Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal

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Abstract

Federal law significantly limits the political activities of charities, but no one really knows why. In the wake of Citizens United, the absence of any strong normative grounding for the limits may leave the rules vulnerable to constitutional challenge. This Article steps into that breach, offering a set of policy reasons to separate politics from charity. I also sketch ways in which my more-precise exposition of the rationale for the limits helps guide interpretation of the complex legal rules implementing them.

Any defense of the political limits begins with significant challenges because of a long tradition of scholarly criticism of them. Critics of the limits suggest that the “market failures” that justify tax subsidies for charity also afflict group efforts to monitor politicians and organize politically, so that the subsidy should extend to cover those activities. These claims, though, overlook a series of additional issues suggested by transaction cost economics and other aspects of economic theory.

Most significantly, even if lobbying and electioneering should be subsidized, it does not follow that these functions should be carried out by charities. I argue that combining politics with charity produces a set of diseconomies of scope, including higher agency costs, diminished “warm glow” from giving, and greater inframarginality of deduction recipients. In addition, I argue that the economically ideal tools for reaching the socially optimal levels of charity and lobbying are incompatible with one another. While there are also offsetting gains from the combination, many of these gains further exacerbate the diseconomies.

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Introduction

As the Supreme Court has deregulated campaign finance over the past few years, money has poured into every crevice of politics, but maybe nowhere more so than in the nonprofit sector.¹ Most of the notorious “SuperPACs,” including Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS, are organized as nonprofits.² Federal tax law in theory prevents most nonprofits from devoting the bulk of their efforts to political campaigns, and true charities, such as hospitals, schools, and churches, are limited in their lobbying efforts as well.³ But now that the Court has declared the pool open, even church leaders are diving in, with a coalition of ministers frankly daring the IRS to attempt to enforce its rules against them.⁴

Should we care? That’s the central question for this Article. Legal limits on lobbying by charities have been around for a long time, but truly thorough explanations for why they are there have been slow to develop.⁵ For about forty years, that was mostly a problem for academics, and perhaps for Congress.

Now, though, Citizens United and the rest of the deregulatory wave of campaign finance decisions lend new urgency to identifying the government’s interest in regulating the political

activities of charities.\textsuperscript{6} Under federal tax law, charities cannot engage in more than a “substantial” amount of lobbying, and cannot take part in campaigns for elective office at all.\textsuperscript{7} The constitutionality of the two limits had been mostly settled by a series of Court decisions in the early 1980’s.\textsuperscript{8} Since government was not obliged to fund speech, the Court held, Congress could---with little justification or explanation---make abstention from politics a condition of its subsidies for the charitable sector.

But those cases depend on the assumption that a charity’s stakeholders can still express themselves through the use of an affiliated, noncharitable nonprofit entity.\textsuperscript{9} The \textit{Citizens United} Court rejected, albeit in a somewhat different context, a very similar argument: the government had claimed that \textit{Citizens United} wasn’t burdened by campaign expenditure limits, because those limits could be mitigated by establishing a separate PAC.\textsuperscript{10} The Court waived aside that alternative as too burdensome to sidestep First Amendment scrutiny.\textsuperscript{11} And strict scrutiny, of course, demands that the government offer a compelling interest in support of its regulation.

Many other authors have also written on the connection between charity and politics, and in any literature as crowded as this one, any new contribution is necessarily incremental.\textsuperscript{12} But I

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\textsuperscript{6} Galston, \textit{supra} note 5, at 873.
\textsuperscript{7} IRC § 501(c)(3).
\textsuperscript{8} Galston, \textit{supra} note 5, at 891--98.
\textsuperscript{9} See infra Part I.
\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Citizens United} v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Id.} at 897--98.
think the increments here are quite significant, in that prior authors have overlooked some fundamental economic concepts. For example, critics of existing political limits suggest that lobbying, at least, is consistent with the goals of the charitable contribution deduction. The standard economic explanation for the deduction, though, is to encourage the production of goods the private market would fail to deliver. To be sure, lobbying can be a tool for delivering services to the needy. But that implies that lobbying should be limited to lobbying in favor of new public goods, not blocking or repealing them. This is a considerable oversight, given that political economists believe that the vast majority of effective lobbying is aimed at obstructing new legislation or regulation.

Another gap that would surprise an organizational economist is the absence of any analysis of economies of scale and scope. Some opponents of the political limitations suggest plausibly that market failures also afflict efforts for under-represented communities to unite for mutual political benefit. Perhaps, then, lobbying should also be subsidized. But should the two tasks, lobbying and charity, be conducted together in the same organization? Are the two more effective when combined, or are there instead ways in which one might undermine the other? That seems like a key question, and so far it has gone unasked. Answering it will form the core of my analysis here.

15 See infra Part II.A.
16 Buckles, Reply, supra note 12, at 1115--16; Mark Chaves et al., Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits’ Political Activity?, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 292, 293 (2004); Chisholm, Matching, supra note 12, at 266--77; Galston, supra note 12, at 1314.
There are other omissions as well. Political scientists have already debated the best design for political subsidies. The charitable contribution deduction, which is more generous for wealthier interests and allows for unlimited spending, is exactly the type of design all the otherwise-fractious political scientists can agree they would reject. The finance and organizational-theory literatures offer a rich account of the perils of organizations that try to conduct two relatively distinct tasks at the same: higher agency costs and managerial distraction are usually the result.

