4-1-2009

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Recommended Citation
Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA, 29 B.C. Third World L.J. 223 (2009), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol29/iss2/1

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AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES, REASONABLE EFFORTS, AND ASFA

Kathleen S. Bean*

Abstract: This Article identifies circumstances that justify a state’s refusal to provide reasonable efforts to reunite parents with their abused or neglected children. Since 1980, federal legislation has explicitly required states receiving federal foster care dollars to make reasonable efforts to reunite parents with children removed because of abuse or neglect. Congress responded to widespread concerns that these efforts were responsible for children being returned to unsafe homes or being left in foster care limbo. Congress’s response, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), identifies three exceptions to the reasonable efforts requirement. This Article uses the aggravated circumstances exception to identify situations where reunification efforts should be denied. ASFA’s exceptions, including aggravated circumstances, recognize the harm that results from making efforts to reunite in situations not appropriate for reunification. The reasonable efforts provision recognizes the harm that results from disrupting the parent-child relationship. To best protect a child against both of these harms, a court should first consider all relevant circumstances, including the effects of the parental conduct, any derivative harm to the child, and any remedial efforts by the parents. Before denying reasonable efforts to reunite, the court should also determine that the past or current harm or parental conduct is sufficient to trigger an ASFA exception; determine that reunification efforts are likely to inflict a very serious harm—either a return to a dangerous home or a stay in foster care that is too long; and identify a nexus between the triggering harm and the predicted harm.

Introduction

In 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) was signed into law.1 With ASFA, Congress sought to achieve several objectives for children who are abused, neglected, or abandoned by their parents.2

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As its name suggests, one was to increase the number of adoptions for these children. Increasing adoptions, however, was primarily a means of serving and complementing the underlying objective of the Act reflected in the “safe families” part of the name. Foremost, Congress sought to shift the pendulum of the child protection system away from what many saw as an unreasonable emphasis on family preservation and towards permanency, and thus health and safety, for the children.

Congress was specifically concerned with a provision in the earlier Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) that required states receiving federal foster care funding to make “reasonable efforts” to reunite families with children removed from their homes. ASFA’s legislative history reveals a widespread perception, by Congress and others, that reasonable efforts had become unreasonable, resulting in a system that was out of balance. States were too focused on efforts to return abused and neglected children to their homes, thus endangering children in the name of family preservation.

Returning children to homes made safe, and doing so quickly, does protect the children; it minimizes the psychological damage that can come from disrupting the parent-child relationship. Returning children to homes that are not yet safe, however, does not. Nor does requiring children to wait in foster care for years, while efforts are expended to make their homes safe. For a child in one of these situations, health and safety often means adoption by a new family.


See Roberts, *supra* note 2, at 113 n.5.

See id.

See generally *id.* (discussing the shift towards protecting children’s health and safety and away from protecting family integrity).


See id. at 8.


See id. at 646–48.

Id. at 655–56.

To better protect these children, Congress attempted to clarify AACWA’s reasonable efforts requirement.\(^\text{13}\) A key part of this clarification was to single out a handful of circumstances where efforts to reunite were not required.\(^\text{14}\) States were granted discretion to bypass reasonable efforts when a parent had committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent; when a parent had been complicit in such a murder or manslaughter, or an attempted murder or manslaughter; when a parent had committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent; and when the parent’s rights to a sibling of the child had been terminated involuntarily.\(^\text{15}\) One additional circumstance was more ambiguous, however.\(^\text{16}\) Under ASFA, “reasonable efforts to reunite children with their parents” are not required if “the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse).”\(^\text{17}\)

Providing states with the explicit discretion to deny reasonable efforts when circumstances indicate that children and parents cannot safely be reunited within a reasonable time should protect children.\(^\text{18}\) ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception, however, by itself, fails to provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing cases where reasonable efforts should be bypassed.\(^\text{19}\) Director of the Children’s Defense Fund MaryLee Allen, warned of this danger in an early hearing on the provi-

This bill addresses the frustrating problem of how to promote adoption of foster children who through no fault of their own are unable to return to their natural parents and who have languished for far too long in the foster care system. It is time to stop the revolving door of foster care that sends children from home to home to home with little or no hope that they will live with the same families from one month to another. . . . H.R. 867 places the safety and well-being of children above efforts by the State to reunite them with biological parents who have abused or neglected them.

\(^{13}\) See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 7–11.


\(^{15}\) Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii).

\(^{16}\) See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).

\(^{17}\) Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (emphasis added).

\(^{18}\) See id. § 671(a)(15)(D).

\(^{19}\) See id.
When addressing legislative efforts to clarify the reasonable efforts provision, Allen advised that: “Congress must proceed cautiously so as to not create new problems by using terms that are subject to numerous interpretations (such as ‘aggravated circumstances’) or widening the arc of pendulum swings in an area of policy that is already too volatile for children’s well-being.”

Similarly, shortly after ASFA was enacted, Sheila Harrigan, Executive Director of the New York Public Welfare Association, warned that New York needed to statutorily define “aggravated circumstances,” to give courts some direction for when to bypass reunification efforts. “Otherwise,” she explained, “much time, [effort], and money will be wasted before case law [will] slowly begin to define the concept of aggravated circumstances.”

The impact on the health and safety of children when reunification efforts are not required can be tremendous. It ends the state’s “responsibility to provide services,” it ends the “duty to facilitate and encourage visitation,” and it “almost inevitably places the parent just steps away from termination of parental rights.” Without reasonable efforts, the opportunity to address the problems that contributed to the child’s removal and to work towards reunification to avoid the damage from disrupting the parent-child relationship is remote.

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21 The “Adoption Promotion Act of 1997”: Hearing on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 49 (1997) (statement of MaryLee Allen, Director, Child Welfare and Mental Health Division, Children’s Defense Fund) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 867]. Allen noted that most of the cases to which child protection workers are assigned present health and safety concerns: “[T]he challenge for the worker in interpreting the reasonable efforts provision is to decide when services or other efforts can reasonably prevent these health and safety concerns from endangering the child.” Id. at 50.
23 Id. (“It is very likely that case law definition would also result in uneven definition across the state, which would be unfair to children and families. Everyone involved should be on fair notice of what egregious abusive actions may result in a court ruling that efforts will not be made to reunite the family.”)
25 Id. (noting that without services and visitation provided for the parent, “there is little, if any, hope for reunification”).
26 See IV CHRISTINE P. COSTANTAKOS, NEBRASKA JUVENILE COURT LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.2(E)(1) (2008); see also In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 435 (Neb. 2003) (noting that “dispensing with reasonable efforts at reunification frequently amounts to a substantial step toward termination of parental rights”).
ness of the aggravated circumstances exception contributes to the likelihood that life-altering decisions will be arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory.\textsuperscript{27} The phrase invites inconsistent, unpredictable decisions about when a state should expend efforts to reunite a child with his or her parents.\textsuperscript{28}

The aggravated circumstances exception was written in anticipation of decisions to forego reasonable efforts at the outset of dependency cases.\textsuperscript{29} Decisions on whether a state should discontinue reasonable efforts once begun, however, raise the same question: based on what we know about this child and these parents at this time, will reunification efforts so threaten the child’s health or safety that we should forego or discontinue those efforts? By examining the aggravated circumstance exception in detail, I hope to contribute to a more systematic approach that will help judges, lawyers, and social workers responsible for answering this question.\textsuperscript{30}

My analysis of ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception first chronicles what seems fairly apparent—the purpose of Congress in passing ASFA. It includes a quick review of the 1980 AACWA and its reasonable efforts provision, along with a more detailed discussion of the related provisions of ASFA. I then look at the legislative history of ASFA, with a particular focus on reasonable efforts and the aggravated circumstances exception. At the same time I examine the case law, especially those cases that have made pointed efforts to define aggravated circumstances.

Ultimately, I conclude that decisions to deny reasonable efforts must be based on more than the existence of past or current “aggravated circumstances.” A decision to deny reasonable efforts must articulate how the circumstances predict a sufficiently serious harm to the child should reunification efforts be attempted. While I offer an analytical approach for these cases, I have no neat and tidy solution for the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} See Hearing on H.R. 867, supra note 21, at 49–50; Burt, supra note 22, at 314–15.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} See Hearing on H.R. 867, supra note 21, at 49–50.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} According to a 2002 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, limited data suggest that some judges are reluctant to allow the state to bypass reunification efforts. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Foster Care: Recent Legislation Helps States Focus on Finding Permanent Homes for Children, but Long-Standing Barriers Remain 24–25 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02585.pdf (reporting that “some judges believe that parents should always be given the opportunity to reunify with their children”). There should be reluctance. But with a better understanding of what should constitute aggravated circumstances, and why, judges may be more willing to deny reasonable efforts when necessary to protect the health and safety of the child.
\end{itemize}
individuals who must ultimately make these difficult decisions. I hope, however, that my discussion will contribute to the health and safety of the children in the dependency system.

I do make certain assumptions when writing in this area, all of which are consistent with ASFA: first, as specifically provided by ASFA, a child’s health and safety must be paramount;\(^{31}\) second, as is implicit in ASFA, preserving the parent-child relationship presumptively contributes to a child’s health and safety;\(^{32}\) third, some parents are so harmful to their children that “the harm outweighs the presumptive benefit of the parent-child relationship”;\(^{33}\) and finally, children are usually harmed by a long and indefinite stay in foster care.\(^{34}\) Each of these assumptions can conflict with another, however, and identifying an ana-


\(^{32}\) See Roberts, supra note 2, at 117 (stating that “[c]hildren have an interest in maintaining a bond with their parents and other family members and are terribly injured when this bond is disrupted. The reason for limiting state intrusion in the home, therefore, is not only a concern for parental privacy, but also the recognition that children suffer when separated from their parents and community”); see also Ex Parte D.J., 645 So. 2d 303, 305 (Ala. 1994) (citing Striplin v. Ware, 36 Ala. 87, 89–90 (1860)) (stating that “[t]he law devolves the custody of infant children upon their parents, not so much upon the ground of natural right in the latter, as because the interests of the children, and the good of the public, will, as a general rule, be thereby promoted”); Bean, supra note 31, at 322–23; Gordon, supra note 9, at 652–54 (noting that the reasonable efforts provision in AFSA minimizes the chances children will suffer a harmful separation from their parents).

\(^{33}\) Gordon, supra note 9, at 654–55 (noting that “an abusive parent assaults psychological as well as physical health, ultimately destroying the child’s ability to feel safe, wanted, and loved”); see In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“When parents act in accordance with the natural bonds of parental affection, preservation of the parent-child bond is prima facie in the best interest of the child, and the state has no justification to terminate that bond. On the other hand, a court may properly terminate parental bonds which exist in form but not in substance when preservation of the parental bond would consign a child to an indefinite, unhappy, and unstable future devoid of the irreducible minimum parental care to which that child is entitled.”); see also Bean, supra note 31, at 322–23.

\(^{34}\) Gordon, supra note 9, at 655 (“Recent empirical work confirms . . . that long periods of multiple [foster] placements or ‘drift’ will be seriously harmful. Even in a loving, long-term foster home, the uncertainty of . . . foster care . . . may cause hardship.” (internal footnote omitted)); see In re Guardianship of DMH, 736 A.2d 1261, 1270 (N.J. 1999) (concerning children who had been in long term foster care: “a delay in establishing a stable and permanent home will cause harm to both these children”); Bean, supra note 31, at 322–23; Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for Children When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 413, 463 (2003) (noting the “potential negative consequences of foster care”).
lytical approach that yields consistent and appropriate results for abused and neglected children is the challenge.

I. Background: State Legislative and Judicial Responses to ASFA

Because ASFA explicitly charged the states with the task of defining aggravated circumstances, a quick survey of state legislative and judicial responses to this delegation provides context for this discussion. 35

A. State Legislation

With some exceptions, state legislative definitions model the federal legislation by providing lists of circumstances or conduct that can constitute aggravated circumstances. 36 Some closely adhere to the ASFA language and say no more; the Georgia statute allows a bypass of reunification efforts when “[t]he parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances which may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse.” 37 Most include some version of the examples in the federal provision. 38 Beyond that, however, the legislation varies greatly and demonstrates the need for a focused inquiry on the meaning of aggravated circumstances. 39

Some listed provisions are very specific. 40 For example, those of North Dakota declare that reasonable efforts are not required when the parent “[h]as been incarcerated under a sentence for which the latest release date is: (1) [i]n the case of a child age nine or older, after the child’s majority; or (2) [i]n the case of a child, after the child is twice the child’s current age, measured in days.” 41 Moreover, Utah law

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35 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2006)) (“Reasonable efforts . . . shall not be required . . . if the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse)”)(emphasis added).
38 See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 36 (listing when reasonable efforts to reunify a family are not required under the provisions of ASFA).
39 See id. at 7–45 (listing aggravated circumstances unique to certain state laws).
41 N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(3)(b).
permits the termination of reunification efforts when “[t]he parent permitted the child to reside . . . at a location where the parent knew or should have known that a clandestine laboratory operation was located.”42 Other provisions are more encompassing.43 South Dakota law allows termination when a parent has “subjected the child or another child to torture, sexual abuse, abandonment for at least six months, chronic physical, mental, or emotional injury, or chronic neglect.”44

In addition, some of the qualifying circumstances are defined by parental conduct and some by the effect of the conduct on the child; some exceptions use both.45 States that include provisions requiring only that the parent has subjected the child to certain parental conduct include Missouri, where no reasonable efforts are required if the parent “has subjected the child to a severe act or recurrent acts of physical, emotional or sexual abuse toward the child.”46 Oklahoma includes chronic drug abuse as a ground for denying reunification efforts, without regard to the effect on the child.47

On the other hand, many states refer to the effect of the circumstances.48 A South Dakota provision concerning chronic drug and alcohol abuse states that reasonable efforts are not required when the parent “[h]as a documented history of abuse and neglect associated with chronic alcohol or drug abuse.”49 A Nevada provision similarly refers to the effect of the parental conduct: no reasonable efforts are required when the parent “[c]aused the abuse or neglect of the child . . . which resulted in substantial bodily harm to the abused or neglected child.”50 Under Arizona law, no reasonable efforts are required when “a child is the victim of serious physical or emotional injury by the parent.”51 A Florida provision encompasses result by not requiring

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44 Id.
47 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 7003–4.6(13) (“The parent . . . of the child has a history of extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the deprived petition which brought that child to the court’s attention.”)
reasonable efforts when the parent has engaged in “egregious conduct” that “threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child’s sibling.” 52

Other states use “aggravated” as an adjective to suggest that the harm or detriment needs to be substantial, either inherently or in its effect. 53 For example, New Jersey law considers whether the parent has “subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse.” 54 North Carolina’s statute also emphasizes the aggravated aspect in its definition: “Any circumstance attending to the commission of an act of abuse or neglect which increases its enormity or adds to its injurious consequences, including, but not limited to, abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse.” 55

Several states favor the fairly encompassing “subjected the child to” language of ASFA. 56 Some provisions explicitly include circumstances involving another child or sibling; some do not. 57 For example, Alaska includes an exception for when the parent has “subjected the child to circumstances that pose a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety; these circumstances include abandonment, sexual abuse, torture, chronic mental injury, or chronic physical harm.” 58 South Dakota uses close to the same language, but also includes other children. 59

Most state legislative provisions focus on current or past conduct when defining aggravated circumstances and list parental conduct, or results of parental conduct, that qualify. 60 Many, however, include a general provision or catch-all phrase that focuses on, or explicitly encompasses, the future of the child. 61 In effect, this latter group of stat-

57 See Alaska Stat. § 47.10.086(c)(1); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1.
58 Alaska Stat. § 47.10.086(c)(1).
59 S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(3) (stating that reunification is not required when a parent has “subjected the child or another child to torture, sexual abuse, abandonment for at least six months, chronic physical, mental, or emotional injury, or chronic neglect if the neglect was a serious threat to the safety of the child or another child”).
utes requires the state to consider whether remediation will be effective.\textsuperscript{62} For example, under New Mexico’s statute, a court may find that reasonable efforts are not warranted when “the efforts would be futile.”\textsuperscript{63} North Carolina states that reasonable efforts are not required when “[s]uch efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.”\textsuperscript{64} Connecticut provides that courts may terminate parental rights without reasonable efforts if the “parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”\textsuperscript{65} Arkansas allows bypass of reasonable efforts when “a determination has been made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification.”\textsuperscript{66} Iowa requires the state to establish, in addition to physical or sexual abuse or neglect, that the “abuse or neglect posed a significant risk to the life of the child or constituted imminent danger to the child” and that there is “clear and convincing evidence that the offer or receipt of services would not correct the conditions which led to the abuse or neglect of the child within a reasonable period of time.”\textsuperscript{67}

### B. Judicial Responses

State courts have also tried to define aggravated circumstances.\textsuperscript{68} Opinions in two cases, one from an appellate court and one from a trial court, illustrate some of the issues.\textsuperscript{69} In the first, \textit{State v. Risland}, the parents claimed that the trial court improperly relieved child protective services from making reasonable efforts to reunite the child and parents.\textsuperscript{70} A unanimous panel of the Oregon Court of Appeals found that the circumstances of the case qualified for the state’s aggravated cir-

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\textsuperscript{63} \textit{N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-22(C)(1).}

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1).}

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17(a)-112(j)(1); see also § 17(a)-111b(b)(1) (incorporating by reference § 17(a)-112(j)).}

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(6)(A).}

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(i)(2), (3) (incorporated by reference in § 232.57(2)(b)).}


\textsuperscript{69} \textit{See Smith, 896 A.2d at 189–90; Risland, 51 P.3d at 705.}

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Risland, 51 P.3d at 699.}
cumstances exception. The 2002 opinion illustrates the relationship of the aggravated circumstances to the future of the child before the court.

