets of practitioners in the same manner.

Figures VII and VIII below reveal the staggering differences in patent and trademark discipline, showing that 77% of all public disciplinary actions involve those who prosecute patents. Though there has been a slight increase in the discipline of trademark attorneys since 2014, that trend is nearly comparable for patent practitioners as well. In 2018, for instance, only 32% (11/34) of all disciplinary actions involved trademark practice alone.

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297 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
298 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
299 See discussion supra Parts II.B and II.D.
Figures IX and X below demonstrate that these differences cannot be fully explained by the disparities in the sizes of the practitioner populations or in the number of USPTO applications filed.
Even when accounting for the larger pool of patent practitioners or the larger number of patent applications filed, there is still a significant difference between trademark and patent practices in regard to discipline.\textsuperscript{300} In fact, dur-

\textsuperscript{300} During the relevant time period, there were averages of 497,004 patent filings and 407,152 trademark filings each year. That gap has been narrowing, however, with 643,349 patent filings and
ing the three-year period between 2006 and 2008, there were no disciplinary actions based on trademark practice alone—an astonishing statistic. These figures should not necessarily suggest that patent practitioners are unduly targeted or over-represented; a quick comparison between Figure VIII and Figure IV indicates that they are subject to less discipline by the OED than are attorneys by their respective state authorities. Rather, these figures seem to indicate that trademark attorneys are significantly under-represented among those receiving discipline. Although discipline for both types of practices is trending upward, the increase is neither steep nor consistent across the time period.

Figure XI presents the frequency with which different types of sanctions are imposed on practitioners in the two practice areas.\textsuperscript{301} It demonstrates that trademark practitioners receive less punitive sanctions than their patent counterparts. Figure XII provides additional detail on the length of suspensions for each group.

\textit{Figure XI: Type of Sanction by Practice Area}

638,847 trademark filings in 2018. With regards to practitioners, there was an estimated average of 41,213 patent practitioners, as compared to 32,198 trademark practitioners. The gap between the two widened to 13,590 in 2018.

\textsuperscript{301} Figure XI and the figures that follow exclude reciprocal discipline cases because the OED does not play a role in determining the type of sanction imposed by the initiating state.
Several trends emerge. First, it is clear that the most severe sanctions are imposed among those practitioners in the “both” category. That result is not surprising, however, once one considers how that category is constructed; by definition, the proscribed misconduct included both patent and trademark prosecution. Given the inherently larger scope of misconduct, it would be expected that the corresponding sanctions would be more punitive on average. Comparing patent- and trademark-only practitioners, patent practitioners have a higher representation among each of the more severe incapacitating sanctions (involuntary exclusion, exclusion on consent, suspension), whereas trademark practitioners are much more likely to receive a reprimand.

Patent practitioners also serve longer suspensions on average than their trademark counterparts. Though there is not comprehensive statewide data available on this subject, available evidence suggests that patent practitioners are likely serving even longer suspensions than they would have, had the sanction been imposed by a state authority. Once again, those practitioners

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302 Notably, the ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline does not require states to provide information on the average length of suspensions; such data could be beneficial to an understanding of this issue. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, supra note 292, at 1.

committing misconduct across both practice areas are receiving the longest suspensions on average.

**D. Ethics Rules Violated by USPTO Practitioners**

Given the differences between patent and trademark practice, along with the disparity between the two in terms of the types of discipline imposed, one would expect there to be corresponding differences between the two in regard to the number and types of ethics rules that are cited as providing the basis for discipline. Figure XIII provides the number of ethics rules cited in all public disciplinary orders, and Figure XIV further calculates the average number of rules cited for each practice area.

*Figure XIII: Number of Ethics Rules Cited in Disciplinary Orders*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Mean Rules Cited</th>
<th>Median Rules Cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patent</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trademark</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Figure XIII indicates, more than eighty percent of USPTO disciplinary actions cited two or more ethics rules that provided the basis for discipline. Unexpectedly, trademark disciplinary cases cite more ethics rules on average.
than do patent cases (3.6 vs. 3.2), even though the former lead to less severe sanctions on average.\footnote{See discussion \textit{supra} Part V.C.}

This mismatch between the number of rule violations and severity of sanctions may contribute to the perception among patent practitioners that they must be wary of the threat of OED investigation. Even a cursory Internet search reveals a number of articles and blog posts about patent practitioner discipline and best practices to avoid getting in trouble.\footnote{See, \textit{e.g.}, Michael E. McCabe, Jr., \textit{This Post Could Save Your Patent Law License}, MCCABE LAW (June 1, 2017), https://www.ipethicslaw.com/this-post-could-save-your-patent-law-license/ [https://perma.cc/5X48-7ME8] (discussing administrative suspensions of patent practitioners at the USPTO).} The same is not true for trademark discipline, about which there is little discussion.