In sum, there are potentially two distinct questions about the legal separation between charity and politics. First, should we subsidize political activity? If not, then we have an easy answer: the limits are simply targeting rules for government dollars, albeit with some potentially tricky questions about how to implement that targeting. But supposing that politics should sometimes get government support---and there’s a good argument they should---we then have the question of how to deliver that additional subsidy. This design problem, I’ll argue, is probably what best justifies the existing rules.

As for the remainder of the Article, Part I offers some more detailed background for readers not already familiar with the tax rules governing charity or the constitutional law bearing on the validity of those rules. Part II begins the analysis by examining whether the rationales usually offered for government subsidies, such as in the case of the charitable contribution deduction, also justify a subsidy for lobbying, a subset of political activities. Although I find that these rationales offer less support than critics of the limits have acknowledged, they do argue for

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18 Hasen, supra note 17, at 29--35.
subsidies at least for some people to engage in some kinds of lobbying. Part III therefore takes up the design question, asking whether charity and politics are wisely conducted together. Part IV plays out the legal implications of Parts II & III, offering suggested definitions of “lobbying” and “substantial,” among other questions that currently vex lawyers in the field. Part V briefly applies the lessons of Parts II and III to charitable involvement in campaigns for elective office.

I. Background

To understand political limits on nonprofits, it’s unfortunately necessary for the reader to take a brief tour of tax law. Federally-recognized nonprofits can earn two distinct forms of tax benefits. Non-charitable nonprofits, such as labor unions and cooperatives, are exempt from the federal tax on corporate income.\(^{20}\) Organizations meeting the tougher standards of section 501(c)(3), which I will somewhat loosely group together as “charities,” are entitled both to this exemption and also are eligible to receive deductible contributions.\(^{21}\) That is, individuals who donate to a qualified 501(c)(3) can reduce their taxable income by the amount of the contribution (subject to a series of technical limitations).\(^{22}\)

The dollar value of this charitable contribution deduction (“the deduction”) is only a fraction of the money donated. Reducing taxable income shrinks the size of the check the taxpayer has to write to the government in an amount equal to the taxpayer’s marginal rate times one dollar. So if Louise makes a $1,000 contribution and has a 28% marginal tax rate, she now pays the government $280 less in taxes. In effect, the deduction is a matching grant from the government to the charity: for every dollar the donor contributes, the government gives back,

\(^{20}\) IRC §§ 501(c)(4) -- (7).
\(^{21}\) IRC §§ 170, 501(c)(3).
\(^{22}\) For a thorough exploration of the contribution rules, see BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS Ch. 25 (3d ed. 2002).
say, 28 or 35 cents, which the donor can then also contribute. Studies suggest that the deduction is an important factor in encouraging donations.\(^{23}\)

Because of its structure as an income-tax deduction, federal support for charity is worth more for higher-income donors.\(^ {24}\) We have a progressive tax system, so higher-bracket donors get a larger matching grant. Only itemizers, who are generally higher-income households, can claim the deduction at all, and donors must have enough taxable income within a five-year span to offset their contributions.\(^ {25}\)

To qualify for their matching grant, nonprofit firms have to meet a series of legal requirements, including two separate limits on their political activities. For one, the organizations cannot engage in a “substantial” amount of “propaganda...or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.”\(^ {26}\) I will call this the “lobbying limitation.” The organization also must not “participate in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”\(^ {27}\) Notice the absence of the word “substantial” in this phrase. I’ll call this second rule the “electioneering ban.”

The other legal requirements for the deduction deal mostly with defining what kinds of firms are eligible for the subsidy. Generally speaking, commercial enterprises aren’t eligible, while churches, educational institutions, nonprofit hospitals, museums, zoos, and social-service organizations are.\(^ {28}\) The key feature these purposes all share is that they suffer from market failure: because consumers of them provide positive externalities to others, the private market


\(^{24}\) STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 136 (1973).

\(^{25}\) IRC §§ 63, 170(d).

\(^ {26}\) IRC 501(c)(3). Non-church charities can also opt into a more detailed set of rules with explicit caps on certain forms of lobbying expenditures and more complex (although not necessarily more precise) definitions of several important terms. IRC § 501(h).

\(^{27}\) Id.

\(^ {28}\) ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, PLANNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, Ch. 7--11 (2011).
will tend to under-supply them.\textsuperscript{29} Entities that meet most of these requirements, but fail to comply with all of the political restrictions, can still be exempt from the corporate income tax under § 501(c)(4).\textsuperscript{30} A (c)(4) can lobby, and can electioneer as long as electioneering is not the primary purpose of the organization.\textsuperscript{31}

Taxpayers have repeatedly and so far unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)’s political limitations.\textsuperscript{32} The leading case is still \textit{Regan v. Taxation with Representation}, or “\textit{TWR}”.\textsuperscript{33} The \textit{TWR} Court held that the deduction is a subsidy for charity, and that the government is free to withhold that subsidy from activities it would prefer not to underwrite.\textsuperscript{34} It declared that there is no right to government support even for constitutionally-protected activities like political speech.\textsuperscript{35}

In cases after \textit{TWR}, though, the Court grew more willing to scrutinize government spending decisions. Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in \textit{TWR} had argued that a complete ban on all speech by a recipient organization went beyond the government’s goal of simply limiting the uses of its own dollars, since the ban effectively also penalized the organization for speech paid for with money that came from elsewhere.\textsuperscript{36} Later cases adopted Blackmun’s concurrence as the more persuasive approach going forward.\textsuperscript{37} If a government grant is conditioned on limits to the recipient entity’s speech, the recipient’s members must have some