*Risland* involved a nine-year-old child, the youngest of three children. The applicable Oregon statute defined aggravated circumstances as “including, but not limited to” seven specific or groups of circumstances, such as “[t]he parent has subjected any child to intentional starvation or torture.” It also included ASFA’s other discretionary exceptions, including when there has been a prior involuntary termination of parental rights or when a parent has committed murder or involuntary manslaughter of another one of his or her children. The *Risland* facts did not fit into any of the enumerated examples, however, and the court was faced with defining aggravated circumstances generally.

The court initially focused on the operative phrase, examining first the meaning of “aggrevate.” It looked at the dictionary definition—“to make worse, more serious, or more severe: INTENSIFY”—and at the specific circumstances listed in the statute. Relying on plain meaning and the canon of *ejusdem generis*, the court concluded that “aggravated” circumstances “are those involving relatively more serious types of harm or detriment to a child.”

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71 Id. at 699, 706. While the Oregon Court of Appeals in *Risland* did not specifically refer to ASFA, the same court noted in a later decision that the Oregon legislature had adopted its aggravated circumstances provision in response to ASFA. State v. Williams, 130 P.3d 801, 804 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (“In response to ASFA, the Oregon legislature enacted Senate Bill (SB) 408 (1999) . . . [which] sets out three categories of circumstances where a court may excuse . . . reasonable efforts to make possible the child’s return home . . . .”).

72 See *Risland*, 51 P.3d at 705–06.

73 Id. at 699.


75 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.340(5); *Risland*, 51 P.3d at 703–04.

76 See *Risland*, 51 P.3d at 705.

77 See id.

78 Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 41 (unabr. ed. 1993)).

79 Id. at 705 (citing State v. Johnston, 31 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)) (“[U]nder [the] principle of *ejusdem generis*, the general category will partake of the same characteristics as the specifically enumerated examples.”). In *Modern Statutory Interpretation*, the authors explain the doctrine of *ejusdem generis* as “[w]hen general words in a statute precede or follow the designation of specific things . . . , the general words should be construed to include only objects similar in nature to the specific words.” LINDA JELLIUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, *Modern Statutory Interpretation: Problems, Theories, and Lawyerin Strategies* 159 (2006). The authors also note that *ejusdem generis* is a species of another canon, *noscitur a sociis*. *Id.* *Noscitur a sociis* requires that “the meaning of words
The court then looked at the plain meaning of “circumstances”—defined as “the total complex of essential attributes and attendant adjuncts”—and concluded that a court could consider not only the parents’ conduct, but also the “results of those actions and conditions, including effects, direct and indirect, on [the] child.”

The court also noted that the specifically enumerated circumstances in Oregon’s statute that could constitute aggravated circumstances “may be found in regard to ‘any’ child,” not only the child before the court.

The court considered a number of circumstances, including the parents’ problems and conduct. The opinion noted the parents had a history of drug abuse—another child was born with methamphetamine in his system, the mother was convicted of methamphetamine possession and driving under the influence, and the father had been convicted of several felonies “including drug manufacture, weapons possession, and child neglect.” In addition, the children had witnessed domestic violence between their mother and her boyfriend, and the father had been convicted of assault based on a domestic violence incident with his girlfriend. The court then looked at the effects of the conduct—the current and past harms—first, to a sibling, who had “suffered severe mental injury as a result of his exposure to significant domestic violence, the parents’ drug use, and a highly unstable home life.” It then recounted the harms to the child before the court, noting that he had “suffered serious psychological and social damage including, among other disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and parent-child relational disorder,” and that the “disorders were caused, in substantial part, by the parents’ conduct.”

The factor that seemed to distinguish the circumstances before the court as appropriate for an aggravated circumstances exception, however, was what the court deemed a second “aggravated” circumstance—

that are placed together in a statute . . . be determined in light of the words with which they are associated.” Id. at 151.

80 Risland, 51 P.3d at 705.

81 Id. The court also noted that the Oregon legislature listed two “circumstances” that could involve the parent’s unintentional conduct: specifically, parental neglect resulting in either a child’s death, or in a serious physical injury. Id. Accordingly, the court did not consider aggravated circumstances to be limited to a parent’s intentional conduct toward a child. Id.

82 See id. at 699–706.

83 Id. at 699.

84 Id. at 699, 700, 706.

85 Risland, 51 P.3d at 705–06.

86 Id. at 706.
that “the parents’ harmful actions and conditions persist[ed], despite extensive efforts to remediate them before the court assumed jurisdiction.”\(^7\) Without explicitly doing so, the court predicted that the child before the court would be harmed by reunification efforts because the parents’ prior failures predicted future failures.\(^8\) The court thus concluded the trial court was authorized to allow the child protection agency to deny reasonable reunification efforts.\(^9\)

The Oregon Court considered a fairly typical statute in a fairly logical manner.\(^10\) It also had before it a set of facts that was not atypical for an abuse and neglect case.\(^11\) To distinguish a situation that might not otherwise fit within the aggravated circumstances exception, however, the court emphasized not only the conduct of the parents and how it contributed to the serious problems of the child, but also that attempts to remediate the parents’ problems failed in the past.\(^12\)

A 2005 Delaware family court decision similarly discussed how reliance on past or current circumstances—the narrow fact of prior involuntary terminations of parental rights—can be insufficient when sorting out cases for which reasonable efforts may be inappropriate.\(^13\) In *In re Division of Family Services v. Smith*, the Delaware child protection agency asserted the involuntary termination of parental rights exception as a basis for denying reasonable efforts for a mother who had two earlier terminations, in 2001 and 2002.\(^14\) The court expressed concern about a prior involuntary termination being used to deny reasonable efforts in a current case, indicating that such a waiver might effectively result in denying parental rights to a parent who “has instituted major positive changes in their life between the first involuntary termination of the child and subsequent court proceedings involving another child.”\(^15\)

Like the Oregon court’s opinion in *Risland* and its focus on the failure of prior efforts to remediate problems, the Delaware family court decision implicitly acknowledged that prior terminations of pa-

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\(^7\) *Id.*

\(^8\) *See id.*

\(^9\) *Id.*

\(^10\) *See Risland*, 51 P.3d at 703–06.

\(^11\) *See id.*

\(^12\) *Id.* at 706.

\(^13\) *See Smith*, 896 A.2d at 188–90.

\(^14\) *Id.* at 187–88. The particular focus of the trial court was a separation of powers issue: namely, whether the agency or the court had the authority to make the decision of whether or not to pursue reasonable efforts. *Id.* at 189–90.

\(^15\) *Id.* at 189.
rental rights are relevant to the reasonable efforts decision because a parent’s prior failures presumably predict future failure. Thus, attempting to reunite a child with a parent who has a prior involuntary termination would likely cause harm to the child involved in the reunification efforts. Like the Oregon court, however, the Delaware court noted that relying on a past circumstance, without considering additional and relevant present circumstances, could result in a denial of reasonable efforts when such efforts would be appropriate, such as “[i]f this case involved circumstances in which [the parent] . . . had now improved considerably her parenting skills and ability to provide adequate and loving care to her child.” However, the court noted that “the mother in this particular action is not such a parent . . . .”

Both the Oregon appellate and the Delaware trial court opinions reflect the core issue concerning any discretionary exception to the reasonable efforts requirement: the likelihood of harm to the child before the court and specifically the harm that may result from an attempt to reunite the child with his or her parents. This same concern is evident in the legislative history of ASFA.

II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT FOR ASFA’S “AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES”

It is plain that Congress meant for the states to provide their own definitions of the aggravated circumstances exception. While the language of the exception provides some examples, it also states that aggravated circumstances “need not be limited” to these examples. The legislative history emphasizes this. For example, U.S. Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) declared:

Mr. President, let me point out now very carefully so there is no risk of misinterpretation on this floor. . . . The authors of
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this legislation do not—do not—intend these specified items to constitute an exclusive definition of which cases do not require reasonable efforts to be made.

Rather, these are examples—these are just examples—of the kind of adult behavior that makes it unnecessary, that makes it unwise, makes it simply wrong for the Government to make continued efforts to send children back to their care. This is not meant to be an exclusive list. We make this clear in the text of the bill. 105

Additional understanding, however, requires a closer look. While the specific language of the aggravated circumstances exception is instructive, some of the broader aspects of ASFA, along with its related legislative history, provide a better beginning for identifying how decision-makers can single out the parent-child relationships for which states should be able to deny reunification efforts. These include ASFA’s emphasis on the health and safety of the child, ASFA’s retention of the “reasonable efforts” requirement, and the immediate legislative context of the aggravated circumstances exception. 106

A. The Health and Safety of the Child Under ASFA

“[I]n determining reasonable efforts to be made[,] . . . the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern . . . .” 107 Thus begins ASFA’s “Clarification of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement.” 108 Legislative history underscores the strength of Congress’s resolve to protect the health and safety of children and also identifies the ways Congress perceived those health and safety issues were created or exacerbated. 109 Two concerns repeatedly surface. 110 First, required reunification efforts were resulting in children being returned to dangerous homes, homes that “present[ed] too great a risk” to the health and safety of the chil-

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105 Id.
106 See infra Part II(A)–(B).
108 Id.
children.\textsuperscript{111} Second, required reunification efforts were also responsible for too many children spending too many years in foster care while states made “fruitless attempts to reunify certain families that simply cannot be fixed.”\textsuperscript{112} Ironically, the second of these concerns, lengthy stays in foster care, was a motivating factor in the initial adoption of the reasonable efforts provision.\textsuperscript{113}

Congress’s determination to make paramount the health and safety of children in dependency proceedings has been consistently recognized by the state courts since ASFA’s enactment.\textsuperscript{114} One Connecticut trial court judge called ASFA’s “health and safety shall be paramount” clause the “mantra” of ASFA.\textsuperscript{115} A New York Family Court judge referred to “ASFA’s unequivocal statement of public policy that children must be protected from depraved parental conduct.”\textsuperscript{116} A Delaware Family Court judge stressed the health and safety provision of ASFA: “[C]hildren’s safety . . . must be the paramount concern of all child welfare decision-making. . . . [T]he safety of the child and the child’s need for permanency are the foremost concerns . . . . To stress the importance of the safety principle, ASFA states explicitly that child health and safety is the paramount consideration.”\textsuperscript{117}

111 Id.


113 See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 224 (1990). For five years before passing the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), Congress heard testimony about the foster system’s treatment of abused and neglected children, and found that

[t]he most striking fact presented was the astonishing number of children who were being removed from their families and placed in foster care, many for the entire duration of their childhoods. . . . While lost in a system that could neither return them to their families nor place them with adoptive parents, these children often moved from foster home to foster home, becoming more and more disturbed with each move.

Id.


115 In re Sheneal W. Jr., 728 A.2d at 552.

116 In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The court’s opinion noted “[t]he impact of . . . ASFA’s mandates is so obvious that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was influenced by it in a termination of parental rights case decided even before that state passed its implementing legislation.” Id. at 834 n.9 (citing In re Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).

117 In re Rasheta D., 2000 WL 1693157, at *20.
1. AACWA and Reasonable Efforts

The phrase “reasonable efforts” was first evoked in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), when Congress responded to concerns about “foster care drift” and “foster care limbo.” Both were familiar terms in the debate about when the states should pursue adoptions for abused and neglected children and when the states should attempt to reunite these children with their parents. AACWA was designed to address the prevailing belief that states were placing too many children in foster care and leaving them there, while failing to make sufficient efforts to reunite those children with their families. AACWA required states receiving federal foster care funding to make reasonable efforts to keep children in their homes, and, if removal was necessary, to make reasonable efforts to return the children to their homes. While AACWA included provisions supporting adoption, the thrust of the Act was keeping children with their families. States were required to provide “child welfare services,” which were defined in a way that made keeping children with their families presumptive and primary. The health and safety of children, beyond

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[t]ypically, [foster families] are urged to avoid becoming too attached or allowing the child to become too attached, so as to avoid disrupting bonds with the biological family with whom the child will be reunited.

. . . Many [foster] children have spent the bulk of their lives moving from temporary foster placement to foster placement—a syndrome critics have described as “foster care drift.” These children suffer developmental and emotional damage from a loss of trust in adults and from a lack of stability and continuity.

Id. In addition, “[f]oster care limbo refers to the existence of children who live in foster care for lengthy periods of time. Limbo results when a foster care child cannot be safely returned home; yet he or she is not free for adoption because the state has not terminated the parent-child relationship.” Sherry A. Hess, Note, Texas Family Code Section 263.401: Improving the Mandatory Dismissal Deadline to Be Truly in the Best Interest of the Child, 9 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 95, 98 (2002) (internal footnotes omitted).

119 Woodhouse, supra note 118, at 158–59.
121 AACWA § 101(a)(1).
122 See id.
123 Id. The Act defined “child welfare services” to mean public social services which are directed toward the accomplishment of the following purposes: (A) protecting and promoting the welfare of all children
general references to protecting the welfare of children, were not explicitly mentioned.\textsuperscript{124}

For a while, AACWA appeared to succeed as the number of children in foster care decreased.\textsuperscript{125} By 1997, however, when ASFA was enacted, the number had returned to its 1977 level, three years prior to AACWA.\textsuperscript{126} As the numbers rose, many in the child protective services field expressed concerns to Congress, most of which were pegged to AACWA’s reasonable efforts requirement.\textsuperscript{127} Some argued the reasonable efforts requirement was not the problem, but rather that the services provided to the families were inadequate “due to chronic underfunding and mismanagement of child welfare agencies and courts.”\textsuperscript{128} In effect, they argued that states were failing to comply with the reasonable efforts provision.\textsuperscript{129} More influential with Congress, however, were

\ldots ; (B) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems which may result in, the neglect [or] abuse \ldots of children; (C) preventing the unnecessary separation of children from their families by \ldots preventing breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and possible; (D) restoring to their families children who have been removed, by the provision of services \ldots ; (E) placing children in suitable adoptive homes, in cases where restoration to the biological family is not possible or appropriate; and (F) assuring adequate care of children away from their homes, in cases where the child cannot be returned home or cannot be placed for adoption.

\textit{Id.} (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{124} See \textit{id.}

\textsuperscript{125} Stephanie Jill Gendell, \textit{In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First Three Years of the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation}, 39 \textit{Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev.} 25, 27 (2001) (citing Thomas P. McDonald et al., \textit{Assessing the Long-Term Effects of Foster Care: A Research Synthesis} 15 (1996)) (reporting that the foster care population was 276,000 in 1985); Shotton, \textit{supra} note 113, at 224 (citing \textit{Edna McConnell Clark Found., Keeping Families Together: The Case for Family Preservation 1} (1985)) (noting a foster care population as high as 502,000 in 1977).

\textsuperscript{126} See Gendell, \textit{supra} note 125, at 25.

\textsuperscript{127} Celeste Pagano, \textit{Adoption and Foster Care}, 36 \textit{Harv. J. on Legis.} 242, 243 (1999). The Department of Health and Human Services did adopt regulations listing services that could be provided for reasonable efforts, but the regulations did not define what constituted “reasonable.” \textit{See id.} at 243–44.


\textsuperscript{129} See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 347–48 (1992) (ruling that—where child beneficiaries brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials arguing that the state had failed to provide reasonable efforts to prevent removal of children from their homes and to reunite families where children had been removed—the
charges that reunification efforts were being pursued at the expense of
the children’s safety or psychological well-being, resulting in children
continuing to be left in foster care for too long and children being re-
turned to unsafe homes.

2. The Concerns about Reasonable Efforts

As early as 1993, four years before ASFA was signed into law, Con-
gress held hearings on “reasonable efforts.” During these hearings
and throughout ASFA’s legislative journey, Congress heard from and
responded to witnesses concerned that reunification efforts were being
made in situations where it was unreasonable—where homes could
never be made safe for children. Always the concerns were two: re-
turning children to unsafe homes and keeping children in foster care
for too long.

Among those appearing before Congress were Connie Binsfeld,
then Michigan’s Lieutenant Governor, and Peter Digre, then Director
of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices. Binsfeld told Congress that states were making reasonable efforts
in “egregious” situations, that children were either being left in dan-
gerous homes or “they [are] taken out of the home and put in foster
care and delayed and delayed in foster care while all of the services to
rehabilitate the parents [are] going on.” Digre argued to committee
members in the House of Representatives that “[t]he word ‘reasonable’

plaintiffs had no enforceable private right under the reasonable efforts provision of
AACWA).