Armed with the knowledge that most OED disciplinary actions implicate more than one ethics rule, this Section now turns to the more nuanced question of what types of misconduct give rise to disciplinary actions. Figure XV presents an initial picture using the categories identified in Part III.C, both for the overall practitioner population and by practice area. The number under the label in parentheses corresponds to the number of disciplinary actions in that category.

\textit{Figure XV: Ethics Rules Cited as Source of OED Discipline}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Misconduct Category</th>
<th>Overall (221)</th>
<th>Patent (174)</th>
<th>Trademark (23)</th>
<th>Both (24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diligence</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Misrepresentation</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of Justice</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Unfitness to Practice</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Property and Accounting</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Acts</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with OED</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting Unauthorized Practice</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination Issues</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truthfulness</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misconduct Category</td>
<td>Overall (221)</td>
<td>Patent (174)</td>
<td>Trademark (23)</td>
<td>Both (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of Interest</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Influence by Third Party</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with Non-Practitioner</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness to Opposing Parties</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Representation</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False Advertising</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of Rules Through Others</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidentiality</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting Misconduct</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Oversight of Non-Practitioner</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Business Transactions with Client</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation of Liability</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t Employee Conflict</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candid Advice</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truthfulness to Others</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex Parte Communications</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Advertising</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improper Solicitation</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After diligence, which is the most prevalent ethics rule that forms the basis of discipline (45.7%), the next three most frequently cited provisions are all part of the general misconduct rule—misrepresentation (44.3%), actions that are prejudicial to the administration of justice (40.3%), and actions that reflect adversely on one’s fitness to practice before the USPTO (35.3%). This is notable, in part because there is criticism among some ethics scholars about the
over-reliance on these provisions by state disciplinary authorities together with
the difficulty for practitioners to understand what types of misconduct are sub-
ject to these rules.306 Indeed, as mentioned in Part III.B, the ABA Rules elimi-
nated the “fitness to practice” provision on account of these concerns.307

These concerns are especially salient when it comes to USPTO practice. The USPTO purports to give heightened attention to misconduct related to the
duties of candor and good faith and yet there are relatively few disciplinary
actions related to that type of misconduct. As Figure XV demonstrates, the eth-
ics provisions that are most clearly linked to these duties—truthfulness toward
the USPTO (the twelfth most frequently cited), fairness to opposing parties
(the sixteenth most frequently cited), and confidentiality (the twenty-first most
frequently cited)—all rank outside of the top ten most frequently cited rules.

Although there is some variation between trademark and patent practices,
these statistics must be interpreted with caution given the small number of
trademark cases in the dataset (twenty-three). So, despite the fact that there are
relatively more trademark cases which cite truthfulness in actions toward the
USPTO as the source of misconduct (13% versus 10% overall), that rule only
appears in a total of three trademark cases over the entire sixteen-year time
period.

Figure XVI provides further insight into the interrelationship between the
top ten ethics rules cited, in order to begin to identify typical patterns of mis-
conduct that give rise to disciplinary actions. Each cell contains the Pearson
correlation coefficient between the two ethics rules, with statistically signifi-
cant correlations denoted by one (significant at .05 level) or two (significant at
.01 level) stars. All correlations above .200 have been highlighted as well. The
strongest correlation is between diligence and communication, which is very
high at .504.

306 See discussion supra Part III.B and note 227.
307 See discussion supra Part III.B.
Using these correlations as a starting point, this Article identifies and describes four commonly observed patterns of misconduct that simultaneously implicate strongly correlated rules. This is the first such categorization in the scholarly literature, which could be replicated for other disciplinary authorities in the future. Each category is described in further detail below.

1. The Financial Fool

One of the most frequent patterns of misconduct leading to OED discipline involves practitioners who submit fee payments to the USPTO that are dishonored for insufficient funds, often triggering violations of the diligence and client property/accounting provisions. These disciplinary actions are nearly exclusively limited to patent practitioners due to various filing fees that must be submitted over the course of the life of a patent; the most common sanctions for violations include public reprimands and term suspensions.308

*In re Guth* in 2011 is paradigmatic of these disciplinary actions.309 The OED received information from the USPTO Office of Finance that Guth had issued ten checks that were dishonored due to insufficient funds. This infor-

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mation triggered an OED investigation that revealed a number of mishandled transactions and patent applications that were under threat of abandonment due to Guth’s financial neglect. Guth’s actions were the result of poor accounting practices, and he undertook remedial action and cooperated with the OED investigation to mitigate his misconduct. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, Guth received a two-year suspension that was stayed and replaced by a two-year probation.310

2. The Overcommitted Practitioner

Another common scenario giving rise to discipline is where an experienced practitioner begins neglecting a series of applications, apparently because the practitioner is overcommitted. They start missing deadlines,311 cutting corners,312 and leaving the client out of the communications loop.313 Eventually these actions come to light, often by a client who asks about the status of an abandoned application.314 At this point, the more ethical practitioners will reveal the misconduct and attempt to ameliorate it.315 But the less scrupulous will attempt to cover up their mistakes with lies—first to their client and sometimes even to the OED.316 These cases regularly involve violations of the diligence and communication provisions and sometimes will include misrepresentations to their clients and the OED.