\textsuperscript{29} BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 158--63 (9th ed. 2007).
\textsuperscript{30} DESIDERIO, \textit{supra} note 28, at 23-2 to -20.
\textsuperscript{31} Vladeck, \textit{supra} note 3, at 321.
\textsuperscript{32} In other words, the reader may now uncover her eyes: our journey through taxland is over. Ok, almost over.
\textsuperscript{33} 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Id.} at 544--45.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Id.} at 545--46.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Id.} at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
other outlet for their expression.\textsuperscript{38} In the case of nonprofits, the \textit{TWR} concurrence acknowledged, this condition is usually met, since a 501(c)(3) organization is free to form an affiliated (c)(4), which its members can then use to do the bulk of their lobbying.\textsuperscript{39}

Thus, until recently it seemed fairly settled that the lobbying limits and electioneering ban are constitutional, even though they arguably burden protected speech, because of the (c)(4) option.\textsuperscript{40} Many charities now also operate an affiliated noncharitable nonprofit which they use to conduct their political operations.\textsuperscript{41}

The now-infamous \textit{Citizens United} decision, and a handful of cases immediately before and after it, have unsettled the consensus that TWR remains good law.\textsuperscript{42} The Supreme Court and courts of appeals have now struck down a series of state and federal limits on political expenditures.\textsuperscript{43} The exact contours of the rules that have been invalidated aren’t important for my purposes here, but the rationale the courts have offered is. In \textit{Citizens United}, for example, the Supreme Court struck down federal limits on certain political advertising paid for out of a corporation’s general treasury funds.\textsuperscript{44} The government argued in defense of the limits that corporations could still form a separately-incorporated “PAC,” or political action committee, which they could then use as a vehicle for whatever advertising they wanted. The Court rejected that argument, stating:

\begin{quote}
Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak-and it does not-the option to form PACs does not alleviate
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 400.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{TWR}, 461 U.S. at 552--53.
\textsuperscript{40} Galston, \textit{supra} note 5, at 891--98, 903--06.
\textsuperscript{41} Hasen, \textit{supra} note 1, at 204; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, \textit{What is This “Lobbying” that We Are So Worried About?}, 26 \textit{YALE L. & POL’Y REV.} 485, 547 (2008). For a helpful case study of these multi-entity structures, see Janelle A. Kerlin & Elizabeth J. Reid, \textit{The Financing and Programming of Advocacy in Complex Nonprofit Structures}, 39 \textit{NONPROFIT & VOL. SECTOR Q.} 802, 806--18 (2010).
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Citizens United} v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See Aprill, \textit{supra} note 1, at 365--75, and Galston, \textit{supra} note 5, at 882--84, for the full story.
\textsuperscript{43} Hasen, \textit{supra} note 1, at 213--16.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Citizens United}, 130 S.Ct. at 897.
the First Amendment problems with [the advertising limits]. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this information within 10 days. . . . PACs have to comply with these regulations just to speak. . . . PACs, furthermore, must exist before they can speak. Given the onerous restrictions, a corporation may not be able to establish a PAC in time to make its views known regarding candidates and issues in a current campaign. . . . [The] prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech.45

In other words, it appears that the burdens of setting up an alternative entity to speak for the organization can themselves create “a ban on speech.”

Commentators have been quick to point out the possible implications of passages like these for the TWR consensus.46 Setting up a (c)(4) organization, like creating a PAC, requires an application form and regular reporting to the government.47 Establishing that none of the (c)(3) entity’s resources are funneled to the (c)(4) requires detailed and careful accounting. If the logic of Citizens United applies, then the effort of setting up a (c)(4) workaround looks as though it could itself be a “burden” on speech.48

Of course, the fact that government regulations burden or ban speech doesn’t necessarily mean that they are unconstitutional. Government always has the opportunity, even under the

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45 Id. at 897--98.
47 I.R.C. § 6033(a); 26 CFR § 1.6033-2.
48 Mayer, supra note 46, at 417--18, 423. But see Aprill, supra note 1, at 397--98 (suggesting that burdens of § 501 are lighter than PAC regime condemned in Citizens United); Galston, supra note 5, at 907--10 (arguing that other caselaw may provide a basis for distinguishing Citizens United).
strictest constitutional scrutiny, to show that it is pursuing a compelling interest with the least restrictive means available.\footnote{\textit{Citizens United}, 130 S.Ct. at 898.}

Thus, the government’s interest in the 501(c)(3) political limits may be the key factor distinguishing them from \textit{Citizens United} and its ilk. In \textit{Citizens United}, the government’s goals were purely regulatory: it wanted to control the market for politics to avoid “corruption”\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 903.}. The rationale for the political limits on charities may be different. Most of the existing explanations for those limits center on protecting the government’s investment in charity.\footnote{\textit{Cf. id.} at 899 (noting that Court has allowed restrictions on speech to permit proper functioning of government institutions).}

Understanding charity, then, is at the center of the constitutional inquiry into the political limits. In what ways might lobbying or electioneering interfere with the underlying goals of § 501? That is the issue I’ll explore for the remainder of this Article.