130 See Michael J. Bufkin, The “Reasonable Efforts” Requirement: Does It Place Children at In-
creased Risk of Abuse or Neglect?, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. Fam. L. 355, 374 (1997) (“Ironically, the
emphasis on family preservation means abused children linger in foster homes while social
workers try to repair hopelessly dysfunctional families.”).

131 See Deborah L. Sanders, Toward Creating a Policy of Permanence for America’s Disposable
Children: The Evolution of Federal Funding Statutes for Foster Care from 1961 to Present, 17 INT’L
J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 211, 222 (2003). Courts were criticized for refusing to remove children
from their sometimes dangerous homes because reasonable efforts had not been made to
keep the children there; they were also criticized for refusing to terminate parental rights
when reasonable efforts to reunite had not been made. See id. The former resulted in chil-
dren being left in homes where they might be harmed; the latter resulted in children be-
ing left in foster care, “without the hope of a plan for permanency.” See id.

132 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 867, supra note 21, at 48–50.

133 See id. at 48–49.

134 See id.

135 Barriers to Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hum. Resources of the H. Comm. on
Barriers to Adoption Hearing]. Binsfeld also stated it “would be very helpful to the States if
[Congress would] define ‘reasonable efforts.’” See id.
is often read out of ‘reasonable efforts[,]’ creating a situation in which children are placed in danger and re-abused in the name of family preservation and reunification. . . . In short, we too often engage in ‘futile efforts’ which are inherently unreasonable.”\textsuperscript{136} Digre talked about foster care as “tragically unstable” and urged Congress to “[r]ecognize . . . that there are classes of parents for whom ‘reasonable efforts’ and family preservation and reunification are or may be inherently unreasonable.”\textsuperscript{137} Examples provided by Digre included “parents who kill or maim children,” “parents who aggressively sexually assault children,” “parents with histories of violent criminal behavior,” “parents who abandon children in life-threatening circumstances,” and “parents with long-term and chronic addictions.”\textsuperscript{138}

Helen Leonhart-Jones, then Executive Director of Montgomery County Children Services in Dayton, Ohio, also noted “there are some parents for who[m] all our best efforts will never be enough,” and argued for “clearly identified criteria” to allow the professionals to bypass reasonable efforts for those parents.\textsuperscript{139} Leonhart-Jones, like others, listed certain situations that so clearly fit these criteria that they should be exempt from reunification efforts, for example, “[p]arents with histories of violent criminal behavior or domestic violence.”\textsuperscript{140}

Members of Congress responded with like concerns and commentary. Representative Tim Roemer talked about the “two major problems” in the foster care system: “[T]oo often we] reunite our children with their families only to find catastrophe to happen later on that week or that month when that child was abused again. . . . The second problem is now we have too many children languishing in foster care situations.”\textsuperscript{141} Upon introducing the early Senate version of ASFA,\textsuperscript{142} Senator John H. Chafee (R-RI) indicated that the goals of his bill were twofold: to “ensure that abused and neglected children are in safe settings, and to move children more rapidly out of the foster care system.

\textsuperscript{136} Id. at 114 (statement of Peter Digre, Director, L.A. County Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.).

\textsuperscript{137} Id. at 116.

\textsuperscript{138} Id.

\textsuperscript{139} Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 52 (statement of Helen Leonhart-Jones, Executive Director, Montgomery County Children Servs.).

\textsuperscript{140} Id.


\textsuperscript{142} The Safe Adoptions and Family Environments Act (S. 511) was an earlier version of ASFA. See 143 CONG. REC. S2701 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1997).
and into permanent placements.” Senator DeWine, a self-proclaimed strong and early supporter of legislation to clarify reasonable efforts, referred frequently to the problem of foster care limbo and returning children to dangerous homes—problems he saw as exacerbated by the reasonable efforts requirement. DeWine also talked about social workers’ concerns and perceptions that reunification efforts were still required, “even when . . . everybody with any common sense would know there is not one chance in a million that we are ever going to be able to fix that family.”

In addition, witnesses and members of Congress alike related accounts or referenced news reports of heartbreaking stories of children removed from foster homes prematurely and of children who suffered horrific crimes or died by the hands of, or in the care of, parents to whom the states had returned them. Child advocate Leonhart-Jones told of a seven-year-old boy she worked with in Cincinnati, who died after falling from a third story window while he was at home, unsupervised, with his three-year-old brother. Representative Barbara Kennelly referred to “the terrible, heartbreaking case with little Emily in Michigan” and “other cases across these United States, headlines telling us the very worst can happen.” Senator Chafee pointed to the notorious abuse and death of Sabrina Green and Senator DeWine related the tragic story of Elisa Izquierdo. Both girls’ families were being

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143 See id. The bill excepted several situations from the requirement of reasonable efforts: where the parent has committed a Child Abuse and Prevention Act Amendments of 1996 (CAPTA) criminal act; where the parent is found “to have abandoned, tortured, chronically abused, or sexually abused the child”; and where returning the child to the home would “endanger the child’s health or safety.” Id. at 2702. It also acknowledged that states could specify the cases where, “because of circumstances that endanger the child’s health or safety,” no reasonable efforts were required. Id.


146 See id.

147 See, e.g., Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 52 (testimony of Leonhart-Jones).


150 Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 10–11.
monitored by child protective services at the time of their deaths.151 Sabrina’s body “was found with fractured skull and a gangrenous severed thumb.”152 Time magazine reported the police as saying, in reference to Elisa, that, “there was no part of the six-year-old’s body that was not cut or bruised.”153 In addition, child advocate Richard Gelles’s The Book of David is credited with “galvaniz[ing] support for ASFA.”154 The book tells the story of David, whose sister had been removed from the home because of severe abuse by David’s parents.155 David was also reported twice as abused, but was left with his parents.156 Ultimately, his mother suffocated him.157 These and other similarly tragic stories are credited with influencing Congress’s response to the reasonable efforts provision of AACWA.158

While members of Congress seemed to give the most attention to decisions that returned children to danger or death in their homes, they also faulted the system for leaving children in foster care for too long.159

152 Id. at 183.
154 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 115.
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 See Bridget A. Blinn, Focusing on Children: Providing Counsel to Children in Expedited Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 818 (2004); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192–93 (1989) (noting that the state had temporary custody of Joshua but returned him to his father even though the caseworker observed “a number of suspicious injuries” in the next six or seven months; Joshua’s father eventually beat the four-year-old so severely that he suffered permanent and severe brain injury); Crossley, supra note 153, at 273–74 (recounting the stories of fifteen-month-old David, who was killed by his mother despite reports to child protective services and a prior voluntary termination of parental rights because case manager did not feel the state made reasonable efforts; of six-year-old Elisa, who was killed by her mother after years of substantial abuse because case manager failed to remove her despite not being subject to the reasonable efforts requirement; and of Joseph, who was to be removed from his mother’s care, but was returned home and subsequently killed by her when the county lost his records).
Prior to AACWA, agencies were charged with not doing enough to reunite parents and children, and thus the children were languishing in foster care.\textsuperscript{160} After AACWA, the result was the same, but now agencies were said to be trying too hard to reunite children with their families, and the blame was placed on the reasonable efforts requirement.\textsuperscript{161}

Senator DeWine, for example, complained in May 1997 that abusive parents were being given a “second chance, a third chance, a fourth chance, a fifth chance, and on and on, to get their lives back together.”\textsuperscript{162} Meanwhile, “their poor little children are shuttled from foster home to foster home, spending their most formative years deprived of what all children should have—a safe, stable, loving, and permanent home.”\textsuperscript{163} Congressman Earl Pomeroy emphasized the uncertainty foster children live with and suffer from:

In some instances, abused children live daily with the fear that they may be sent back by some people in some process they do not begin to understand into a home where the abuse occurred in the first place. They do not even go to bed at night with the sense of personal safety and security.\textsuperscript{164}

Finally, while ASFA’s legislative history does not reveal an explicit emphasis on cost effectiveness, common sense points to the wisdom of conserving scarce resources for reunification efforts that have a chance


\textsuperscript{160} See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{163} Id. Senator DeWine told of twins who were placed in foster care when their mother, who had “serious substance abuse problems” abandoned them. \textit{Id.} at S3947–48. While reunification efforts resulted in a decision to reunite the children and parent, this result took three and one-half years to come about. \textit{Id.}; see also 143 Cong. Rec. S12,673, S12,675 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Craig) (noting that the system is “trapping [children] in what was supposed to be ‘temporary’ foster care, instead of moving them into permanent homes”); (statement of Sen. Jeffords) (“Too often, children languish in foster care for years—years—before they find a safe, loving family.”); (statement of Sen. Moynihan) (“[ASFA] . . . accelerates the process for determining the permanent placement for a child in foster care, so that children do not spend years bouncing among foster homes.”).

of working, and for using them to benefit children, not harm them. As Cristine Kim wrote in her oft-cited student note, “[r]easonable efforts has its optimal effect if made with respect to parents who are not ‘bad’ but have external problems or parents who may be ‘bad’ but exhibit a sincere desire and clear potential to change.”

The reallocation of resources made possible from being able to deny reasonable efforts in certain circumstances has not escaped the notice of state courts. The Pennsylvania Superior Court commented, shortly after ASFA was enacted, on the serious and costly problems that foster care creates. Quoting a U.S. News and World Report article entitled Adoption Gridlock, the court discussed the “cost to the taxpayer” of using foster care for long-term placements “rather than as a pass through program, as originally intended.” The article explained that “[k]eeping these kids stuck in temporary homes is not only devastating to the kids—it has been a fiscal disaster.” The Maine Supreme Judicial Court also emphasized the economic considerations two years later, in a 2000 prior involuntary termination of parental rights case:

The State also has a legitimate interest in making the best use of its limited resources. . . . [T]he Department’s resources are limited and in many instances are insufficient even to meet the needs of parents who are able and willing to work on the impediments to the return of their children. . . . If difficult decisions regarding allocation of scarce resources must be made, the Legislature’s determination that a prior involuntary termination is a factor to be considered is both reasonable and legitimate.

In 2003, the South Dakota Supreme Court commented that one of the effects of ASFA is that “the child protection system is not required to expend its limited resources attempting to reunify children with abusive parents if certain circumstances exist,” and under these circum-

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165 See Burt, supra note 22, at 314.
168 See In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 334 (noting “a serious and costly problem in human lives and public monies relating to the grid lock of foster care in this country”).
169 Id. at 335.
170 Id.
171 In re Heather C., 751 A.2d at 456.
stances, states can move “more efficiently” toward termination of parental rights.\footnote{People ex rel. D.B., 670 N.W.2d at 70; see also In re Ashley, 762 A.2d 941, 947 (Me. 2000) (“[T]he Act gives courts the discretion to identify the most egregious cases, from early stages of the child protection process . . . without providing fruitless reunification services.”); In re I.H., 674 N.W.2d 809, 812 (S.D. 2004) (“ASFA provides an exception to the reasonable efforts requirement in cases where the court determines that a parent has subjected a child to ‘aggravated circumstances’ as defined by state law.”).}

3. ASFA’s Clarification and Retention of Reasonable Efforts

Although Congress continued the reasonable efforts requirement in ASFA, it also responded to the criticisms that reasonable efforts were, under AACWA, too often “unreasonable,” and that children were too often being subjected to dangerous homes or lengthy foster care stays.\footnote{See supra Part II(A)(2).} It thus took care to include language emphasizing the primacy of the health and safety of the children, and it also included several specific provisions designed to limit the reasonable efforts requirement.\footnote{See, e.g., ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §§ 101(a), 305(b), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 629b(a)(9), 671(a)(15)(B)(i), (D)(i)–(iii) (2006)); see also Sanders, supra note 131, at 227 (noting that “ASFA has not abandoned the family preservation model, but merely subordinated it to child safety”); Developments in the Law, supra note 128, at 2116 (“Under current policy a child’s health and safety is the primary concern.”).}

Congress first required state plans to “[contain] assurances that . . . the safety of the children to be served shall be of paramount concern.”\footnote{ASFA § 305(b), 42 U.S.C. § 629b(a)(9).} Congress then emphasized this hierarchy by liberally sprinkling “safe,” “safety,” and “safely” throughout the applicable provisions of the United States Code.\footnote{Id. §§ 622, 675 (titled “Including Safety In Case Plan And Case Review System Requirements”).} Under AACWA, for example, reasonable efforts were required “to make it possible for the child to return to his home.”\footnote{AACWA of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–272, § 471(a)(15), 94 Stat. 500, 503 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).} Under ASFA, reasonable efforts are required to make it possible for children to “safely return” to their homes.\footnote{ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).} AACWA also required states to make reasonable efforts to return children to their homes “in each case.”\footnote{AACCW § 101(a).} A centerpiece of ASFA’s clarification of reasonable efforts is its provision allowing states to deny reunification efforts in three categories of circumstances.\footnote{ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii).}
One exception incorporates the Child Abuse and Prevention Act Amendments of 1996 (CAPTA).\textsuperscript{181} CAPTA had already identified several criminal acts that would release states from required reasonable efforts, for example, where the parent had committed murder of another child of the parent or committed a felony assault resulting in a serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent.\textsuperscript{182} A second exception releases states from required efforts when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling of the child have been terminated involuntarily.\textsuperscript{183}

The aggravated circumstances exception makes reasonable efforts discretionary where “the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse).”\textsuperscript{184} Each of ASFA’s exceptions, including the aggravated circumstances exception, identifies past or current circumstances that operate not only to rebut the presumption of reasonable efforts being in the child’s best interests, but also to trigger a presumption that serious harm or detriment will result to the child if reunification efforts are attempted.\textsuperscript{185} While the harm can be a return to a dangerous home, Representative Clay Shaw recognized these exceptions as an important part of the response to lengthy foster stays and their threat to children’s safety: “If families will not or cannot change within a reasonable period of time, we must, in the interest of the children, be willing to terminate parental rights and move expeditiously toward adoption.”\textsuperscript{186}


\textsuperscript{182} Id. Reasonable efforts are not required where the parent has committed certain criminal acts: murdered or committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent; aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit a murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent; or committed a felony assault that resulted in a serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent. ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15)(D)(ii).

\textsuperscript{183} ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15)(D)(iii).

\textsuperscript{184} Id. § 671(a) (15)(D)(i).

\textsuperscript{185} See Herring, supra note 2, at 337 (noting the state is excused from attempting to reunify the family and that the law presumes that the parent is unfit); see also Sallie K. Christie, Note, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice for All, 36 Col. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 4–5 (2002). If a parent has committed a CAPTA criminal act, ASFA requires the state, with some exceptions, to file a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). The same requirement does not apply to the prior TPR or aggravated circumstances exceptions, however. See id.; see also infra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.

tative Shaw went on to explain that “[w]e do this by allowing States to define what we call aggravated circumstances that allow them to dispense with services for the family and get on with the business of finding an adoptive home for the child.”\(^{187}\)

In connection with the reasonable efforts exceptions, Congress took precautions to ensure the primacy of health and safety.\(^{188}\) It included its own statutory construction rule, applicable to the reasonable efforts requirement, providing that “[n]othing in this part shall be construed as precluding State courts from exercising their discretion to protect the health and safety of children in individual cases, including cases other than those [exempted from reasonable efforts].”\(^{189}\)

Finally—and significantly—Congress took additional steps to protect the emotional and psychological well-being of children who were spending too much of their childhoods in “temporary” foster care, by directing states to focus on finding, more quickly, permanent situations for these children.\(^{190}\) If reasonable reunification efforts are denied (or discontinued), ASFA also requires the states to expend reasonable efforts “to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement [including adoption] of the child.”\(^{191}\) Along with this, Congress shortened the timeline for dispositional or “permanency” hearings from eighteen months to twelve months, requiring states to decide more quickly whether a child will go back to his or her parents or be placed for adoption (thus necessitating a termination of parental rights).\(^{192}\) In addition, Congress shortened the time for reasonable ef-

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\(^{187}\) See id. Representative Shaw’s remarks were about the Adoption Promotion Act of 1997—an earlier version of ASFA, which also required that a TPR petition be filed if a child younger than ten had been in foster care for eighteen of the most recent twenty-four months. Id. at H2024; Adoption Promotion Act (APA) of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(E). See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 9 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2737, 2741.


\(^{189}\) See id. § 678. Section 101(d) of ASFA states that the rule of construction amends Part E of title IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670–679 (and thus it applies to the reasonable efforts provision and the exceptions to the reasonable efforts provision). Id. Robert Gordon suggests that while this provision allows states to deny reasonable efforts in cases other than those explicitly excepted in ASFA, a parent could still demand a judicial hearing authorizing the denial of services. Gordon, supra note 9, at 680 n.250 (citing ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D), which provides that “reasonable efforts ... shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that” one of the exceptions exists).

\(^{190}\) See ASFA §§ 101(a), 302, 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(C), 675(5)(C).

\(^{191}\) Id. § 671(a)(15)(C).