In re Fuess in 2017 exemplifies one of the more extreme scenarios.317 Over thirty-six years of active patent practice, Fuess had prosecuted more than three hundred applications and had no disciplinary history prior to 2008. At that time, he neglected ten separate patent applications for four clients, which ultimately led to abandonment. Several of these applications were for one of his longstanding clients, who eventually confronted him about them and even-

310 See id.
312 See id. (rejecting respondent’s claim that he made a timely response and noting that the USPTO did not receive any such response).
313 See, e.g., In re Shaffer, No. D2014-18, at 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 31, 2014) (final order) (finding that respondent abandoned several trademark applications and failed to inform clients of the status of their applications).
314 See, e.g., In re Fuess, No. D2015-08, at 7 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 21, 2017) (initial decision and order) (describing how respondent faced discipline after a client inquired about the status of their abandoned application).
315 See, e.g., In re Lahser, No. D2016-27, at 4, 6 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 3, 2016) (final order) (suspending practitioner for twelve months, mitigated by the fact that the practitioner voluntarily made restitution to the client and cooperated with OED).
316 In re Fuess, No. D2015-08, at 7.
317 Id.
tually replaced him with another practitioner. Fuess repeatedly shaded the truth, first blaming it on the USPTO and eventually providing responses to the OED in which he misrepresented the nature of his relationships with clients and their wishes. Fuess received a three-year suspension from patent practice, justified in part by the breadth of his neglect and misrepresentations. 318 The initial hearing decision specifically noted that this misconduct was likely the result of Fuess’s burgeoning patent docket. 319

Unlike the financial fool, the overwhelmed practitioner may be a patent or trademark practitioner—though the vast majority of disciplinary actions in this category involve patent practice. 320 The sanctions also vary widely, with a larger percentage of public reprimands and shorter suspensions among those practitioners who neglect fewer applications and/or are fully responsive to the client and OED inquiries. 321

3. The Absent Advocate

Similar to the overwhelmed practitioner, the absent advocate neglects one or more client matters—but they do so by wholly failing to communicate, either with or on behalf of clients. 322 Invariably their non-responsiveness continues even after they become subject to an OED inquiry, which exacerbates their misconduct and leads to more punitive sanctions. 323 This category includes those who practice patent or trademark law and they often receive sanctions in the form of suspensions and occasionally exclusions. 324 Among the cited rule violations are failure to cooperate with the OED, failure to communicate, and failure to return unearned client funds.

318 Id.
319 See id. at 68 (“As the reasons Respondent offered for the neglect were not credible, the Director suggests that the reasons Respondent neglected the applications might be that he was overwhelmed with work . . . .”).
320 See, e.g., In re Shaffer, No. 2014-18, at 2–6 (disciplining a trademark practitioner).
321 See, e.g., In re Hill, No. D2001-06, at 11 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office July 26, 2004) (final decision) (reprimanding an attorney who neglected patent applications due to a firm docketing system, in part because “Respondent owned up to the errors of his own volition, filed petitions to revive in time to prevent any appreciable harm to his client, and paid the full costs associated with these petitions, approximately $20,000, out of his own pocket without prodding or debate”).
322 See, e.g., In re Schaefer, No. D2007-01, at 1–2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Apr. 30, 2007) (final order) (failing to prosecute a number of applications and communicate with clients or the USPTO).
323 See, e.g., In re Hill, No. D2014-41, at 11–16 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Feb. 19, 2015) (initial decision on default) (failing to respond, in part or in whole, to multiple RFIs from the OED).
324 See id.
In re Dao in 2015 illustrates this category of misconduct for a practitioner who prosecutes both patent and trademark applications. After filing three patent applications for three clients and two trademark applications for another client, Dao became completely unresponsive to office actions and failed to maintain client communications. He also continued to prosecute trademark applications—and failed to inform the USPTO—when he was administratively suspended from the practice of law by a state disciplinary authority. When the OED sent an RFI and multiple follow up notices, Dao did not respond for six months. Though he eventually provided a response, he did not provide a reason for his prolonged unresponsiveness. Eventually, Dao entered into a settlement agreement with the OED under which he would serve a six-month suspension from USPTO practice.