\section*{II. Preserving the Government’s Money?}
With that background out of the way, I turn now to attempting to determine whether there are any good explanations for the lobbying limits.\footnote{By “lobbying,” I mean efforts to achieve outcomes through political rather than private means.} One obvious potential justification is that politics could be a wasteful diversion of charitable dollars. The charitable-contribution deduction serves as a subsidy for charities, and tax exemption may further subsidize some organizations.\footnote{Jeff Strnad, \textit{The Charitable Contributions Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis}, in \textit{THE ECONOMICS OF THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR} 265, 273 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). Dan Halperin explains that exemption is a subsidy to the extent that the organization would not be able to offset all its revenues with deductions in the future. Daniel Halperin, \textit{Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?}, 64 \textit{TAX L. REV.} 283, 285, 292--94 (2011). Since political expenditures are not deductible business expenses, IRC § 162(e), exempt entities are receiving a subsidy in the amount of lobbying and any untaxed campaign expenditures. \textit{Cf. IRC § 527} (imposing tax on exempt entity expenditures on electioneering activities, but only to the extent of organization’s net investment income).} Perhaps limits on lobbying are simply ways of channeling those subsidies to their desired purposes. For any government-purpose analysis to be coherent, of course, we first
have to agree on what purposes the deduction might be furthering. That is itself somewhat
controversial. Thus the sub-Parts that follow each first lay out a possible set of rationales for the
deduction, and then consider whether lobbying activity is consistent with those justifications.

**A. Government Failure & Diversity Rationales**

By far the most common modern justifications for the deduction rest on the claim that it
helps society to produce goods that neither the market nor majoritarian government could.\(^{54}\)
Markets can fail to satisfy social demand for “public goods,” or other goods with a significant
positive externality attached, because potential buyers do not take into account the benefit their
purchase would provide to others.\(^{55}\) For-profit firms may also struggle to sell “credence” goods
whose quality is difficult for the purchaser to monitor; by promising not to divert profits, the firm
can help reassure consumers that it will not cheat them in order to pad the bottom line.\(^{56}\)
Although governments can use their taxing power to fill these gaps, government production
might be limited to the policies that can command the support of a majority of the voting
public.\(^{57}\) The argument therefore is that government, too, fails to meet the needs of novel or
unpopular causes, or of voters with unusually high demand for a service desired in only modest
amounts by the average voter.\(^{58}\)

Debate over whether this rationale is consistent with nonprofit lobbying has so far
amounted to a fairly simple back-and-forth. Critics of lobbying by charities suggest that, since
lobbying is not the production of services the market has failed to offer, use of subsidized

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\(^{54}\) *Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2008*, at 257–59.


charitable dollars for that purpose misallocates the government’s dollars.\(^{59}\) Supporters respond that lobbying is simply an alternative way of getting society to create the under-provided goods.\(^{60}\) They also argue that advocacy on behalf of those with few resources or political influence is itself a form of public good.\(^{61}\) And they claim that including these forgotten voices in the political conversation can transform the debate, which is perhaps yet another common benefit we all would enjoy.\(^{62}\)

The combatants have not yet recognized, however, that each of these three counter-claims rests on factual assumptions that may not be well-grounded. Increased lobbying expenditures might not in fact lead to greater social production of the goods sought. Advocacy may not actually improve the lives of the under-represented. And subsidies for charity might not change the political climate, or, if they do, might not change it for the better. Each of these possibilities needs some unpacking.

1. “Get Stuff”

Consider first the claim that lobbying might be another way to encourage production of goods that market and government would otherwise fail to provide. A preliminary problem with this theory is that it doesn’t really support many forms of lobbying activity. The theory, which I’ll call the “get stuff” premise, implies very significant restrictions on the permissible subjects

\(^{59}\) Ann M. Murphy, *Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate: Never the Twain Shall Meet?*, 1 Pitt. Tax Rev. 35, 64, 80 (2003); see Leff, *supra* note 12, at 676 (summarizing this argument); see also Chapman, *supra* note 12, at 865 (claiming that lobbying by charities would exacerbate political conflicts that the deduction is supposed to resolve).

\(^{60}\) See sources cited *supra* note 16.


charities could lobby on. A large fraction of U.S. lobbying expenditures are “defensive” --- they are devoted to preventing changes to existing law. 63 Perhaps preserving an existing entitlement program is another way of ensuring that the program’s benefits continue to exist. But many other kinds of defensive lobbying, such as NIMBY-ish efforts to block or relocate a proposed public works project, opposition to new regulations of industry or human behavior, or calls for government austerity, couldn’t plausibly rely on the “get stuff” theory. Similarly, efforts to repeal existing regulations, or to cut taxes or services, would seem the exact opposite of a “get stuff” rationale. And of course any lobbying for the production of “private” goods that the market could produce--which, by some accounts, is the bulk of all lobbying64--would fall outside the charitable-support framework entirely. Proponents of a “get stuff”-type argument have so far not acknowledged these logical limits on their position.65

Assuming that lobbying funds were spent on goals consistent with the purpose of the deduction, it still is unclear to what extent such expenditures would actually increase production of the goods sought. Injecting new funds into the system may simply contribute to an arms race in which all the actors spend more but none get better results.66 Further, it is likely that at least some portion of a lobbying subsidy would be captured as “rents” for public officials and professional lobbyists.67 Political economists argue that the time, attention, and agenda space of

65 Arguably, existing rules preventing charitable resources from being spent for the “private inurement” of a nonprofit’s insiders or “private benefit” of outsiders might limit lobbying for the production of private goods. Buckles, Reply, supra note 12, at 1119--21. But, as Buckles acknowledges, these rules are nearly impossible for the government to invoke successfully in the lobbying context, since there will almost always be some colorable public-regarding purpose for any lobbying effort. Id. at 1122.
public officials is limited.68 Those who seek access must bid against each other, allowing the official to extract rents as payments for the opportunity to move up in line.69 Intermediaries with relational capital invested in ongoing ties with officials may help provide access, but they, too, may claim rents in exchange for the scarce resource of their leverage with their allies in office.70 Helping groups to organize may simply facilitate the process of rent extraction.71

Funds devoted to lobbying may also be particularly vulnerable to diversion by a charity’s own officers and employees. Commentators have recognized that, due to the difficulty of monitoring the quality of most public goods and the weak legal oversight mechanisms for most charities, it can be relatively easy for their employees to exploit the organization’s resources for the employees’ own ends.72 Officers may pay themselves generous salaries, give only indifferent effort, or may pursue purposes that satisfy their own preferences rather than those of donors.