\(^{192}\) See id. § 675(5)(C). A legal guardianship or another planned permanent living arrangement may also be part of the “permanency plan” for the child. Id. § 675(1)(E).
forts by requiring a termination of parental rights petition to be filed if a child is in foster care for “15 of the most recent 22 months,” if the child is an abandoned infant, or if any of the subsection (ii) of section 671(15)(D) (CAPTA criminal acts) circumstances exist.\textsuperscript{193} In each of these situations, the state is required, with some exceptions, to file a termination of parental rights petition and move towards adoption.\textsuperscript{194} Finally, to complement this emphasis on permanency, Congress also heightened and provided support for adoptions, including adoption incentive payments, concurrent planning (placing children in their pre-adoptive homes while reasonable efforts are on-going), and specific requirements to identify and approve families for adoptions.\textsuperscript{195}

The multiple provisions in ASFA targeting lengthy foster stays emphasize the concern Congress had about the threat of these stays to the health of children.\textsuperscript{196} Interpreting aggravated circumstances, then, in line with the broader legislative provisions and aims of ASFA, requires recognizing not only the risk of harm that comes from children being returned to dangerous parents, but also the risk of delayed or denied permanence that comes from long and uncertain stays in foster care. It also requires recognizing one additional harm—that which is inflicted on a child when parental rights to that child are terminated.

The reasonable efforts requirement was meant to preserve families and to prevent terminations of parental rights.\textsuperscript{197} Central to any analysis of aggravated circumstances is reading each of ASFA’s exceptions as it is presented—as a part of the “Clarification of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement.”\textsuperscript{198} Although most of the commentary in the legislative history focuses on circumstances when reasonable efforts should not be made, a sprinkling of specific comments confirm the underlying agreement on the rationale behind reasonable efforts.\textsuperscript{199} Senator DeWine stated that “[f]amily reunification is very important. It is a laudable goal[,] we all want to try that.”\textsuperscript{200} Representative Dave Camp explained


\textsuperscript{194} ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 675(E) (requiring that the state “concurrently . . . identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for adoption”).

\textsuperscript{195} Bean, supra note 31, at 328.

\textsuperscript{196} Id. at 327–29.


\textsuperscript{198} ASFA § 101.


\textsuperscript{200} Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 41.
that “[ASFA] calls upon States to continue efforts to reunite the family.” More explicit is the House Report on ASFA, which addresses “the importance and essential fairness of the reasonable efforts criterion” and instructs that ASFA does not seek to effect “a wholesale reversal of reasonable efforts.”

“Rather than abandoning the Federal policy of helping troubled families, what is needed is a measured response to allow States to adjust their statutes and practices so that in some circumstances States will be able to move more efficiently toward terminating parental rights and placing children for adoption.” ASFA’s emphasis on permanency, in fact, fully encompasses the rationale for reasonable efforts—to “minimiz[e] the likelihood that [children] will suffer harmful separation from their parents.”

States thus retain the discretion to provide reunification services when appropriate, even when an exception applies. Representative William Goodling highlighted this discretionary aspect when discussing the CAPTA criminal acts exceptions, noting the amendments are “intended to give the States flexibility in this area. . . . States may still seek to reunify the family, but will no longer be required to do so by Federal law.”

State courts have also recognized this distinction by consistently speaking of the “discretion” to deny reasonable efforts when considering the bypass provisions. The New Mexico Court of Appeals discussed the “discretionary nature of the statute” in a 2002 termination of parental rights case, noting that New Mexico’s statute “does not mandate that the state cease reasonable efforts once there has been a prior termination of parental rights. . . . [Our ASFA statute] provides the trial court with discretion to relieve the state of the burden of providing services.”

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203 Id.

204 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 653; see also Sanders, supra note 131, at 227 (noting that ASFA does not abandon the family preservation model, but “merely subordinate[s] it to child safety and permanency timeline goals”).


207 See, e.g., In re Heather C., 751 A.2d at 455; State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 849 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).

208 Amy B., 61 P.3d at 849. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “[w]hen the court finds aggravated circumstances exist, it is well within its discretion to order the cessation of reunification services”). In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“[ASFA] provides the court with discretion to determine whether or not reasonable efforts to prevent or elimi-
tinction, noting that Maine’s ASFA statute “is written to allow, but does not mandate, that the Department be relieved of its responsibilities.”

Still, a discussion of whether an exception applies usually takes place only when the state seeks to deny reunification efforts. In this sense, they are one and the same.

B. The Immediate Legislative Context of the Aggravated Circumstances Exception

Words are known by the company they keep. The aggravated circumstances exception keeps company with two others, the CAPTA criminal acts exception (murder, manslaughter, and so forth) and the prior involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR) exception. How these exceptions operate is instructive in several ways. They first suggest that Congress intended states to be able to deny reasonable efforts only with evidence of an act or circumstance that was meant to inflict or did inflict a very serious harm or detriment on a child.

The CAPTA circumstances are particularly serious, in part because of their immediacy. The extremes in this exception include murder, defined by the United States Code as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought,” and voluntary manslaughter, “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” The harm resulting from a felony assault is similarly serious and justifies the termination of reunification efforts if committed against the child or another child of the parent. Generally, a crime is classified as a felony when the punishment is imprisonment for more than one year, and the felony circumstance also re-
quires, by definition, that the assault result in “serious bodily injury.”

The final CAPTA circumstance is simply an extension of the murder and voluntary manslaughter provisions, that is, when a parent has aided, abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit the murder or voluntary manslaughter.

The involuntary TPR exception similarly captures only very serious harms or circumstances. A termination of parental rights can be said to inflict two harms on a child. In addition to the severance of the parent-child relationship, the child is harmed by the circumstances that justify the termination. The termination of parental rights has been

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217 Model Penal Code § 1.04(2) (1962) (“A crime is a felony if . . . persons convicted thereof may be sentenced [to death or] to imprisonment for a term that . . . is in excess of one year.” (brackets in original)). The phrase “serious bodily injury” was defined in CAPTA to mean “bodily injury which involves substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” CAPTA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 107(b) (4) (B), 110 Stat. 3036 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (4) (B) (Supp. V 2005)). Under the Model Penal Code, ASFA’s felony assault provision would probably fit within the definition of aggravated assault, which includes: “causes [a serious bodily injury to another] purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Model Penal Code § 211.1(2)(a). A section 211.1(2)(a) aggravated assault under the Model Penal Code is a second degree felony. Id.; see also In re Janet J., 666 N.W.2d 741, 751 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a spiral fracture of the leg of the child involved “a substantial risk of disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of that leg and was therefore a serious bodily injury”), disapproved of on other grounds by In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 435 (Neb. 2003); Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 S.E.2d 214, 218 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (construing “felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury” as being concerned with the effect the crime had on the child).

218 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(D)(ii). Congressional Record references to the 1996 CAPTA amendments further indicate that Congress was focused on very serious circumstances. See 142 Cong. Rec. H11,148–53 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). The listed exceptions were adopted, according to Representative William Goodling, to prevent “overzealous attempts of ‘family preservation’” that place “children back into homes where parents have been convicted of egregious acts.” Id. (statement of Rep. Goodling) (emphasis added).


221 Id. The “immensely influential” writings by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, Albert Solnit, and Sonja Goldstein on the best interests of the child have persuaded most professionals in the field that “disrupting the parent-child relationship seriously hurts children of all ages.” Gordon, supra note 9, at 652–53 (noting that the work had been “harshly criticized for its lack of empirical support, among other things,” but that the “work is nonetheless compelling in view of what is now known”); see also Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 176, 221–22 (2004); Blinn, supra note 158, at 812–13. One author asserts, with some justification, that AACWA, in fact, “was based on the premise that removal of a child from his or her home was so harmful to his or her psyche that it was virtually never in the child’s best interests to be removed.” Pagano, supra note 127, at
characterized as a civil “death penalty” by many state courts, and thus requires a substantial justification. Legislative examples of grounds for termination include (a) abandonment; (b) abuse or neglect; (c) unfitness of the parent; (d) parent’s failure to provide child support; (e) mental or physical disability of the parent; (f) incarceration of the parent; (e) risk of serious physical, mental or emotional injury to the child; and (f) dependency. In most states, a termination must be supported by clear and convincing evidence showing that the parent is unfit and, additionally, that the termination is in the best interest of the child. In other words, the harm that justified the termination is, by definition, very serious.

Moreover, CAPTA and CAPTA-like acts can also be the basis for an involuntary termination of parental rights, and thus ASFA’s TPR exception predicts and protects against these same harms. But terminations additionally occur because of ongoing and chronic circum-

222 State ex rel. S.A.C., 938 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (La. Ct. App. 2006); In re P.D., 144 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re Parental Rights as to K.D.L. 58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002); In re A.C., 827 N.E.2d 824, 831 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 329; In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. App. 2002). While the grounds for termination are many and varied, it is generally recognized that an involuntary termination of parental rights interferes with the right of a parent to the care, custody and management of his or her child. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing the “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”).


224 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48; see In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 330–31 (noting that the trier of fact must “come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue”).

225 See, e.g., Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 Va. L. Rev. 635, 678 (2002) (stating the Court’s analysis in Santosky “endorsed a high, unfitness-based standard”); see also In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 329 (Pennsylvania requires clear and convincing evidence, and petitioner must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied”).


227 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48; In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 329–31; Buss, supra note 225, at 678; Dwyer, supra note 226, at 955–56; Ferguson, supra note 226, at 93.

Consequently, it is important to ask what harms these triggering circumstances are designed to protect against. The immediate effect of the harm inflicted on a child returned to a chronic situation, while sufficient to require state intervention, is often not as serious as that in a CAPTA circumstance. Further, the parents may have more of an opportunity to show change and not merely compliance. Parents who have neglected a child as a result of a drug addiction, for example, may be able to submit test results to show they are no longer doing drugs. While not proving lasting change, the evidence does establish a drug-free status quo and may suggest a diminished risk to the child should reunification occur. Finally, if the parent relapses, the state may be able to intervene before the harm to the child becomes too serious and irreparable. These types of harms, by themselves, are not necessarily serious enough to trigger an exception to the requirement of reasonable reunification services.

If, however, chronic abuse or neglect circumstances have been an issue, and such that they resulted in a termination of parental rights—which is the measurement of harm recognized by ASFA’s TPR exception—the parent apparently failed to remediate, even when faced with the loss of parental rights. Thus, even if the current circumstances are such that the child before the court can be removed before a serious or irreparable harm accrues, the parent’s involuntary termination of parental rights with another child predicts that such a removal will be necessary, that the parent will lapse in his or her remediation, and thus, the child will be subject to a lengthy and uncertain foster stay.

In addition, the CAPTA and TPR exceptions suggest that the harm triggering the exception for the child before the court can be derivative. But for the CAPTA felony assault circumstance, which can involve either the child before the court or another child, the other circumstances in the CAPTA and TPR exceptions involve only “another child” of the parent. The risk of harm to the child currently before the court, should the state make efforts to reunite parent and child, is most often predicted by a very serious harm inflicted upon another child. This type of presumption is not new to abuse and neglect law.

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229 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Melvin, 885 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (“[T]he mother’s marginal improvement in parenting skills despite her long-time involvement with the department showed that her unfitness was highly likely to continue into the indefinite future.”).


231 Id.

232 See, e.g., In re K.O., 933 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
In 1996, a year before ASFA, the Missouri Court of Appeals captured the concern that a parent who has caused severe harm to one child will cause severe harm to another child. In *In re K.O.*, the mother argued that the termination of her parental rights to two children, based on her murder of a stepsibling, was not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, as required by law. “The termination of parental rights of an abusing parent under this subsection,” said the court, “is premised on the belief that requiring the child to suffer the fate of his or her sibling (or step-sibling) prior to termination of the rights of the abusing parent would defeat the purpose of the law.” A New York Family court articulated the implicit qualifiers that often go with this belief and assumption: the abuse must be serious, not too remote in time, and demonstrative of a fundamental defect in the parent’s understanding of his or her duties. If these circumstances exist, a court need not “‘await broken bone or shattered psyche before extending its protective cloak around [a] child.’”

Further, in *In re Marino S.*, the New York courts emphasized not only the validity of derivative abuse, but also ASFA’s recognition of derivative abuse and harms. *Marino* involved only one child who was directly abused, but the trial court relied on this abuse to deny reasonable efforts for the child’s siblings. The trial court noted that the “premise” of ASFA encompasses the reasoning of derivative abuse by assuming that “in certain types of cases, . . . the dangers of reunification efforts often outweigh any potential benefit.” On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed. It too commented on the derivative nature of ASFA’s discretionary bypass provisions, noting that one of ASFA’s “goals was to prevent the return of a child to unrehabilitated abusive or neglectful parents, and, to that end, the Act created categories of cases in which ‘reasonable efforts’ to provide for a return of the child to the parent(s) were not required.” Finally, the New York Court of Appeals, also affirming, relied on both the validity of derivative findings

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233 See id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 934 (citing *In re P.M.*, 801 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)).
237 Id. at 596–97 (quoting *In re Maria Anthony*, 366 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (Fam. Ct. 1975)).
239 *In re Marino*, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
240 Id.
241 *In re Marino*, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
242 Id.
and ASFA’s recognition of derivative harms.\textsuperscript{243} The court noted that a “derivative [finding] of severe abuse may be ‘predicated upon the common understanding that a parent whose judgment and impulse control are so defective as to harm one child in his or her care is likely to harm others as well.’”\textsuperscript{244} Further, the Court of Appeals emphasized that ASFA was meant to expedite permanency planning for abused children by allowing the agency to be excused from expending “considerable effort in preparing an obviously unfit parent for permanent placement.”\textsuperscript{245}

If the aggravated circumstances exception is interpreted consistently with the CAPTA and TPR exceptions, then it may be triggered only with evidence of a very serious harm. That harm may have been directed at either the child before the court or another child of the parent. These triggering harms are the central and defining feature of the CAPTA and TPR exceptions, but their purpose is to protect the child before the court from the harms they predict. Thus, understanding the harms the CAPTA and TPR exceptions predict is also helpful.

The CAPTA criminal acts exception most frequently predicts that one of two very serious harms will occur if reunification efforts are attempted. The child will either be returned to a dangerous home or will linger in foster care. In most CAPTA circumstances, the parent has shown the capacity to inflict a very serious harm, often instantaneously. A parent who has demonstrated the capacity to murder his or her own child, for example, predicts not only a very serious risk to the subject-child if the child is returned to parent, but a risk that has little warning or opportunity for the state to remove the child if the parent acts again. In addition, given the nature of the risk associated with most CAPTA acts, it is more difficult for parents to assure the state that they have successfully remediated their problem. The situation thus also risks leaving the child in foster care for too long.

A 2005 “shaken baby” case in South Dakota reflected both of these dangers.\textsuperscript{246} An eight-month-old boy and his sister were removed from the mother after the boy suffered life-threatening injuries.\textsuperscript{247} After the children were placed in foster care, the mother contacted the child

\textsuperscript{243} \textit{In re Marino}, 795 N.E.2d at 28.
\textsuperscript{244} Id. at 28 (quoting \textit{In re Marino}, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 831). \textit{But see} Robert May, Note, \textit{Derivative Neglect in New York State: Vague Standards and Over-Enforcement}, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 605, 613–14 (2007) (criticizing the similar “fundamental defect” or “fundamentally flawed” standard).
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{In re Marino}, 795 N.E.2d at 26.
\textsuperscript{247} Id.
protection agency to inquire about regaining custody of her children.248 The agency provided a plan requiring that the mother address parenting, anger management, and visitation.249 The trial court ultimately found the agency failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with her children, but that the circumstances were “aggravated,” thus releasing the state from the reasonable efforts requirement.250 The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding and termination of parental rights.251

The risk the court recognized most was that of returning the child to the mother.252 The court noted that the caseworker believed the children would be at risk if they were returned and relied on the caseworker’s testimony that “even though” the mother’s assault of the child was a “split second poor decision,” it provided a reason “to believe it could happen again.”253 The risk of extended foster care in such a situation was also demonstrated, as the court conceded the mother had completed “all that was asked of her” in the reunification plan and that she had even “sought out more in an attempt to regain custody of her children.”254 However, “just because Mother completed the objectives of her [reunification plan] does not establish that Mother would no longer be a risk to the safety of the children.”255

The South Dakota court’s concern has been identified by the child welfare expert Richard Gelles as one of distinguishing change from compliance.256 Compliance is when the parents have done what they have been asked to do—for example, attend an anger management class or keep the house clean.257 But social workers, lawyers, and judges must make child placement decisions based on “risk and change, not simply the passage of time and compliance.”258 Given the serious and

248 Id. at 844.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 844–45.
251 In re E.L. & R.L., 707 N.W.2d at 843, 849.
252 See id. at 847.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 10 (statement of Richard J. Gelles). Professor Gelles currently holds the Joanne and Raymond Welsh Chair of Child Welfare and Family Violence in the School of Social Policy & Practice at the University of Pennsylvania, is the Director for the Center for Research on Youth & Policy, and is Co-Director of the Field Center for Children’s Policy Practice & Research. University of Pennsylvania School of Social Policy & Practice, Richard J. Gelles, PhD., http://www.sp2.upenn.edu/people/faculty/gelles/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
257 See Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 14.
258 Id. at 15.
irreparable harm that may await a child in a CAPTA-like circumstances case, the risk is great.\textsuperscript{259} If reunification efforts are made, the child might be returned to a dangerous home, but equally likely is that the child will be kept in foster care for too long, out of fear that the parents have merely complied and not changed.\textsuperscript{260}

The very serious harm that can come from returning a child to a home where parents have committed a CAPTA-like act and have not yet remediated their problems is apparent.\textsuperscript{261} The harm that comes from placing a child in a foster home is just as serious, however, as it results in an extended delay of permanence for the child.\textsuperscript{262} In many of the chronic circumstances, the child may stay in foster care for too long because the parents have failed, yet again, to change.\textsuperscript{263} As stated by the California Court of Appeals,

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 delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests. “Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.”\textsuperscript{264}
\end{quote}

In the CAPTA-like situation, the child may stay in foster care because the state is waiting to be reassured the parent will not strike again—a

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 Generally, the aggravated circumstances cases are not complex in terms of either law or morality. The facts of those cases are so heinous that line-drawing should not prove difficult. In cases involving “aggravated circumstances” the parent has already put the child’s life at risk. In contrast, the cases in the second group [foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months] are not so straightforward. With the passage of time, termination becomes more and more likely, and the needs all children have for stability and permanence are pitted directly against the claims of their parents.
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\textsuperscript{259} See id. at 11 (recounting the story of a fifteen-month-old boy who was killed by his mother despite several reports of physical abuse).