4. Patent Mill Participants

Whereas the preceding categories are not unique to USPTO practice, the patent mill is necessarily limited to patent practice. Although there are some variations in their structure, most patent mills employ very few patent practitioners and have a larger number of non-practitioners who conduct nearly all work for the organization. The practitioners have little to no contact with the inventor clients, relying on the non-practitioners to assist clients in navigating the patent application process. The patent mills’ services are widely advertised to prospective clients who are relatively unfamiliar with patent prosecution, and they leverage this fact—often along with unfounded claims of success—to acquire a large client base. These cases involve violations of competence, the relationship with non-practitioners, and the general misconduct provisions.

World Patent Marketing (WPM) was one of the more notorious patent mills. Its fraudulent practices were uncovered by a disgruntled customer in

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326 Id. at 3.
327 Id. at 5.
329 See id. at 32.
330 See, e.g., In re Montgomery, No. D2018-02, at 13 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 10, 2018) (final order) (“Respondent understood the general lack of sophistication of his clients, but neither Respondent nor [Montgomery Patent & Design, L.P.] ever explained to inventors the likelihood that the inventor would receive a patent of ‘useful scope,’ as described on [the Montgomery family businesses’] websites, if they pursued provisional, design, or utility patent protection.”).
331 See Carol D. Leonnig et al., Whitaker Fielded Early Fraud Complaints from Customers at Patent Company Even as He Championed It, Records Show, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://
conjunction with an undercover Federal Trade Commission investigation. The company’s sole registered patent practitioner, Marina Mikhailova, filed more than 400 patent applications under her registration number.\(^{332}\) Not surprisingly, Mikhailova did little work on the applications, relying without question on the assertions of non-practitioner employees without verifying the details of the filings or directly communicating with clients. As a WPM employee, she received all her compensation from the company and did not address the conflicts issues that inherently arose.\(^{333}\) Once the OED investigation began, however, she was extremely cooperative, acknowledging her misconduct and agreeing to serve a twenty-month suspension.\(^{334}\) Scott Cooper, the CEO of WPM, has been banned by the FTC from running an invention promotion business and forced to pay $1 million.\(^{335}\) A criminal investigation is also underway.\(^{336}\)

Taken together, these four categories of misconduct illustrate some of the most common types of misconduct that lead to OED investigations and public discipline. But it must be remembered that almost half of all disciplinary actions do not originate with the USPTO; rather, they are the result of the imposition of reciprocal discipline.\(^{337}\) Three of these categories—the financial fool, overwhelmed practitioner, and absent advocate—are not unique to USPTO practice and are easily detectable in that they leave a trail of dishonored checks, abandoned applications, and irate clients in their wake. Although patent mills do not inherently lead to substandard results, they are structured in such a way that some percentage of their clients will be dissatisfied with their work.\(^{338}\) Eventually, one or more of these clients may contact the USPTO and trigger an OED investigation.

Although it is important for the OED to continue to investigate and discipline practitioners who fall into one of the preceding categories, they only repre-


\(^{333}\) Id. at 3.

\(^{334}\) Id. at 5.


\(^{337}\) See discussion supra Part V.B.

\(^{338}\) See, e.g., In re Montgomery, No. D2018-02, at 2 (“Approximately, twenty percent (20%) of inventions that were submitted for suitability review were recommended by [the Montgomery family businesses] for a Research Report; the balance of approximately eighty percent (80%) were determined not to be suitable.”).
sent a subset of ways in which practitioners may commit misconduct in connection with their USPTO practice. In particular, there are very few disciplinary orders that involve practitioners who overreach in connection with their work, whether fraudulent (for example, filing a fraudulent specimen or falsely claiming that a trademark is being used in commerce) or misleading (for example, failing to disclose information material to patentability).\footnote{But see In re Swyers, No. D2016-20, at 1 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Jan. 26, 2017) (final order) (finding exclusion by consent where trademark lawyer allowed the filing of multiple fraudulent specimens by non-lawyer employees). Swyers is the only trademark attorney who was disciplined on this basis, notable in its own right. See id.} Although these types of misconduct are somewhat harder to detect, they are arguably even more dangerous given that an incorrectly issued patent or registered trademark can have an impact that extends beyond the practitioner-client relationship to investors, competitors, and the public at large.\footnote{See discussion supra Introduction; Iancu, Remarks at International Trademark Association, supra note 8.} Moreover, the USPTO has recognized the importance of regulating such misconduct by adopting regulations that require a stricter level of practitioner candor than the ABA Rules.\footnote{See discussion supra Part III.B.}

VI. THE PATH TOWARD USPTO DISCIPLINARY REFORM

As Part V illustrates, USPTO discipline is underutilized as a tool to regulate practitioner conduct and promote good faith in the prosecution of patent and trademark applications. Practitioner discipline rates are far below those found in state counterparts, particularly when accounting for the high percentage of USPTO reciprocal discipline cases. The OED’s sanctioning practice, although in some respects more punitive than its state counterparts, is aimed at promoting specific deterrence rather than general deterrence, thereby limiting its broader impact on the USPTO practitioner population. The actions that become the subject of discipline are largely not unique to the USPTO and are easy to identify. The types of misconduct before the USPTO that are more likely to have an effect on the broader public interest, however, are less likely to be subject to discipline.