These problems are more acute in the lobbying context because of a form of team-production problem. When many actors collaborate together, it is difficult for monitors to judge each of their individual contributions.73 Knowing this, participants may each feel free to pursue their own goals. Any lobbying to “get stuff” necessarily involves multiple actors---the charity’s employees, the officials, the charity’s outside lobbyists, and often a coalition of allied

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68 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 63, at 42--44; see Hasen, supra note 1, at 219 (noting critical role of personal contact in successful lobbying efforts).
71 MCCHESSNEY, supra note 69, at 151--52.
organizations. Employees may take money to lobby and, when undesired outcomes occur, simply blame the officials. Or they may take money to “lobby” for an outcome that would have happened anyway.

More generally, as I’ve argued previously, lobbying is a costlier method of producing public goods than direct production by a charity because it requires the efforts of two separate sets of agents. We’ve just seen that when donors give money to a charity to produce a public good, some portion of their money and time will be lost to efforts at monitoring the charity’s employees. Unless monitoring and control mechanisms are perfectly effective some additional fraction is lost in rents paid to the charitable “entrepreneurs.” If the charity is tasked with lobbying, then this process is repeated again, as the charity’s employees contract with second or even third sets of agents, in the form of outside lobbyists and public officials.

Moreover, an enterprise dependent on government support is vulnerable to holdups in a way that a private firm is not. Managers of a for-profit firm may be tempted to exploit the firm’s dependence on them by demanding extra portions of the profits, but the size of these demands is limited to the firm’s cost of replacing the manager. Most shareholders can also respond to holdup attempts by simply selling their stock. In contrast, many nonprofit stakeholders have deep and lifelong ties to their institution—say, the university’s name on their resume. These

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74 See Thomas T. Holyoke, Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360, 361--75 (2009) (reporting that working with legislators and coalition partners moves organizational lobbyists away from positions preferred by their group’s members).
78 Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 70, at 1653--54.
stakeholders can likely be shaken down for rents repeatedly by public officials who fund the institution or its mission.80

Even if all these various potential diversions do not wholly consume the value of the government’s subsidy, they might still represent a reason to limit lobbying. If lobbying activities lead to a greater degree of waste and diversion than other methods for getting “stuff,” limiting them could be a way to enhance the cost-effectiveness of the government’s dollars.

2. Interest Representation

Another way of justifying lobbying within a “government failure” framework for charity is to claim that the act of presenting the claims of under-served groups to government is itself one of the public goods society fails to provide.81 Importantly, this vision of lobbying would seem to avoid both of my criticisms of the “get stuff” approach. For one, logically it would embrace a much wider set of permissible lobbying topics, such as “defensive” lobbying or efforts to repeal existing government programs, so long as the goals represented the interests of a group that would otherwise be unable to find purchase in the scramble for political influence.

Representing the interests of others also might be a justifiable target for government subsidies even if lobbying dollars are relatively easily diverted. Since lobbying is itself the goal, there is no alternative, more cost-effective method the government could point to as a preferred target of its funds.

But there are significant additional factual assumptions that the interest-representation theory relies on. For one, it is unclear that minority interests would be voiceless in the absence of a subsidy. As most readers likely know, public choice theory predicts that small and

81 For accounts of lobbying as a public good outside the nonprofit context, see Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 70, at 1668.
concentrated interests are exactly those that are most likely to succeed politically. Even groups with few resources of their own can attract policy “entrepreneurs” to represent them, on the expectation that successful lobbying will bring later rewards for the entrepreneur. Indeed, this argument would seem to undermine the premises of the “government failure” rationale for the deduction itself, as I’ve explained elsewhere. Nonetheless, there would be still be some groups—especially those that are poor, fairly numerous, and widespread—for whom public choice theory would suggest that subsidies might be needed, whether for lobbying or direct production of other public goods they prefer.

Another question for the interest-representation argument is whether it can remain coherent if lobbying is permitted by most charities. Again, it’s widely accepted that access to public officials is limited. Some, but likely not all, under-represented interests will be able to attract charitable organizations to fight on their behalf. Subsidies for represented groups may bid up the cost of access to officials, meaning that it will become even more costly for groups that don’t have representation. So subsidized lobbying might amplify some voices by drowning out others. And these new outsiders are likely already especially marginal, given their inability to draw even private policy entrepreneurs into their corner.