\textsuperscript{260} See id. at 10, 13–15.

\textsuperscript{261} See id. at 11.

\textsuperscript{262} See Gordon, supra note 9, at 655–56. Professor Catherine Ross recognized this harm when comparing circumstances she perceived to be “aggravated” to circumstances where a child was in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months. See Ross, supra note 221, at 196–97. Her comparison assumes that aggravated circumstances are easy to identify and generally assumes aggravated circumstances will be more immediately life-threatening and thus not involve foster care. See id. at 197. But her comment highlights the different types of harms that can be inflicted on a child:

\begin{quote}
 Generally, the aggravated circumstances cases are not complex in terms of either law or morality. The facts of those cases are so heinous that line-drawing should not prove difficult. In cases involving “aggravated circumstances” the parent has already put the child’s life at risk. In contrast, the cases in the second group [foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months] are not so straightforward. With the passage of time, termination becomes more and more likely, and the needs all children have for stability and permanence are pitted directly against the claims of their parents.
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\textsuperscript{263} See In re Casey D., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 432 (Ct. App. 1999).

\textsuperscript{264} Id. (quoting In re Baby Boy L., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 654, 670 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal cites and editing marks omitted)).
wait that may never end.\textsuperscript{265} ASFA recognizes that the lack of permanency that comes with foster care limbo, no matter what the reason, almost always endangers a child’s health and safety in a serious and irreparable way.\textsuperscript{266}

Ultimately, the CAPTA and TPR exceptions protect the child before the court from two harms—the same two harms Congress consistently recognized when it enacted ASFA: children being returned to dangerous homes and children being left in foster care for too long. If the aggravated circumstances exception is interpreted as consistent with the company it keeps, the exception should apply only (1) when a very serious harm has occurred to either the child before the court or another child of the parent and (2) when those circumstances suggest the risk of either a return to a dangerous home or a too-long foster stay.\textsuperscript{267}

Finally, the presence of the involuntary TPR exception emphasizes that the details of the triggering circumstances must be relevant.\textsuperscript{268} One criticism of ASFA’s TPR exception is that it applies without regard to the circumstances or timing of the termination.\textsuperscript{269} As explained by one child advocate, “[a] parent whose rights to another child were terminated when the parent was a teenager, for example, would be deprived of services even though, when the parent was older and more mature, reunification efforts might be appropriate.”\textsuperscript{270} While the fear behind the criticism is understandable, the exception does not require states to deny reunification efforts; it only allows the state to do so.\textsuperscript{271} If the circumstances of the termination of parental rights and the child before the court indicate no undue risk of harm to the child, reunification efforts should be provided.

\textsuperscript{265} See id.
\textsuperscript{266} See Gordon, supra note 9, at 653–55.
\textsuperscript{267} See generally id. (discussing the rationale of ASFA).
\textsuperscript{269} See Pagano, supra note 127, at 245 (citing Bill Grimm, ASFA Brings Big Changes, Youth L. News 1–2, (1997)) (arguing that an involuntary termination of parental rights when a parent was a teenager could be used to deprive the parent of reasonable efforts in a current abuse or neglect case when efforts might “be appropriate” given the parent’s current age and maturity); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Children’s Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1189, 1190 n.4 (1999) (noting that the timing and circumstances of a prior termination are irrelevant for determining whether the discretionary bypass provision applies).
\textsuperscript{270} Pagano, supra note 127, at 245 (citing Grimm, supra note 269, at 1–2); see also In re Div. of Family Servs. v. Smith, 896 A.2d 179, 189–90 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2005) (noting a parent may have made “major positive changes” since the prior termination of parental rights).
\textsuperscript{271} See ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
The Iowa Court of Appeals, faced with a prior involuntary termination of parental rights situation, recognized that the circumstances of the termination were important to its prognostic value and thus to the court’s decision concerning reunification efforts. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of reasonable efforts, but only after noting the relevant circumstances. The time between the prior termination and the birth of the child currently before the court was three weeks, the mother had been provided with a “myriad of services’ prior to the termination of her parental rights . . . but was unable to respond to them,” and additional services to the mother “offered such a short period of time after a previous termination, would not correct the situation.” The court confirmed that both the present circumstances and those of the prior termination predicted an undue risk to the child before the court if reunification efforts were provided.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court similarly recognized that the details of the aggravated neglect circumstances were important to the prognostic value of those circumstances. “As horrifying as the conditions in that apartment were, they must be seen in the context. If [these] were first time parents with no resources, and no training, the apartment would have been no less appalling but, perhaps, not the basis for a cease reunification order.”

The relevance of circumstances to the prognostic value of a termination of parental rights is also confirmed by ASFA’s treatment of the CAPTA and TPR circumstances in another of its provisions. Section 103(a) (3) of ASFA seeks to speed adoptions and thus permanency for children by requiring that states initiate terminations of parental rights in certain situations. Petitions are generally required, along with concurrent efforts to place the child up for adoption, when the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, when a court determines that the child is an abandoned infant, or when

273 See id.
274 Id. The mother had “an IQ of 84, and suffer[ed] from schizophrenia, schizoid personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, borderline intellectual functioning and an impairment of adaptive functioning.” Id. at *1.
275 See id. at *3–4.
276 In re Ashley, 762 A.2d at 948.
277 Id.
279 See id.
the parent has committed any of the CAPTA acts. Petitions are not required, however, as a result of the parent having an involuntary termination of parental rights with another child or because the parent has subjected the child before the court to aggravated circumstances.

That ASFA does not require a petition for the child before the court based on the parent already having an involuntary TPR with another child recognizes how important the circumstances of any prior terminations can be. It also recognizes that the typical CAPTA circumstances, which do require a mandatory termination petition, simply provide less room for a discretionary decision to return the child to the home. With a CAPTA act, the feared harm is very serious and frequently instantaneous with its initial infliction, “change” versus compliance is hard to confirm, and the state’s ability to prevent the harm if the child is returned is slight. A termination of parental rights is a likely outcome for the child before the court. The prognostic value of a prior TPR, however, without considering past and present details, is not as reliable. Further, because the circumstances will matter, a decision to provide reunification efforts for the child before the court is more likely.

The effect of including prior terminations as a basis for an exception thus emphasizes that states may—and when the circumstances indicate that it is sufficiently safe to do so, should—provide reasonable reunification efforts to the family.

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280 Id. There are three exceptions. Id. A petition is not required to be filed when:

(i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative;
(ii) a State agency has documented in the case plan (which shall be available for court review) a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or
(iii) the State has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home, if reasonable efforts of the type described in section 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) of this title are required to be made with respect to the child.


282 Even in a CAPTA situation, however, a termination of parental rights petition does not have to be filed if the child protection agency documents a compelling reason demonstrating that it would not be in the best interest of the child. ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 675(E)(ii) (2006).

283 See In re LN, 689 N.W.2d 893, 898 (S.D. 2004) (concluding that “a court must necessarily consider whether a less restrictive alternative is appropriate in making the bypass decision. After all, [the South Dakota statute] does not preclude reunification efforts when
Congress’s decision to omit aggravated circumstances from those situations for which a termination of parental rights petition must be filed might easily be because Congress left the definition of the phrase to the states.\footnote{ASFA §§ 101(a), 103(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i), 675(5)(E).} It might also suggest, however, that Congress thought the aggravated circumstances exception, like the involuntary TPR exception, would encompass a greater number of situations where reunification efforts would not present an unacceptable risk to the subject-child and should thus be provided. Regardless, scrutiny of ASFA’s provisions emphasizes that it is the predicted fate of the child before the court—not the past or current circumstances in isolation—that matter. The exceptions allow, not require, states to deny reasonable efforts.

III. The Language of the Aggravated Circumstances Exception

The aggravated circumstances exception provides that reasonable efforts are not required when “the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse and sexual abuse).”\footnote{Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii)).} The exception, like the Child Abuse and Prevention Act Amendments of 1996 (CAPTA) and prior involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR) provisions, relies on past circumstances to predict future circumstances, specifically harm to the child before the court should reunification efforts be made.\footnote{See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii).} The CAPTA and TPR provisions, however, rely explicitly on distinct end-results for their circumstances and, except for the felony assault provision, must directly involve another child of the parent.\footnote{See id. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii).} By contrast, the aggravated circumstance exception relies on a nebulous and abstract situation: circumstances that are aggravated.\footnote{See id. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i).} Additionally, while the circumstances must involve the child before the court, the directness of the child’s involvement is also unclear; that is, the child must be “subjected to” the aggravated circumstances.\footnote{See id.}
The few state court opinions that include a pointed effort to sort out the language of the aggravated circumstances exception have generally focused on “subjected the child to” and “aggravated circumstances.” The examples listed in the statute, “abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse,” have received less attention, presumably because they are merely examples and additionally because most court opinions deal with specific state provisions. Still, since they are tangible examples of an otherwise abstract exception to reasonable efforts, a review is helpful.

A. Abandonment, Torture, Chronic Abuse, and Sexual Abuse

The characteristics of the examples provided by Congress confirm that “aggravated circumstances” must begin with, as do the other exceptions, circumstances that are very serious. They also confirm that Congress meant the aggravated circumstances exception to prevent the same types of harms as the other exceptions—very serious harms that (1) are immediate and thus irreparable or (2) come from foster care stays that are too long.

1. Torture

The plain meaning of torture, “[i]nfliction of severe physical pain as a means of punishment or coercion,” suggests a type of child abuse that can inflict immediate harm. It also suggests a very serious, irreparable harm. For example, Louisiana defines torture in its child abuse statutes as “torment, maiming, mutilation, or ritualistic or malicious acts causing extreme and unjustifiable physical or mental pain or suffering, disfigurement, or injury.” Maryland’s definition is “to cause intense pain to body or mind for purposes of punishment or extraction of information or for sadistic purposes.” Sending a child back to a parent who has tortured a child, even after remedial efforts, would likely present “an unacceptably high risk to the health, safety and welfare of the child.” A “split second” single incident could cause

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290 Id.
293 See id.
death or other irreparable injury.\textsuperscript{297} Further, keeping the child in foster care until the state is adequately assured that the parents have changed, and not merely complied, would likely deprive the child of the permanency that is critical to protecting the child’s health and safety.\textsuperscript{298}

2. Sexual Abuse

Sexual abuse is another type of abuse that can inflict an immediate, very serious, and irreparable harm.\textsuperscript{299} Kentucky’s abuse and neglect statute defines sexual abuse as including, but not limited to, “any contacts or interactions in which the parent . . . uses or allows, permits, or encourages the use of the child for the purposes of the sexual stimulation of the perpetrator or another person.”\textsuperscript{300} In addition, because of the usually secretive and private nature of sexual abuse and the perception that traditional treatment is ineffective in changing the behavior of the abuser, reunification of a child with a parent who has sexually abused a child could also be perceived as presenting a risk of recurrence without a visible warning that would allow a quick removal of the child.\textsuperscript{301} Finally, the foster stay likely required for assuring that the parent has changed, and not merely complied with the reunification plan, would also deprive the child of the permanency essential to the child’s health and safety.\textsuperscript{302}

3. Chronic Abuse

Chronic abuse, similar to torture, can include abuse that inflicts very serious harm immediately and irreparably. The modifier that distinguishes this example is not “severe,” “egregious” or even “very serious”; instead, it is “chronic.”\textsuperscript{303} The plain meaning of chronic is “[o]f
long duration; continuing.” Oklahoma defines the phrase in its child abuse statute to be “a pattern of physical or sexual abuse which is repeated or continuing.” Beyond “repeated” or “continuing,” chronic also suggests intractable or resistant to change. For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a case involving a termination of parental rights, explained that “[w]ith respect to the finding of unfitness because of chronic substance abuse, this Court has defined the term chronic as ‘[w]ith reference to diseases, of long duration, or characterized by slowly progressive symptoms; deep seated and obstinate, or threatening a long continuance.’” Providing reunification efforts for a child and parent when the parent has chronically abused the child predicts a long foster stay for the child.

4. Abandonment

What Congress intended by abandonment is more difficult to discern from its plain meaning. In family law, its meaning can range from abandoning a newborn infant at a hospital or elsewhere, to failing to pay child support, to failing to visit or otherwise maintain contact.

304 American Heritage College Dictionary, supra note 292, at 250.
307 Id. (citing In re Tara P., 836 A.2d 219, 223 (R.I. 2003)).
308 “Abandoned infant[s]” are explicitly listed in ASFA as circumstances requiring the state to file a termination of parental rights petition. ASFA § 103(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). Because section 675(5)(E) includes some (but not all) circumstances covered by section 671(a)(15)(D) (exceptions to reasonable efforts), the difference in phrasing is presumably intentional and “abandonment” in section 671(a)(15)(D)(i) is meant to be more inclusive than “abandoned infant[s].” ASFA leaves the definition of “abandoned infant” to the states. Id. § 675(5)(E).
309 See Young v. Foster, 252 S.E.2d 680, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that father’s “nonpayments were intentional and constituted a voluntary abandonment”); In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1998) (discussing legislative intent that termination for non-payment can occur when nonpayment manifests indifference to the child); Klobnock v. Abbott, 303 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Iowa 1981).
310 See In re Roshawn R., 720 A.2d 1112, 1117 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that because of father’s failure to utilize department of correction services to contact his children while incarcerated, the lower court properly found he had abandoned the children); Z.H. v. G.H., 5 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (state statute provides that abandonment occurs if, without good cause, the parent leaves the child without parental support for a period of six months or longer and makes no efforts to visit, although able to do so); see also State v. Williams, 130 P.3d 801, 806 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that incarceration, without more, does not constitute an aggravated circumstance, and noting that, while incarceration of a parent might seem to be included in abandonment “at first glance,” the state had not made that argument).
In some states, a man’s failure to register on a putative father registry is prima facie evidence that he has abandoned his child.\textsuperscript{311} In addition, the distinction between abandonment and child neglect can sometimes blur; failing to provide basic care and support for a child can constitute either abandonment or neglect.\textsuperscript{312}

Abandonment in abuse and neglect law, however, normally requires an “intent to relinquish parental claims to the child.”\textsuperscript{313} As stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, “generally, abandonment is demonstrated by facts or circumstances that evince a settled purpose to \textit{forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims} to the child.”\textsuperscript{314} The court went on to say that “[n]on-support does not itself constitute abandonment, especially where the child is supported by a volunteer, but it may be an element of abandonment.”\textsuperscript{315} More recently, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals had to apply Alabama’s statutory definition of abandonment in an aggravated circumstances case.\textsuperscript{316} The statutory definition included “the failure to claim the rights of a parent, or failure to perform the duties of a parent.”\textsuperscript{317} In spite of the language of the statute, the court held that “involuntary, unintentional, and/or justifiable parental conduct” would not support a finding of abandonment.\textsuperscript{318}


\textsuperscript{312} See \textit{In re Monique H.}, 681 N.W.2d 423, 428–29 (Neb. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that the findings did not rise to the level of abandonment contemplated by the reasonable efforts exception in the Nebraska statute). The court maintained that the trial court adjudicated Monique not only on the basis that she is an abandoned child, but also on the basis that she lacks proper parental support and parental care. In family law, the terms “abandoned” and “abandonment” can include many forms of child neglect, and the lines of distinction between the two are not always clear, so that failure to support or care for a child may sometimes be characterized as abandoning a child and sometimes characterized as neglect.

\textit{Id.} at 428.

\textsuperscript{313} Gregory et al., supra note 223, at 186.


\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{317} \textit{Id.} at 1105 (quoting \textit{Ala. Code § 26-18-3(1)} (1975)).