Even if the lower disciplinary rates for USPTO practitioners are somewhat related to the nature of their work, the significant disparities between patent and trademark practitioners suggest that even though they are considered equals by the OED in theory, they are in fact receiving disparate focus and treatment. Patent practitioners are more likely to receive public discipline and receive more punitive sanctions, despite the fact that fewer rule violations are being cited in their disciplinary orders.
This Part responds to these weighty empirical findings, providing three recommendations that aim to improve the USPTO disciplinary system. Although these recommendations may be implemented in tandem in a synergistic fashion, each should have a positive effect. In developing these recommendations, special attention has been paid to regulating misconduct that currently slips through the cracks because there is neither a mechanism to detect it nor an entity (such as an adversary) that would naturally report it.

A. Recommendation 1: Trademark Attorney Registration

As discussed in Part II.B, trademark attorneys are not subject to separate substantive admissions requirements to practice before the USPTO; they only need to be an active member in good standing of any state bar. Nor is there an admissions process or registration like that which exists for patent practitioners; the USPTO first learns that an attorney is prosecuting trademarks when she files her first application on behalf of a client and provides her name and contact information.

The lack of a trademark attorney registration system greatly impacts the OED’s ability to regulate trademark attorneys. First, it makes it extremely difficult for the USPTO (and thereby the OED) to have an accurate picture of a trademark attorney’s prosecution history. Currently the USPTO would have to construct this history using the information provided on trademark application forms. But these forms require an attorney to provide little information and have no quality control checks in place. For example, an attorney might include a middle name on one application and not another, accidentally misspell part of their name, or legally change their name between filings. Unless a trademark attorney is extremely vigilant and detail-oriented, it is unlikely that the USPTO has a complete record of that attorney’s trademark filings. If each trademark attorney had a uniquely assigned registration number, similar to patent practitioners, the OED could more easily track and monitor their work.

Second, such a registration system would allow the OED to easily identify and track those dual practitioners, i.e. those who are prosecuting both patents and trademarks. This would have at least two benefits. First, the additional detail could aid the OED’s searches for practitioners who are neglecting multiple client matters, because those could involve both practice areas. Second, it would lessen the likelihood that a suspended or excluded patent practitioner could continue to prosecute trademark applications. This latter issue is

342 The USPTO compiles this data in its research datasets. See Trademark Case Files Dataset, supra note 295.
one that seems to occur with some frequency, perhaps because there is less formal oversight of trademark attorneys.343

Third, trademark attorney registration would provide the USPTO a better understanding of those who are actively engaged in trademark practice. As discussed in Part V.A, currently there is no easy way to ascertain the number of active trademark practitioners because they may choose to begin or end practice at any time without notifying the USPTO (and the data itself has a large percentage of incorrect or suspect attorney names). Were there a trademark attorney register, the OED could send inquiries to registered trademark attorneys about their practice as it currently does for patent practitioners and remove those who no longer intend to practice.344 Having a register would also significantly streamline the imposition of reciprocal discipline that appears to be more regularly imposed for patent practitioners than their trademark counterparts.345

Fourth, maintaining a trademark practitioner registry would provide the USPTO with a way to communicate with those practitioners who are subject to its regulation. This communication channel could be used to provide information of interest about emerging issues that implicate the USPTO Rules.346 Further, it could reinforce the notion that the OED is paying attention to trademark attorneys and that they should conduct themselves accordingly.

Although any registration system is not without cost, a trademark attorney registration need not be as comprehensive or costly as the current patent practitioner registration system that has been maintained—seemingly without debate—for decades. In terms of the substantive admission requirements, the USPTO could continue its practice of permitting any actively licensed attorney to prosecute trademarks. At most, an attorney applicant would have to prove the fact of an active admission in good standing (thereby avoiding unauthorized practice issues from the outset), provide basic contact information, and then be assigned a unique registration number. Trademark attorneys could then

343 See, e.g., In re Frayne, No. D2016-09, at 4–5 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 17, 2016) (initial decision on default) (excluding practitioner who continued to represent trademark applicants and registrants before the USPTO while suspended from practice).