83 K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 72-74 (1986).
84 Galle, supra note 75, at 804.
85 Hasen, supra note 1, at 226–27.
86 See THEDA SKOCPOL, 211–15 (2003) (arguing that modern interest groups “privilege the already-educated and already-politicized”); Hasen, supra note 17, at 30 (suggesting voucher systems might advantage better-organized and wealthier groups); Jennifer E. Mosley, Organizational Resources and Environmental Incentives: Understanding the Policy Advocacy of Human Service Nonprofits, 84 SOC. SERV. REV. 57, 72 (2010) (finding survey evidence that “small, isolated organizations” are not successful at lobbying and that this disparity may diminish “diversity of voices advocating for clients”).
87 Cf. Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 70, at 1658 (observing that groups that can afford more effective lobbyists will become yet more powerful than those with weak representatives).
Similarly, a lobbying deduction might simply amplify existing disparities in resources and influence. Wealthy and powerful donors, too, can form organizations to lobby on their own behalf. And the current structure of the deduction provides much greater benefits to top-bracket donors than to the bottom 50% of households, magnifying rather than narrowing disparities in the groups’ political access. Better-financed interests could also use these additional resources to bid up the costs of access, further reducing the access of poorer groups. For these reasons, commentators weighing the design of a possible lobbying subsidy overwhelmingly favor vouchers or other rewards that are identical in size for each individual, rather than a matching grant. Even if there is no crowding out, the possibility that already-successful interests could claim the deduction means that the deduction would not be a very cost-effective support for the underserved; only a small fraction of each dollar spent by the government would go to the targeted groups.

Some proposals would diminish these tax-driven differences by converting the deduction to a credit that would give all donors an equal dollar value for each dollar donated. But that structure would still allow wealthy donors to claim a government subsidy to lobby. Because for-

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89 Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776–78 (2007) (offering this as a reason tax system limits lobbying with deductible dollars); see Galston, supra note 12, at 1317. It is also possible that wealthier interests will not much increase their spending in response to the subsidy. But they will surely claim the deduction anyway, meaning the government is spending money for nothing.


91 Cf. Overton, supra note 91, at 112-13 (noting that wealthy donors are likely to be inframarginal).

profit firms and the wealthy can spend much more than poorer households, they would still claim a considerably larger pile of government dollars.\textsuperscript{93}

The crowding-out point would be less worrying to the extent that, as some suggest,\textsuperscript{94} there are diminishing marginal returns from lobbying expenditures. If returns diminish quickly within the range likely occupied by existing powerful organizations, then the subsidy might usefully increase the representation of less powerful groups: a dollar given to each group would produce greater returns for the low-powered group than for the high-powered. But it also seems plausible that the returns curve is S-shaped, in that lobbying by already-influential groups likely commands particular attention from officials, until at some point the official is fully captured and further expenditures have little effect. Figure one illustrates this possibility and others.

\textit{Figure One: A Possible Relationship Between Expenditures and Influence}

\textsuperscript{93}See John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, \textit{Paying for Politics}, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 644--45 (2001) (pointing to historical evidence that this was the case for federal campaign contribution tax credit); Gergen, \textit{supra} note 55, at 1405--06 (arguing that even credits will give wealthy donors control over how to allocate government dollars).

\textsuperscript{94}Hasen, \textit{supra} note 1, at 229.
In this graph, the impact of lobbying subsidies depends on where existing powerful interests fall on the graph. Each arrow represents a possible boost in expenditures represented by subsidies. By assumption, under-represented interests are at the arrow labeled “A”: subsidies amplify their voice, but the return on expenditures is only moderate. Whether this represents a net gain depends on whether more powerful interests are mostly at arrow B or arrow C. If the most influential are at arrow C, the subsidy these winners claim doesn’t produce much greater influence, because they’ve already bought all the influence that can be bought. In that scenario, subsidies available to all on net increase the voice of the poor. But if the powerful are at point B, the voiceless are net losers: the subsidy buys more influence per dollar for those who already have some. And, of course, wealthier interests can spend more dollars.

While many of these objections could be overcome if lobbying were limited only to a select group of charities, that approach faces significant challenges. Given that theory doesn’t clearly identify which interests are underrepresented, government line-drawing rulings could be difficult, contentious, and politically fraught. As with the question of the eligibility for the deduction generally, there would be a danger that government officials might selectively favor the organizations with which they are ideologically aligned. I’ve suggested elsewhere some mechanisms for cabining this problem, but they don’t translate perfectly to the lobbying context.

It is also possible that the problem of crowd-out and competition from better-funded groups could be alleviated with tools short of strict limits on lobbying by all charities. A sensible campaign finance regime, separate and apart from the tax system, might help to ensure a level

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95 Mayer, supra note 41, at 549.
96 See Chisholm, Matching, supra note 12, at 244.
97 Galle, supra note 75, at 848–50. In brief, the translational problem is that it isn’t obvious how to design a “costly screen” to select out organizations that don’t really “need” a lobbying subsidy.
playing field for all. If it were really effective, though, then the need for lobbying subsidies might itself wilt. Sticking to regulations of charities per se, caps on the amount of lobbying that could be carried out by any one organization (or group of related organizations) would tend to limit the ability of already-powerful groups to consume all the available political oxygen. I’ve argued elsewhere that the current law’s restriction of charities to an “insubstantial” amount of lobbying, if properly understood, already constrains the amount of influence any one entity can wield without losing its exemption.98 The interest-representation rationale, then, may be consistent with these existing limits, if not a more dramatic constraint.