\textsuperscript{318} \textit{Id.} at 1103–04. The mother in the case did not have contact with the child protective services, nor did she physically visit the child between November 2005 and April 2006; as such, the juvenile court found that she had “abandoned” her child. \textit{Id.} at 1097. The appellate court concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the mother had “intentionally, voluntarily, and unjustifiably failed to claim the rights of a parent; failed to perform the duties of a parent; or withheld her presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, or the opportunity for the display of filial affection.” \textit{Id.} at 1104.
To the extent that abandonment is separate from traditional abuse, neglect, and failure to care situations, it would likely be a parent who has, without good cause or excuse: left a child, or left a child with someone, and failed to return; failed to maintain contact with the child; or otherwise failed to do what is necessary to keep alive his or her parental claims or parent-child relationship. Certainly such conduct can result in very serious harm or detriment to a child if reunification efforts are made. Because the details of the abandonment can vary greatly, however, the presumption of harm probably depends more on the specific circumstances than does the presumption stemming from torture, sexual abuse, or chronic abuse. Nevertheless, reunification efforts with a parent who has abandoned a child can suggest a likelihood that the child might be very seriously and irreparably harmed, either directly by the parent if returned prematurely, or by a lengthy stay in foster care if made to await the parent’s remediation.

5. Chronic Neglect

In addition to considering the examples listed, it is worth noting that Congress did not include chronic neglect. Its absence highlights the intentional and affirmative nature of the examples provided. Nevertheless, while most specific references are to affirmative acts, there are scattered references to neglect, and child advocates who appeared in Congressional hearings have also referred to circumstances that could

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319 As mentioned, ASFA requires that a termination of parental rights petition be filed when the abandoned child is an “abandoned infant.” ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006)). Abandoned infants are often sorted out for individual treatment in state abuse and neglect statutes. Arkansas defines “abandoned infant” and “abandonment” as follows:

(1) “Abandoned infant” means a juvenile less than nine (9) months of age whose parent, guardian, or custodian left the child alone or in the possession of another person without identifying information or with an expression of intent by words, actions, or omissions not to return for the infant;
(2) “Abandonment” means the failure of the parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the juvenile through statement or contact when the failure is accompanied by an intention on the part of the parent to permit the condition to continue for an indefinite period in the future and failure to support or maintain regular contact with the juvenile without just cause or an articulated intent to forego parental responsibility.


321 See id.
constitute neglect and chronic neglect.\textsuperscript{322} Especially emphasized were substance addictions; for example, Michigan’s Lieutenant Governor Connie Binsfeld argued that no reasonable efforts should be required in chronic circumstances—when “multiple attempts have been made to rehabilitate the family or when substance abuse has been ongoing and has resulted in previous harm to the children and the addiction has proved to be intractable even with appropriate treatment.”\textsuperscript{323} Similar views were expressed by child advocates Peter Digre and Albert J. Solnit.\textsuperscript{324} Digre argued that reasonable efforts should not be made for “parents with long-term and chronic addictions.”\textsuperscript{325} Solnit noted it was “too late for family preservation” when “the child has already been . . . severely neglected to the degree that it is life-threatening or leads to serious physical impairment.”\textsuperscript{326}

In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was quick to recognize neglect and nonaffirmative conduct as a basis for bypassing reasonable efforts when construing the state’s aggravated circumstances exceptions.\textsuperscript{327} In \textit{In re Ashley}, the parent argued that Maine’s aggravated circumstance exception required affirmative conduct.\textsuperscript{328} The statutory definition provided, in part, that the state was not required to use reasonable efforts when the parent had “subjected the child to aggravated circumstances including, but not limited to . . . [r]ape, gross sexual misconduct, gross sexual assault, sexual abuse, incest, aggravated assault, kidnapping, promotion of prostitution, abandonment, torture, chronic

\textsuperscript{322} See, e.g., 143 \textsc{Cong. Rec.} H2013 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (commenting that the legislation protects children who “through no fault of their own are unable to return to their natural parents” either because of abuse or neglect).

\textsuperscript{323} See \textit{Barriers to Adoption Hearing}, supra note 135, at 33 (statement of Lt. Gov. Binsfeld). Lt. Gov. Binsfeld maintained that it “would be very helpful to the States if [Congress would] define ‘reasonable efforts.’” \textit{Id.} at 37. Binsfeld, as part of her testimony, shared the recommendations made by Michigan’s Special Commission on Adoption to enable a bypass of reasonable efforts. \textit{Id.} at 33. She also discussed the harm to children left in foster care while the state provided efforts to rehabilitate parents who had committed egregious crimes against the children or their siblings. \textit{See id.} at 30–34.

\textsuperscript{324} See \textit{id.} at 110 (statement of Digre). Digre was then the Director of the L. A. County Department of Children and Family Services. \textit{Id.} at 110. Solnit was then a Senior Research Scientist for the Yale University Child Study Center and Commissioner for the Connecticut Department of Mental Health. \textit{Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways \& Means}, 104 \textsc{Cong.} 95 (1997) (statement of Albert J. Solnit, M.D.) [hereinafter Solnit Hearing].

\textsuperscript{325} See \textit{Barriers to Adoption Hearing}, supra note 135, at 116 (statement of Digre).

\textsuperscript{326} Solnit Hearing, supra note 224, at 97.

\textsuperscript{327} See \textit{In re Ashley}, 762 A.2d 941, 947 (Me. 2000).

\textsuperscript{328} See \textit{id.}
abuse or any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.”

The father argued his actions were only those of gross neglect. Moreover, he asserted that because the statutory examples encompassed only affirmative and criminal acts, his actions failed to satisfy the statutory phrase the trial court relied on for its findings of aggravated circumstances: “treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.”

The court disagreed, ruling that both action and inaction qualified as aggravating factors under the statute. The court emphasized both the use of the phrases “subjected to” and “treatment.” While acknowledging that “[n]eglect . . . will rarely constitute the heinous or abhorrent treatment envisioned by the Legislature,” the court found that there was “no question . . . that the severe neglect to which the father subjected Ashley and her infant brother” qualified.

The court noted Ashley and her two-month-old brother were “ignored for hours, if not for days, in a shockingly unsanitary environment. They sat in their own excrement, unattended, unfed, and unwashed. They received no human contact for hours on end.” The two-month-old had been put to bed in his car seat, which was placed in his bassinet. From approximately 11:00 that evening until 1:15 the following afternoon, no one tended to the baby’s needs. The mother called around 1:15 p.m. to report her baby had died in his sleep.

State legislative definitions are also largely consistent with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in In re Ashley. Some states, such as Oklahoma and South Dakota, explicitly included chronic neglect as a basis for allowing discretionary bypass of reasonable efforts.

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330 Id. at 947.
331 Id. In effect, the father argued ejusdem generis. See id.; Jellum & Hrick, supra note 79, at 159 (defining the term ejusdem generis).
332 See In re Ashley, 762 A.2d at 947.
333 See id.
334 Id. Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals also concluded that aggravated circumstances, as defined by its legislature, was not limited to intentional conduct and included neglect. See State v. Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). In Risland, however, the court noted that the Oregon legislature had listed two examples of aggravated circumstances that could include nonintentional conduct, “neglect’ resulting in a child’s death or serious physical injury.” Id.
335 Ashley, 762 A.2d at 947–48.
336 Id. at 944.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 943–44.
339 Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7003-4.6 (2007) (allowing bypass when “the parent . . . has inflicted chronic abuse, chronic neglect or torture on the child, a sibling of the child or another child within the household”); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(3) (2008) (allowing
More often, however, states have qualified their neglect grounds with specific “aggravating” factors.\textsuperscript{340} For example, Indiana requires criminal neglect, which can be found when a parent “has been convicted of . . . neglect of a dependent,”\textsuperscript{341} while Alaska dictates that a child must have “suffered substantial physical harm” as a result of the neglect.\textsuperscript{342} In addition, Kansas requires “life threatening” neglect,\textsuperscript{343} while Montana requires “chronic, severe” neglect.\textsuperscript{344} Thus, while including some form of neglect as an aggravating circumstance, states have also recognized the need to include only those circumstances that reflect very serious harms, either because of the very serious and immediate harm that may be inflicted or when the chronic nature of the neglect forecasts a long term foster stay for the child before the court.

B. “[S]ubjected the child to aggravated circumstances”

When faced with the explicit task of applying the aggravated circumstances exception, most courts agree that to be “aggravated,” the situation must reflect conduct or harm that is more than serious. The Oregon Court of Appeals examined the aggravated circumstances phrase in 2002 and concluded that it required “circumstances . . . involving relatively more serious types of harm or detriment to a child.”\textsuperscript{345} One year later, New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court similarly examined, along with other factors,\textsuperscript{346} the ordinary meaning of the phrase.\textsuperscript{347} The court considered “any circumstances that increase the severity of


\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Ind. Code Ann.} § 31-34-21-5.6.

\textsuperscript{342} \textit{Alaska Stat.} § 47.10.086.


\textsuperscript{344} \textit{Mont. Code. Ann.} § 41-3-423(2)(a).

\textsuperscript{345} \textit{Risland}, 51 P.3d at 705.

\textsuperscript{346} \textit{A.R.G.}, 824 A.2d at 224–34. The court interpreted New Jersey’s ASFA provisions by looking at the language used, the purpose of the legislation, and the statutory context of the phrase. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{347} \textit{See id.} at 227–28. The New Jersey statute at issue excepted aggravated circumstances by providing that no reasonable efforts were required when “[t]he parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment.” \textit{Id.} at 219–20 (quoting \textit{N.J. Stat. Ann.} § 30:4C-11.3 (West 2008)). The court noted that the New Jersey legislature “has chosen to use the term ‘aggravated circumstances’ as a modifier of ‘abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment.’ . . . Stated another way, it appears that the degree, or extent, of the ‘abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment’ would seemingly determine whether ‘aggravating circumstances’ are present.” \textit{Id.} at 227 (citation omitted).
the abuse or neglect, or add to its injurious consequences, [to equate] to ‘aggravated circumstances.’”

That “aggravated” means something worse than the typical, but still serious, abuse or neglect case is fairly apparent. The meaning and impact of the phrases “subjected the child to,” as well as “circumstances,” however, are less apparent. These phrases are not used in the CAPTA and TPR exceptions. Their use thus distinguishes the aggravated circumstances exception and consequently their meaning and impact are important to consider.

With the exception of CAPTA’s felony circumstance, both the CAPTA and TPR provisions rely upon the validity of the presumption that a parent who has caused or allowed “another child” to be harmed will also cause harm to the child before the court should reunification efforts be made. These provisions require no specific evidence concerning the child before the court. The presumed risk to the subject-child is derived solely from a specific, concrete, and very serious harm, either a CAPTA act or an involuntary TPR, which the parent inflicted upon another child. In contrast, the aggravated circumstances exception relies upon the validity of a presumption that a parent who has previously created aggravated circumstances concerning “the child” before the court will harm the same child in the future if reunification efforts are provided. The predicted future harm is thus explicitly derivative only in the sense that a prior circumstance concerning the subject-child is used to predict a future harm to the same child.

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348 Id. at 233. The court focused on whether the circumstances would create an unacceptably high risk to the health, safety and welfare of the child; if so, they are “aggravated,” and thus reasonable efforts may be bypassed. See id. The court concluded that “aggravated circumstances’ embodies the concept that the nature of the abuse or neglect must have been so severe or repetitive that to attempt reunification would jeopardize and compromise the safety of the child, and would place the child in a position of an unreasonable risk to be abused.” Id.

349 See id.

350 See id. at 220.


352 See A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 224–34.

353 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (when a parent has “committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent”).

354 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii).

355 See id.

356 See id.

357 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).
On the other hand, the aggravated circumstances exception is triggered not only when the child before the court has been directly harmed by aggravated circumstances—when the child has been tortured, for example—but also when the child has been “subjected” to the aggravated circumstance. This language raises the question of whether aggravated circumstances can be derived from a situation involving another child of the parent, and if so, how closely linked to the subject-child those circumstances must be.

The New York Court of Appeals directly faced the first part of this question in 2003 in a termination of parental rights case, In re Marino S., and affirmed that the aggravated circumstances need not be directly inflicted upon the subject-child, but can instead be derived from circumstances involving another child.

The New York Family Court in this case found that Shaina, the eldest of the mother’s three children, was raped by the man who had fathered her two younger siblings and who lived with her mother. The court also found that the mother had “severely abused” Shaina, by knowingly allowing her to be raped and by delaying medical treatment, which endangered her life. When affirming the Family Court’s opinion, the New York Court of Appeals relied upon the severe abuse of Shaina to support its finding of aggravated circumstances concerning the younger children.

New York’s statutory scheme included exceptions to reasonable efforts similar to ASFA. It included an aggravated circumstances exception that used ASFA’s language: reasonable efforts could be bypassed

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359 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28.

360 Id. at 28–29.

361 In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 825.

362 Id. at 829.

363 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28.

364 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1039-b(b) (McKinney Supp. 2009). For example, no reasonable efforts are required under New York law when the parent of the child before the court has murdered another child of the parent. Id. Section 1039b-(b) further provides that if any of the exceptions exist, diligent reunification efforts are not required “unless the court determines that providing reasonable efforts would be in the best interests of the child, not contrary to the health and safety of the child, and would likely result in the reunification of the parent and the child in the foreseeable future.” Id.; see also In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 828 (using the language of § 1039-b(b) to support the derivative findings of abuse).
when the parent had “subjected the child to aggravated circumstances.”\(^{365}\) New York defined aggravated circumstances to mean, among other things, “severe or repeated abuse.”\(^{366}\)

The parents focused on the severe abuse provisions.\(^{367}\) Two of the three definitions of “severe abuse” encompassed the abuse facts in Marino, and both referred only to circumstances directly involving “the child”:

(i) *the child* has been found to be an abused child as a result of reckless or intentional acts of the parent committed under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, which result in serious physical injury to *the child* . . . ; or

(ii) *the child* has been found to be an abused child as defined [elsewhere] . . . as a result of such parent’s acts; provided, however, the respondent must have committed or knowingly allowed to be committed a felony sex offense as defined [elsewhere].\(^{368}\)

The parents argued that the severe abuse, and thus the aggravated circumstances, covered only Shaina, not her siblings.\(^{369}\) While the third definition of severe abuse explicitly recognized derivative abuse, deeming the child before the court to be severely abused if the parent had committed murder, manslaughter, assault or aggravated assault of another child of the parent\(^{370}\) it did not apply to the facts in Marino.\(^{371}\)

The Court of Appeals declared: “We refuse to read the absence of specific references to siblings in subparagraphs (i) and (ii)” as preventing derivative findings of abuse.\(^{372}\) “It would be unthinkable to interpret the Social Services Law so that a derivative finding can be made when a parent assaults a sibling, but not when the parent rapes a sibling or seriously injures her under circumstances evincing a depraved indif-


\(^{366}\) In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (quoting and construing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(j) (McKinney Supp. 2009) (referencing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(8) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).

\(^{367}\) In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28–30.

\(^{368}\) N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(8)(a)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).

\(^{369}\) In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28.

\(^{370}\) N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(8)(a)(iii).

\(^{371}\) In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 29. The court reasoned that “[a]nomalous though it may seem, however, this subparagraph was not triggered in the present case because the conduct at issue was violent rape causing life-threatening injuries, and not homicide or assault.” Id. (construing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(8)(a)(iii)).

\(^{372}\) In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 29.
ference to her life.”

Thus, while Shaina was the only direct victim of severe abuse, the court affirmed that the siblings were severely abused and thus subjected to aggravated circumstances.

Much of the reasoning in Marino supports the use of derivative findings for ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception. In Marino, one definition of severe abuse explicitly recognized derivative abuse and the Court of Appeals relied on this to extend the concept of derivative abuse to the remaining definitions. In ASFA, both the CAPTA and TPR exceptions explicitly encompass derivative abuse, suggesting derivative abuse should also be recognized for the aggravated circumstances exception. Additionally, the language of ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception is different than its CAPTA and TPR counterparts in a way that is consistent with recognizing derivative abuse or harm. The aggravated circumstances exception requires that the child before the court only be “subjected to” those circumstances. Unlike the New York statutory provisions, ASFA does not include any specific definitions for aggravated circumstances requiring “the child” before the court to be a direct victim of the abuse or neglect. None of the suggested definitions for aggravated circumstances—“abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse”—must be directed at the subject-child. ASFA also allows an exception to required reasonable efforts for the child before the court if a felony assault resulted in serious bodily injury to either the child or another child of the parent. Finally, as each of the three Marino courts noted—the Family Court, the Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals—ASFA is premised upon and relies upon the validity of derivative harms.