345 Of the 184 reciprocal discipline cases, 139 (75%) involve patent practitioners, 43 (23%) involve trademark practitioners, and 2 (1%) involve dual practitioners. The dual practitioners statistic is low in part because there is no easy way to determine whether some of the disciplined patent practitioners also prosecute trademarks.

incur an ongoing duty to update their information and to notify the OED if there is a change in their state bar status.

**B. Recommendation 2: Strategic USPTO Practitioner Audits with Examiner Input**

Along with the multitude of benefits that a trademark practitioner registration system could provide, the USPTO could also benefit from instituting a strategic practitioner audit program (PAP). This idea is not entirely novel. In 2017, the USPTO instituted the Post-Registration Proof of Audit Program (Use Audit Program) to tackle the issue of so-called “trademark dead wood,” that is, existing registrations that no longer reflect the classes of goods and services in which the trademark is being used in commerce. Its initial pilot program was quite successful, with over half of the randomly audited registrations containing registrations that could not be substantiated.

The USPTO should experiment with a different type of audit—one that focuses on practitioners rather than their work. Even though both patent and trademark applications receive examiner review, they concentrate on whether the application under consideration meets the relevant formal and substantive requirements. By contrast, a practitioner audit would review all of the practitioner’s filings and other interactions with and representations to the USPTO to determine the propriety of their conduct. The validity of the underlying intellectual property would be a secondary factor of this type of PAP and it is quite likely that audits would be triggered by a practitioner’s unsuccessful applications.

Although the PAP could randomly select its targets, experience suggests that such audits would be more effective if they were conducted strategically—similar to a tax audit. Among the criteria that could be considered in deter-

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348 See Kappers & Michael, supra note 347.

349 See SUE A. PURVIS, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT EXAMINER 8–9 (2013), [https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/offices/oua/04082013_StonyBrookU.pdf](https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/offices/oua/04082013_StonyBrookU.pdf) (describing the role of the patent examiner as requiring the examiner to “[i]ssue [v]alid [p]atents” and to “[a]ct as an advocate for the [p]ublic” in ensuring that patents are only issued in accordance with the law).

350 See IRS Audits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., [https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/irs-audits](https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/irs-audits) (“[S]ometimes returns are selected based solely on a statistical formula. We compare your tax return against ‘norms’ for similar returns. We develop these ‘norms’ from audits of a statistically valid random sample of returns, as part of the National
mining which practitioners to audit would be those having a relatively high percentage of denied applications. Though this fact is not dispositive of misconduct, this may be an indication that a practitioner is either intentionally or recklessly overreaching in their work. Over time, additional audit criteria could be identified and eventually an algorithm could be developed to pinpoint suspect activities with precision.\textsuperscript{351}

But the first line of defense against practitioner misconduct is already in place. In the course of their daily work, patent and trademark examiners are reviewing numerous applications and responses filed by practitioners. Not every examination denial (or even the vast majority) will indicate potential practitioner misconduct, but denials could help examiners identity practitioners who should be subject to the PAP or, in more egregious cases, make a direct referral to the OED. Although the frequency of these direct referrals is not publicly known, the overwhelming majority of disciplinary actions appears to have originated from identifiable financial misconduct or from neglect that later became apparent to a client.\textsuperscript{352}

Instituting the PAP will come at a cost. An audit process must be identified and executed, requiring auditors to extensively review practitioner conduct and engage with audited practitioners. In addition, it will likely lead to additional OED investigations and formal processes. These expenses, however, are justified if it is assumed that the USPTO should be increasing the frequency of its discipline. Further, the PAP could be streamlined over to defray some of these costs. The USPTO could facilitate greater information sharing between the examiners and auditors, which should theoretically decrease the auditors’ work. Audited practitioners would also be required to respond to a series of questions (similar to an RFI), which would then guide the rest of the audit.

As with the first recommendation, the PAP could provide a number of secondary benefits as well. First, the audits could reveal fraudulent or otherwise ineligible patents or trademarks. The revelation of fraud is in and of itself a concern worth addressing, but this could also tackle rising concerns about the Research Program the IRS conducts. The IRS uses this program to update return selection information. In spite of decreases in IRS personnel, the threat of a tax audit is heavily discussed and tied to particular categories of reported activities. See Thomas Heath, \textit{Your Chances of an IRS Audit Are Way Down. But Keep It on the Up and Up.}, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://wapo.st/3bhkkq2 [https://perma.cc/8S8U-5RRG].\textsuperscript{351}


\textsuperscript{351} See discussion \textit{ supra} Part V.C (discussing the common patterns of misconduct).
depletion and clutter. Second, the PAP could have a deterrent effect on those practitioners who are subject to an audit. Even if the audit does not reveal misconduct giving rise to formal discipline, the audit findings could dissuade those practitioners from continuing certain practices that could lead to future discipline. Third, and perhaps more importantly, the potential of being subject to an audit could have a general deterrent effect on high volume practitioners who might otherwise be susceptible to committing misconduct in the face of a growing docket and demanding clients.