3. Political Pluralism

A final way in which government-failure theorists explain lobbying by nonprofits is to argue that lobbying on behalf of underrepresented groups benefits not only the groups but also society at large. Incorporating competing views into major political discussions, it is argued, enriches the debate, challenging old verities and offering innovative new alternatives.99 These arguments face many of the same questions as interest-representation theories: would subsidies actually amplify the voices of the underrepresented, or instead crowd them out? Would charities really offer an independent voice, or would the prospect of an unlimited federal matching grant tempt managers and outsiders to divert charity to other purposes?100

In addition, even if it proves the case that subsidies for lobbying by charities significantly increase the influence of underrepresented interests, there is still a serious question whether such voices in fact enrich politics rather than polarizing it. Evidence suggests that deliberation among individuals of differing views contributes to better, more inclusive, and more legitimate-seeming

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99 See sources cited supra note 62.
100 For more consideration of this point, see infra Part III.A.5.
government.\textsuperscript{101} When, however, politics consists not of individuals, but conflict among interest groups, these benefits of deliberation apparently diminish.\textsuperscript{102} Membership in a homogenous group----such as most voluntary associations\textsuperscript{103}----often appears to harden the views of the group’s members, leaving them predisposed to doubt even basic factual propositions that would challenge their existing worldview.\textsuperscript{104} As more extreme sets of beliefs come into contact, they struggle to agree on these basic facts, leading to gridlock and bitter partisanship rather than deliberation and compromise.\textsuperscript{105} Subsidies that channel citizen participation into these kinds of outlier organizations might add some voices to public debate at the cost of making our public debate more toxic overall.\textsuperscript{106}

Another way that lobbying subsidies can contribute to polarized debate is by channeling political conversations into narrowly-focused organizations. Most entities don’t represent their stakeholders’ global interests, but instead focus on one or two goals or issues.\textsuperscript{107} As Issacharoff

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 117--28 (1996); Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 655, 658 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{102} Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 105--11 (2000).
\item \textsuperscript{104} Sunstein, supra note 102, at 85--96; Elisabeth S. Clemens, The Constitution of Citizens: Political Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in POWELL & STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 207, 208, 211--12; Marc Hooghe, Voluntary Associations and Democratic Attitudes: Value Congruence as a Causal Mechanism, in GENERATING SOCIAL CAPITAL: CIVIL SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 89, 105-07 (Marc Hooghe and Dietland Stolle eds., 2003); see DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE 3 (2006) (describing authors’ research finding that heterogeneity of political views in groups reduces political engagement by their members); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARY. L. REV. 1422, 1468--71 (2011) (arguing that members of ideologically diverse groups have stronger incentives to acquire new information).
\item \textsuperscript{105} BILL BISHOP & ROBERT CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: HOW THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICANS IS TEARING US APART Ch. 7 (2008); TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTH, PUBLIC LIES 16--21 (1995).
\item \textsuperscript{106} See Morris Fiorina, Extremist Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 395, 396 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina, ed., 1999); see also Margaret Levi, Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, 24 POL. & SOC’Y 45, 47-48 (1996) (arguing that in-group bonds may lead to inter-group conflict); MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 1 (1986) (same); cf. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 1024 (2010) (arguing that deduction contributes to social conflict over meaning of “the good life”).
\item \textsuperscript{107} Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 70, at 1656.
\end{itemize}
& Ortiz argue, these entities are often bound contractually to their vision and must “argue[]
without compromise” rather than representing the more nuanced views of their principals. 108

To sum up, the government-failure rationale doesn’t necessarily offer support for
nonprofit lobbying. While there is still a case to be made, there are a number of unresolved
empirical questions about the way lobbying works that might undermine that case severely.

B. Privatization Rationale
Although most of the debate over lobbying restrictions has so far centered on the
traditional rationales for charity, there are also other grounds for supporting the deduction. One
of these is the claim that the deduction helps to transfer the production of public goods from the
government to the private sector. 109 Some argue that this relocation is helpful because the
private sector outperforms government, 110 while others simply hail the opportunity to reduce the
coercive power of the state. 111 My own view is that both these claims are mistaken, for reasons I
explain elsewhere. 112

For my purposes here I only want to point out that, if one accepted the privatization
rationale, strong limits on lobbying would seem to follow. Since the point of the deduction, in
this view, is to substitute private for government production, lobbying the government to “get
stuff” is antithetical to the deduction’s purpose. 113 Defensive lobbying or lobbying to repeal

108 Id.; see also Hasen, supra note 17, at 35--36 (noting incentives of subsidy recipients to concentrate contributions
in single-issue groups).
109 Helmut K. Anheier & Lester M. Salamon, The Non-profit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in POWELL &
STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 89, 92. Lloyd Mayer’s recent arguments for nonprofit “autonomy” may also fall in
this category. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent” Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of
110 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information and the Private Pursuit of
Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 262--63 (2009); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 406--
111 Kenneth Prewitt, Foundations, in Powell & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 358--59.
112 Galle, supra note 75, at 782.
113 Some privatization advocates base their preference for nonprofits in part on the superior information of nonprofit
donors. Levmore, supra note 110, at 409--10; Schizer, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 47--52, 60--
62. These theorists might embrace lobbying for government services, so long as the end products of government
programs and cut taxes of course would be more palatable, although it’s unclear why this should be a function of the nonprofit sector. Further, the rules for enforcing any such regime would be difficult to implement. Defeating one piece of legislation may leave another pre-existing one in place. Deciding which set of laws better represents privatization’s values would be a controversial task for which government bureaucrats seem especially poorly suited.