While the use of derivative harms appears permissible, the phrase “subjected the child to” indicates that the circumstances must, in some

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373 Id.
374 See id.
375 See id.
376 See id.
377 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)–(iii) (2006)). Except for the felony circumstance, all of the CAPTA and TPR circumstances rely on the direct abuse of one child of the parent to trigger the presumption that the child before the court will also be abused. Id.
378 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D) (ii)–(iii).
379 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D) (i).
380 Id.
381 Id.
383 See supra notes 238–245 and accompanying text.
way, be related to the child before the court.\textsuperscript{384} The New York Court of Appeals \textit{Marino} analysis does not address the degree to which the phrase “subjected to” requires the state to demonstrate that the aggravated circumstances evince harm, or risk of harm, to the child before the court.\textsuperscript{385} But the court implicitly acknowledges there must be some connection.\textsuperscript{386} The decision notes that “courts have consistently sustained derivative findings where a [parent’s] abuse of [one] child is so closely connected with the care of another child as to indicate that the second child is equally at risk” and that “children who are not themselves the direct targets of abuse may, \textit{in accordance with the proof}, suffer damage from witnessing the severe abuse of their siblings.”\textsuperscript{387}

Another New York decision, \textit{In re William S.}, suggests that a lack of connection would require the state to provide reasonable efforts to the child before the court.\textsuperscript{388} The family court in \textit{William S.} emphasized that New York’s statute allowing aggravated circumstances (or any other circumstances) to excuse reasonable efforts is subject to a statutory “unless” provision: the court may require reasonable efforts if it “determines that providing reasonable efforts would be in the best interests of the child, not contrary to the health and safety of the child, and would likely result in the reunification of the parent and the child in the foreseeable future.”\textsuperscript{389} This provision places the ultimate burden of proof on the agency seeking to deny reasonable efforts to show “that reasonable efforts are not in the child’s best interest.”\textsuperscript{390} In \textit{Marino}, noted the \textit{William S.} court, the parents were given “full opportunity” to come forward with evidence to support their contention that reasonable efforts should be provided.\textsuperscript{391} Presumably, if the aggravated circumstances

\textsuperscript{384} ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15)(D)(i).
\textsuperscript{385} \textit{In re Marino}, 795 N.E.2d at 28.
\textsuperscript{386} \textit{See id.} at 28–29.
\textsuperscript{387} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added). One of the children found to have been derivatively abused was in the same bed when her father raped Shaina. \textit{Id.} at 29. The \textit{Marino} trial court similarly noted that children who are not direct targets are likely to be harmed by a parent who has already harmed another in his or her care, and that they are also like to suffer from seeing their sibling mistreated. \textit{In re Marino}, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 831. The trial court also observed that derivative findings were “similar to findings of neglect based upon domestic violence between adults within the child’s home when no physical injury to the child has occurred.” \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{388} \textit{In re William S.}, 832 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (Fam. Ct. 2007).
\textsuperscript{389} \textit{Id.} (quoting N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1039-b(b) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).
\textsuperscript{391} \textit{Id.} at 785–86 (citing \textit{In re Marino}, 795 N.E.2d at 28).
were not sufficiently connected to the child before the court, New York would require reasonable efforts.

The specific language of the CAPTA and TPR exceptions, however, does not require any connection or proof of harm to the subject-child, nor does the language of the aggravated circumstances exception clearly require child-specific harm to the subject-child.\textsuperscript{392} Language in an earlier version of the legislation perhaps came close to a child-specific harm requirement, that is, allowing states to forego reasonable efforts when there are “serious circumstances that endanger a child’s health or safety.”\textsuperscript{393} But otherwise, legislative history yields very few specifics on this issue. Two state courts, however, in Oregon and New Jersey, have considered the relevance of specific harm to the child before the court.\textsuperscript{394}

The argument before the Oregon Court of Appeals in \textit{State v. Risland} was limited to whether the specific effects of the circumstances on the child before the court \textit{may} be considered to establish aggravated circumstances.\textsuperscript{395} The court’s opinion, however, provides a basis for arguing that the effects on the child \textit{must} be considered if relevant to an argument against aggravated circumstances.\textsuperscript{396}

The Oregon court relied heavily on the legislature’s use of the word “circumstances” to conclude that the results on the child, both direct and indirect, could be considered when determining if aggravated circumstances existed.\textsuperscript{397} The court explained additional effects

\textsuperscript{392} ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii) (2006)). One could argue that without proof that the child in question would suffer harm, providing reunification efforts would presumably be in the best interest of the child and thus consistent with ASFA’s mandate, that “in determining reasonable efforts to be made . . . the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.” See \textit{id.} § 671(a)(15)(A). Further, New York does require this. See supra text accompanying notes 388–391.

\textsuperscript{393} \textit{143 Cong. Rec.} S12,183 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (amendment by Sen. Craig to H.R. 867, § 101(a), 105th Cong., providing that reasonable efforts shall not be required “if the State, through legislation, has specified cases in which the State is not required to make reasonable efforts because of serious circumstances that endanger a child’s health or safety”).

\textsuperscript{394} \textit{See A.R.G.}, 824 A.2d at 234–35; \textit{Risland}, 51 P.3d at 705–06;.

\textsuperscript{395} \textit{See Risland}, 51 P.3d at 705.

\textsuperscript{396} \textit{See id.} at 705–06.

\textsuperscript{397} \textit{Id.} The Oregon statute considered was different from ASFA in a couple of respects. See \textit{Or. Rev. Stat.} § 419B.340(5), (5)(a)(A) (2007). First, the statute allowed a bypass of reasonable efforts when aggravated “circumstances exist.” \textit{Id.} (emphasis added). While “subjected to” is included in some of the listed examples of aggravated circumstances—for example, “the parent has subjected any child to intentional starvation or torture”—it is not specifically used with the broader term “aggravated circumstances.” § 419B.340(5)(a)(E). Further, the Oregon court explicitly noted the legislature’s use of “any” child in some of the
must be considered when evaluating whether to terminate reunification efforts, as they may establish the lack of aggravated circumstances:

We caution that, in concluding that the circumstances here are “aggravated” . . . , we do not rely solely on the parents’ actions and conditions. As [the] father observes, the nature and scope of the parents’ problems are not unlike many examples of parental circumstances that would support the court’s dependency jurisdiction yet still require [the child protection agency] to make further reasonable efforts to reunify the family.398

Ultimately, the court ruled that the aggravated circumstances exception applied and specifically found relevant the harm suffered by the child before the court and the failure of extensive remediation efforts directed at the parents.399

The more specific issue of whether a court must consider the effects on the subject-child when the state seeks to excuse reasonable efforts based on aggravated circumstances was raised by a dissenting opinion in a New Jersey Appellate Division case, New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. A.R.G.400 A.R.G. involved three children who were the subject of abuse and neglect complaints filed against their father.401 The trial court had excused the child protection agency from reasonable efforts for all of the children, holding that the middle child had been severely abused and that, given the severity of abuse, the other two children were at risk for abuse.402 The New Jersey Appellate Division, in a split decision, affirmed.403 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed in part, but only after “elucidating” the Appellate Division’s standard.404

enumerated aggravated circumstances exceptions as contributing to its understanding of “circumstances,” § 419B.340(5)(a)(A); Risland, 51 P.3d at 705 (including, for example, “[t]he parent by abuse or neglect has caused the death of any child”). The Risland court relied on this to include within aggravated circumstances other, non-enumerated circumstances with “’any’ child, not merely the child who is the subject of the dependency petition.” Risland, 51 P.3d at 705. Consistent with this, the court included in its “circumstances” that the subject-child’s sibling had “suffered severe mental injury as a result of his exposure to significant domestic violence, the parents’ drug use, and a highly unstable home life.” Id.

398  *Risland,* 51 P.3d at 706.
399  Id. at 705–06.
400  See *A.R.G.,* 824 A.2d at 239–40 (Eichen, J., dissenting).
401  Id. at 216, 221.
402  Id. at 221, 223.
403  Id. at 236.
The discussions in the Appellate Division’s majority and dissenting opinions, as well as the subsequent New Jersey Supreme Court opinion, are instructive. Because New Jersey had not provided a legislative definition of aggravated circumstances, Judge Fall’s majority opinion focused on ASFA, its purpose, and its language to determine the meaning of the phrase. Judge Fall’s opinion concluded that ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception “embodies the concept that the nature of the abuse or neglect must have been so severe or repetitive that to attempt reunification would jeopardize and compromise the safety of the child, and would place the child in a position of an unreasonable risk to be reabused.” Like the Oregon court in Risland, the opinion also read ASFA’s provision to allow circumstances beyond parental conduct to be considered when assessing the situation for aggravated circumstances, for example, “whether the offer or receipt of services would correct the conditions that led to the abuse or neglect within a reasonable time.” The opinion noted that two of the three children in the case before the court had had been beaten by the father, the middle child “repeatedly” and once “savage[ly].” In addition, all three children had witnessed the father’s abuse of their mother. The majority determined that the “totality of the evidence paints a vivid picture of the children and others in [the father’s] household being sub-

407 Id. at 224–34. In the opinion, Judge Fall provided an extensive review of how other states dealt with ASFA’s aggravate circumstance exception. Id. at 227–32. The review showed a focus on past or present circumstances or harm: for example, Maine’s definition includes “[r]ape, gross sexual misconduct, gross sexual assault, sexual abuse, incest, aggravated assault, kidnapping, promotion of prostitution, abandonment, torture, chronic abuse or any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.” Id. at 230–31 (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4002(1-B)(A)(1) (2003) (current version at tit. 22, § 4002(1-B)(A)(1) (Supp. 2007)) (alteration in original; other alterations and emphasis omitted). Missouri’s definition states: “The parent has subjected the child to a severe act or recurrent acts of physical, emotional or sexual abuse toward the child, including an act of incest” A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 231 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.183(7)(1) (2003) (current version at § 211.183(7)(1)(2004)) (brackets in original; other alterations and emphasis omitted)).
408 A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 233.
409 Id. at 234; Risland, 51 P.3d at 706. The opinion can also be interpreted such that conduct alone may constitute “aggravated circumstances,” if the conduct is “particularly heinous or abhorrent to society.” A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 234.
410 A.R.G. 824 A.2d at 234. The court acknowledged that even the middle child had “suffered no broken bones or prolonged medical treatment.” Id. at 234–35.
411 Id.
jected to a violent and intimidating atmosphere,” and held it was appropriate to refuse reasonable efforts to reunite the children with their father based on aggravated circumstances.

Judge Eichen explicitly raised in her dissent the issue of “whether conduct alone is sufficient to establish a case . . . or whether the effect of that conduct must be factored into the equation.” She argued that other mitigating factors should have been considered in *A.R.G.*, noting that the family “had no prior history of intervention” by the state’s child protection system and that there had been no psychological evaluation of the father to determine if services might remediate the problems that led to the abuse. One of her “serious reservations” was “if the evidence underpinning the trial court’s decision in this case can be viewed as supporting a conclusion of ‘aggravated circumstances of abuse,’ consider how many other cases alleging child abuse . . . could arguably fit within the [same] definition.”

The case was reviewed on appeal by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In response, the court created two categories of aggravated circumstances—one where it is permissible to consider parental conduct alone and one where further inquiry is required. The proper inquiry should be whether the “abuse was of such a nature that standing alone, it compels the conclusion that reunification should not be required,” for example, “where the parental conduct is particularly heinous or abhorrent to society, involving savage, brutal, or repetitive beatings, torture, or sexual abuse.” If so, the court’s language suggests a strict liability of sorts: “[T]he acts complained of, by their very nature are, so unnatural or depraved that the fundamental bond that is

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412 *Id.* at 235.

413 *Id.*

414 *Id.* at 240 (Eichen, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Eichen’s dissent first criticized the trial court’s actions and the majority’s affirmance on due process grounds. *Id.* at 237. She also questioned the sufficiency of the evidence used to excuse reasonable reunification efforts: “[T]here was no medical testimony concerning the full extent and nature of the injury to R.L.G. from A.R.G.’s physical abuse. . . . Nor was there a psychological evaluation of R.L.G., or the other children, which might have afforded some insight into the emotional effects of the abuse on the children.” *Id.* at 239.

415 *A.R.G.* at 240 (Eichen, J., dissenting).

416 *Id.* at 239–40. The majority’s response to Judge Eichen’s dissent was that the father offered no “proofs or evidence” challenging the claim of aggravated circumstances and that “everything that could have been submitted was fully before the court.” *Id.* at 236.

417 *A.R.G.* 845 A.2d at 110.

418 *Id.* at 119. Both categories first require, however, that the conduct be “severe or repetitive.” *Id.* at 118. If not, aggravated circumstances cannot exist and reunification efforts are required. *Id.* at 118–19.

419 *Id.* at 118–19 (quoting *A.R.G.*, 824 A.2d at 213).
the basis of the reunification notion is deemed to be irremediably undermined.’”\textsuperscript{420} If these circumstances exist, “the conduct may . . . be said to constitute ‘aggravated circumstances,’”\textsuperscript{421} and “the abusive parent’s future remedial efforts would be of no consequence.”\textsuperscript{422}

This first category of aggravated circumstances seems to reflect those in the CAPTA criminal acts exception: where a parent has inflicted a very serious harm; where the infliction was somewhat immediate; where the state would have little or no warning before a similar harm was inflicted if the subject-child were reunited with the parent; and where the state will likely remain unsure of change by the parent, even with the parent’s compliance.\textsuperscript{423}

For the court’s second category, circumstances aside from parental conduct must be considered, specifically the effect on the child and whether reunification efforts can sufficiently address the problem within a reasonable time.\textsuperscript{424} Examples that usually belong in this category are “abandonment, corporal punishment that does not result in permanent injury, [and] serious neglect and mental abuse.”\textsuperscript{425} These cases “[require] inquiry beyond the mere conduct of the parent,” to determine if the circumstances have “irremediably undermined the parent-child relationship” and thus “support the conclusion that reuniting the family will place the child at risk.”\textsuperscript{426} Thus a court “may consider whether to admit expert testimony about the conduct and its relationship to the parent-child bond,” and “whether the parents’ remedial efforts are sufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of re-abuse.”\textsuperscript{427} “It is the result of all of [these] inquiries that will determine whether reunification efforts are required.”\textsuperscript{428}

\textsuperscript{420} \textit{Id.} at 119. A student author refers to this, as used in New York cases, as the “fundamental defect” theory. See May, supra note 244, at 614. One New York court described the situation as reflecting “such an impaired level of parental judgment as to create a substantial risk of harm for any child in [the parents’] care.” \textit{Id.} (quoting \textit{In re Dutchess Co. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.}, 661 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (App. Div. 1997)).


\textsuperscript{422} \textit{Id.} at 119.

\textsuperscript{423} See \textit{id.}

\textsuperscript{424} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{425} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{426} \textit{A.R.G.}, 845 A.2d at 119.

\textsuperscript{427} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{428} \textit{Id.} The court first discusses this additional evidence in terms of requirements, that is, that there is “another class of cases . . . that requires inquiry beyond the mere conduct of the parent.” See \textit{id.} (emphasis added). Later the court discusses this evidence as something the court “may” consider, that is, “[i]n [these] cases, the court may consider whether to admit expert testimony about the conduct and its relationship to the parent-child bond along with an assessment of whether the parents’ remedial efforts are sufficient to elimi-
For New Jersey’s child welfare agency to validly deny reasonable reunification efforts in this second class of cases, a court must have evidence that specifically connects the parent’s conduct or circumstances to a harm or risk of harm to the child before the court.\(^{429}\) In effect, the court requires a focus on the subject-child’s future health and safety should reasonable efforts be required.\(^{430}\) While the court does not otherwise specify the level of harm or the probability of the risk required, presumably each must be that which is evident from the conduct required in the first class of cases.\(^{431}\) Thus the harm must be serious enough to approximate a break of the “fundamental bond that is the basis of the reunification notion,” and it must also establish that reunification efforts will create an unacceptable and very serious risk to the child.\(^{432}\)

The New Jersey Supreme Court’s treatment of its second category of cases is generally consistent with ASFA’s requirement at the outset of its clarification of reasonable efforts—that “in determining reasonable efforts to be made . . . , the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.”\(^{433}\) In the first category, the exception applies without regard to any child-specific circumstances or harm concerning the child before the court.\(^{434}\) Because the New Jersey Supreme Court speaks of whether the exception applies, however, a court could still exercise the discretion, in either category, to provide reunification efforts if any evidence is introduced to suggest the presumption stemming from the aggravated circumstances is not valid.\(^{435}\) Indeed, ASFA’s mandate that the child’s health and safety is paramount, and its explicit directive that the child’s health and safety must be paramount when decisions about reasonable efforts are made, requires that the court consider not only circ-

\(^{429}\) See id.
\(^{430}\) See id.
\(^{431}\) See A.R.G., 845 A.2d at 119.
\(^{432}\) See id. at 118–19. Once the inquiry goes beyond the parental conduct and looks at other factors, the inquiry becomes whether reasonable efforts should be denied, in addition to whether reasonable efforts may be denied. See id.
\(^{434}\) See A.R.G., 845 A.2d at 118–19.
\(^{435}\) See id. at 119.
cumstances that make the case for an exception, but also circumstances that make a case against a denial of reunification efforts.436

IV. Recommendations

As stated at the outset, I have no tidy solution for the individuals who must ultimately make such difficult decisions about the lives of children. I do, however, offer an analytical approach for determining whether to deny reunification efforts. To approve a denial of reasonable efforts, a court (or other decision-maker) must not only require that the circumstances qualify under one of the ASFA exceptions,437 but also be satisfied that if reunification efforts are attempted, the child is likely to be very seriously harmed. To reach this point, the court must first find that a very serious harm has been created or caused by the parent of the child before the court. When determining the seriousness of this harm, any relevant factors should be considered, including derivative circumstances. There must, however, be a nexus between the harm the parent has already created and the harm predicted to the subject-child should reunification efforts be attempted. Finally, the predicted harm must be of sufficient magnitude to justify denying reasonable efforts.