C. Recommendation 3: Broader Dissemination of OED Disciplinary Function

There is existing literature on the advantages of ensuring that the work of a state disciplinary authority is adequately publicized to practitioners and members of the general public. Information about disciplinary actions can increase practitioners’ knowledge about the types of misconduct that they should guard against. The public dissemination of practitioner discipline also has an expressive component as well, signaling to practitioners that the

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353 See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945, 1041 (2018) (concluding that trademark depletion and congestion is a real concern, despite popular belief to the contrary).


Most studies show that the [general deterrence] effect of audits overwhelms the direct revenue effect. One recent study estimates the general deterrence effect is over ten times the direct revenue effect, and that a doubling of audit funding at the federal level would increase taxes by as much as 60 times the cost of the additional audits.

Id.

355 See Levin, supra note 239, at 2 (identifying the benefits and drawbacks of greater transparency, and concluding that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks). One author writes:

Making disciplinary proceedings more available to the public, particularly by ensuring access to online records as the digital age requires, advances several goals the ABA has set for attorney discipline, including consistency in punishments, attorney awareness of wrongful conduct, integrity of the legal profession, protecting and educating the public, ensuring effective assistance, and creating competition for clients.

Desch, supra note 239, at 923 (citations omitted).

OED is committed to ensuring that practitioners act in accordance with the USPTO Rules.\textsuperscript{357}

For the general public, broader dissemination of OED discipline can raise awareness about the disciplinary process and increase the likelihood that clients and other affected persons will report complaints to the OED for investigation. Furthermore, it can have a positive impact on the public’s belief that the USPTO is operating as an effective gatekeeper for the issuance of patents and trademarks.\textsuperscript{358}

Currently the USPTO does very little to publicize the OED’s disciplinary function. The OED section of the website is difficult to navigate and requires users to actively look for information on discipline. There is no public information on the website about the imposition of warning letters (private discipline), including the number of letters issued or the types of misconduct that give rise to such letters.\textsuperscript{359} Although the OED Reading Room website allows users to search for public discipline, users need to understand how disciplinary actions are organized in order to perform an effective search. Even then, the search returns PDF versions of documents with descriptive labels such as “Final Order,” which means that a user has to read the entire document to learn the specifics about the practitioner’s misconduct and sanction imposed.\textsuperscript{360} Again, there is no compiled information on the public website about the frequency of public discipline or the types of misconduct that may lead to public discipline.

This Article suggests a variety of measures that could increase the visibility and understanding of USPTO discipline, which vary in terms of the administrative time required. First, the USPTO website could be redesigned so that discipline would be featured more prominently. A few simple changes to the site architecture and menu would enable website users to quickly find information about the OED’s disciplinary function and ways that aggrieved persons can provide relevant material to the OED so that it can begin an investigation.\textsuperscript{361}

\textsuperscript{357} See generally Mark J. Fucile, Public Discipline Is More “Public” Than Ever: The Impact of Web-Based Lawyer Rating Services on Discipline, 24 PROF. LAW. 1 (2016) (discussing the impact of publicity of attorney discipline on lawyer conduct).

\textsuperscript{358} Cf. Carpenter & Cluderay, supra note 241, at 739–40 (discussing the public benefit to increased transparency of attorney disciplinary proceedings).

\textsuperscript{359} The USPTO presents selected statistics at its Patent Law Institute but the files and data are not posted consistently on the USPTO website. See generally USPTO Presentation, supra note 146.

\textsuperscript{360} See FOIA Documents, supra note 163.

\textsuperscript{361} For an example of a well-designed and comprehensive site, see Lawyer Discipline, N.C. ST. BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/lawyer-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/4MLC-E3TA]. From the main page, users can search past disciplinary orders, read a roadmap of the disciplinary process, view annual disciplinary reports, and learn how to file a grievance or engage in alternative dispute resolution. Id.
Second, the USPTO website could include pages related to the disciplinary process and data on the imposition of private and public discipline. Even though the specific contents of warning letters should remain private, there is an opportunity to share redacted information on these troubling actions that could, if repeated, lead to the imposition of public discipline.\footnote{See, e.g., OFFICE OF COUNSEL, N.C. STATE BAR, 2018 ANN.