A. Require a Very Serious Harm at the Outset

Both the CAPTA and the TPR exceptions apply to parents who have attempted to inflict, have inflicted, or have allowed to be inflicted very serious or severe harms upon their children.438 A court should be required to find a similar harm for the aggravated circumstances exception to apply.

The CAPTA and prior involuntary TPR exceptions have an advantage of encompassing only distinct and concrete situations or harms.439 The aggravated circumstances exception, however, must function as the catch-all, as the safety net for children affected by circumstances that make reunification efforts dangerous to their health and safety.440 An attempt to list the many aggravated circumstances that could justify the

436 Cf. In re William S., 832 N.Y.S.2d at 786 (noting a child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern when considering a request to deny reasonable efforts).
438 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii).
439 See id.
440 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i).
denial of reunification efforts has the advantage of definitiveness, but it risks leaving out unanticipated circumstances or circumstances that are difficult to describe with sufficient specificity.

Even Congress, while providing its examples of aggravated circumstances (abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse), cautioned that the exception was not to be limited to these situations.\footnote{See \textit{id}. This wisdom was seemingly borne out by the severe circumstances of neglect in Maine’s \textit{In re Ashley} case, where the two-month old infant died after being untended for “hours on end.” \textit{In re Ashley}, 762 A.2d 941, 943–944, 948 (Me. 2000).} Further, as the case law has made apparent, circumstances that might not qualify as “aggravated” in some situations—new parents who are overwhelmed, for example—should perhaps qualify in other situations.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 948.} Thus instead of defining aggravated circumstances with an exhaustive list, a better approach is to define it by focusing on the level of harm required for circumstances to be aggravated.

The courts have provided some good guidance here, having agreed that something more than serious is required.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 1248.} While adjectives in abuse and neglect law must be read as relative, definitions always help. “Serious” encompasses “[g]rave,” “[n]ot trifling,” “[b]eing of such import as to cause anxiety.”\footnote{\textit{American Heritage College Dictionary}, supra note 292, at 1245.} Severe [abuse] is generally considered beyond serious [abuse], and includes “[u]nsparing or harsh” [language], “causing sharp discomfort or distress; extremely violent or intense.”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 1248.} Requiring a severe harm would limit the applicability of the exception and thus provide some relative clarity. But such a high threshold would fail to capture what the New Jersey Supreme Court in \textit{New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. A.R.G.} identified as “another class of cases” where the health and safety of a child may require that reasonable efforts be denied.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} These situations, “which may or may not have irremediably undermined the parent-child relationship and may or may not support the conclusion that reuniting the family will place the child at risk,” require a court to probe further to determine if the child will be at undue risk with reunification efforts.\footnote{\textit{Id.} The New Jersey Supreme Court’s language in \textit{A.R.G.} recognizes that there may be two levels of aggravated circumstances, although the qualitative harm or detriment in its second level is not clear. See \textit{id}. Still, the court recognizes that the “aggravated” characteristic of some circumstances will be apparent, but for others further inquiry will be needed to determine if they meet the level of “aggravated.” \textit{Id.}}
Ultimately, while the harmful circumstances for aggravated circumstances should be significant and therefore exceed serious, they should not be limited to the severe and “heinous” circumstances identified by A.R.G.\(^448\) Circumstances less dire, but still very serious, are a better compromise for a threshold harm that can preserve the reasonable efforts requirement, but also provide states with sufficient power to protect the health and safety of their children.

**B. Consider all Relevant Circumstances**

Congress intended for child protection agencies and courts to consider all relevant circumstances when determining if situations fit the aggravated circumstances exception. This intent is apparent from the language of the exception—aggravated circumstances.\(^449\) This reading is also consistent with ASFA’s central policy aim, protecting the health and safety of the child.\(^450\) As courts have noted, “circumstances” should include the effect on the child, any neglect circumstances, and any derivative circumstances.\(^451\)

If the effect on the child, as opposed to the conduct of the parent, is what qualifies a circumstance as aggravated, the court ought to be able to consider the effect circumstances. As the Oregon Court of Appeals in *Risland* emphasized, “circumstances” includes “the total complex of essential attributes and attendant adjuncts,” and not only the “aggravated actions and conditions of a parent.”\(^452\) The same is true of ASFA’s exception.

In addition, the circumstances need not involve an affirmative act. The severe neglect circumstances in *In re Ashley*, the case in which the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a finding of aggravated cir-

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\(^448\) Id.


\(^450\) See *supra* Part II(A).

\(^451\) See *supra* Part I(B).

circumstances, demonstrate that non-affirmative conduct can cause very serious harms.\textsuperscript{453}

Finally, the court should also consider derivative circumstances when determining if aggravated circumstances exist. It is fair to read the plain language of the exception—“subjected the child to aggravated circumstances”—as encompassing derivative harms.\textsuperscript{454} In addition, the premise of the CAPTA and TPR exceptions in ASFA is derivative harms.\textsuperscript{455} Conventional abuse and neglect cases have also long relied on derivative harms.\textsuperscript{456} Recognizing derivative harms is consistent with protecting the health and safety of children. The court should certainly consider the very serious abuse of another child of the parent as possible aggravated circumstances.

Allowing courts to consider any circumstances that contribute to the showing of the harm required for aggravated circumstances, along with setting the threshold of harm at “very serious,” may appear to qualify too many situations as aggravated. But these qualifications only constitute the aggravated circumstances. They do not by themselves, nor should they, justify the denial of reunification efforts. To deny reasonable efforts, the decision-maker must also be satisfied that the harm triggering the exception—the aggravated circumstance—is connected to the harm forecast to the subject-child and that the forecast harm is sufficient to justify the denial. Further, these requirements should apply to all reasonable efforts exceptions, not just aggravated circumstances.

C. Identify the Nexus Between the Triggering Circumstances and the Anticipated Harm to the Child Before the Court

For reasonable efforts to be denied, the decision-maker should be required to articulate with some specificity the link between the triggering circumstances (whether CAPTA, TPR, or aggravated) and the threat to the future health and safety of the child before the court should reunification efforts be attempted.

While a threshold showing of a “very serious” harm will allow broad latitude for protecting the health and safety of children from harmful reasonable efforts, the threshold has two related weaknesses. First, while the phrase “very serious” is a bit more concrete than “aggravated circumstances,” a common and firm understanding of what it

\textsuperscript{453} In re Ashley, 762 A.2d at 947–48; see supra Part III(A)(5).


\textsuperscript{455} See id. § 671 (a) (15) (D) (ii), (iii).

\textsuperscript{456} See, e.g., In re Parental Rights of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1007–08 (Wyo. 1984).
constitutes will be difficult to attain. Second, even apart from its vagueness, the broad applicability of the phrase risks inviting abuse if not restrained. In other words, once the exception is triggered, its applicability is restrained only by discretion. The language of the exception offers no additional guidance on when a state should exercise this discretion to deny reunification efforts.

State courts have consistently recognized the difference between the applicability of ASFA’s exceptions and the subsequent exercise of the discretion to deny efforts. Along these same lines, Iowa legislatively restricts the applicability of its aggravated circumstances exception by requiring evidence that the abuse or neglect “posed a significant risk to the life of the child or constituted imminent danger to the child.” Each of the ASFA exceptions, however, not just the aggravated circumstances exception, should be subjected to explicit restrictions concerning the denial of reunification efforts to parents. Without some restriction, these life-altering decisions will be too susceptible to inconsistencies or worse.

Accordingly, the decision-maker must first be satisfied that the triggering circumstances for any exception are connected to the child and the decision before the court; the circumstances should thus forecast a threat to the future health and safety of the child should reunification efforts be attempted.

When the circumstances are directed at the child before the court, this connection is usually self-evident. Derivative circumstances differ, however, and must be connected explicitly. Some Florida courts have referred to this when discussing termination of parental rights based on the abuse of a sibling as finding a “nexus between the abuse and the prospective abuse.” In typical derivative “risk of abuse or neglect” cases, two significant factors help establish or refute this nexus. The first of these is a given—the control and physical proximity that comes

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457 E.g., State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 849 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); see also supra notes 205–209 and accompanying text.

458 IOWA CODE § 232.116(1) (i) (incorporated by reference in IOWA CODE § 232.57(2)(b) (Supp. 2008)).

459 In re G.D., 870 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). Similarly, in a District of Columbia removal case, the court ruled there can be “no per se rule allowing a child to be adjudicated neglected (and thus to be removed from a home) simply because a different child within that home has been abused.” In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d 465, 472 (D.C. 2004). Instead, the court ruled, there must be “an individualized finding” for each child, justifying that child’s removal from the home. Id. at 473; see also In re Arthur H., 819 N.E.2d 734, 753 (Ill. 2004) (noting “there here is no per se rule that the neglect of one child conclusively establishes the neglect of another child in the same household”).
from the parent-child relationship. The second significant factor is proximity in time, that is, how recent the circumstance was that triggered the exception. A third important factor will also be relevant to nexus and that is any parental change or failure to change since the triggering event.

Some Florida case law recognizes nexus is usually established “when the parent has a mental or emotional condition that will continue, such as mental illness, drug addiction, or pedophilia, and which will make it highly probable that in the future the parent will abuse or neglect another child.” A number of other factors can be relevant also, including the nature of the harm; the conduct or circumstances that resulted in the harm; the age, sex, health, abilities, and disabilities of the children; and the health, abilities, and disabilities of the parents.

In addition, the essentials of the CAPTA criminal acts circumstances will usually satisfy a nexus requirement. Most of the time, a parent who has murdered, committed voluntary manslaughter, or committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to one of his or her own children, has demonstrated he or she is a parent with dangerous propensities who presents an undue risk to his or her other children. The nexus of control and physical proximity of the parent to the child is inherent in the anticipated reunion of parent and child if reunification efforts are attempted. Proximity of time, often relevant, is usually not a factor in these cases. A parent guilty of the murder of one of his or her children, for example, suggests a parent whose “judgment and impulse control are so defective” that passage of time is unlikely to ease the state’s legitimate concern that the parent will harm other children in his or her care. Even in some CAPTA-like circumstances, though, there can be exceptions. If the murder was a shaken baby case that occurred twenty years ago, for example, and the child before the court is twelve years old and the current removal was for educational neglect, the nexus is not apparent. In these circumstances, the health and safety needs of the twelve-year-old might require reasonable efforts.

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463 See id.
For a prior TPR exception, the nexus between the prior termination and the anticipated harm to the subject-child requires more than the fact of the prior termination of parental rights and the parent’s control of or physical access to the child.\textsuperscript{466} In a termination of parental rights case, the Florida Supreme Court identified various factors that might be relevant: whether the conduct that led to the TPR involved “egregious abuse or neglect”; “[t]he amount of time that has passed since the prior involuntary termination”; and “evidence of any change in circumstances since the prior involuntary termination.”\textsuperscript{467} The court noted a “very recent involuntary termination will tend to indicate a greater current risk,” and that “positive life changes can overcome a negative history.”\textsuperscript{468} Certainly circumstances of the prior TPR, of the child before the court, and of the parent then and now are likely to be relevant when assessing whether the TPR sufficiently predicts harm to the child before the court if reunification efforts are ordered.

Connecting the triggering harm with the predicted harm to the child before the court is one step. The predicted harm must also be sufficiently detrimental to the child before a denial of reasonable efforts is justified.

D. Articulate Anticipated Harm to the Child

To justify the denial of reunification efforts, the state should also be required to establish a probable and substantial likelihood that the child will suffer one of the major harms ASFA sought to prevent—either a return to a dangerous home or a stay in foster care that is too long for the health and safety of the child.\textsuperscript{469} These requirements will force states to consider whether the parents are able and likely to remediate the concerns within a reasonable time.\textsuperscript{470} If the parents are likely to fix the problem, the child is unlikely to suffer the anticipated harm.

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\textsuperscript{466} See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15)(D) (iii).
\textsuperscript{467} Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 610 (Fla. 2004).
\textsuperscript{468} Id.; see also In re Div. of Family Servs. v. Smith, 896 A.2d 179, 190 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2005) (noting mother had not made any significant changes in her parenting skills since her prior terminations of parental rights); Kathleen Haggard, Note, \textit{Treating Prior Terminations of Parental Rights as Grounds for Present Terminations}, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1998) (arguing that a prior termination of parental rights should provide grounds for terminating the parent’s rights to the child before the court “if the State finds the parent’s continuing behavior puts the child at risk for abuse or neglect”).
\textsuperscript{469} See supra Part II(A).
\textsuperscript{470} This requirement is in line with ASFA’s provisions concerning mandatory termination of parental rights petitions. As noted, ASFA requires mandatory petitions in several circumstances, for example, when one of the CAPTA criminal acts exceptions exists or when a child
If the identified threat to the child’s health or safety is a CAPTA-like harm, that is, an instantaneous infliction of a very serious harm, reunification efforts are less likely to be successful, in large part because the risk that something very serious and irreparable might happen is just too great. Circumstances may matter, however, including the passage of time since the triggering event. If the parent appears ready to comply with a reunification plan, the court must still consider whether the current concern about the parent will linger, despite compliance with the plan. Further, the court also must consider whether the parent can complete the reunification plan within a reasonable time. Thus the court must be cognizant of not only the harm that may result if the child is returned to the home before it is safe, but also the harm that will accrue from an extended stay in foster care. Either can cause a very serious and irreparable harm to the child and either should suffice for a denial of reunification efforts. Allowing reunification efforts in CAPTA-like circumstances will often, and probably most often, create a substantial likelihood of one or the other of these two harms.

If the identified threat is one that results from ongoing circumstances or actions such as chronic abuse or neglect, the success of reunification efforts may be more plausible and the risk to the child, if he or she is returned to the home, not as stark and irreparable. If the parents relapse, the child can often be removed again before a significant and irreparable harm occurs. (This observation is not meant to dismiss the harm that comes from removing the child again. It simply recognizes the importance of preserving the parent-child relationship for the child’s long-term health and safety.) That the problem is chronic and that the parents may lapse is not sufficient for predicting a substantial likelihood of one of the two harms ASFA was meant to address. However, if there is a substantial likelihood that the chronic nature of the parents’ problems will ultimately prevail, or a substantial likelihood that the parents will not recover within a reasonable time, this predicts a

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has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). One exception to this requirement, however, is when an agency has “documented in the case plan . . . a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child.” Id. § 675(5)(E)(ii). New York has a similar provison affecting the aggravated circumstances exception. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1039-b(b) (McKinney Supp. 2009) When there are aggravated circumstances, reasonable efforts are not required “unless the court determines that providing reasonable efforts would be in the best interests of the child, not contrary to the health and safety of the child, and would likely result in the reunification of the parent and the child in the foreseeable future. The court shall state such findings in its order.” Id. Both ultimately look to the future of the child and the child’s health and safety. See ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5) (E)(ii), 1039-b(b).
long and uncertain stay in foster care. The court does not need to determine that the situation is so bad that the family can never be fixed. The court does need to find, however, that it is substantially unlikely that the problem can be fixed within a reasonable time. If so, reunification efforts should not be provided.

The key to both of these situations is “reasonable time.” ASFA has established a maximum default “reasonable time” framework by requiring a permanency plan within twelve months after the child enters foster care and requiring a mandatory termination of parental rights petition if the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The circumstances of individual cases may, however, require longer or shorter times. States may also wish to establish specific or presumptive reasonable times based on the child’s age, similar to what some states have done when defining the duty to provide reasonable reunification efforts. If the court finds it substantially likely that the concerns will not be successfully remediated within the reasonable time and that the concerns present a very serious health or safety threat to the subject-child, however, denying reasonable efforts is appropriate.

A final caution is important. Courts often assess the likelihood of parents’ successfully remediating a future threat to the subject-child’s health and safety by relying, in whole or part, on the failure of the parents’ prior efforts to remediate their problems. While these are circumstances appropriate to consider, the court must also consider if the state provided the parents with reasonable reunification efforts. To use the parent’s failure to respond to prior efforts as a basis for concluding that successful remediation is unlikely in the future requires that the state demonstrate the reasonableness of the state’s prior assistance.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception is to protect children from the harms of a lengthy, uncertain status in the dependency system. It is also intended to safeguard these children from being returned to unsafe homes. The vague statutory language of the aggravated circumstances exception necessitates a thorough method of

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471 See ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C), (E).
472 For example, California provides that reunification efforts for a child age three or older “shall not exceed a period of 12 months from the date the child entered foster care.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(a)(1) (2008). For a child under three, services “shall not exceed a period of six months from the date the child entered foster care.” Id. § 361.5(a)(2).
473 For a discussion supporting this concern, see Bean, supra note 31, at 342–67.
analysis for courts to apply in determining whether to deny reasonable efforts to reunite abused or neglected children with their parents. The analysis delineated in this Article presents an approach that will encourage consistency within the judicial process in accordance with the purpose of the exception.