Third, the USPTO website could include clear and easily accessible information about the imposition of public discipline for specific practitioners. Instead of requiring interested persons to read through numerous (and often lengthy) documents to glean an understanding of USPTO public discipline, the USPTO could produce short summaries of these actions and publish them on the website.\footnote{See, e.g., Archived Issues, STATE BAR CAL., http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/News-Events/California-Bar-Journal/Attorney-Discipline/attorney-who-flouted-court-orders-stripped-of-law-license [https://perma.cc/F89D-DH5U] (providing updates on latest disciplinary actions).} Although some of the Official Gazette notices include such information, they are not written at a consistent level of detail and are not compiled together in one location for reference or review.

Fourth, the USPTO could develop a series of formal ethics opinions. These types of opinions are frequently published by state disciplinary authorities and enable the authority to communicate definitive guidance on frequently encountered or emerging issues.\footnote{For an example of a comprehensive website containing formal ethics opinions, see Adopted Opinions, N.C. STATE BAR, https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/ethics/adopted-opinions/ [https://perma.cc/DMS7-8S79].} At their best, these formal opinions can guide practitioner conduct so that they do not become the subject of an investigation. If not complied with, the formal ethics opinions can aptly demonstrate that a practitioner committed misconduct.\footnote{See Alice Neece Mine, How the State Bar Rules on Questions of Legal Ethics, N.C. ST. B. Q., Spring 1994, at 6, 6 (discussing the significance of formal ethics opinions and ethics advisories in North Carolina).}

With regard to the costs associated with the foregoing suggestions, the first three would take little administrative time and expense. The USPTO compiles much of this information for other purposes already, and thus the additional time would be for altering the website architecture, creating a modest amount of web-friendly content, and then making regular updates.\footnote{See generally USPTO Presentation, supra note 146.} Though formal ethics opinions would take significantly more time to craft and publish, they could have considerably greater deterrent value—particularly given the low number of formal disciplinary decisions that have been published since the 2013 adoption of the USPTO Rules. Indeed, the USPTO had contemplated that...
practitioners would be able to increasingly use disciplinary decisions to guide their conduct, a circumstance that has not come to fruition.\textsuperscript{367}

CONCLUSION

Over the last several decades, the USPTO has come to recognize the critical role that practitioners play in the provision and enforcement of intellectual property rights. They serve as trusted technical and legal intermediaries between applicants and the USPTO—simultaneously expected to advocate for their clients and act in good faith by fully disclosing information that could potentially damage their clients’ chances of success. It is for these reasons that the USPTO has invested significant energy in professionalizing the practitioner ranks, both for admissions and discipline. The OED has considerable infrastructure and processes already in place. Without knowing more, one might assume that the OED is likewise acting in a manner similar to other state disciplinary authorities in regulating practitioners.

Yet as the results of this original empirical study have demonstrated, the OED has failed to fully leverage its disciplinary authority, particularly in its regulation of trademark attorneys. Overall, practitioner discipline rates are less than one-fourth of that which is imposed by state authorities, and nearly half of the OED’s cases involve the imposition of reciprocal discipline imposed by another state. Furthermore, trademark discipline comprises less than one-quarter of all OED cases, and trademark attorneys generally receive less punitive sanctions than do patent practitioners despite violating more ethics rules on average. This disparity between patent- and trademark-related discipline may not be all that surprising, however, given the differences in how the USPTO regulates these two groups of professionals.

Over the sixteen-year period under study, USPTO discipline was used primarily as a tool to regulate individual practitioners who have committed easily detected types of misconduct. Three of the four common patterns of misconduct that were identified and described—the financial fool, overcommitted practitioner, and absent advocate—are not unique to patent practice and do not relate to the central place that the duties of candor and good faith occupy in the USPTO’s regulatory purpose.

With fraudulent and suspicious activity before the USPTO on the rise, it is now time for the OED to use its disciplinary authority to more effectively serve the public interest. With the adoption of the newest version of the USPTO Rules, there is already a regulatory mechanism in place to sanction

these types of misconduct. But this mechanism has largely gone unused and its workings are largely unknown, even to those who are subject to it.

The three recommendations provided in this Article present a first step towards strategically leveraging the threat of practitioner discipline to promote more ethical conduct before the USPTO. Rather than being conceived as draconian measures, however, these recommendations reinforce the notion that USPTO practitioners are entrusted to act responsibly and in good faith—not only in relation to their individual clients, but also in their entire practice before the USPTO.

This Article also has provided a blueprint for how to conduct empirical studies of practitioner/attorney discipline, which can be emulated for other disciplinary authorities so that they may better understand and improve their work. In conducting the background research in preparation for this study, the author was surprised that there is very little scholarly work on the subject. Additional studies would enable disciplinary authorities to identify best practices and to align their work in accordance with their mission and the purposes of discipline that they wish to prioritize and promote, as was done for the USPTO in this Article.