C. Government Complement Rationale

Finally, I have argued at length in prior work that none of these other rationales is fully satisfying, and that instead the best justification for subsidizing nonprofits is that nonprofits are a useful complement to a multi-tiered system of government. Although in theory governments in a federal system are forced to compete with one another for, in Publius’s terms, the “affections” of their citizens, in reality inter-jurisdictional competition is often congested by citizens’ inability to move to the jurisdiction they think is performing the best. Nonprofits can fill in this gap, offering a rival source of services citizens can use as an alternative to, or yardstick for measuring the quality of, other governments. The credible threat of these alternatives may itself improve the quality of government. Additionally, sometimes inter-governmental competition is too severe, as where states “race to the bottom” to curtail redistributive spending. Here, too, nonprofits perhaps can supply services where federalism fails.

were guided by the better-informed choices of donors and managers. Considering the many limits on government discretion, and the many other voices that likely guide any policy choice, though, it is unlikely that government production would embody the preferences of donors and managers as clearly as a nonprofit under the donors’ control could. Cf. Galston, supra note 12, at 1323–24 (noting that lobbying organizations may no longer be able to capitalize on their differences from government). So Levmore & Schizer should probably oppose nonprofit lobbying.

114 Galle, supra note 75, at 790–835.
For the federalism-complement rationale to function, governments and nonprofits must likely compete with each other on something like an even footing.\footnote{Galle, supra note 75, at 851.} This implies that nonprofits should be relatively free from government controls, and vice-versa. A government that can hamstring its rival would not feel pressure to perform. At the same time, a nonprofit that can strongly influence the behavior of its government rival would not provide true comparative information to the public, perhaps resulting in public decisions to privatize even where government could have outperformed the charity.\footnote{Cf. Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90--91 (2010) (noting firm managers may lobby to enact rules that favor themselves).}

The even-footing principle therefore probably implies at least some partial restrictions on lobbying. Although nonprofits should be limited in their ability to lobby the government with which they compete, they would still be free to lobby others. Lobbying on topics that could not plausibly affect the nonprofit’s relationship with rival public providers should also be permissible, although it could be a challenging task to draw that line in close cases.

The even-footing story may be less cogent for nonprofits that do not compete with government. The competition story makes sense for educational institutions: when a private school opens, political support for high-quality local schools falls.\footnote{JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 295--97 (3d ed. 2011). For discussion of evidence in other public goods see id. at 198--99.} On the other hand, churches and other institutions of worship obviously have no public competitors for their central mission.\footnote{U.S. Const. Amend. I.} There is no rival government service to protect against church influence. Similarly, organizations whose membership and operations are scattered widely across many jurisdictions might compete with the public sector, but could not easily focus their lobbying on one rival government, limiting the need to protect government from their efforts.\footnote{Galle, supra note 75, at 822.}
At the same time, the “government complements” approach to charity also offers some reasons to welcome lobbying. Lobbying could be a way to “get stuff” that excessive inter-jurisdictional competition would discourage governments from otherwise providing. It is also a potential tool for reforming low-quality governments.

On balance, the potential gains from lobbying under this rationale, and the complexity of drawing distinctions between helpful and less-helpful political participation, probably make a strong prohibition unwise. But perhaps a brightly-delineated limit on lobbying against the provision of services similar to those offered by the charity could be administered easily enough, and is important enough to this rationale for the deduction, that it would be worth the challenges.

D. An Initial Assessment Proves Incomplete

So far I have focused on the internal logic of the charitable-contribution deduction. I’ve asked whether, given the underlying rationales for the deduction, the government might be justified in limiting lobbying in order to preserve taxpayer dollars for their intended purposes. In resolving that question, the unsettled basis for the deduction has turned out to be a problem. One possible reason the deduction is so popular is because it can appeal to both ends of the ideological spectrum, offering the possibility of redistribution and social empowerment to liberals while giving the promise of privatization and smaller government to conservatives.122 But this incompletely-theorized consensus breaks down when it comes to writing lobbying rules, as the two currently-accepted theories seem to give diametrically opposite results. Diversity rationales would likely at least disallow lobbying in opposition to government, while privatization theorists would allow only lobbying in opposition.

Another obstacle for lobbying under any of the theories is that none of them, standing alone, explain why lobbying must be done by charitable organizations. For instance, diversity

122 See Knauer, supra note 80, at 1063–66.
proponents claim that minority interests will be disappointed by the political process. To the extent this claim is true, that failure can be overcome simply by bolstering the political power of the minority group. That bolstering could be in the form of subsidies to a nonprofit that represents the group, but it could also come in the form of subsidies for individual lobbying efforts, or money directed to a separate organization that only lobbies. \(^{123}\) The next Part considers the pros and cons of these various approaches.

III. Lobbying Charities or a Subsidy for Lobbying?: Economies & Diseconomies of Scope

So far I’ve argued that the internal logic of most rationales for the charitable contribution deduction appears open to at least some degree of lobbying, although that consensus erodes when we attempt to identify which forms of lobbying should be permissible. Assuming that this dissensus could be overcome, we still face the question whether lobbying subsidies necessarily must be combined with subsidies for charitable activities. None of the arguments I have surveyed so far clearly explain why the two activities should or should not be carried out at the same time by the same entities.

There is, however, an extensive economic literature devoted to the optimal design of organizations. \(^{124}\) In this literature, managers of firms and governments must decide which activities to combine together and which to spin off under separate management. \(^{125}\) A key factor in these decisions is whether some activities complement each other when conducted together,

\(^{123}\) Indeed, the “get stuff” rationale arguably favors lobbying subsidies over nonprofit subsidies. There is some evidence that lobbying at the federal level by for-profit firms can yield returns of more than 100:1. Hasen, *supra* note 1, at 233. Even if one assumes, as one surely should, that the lobbying expenditures firms are willing to admit to are considerably lower than their actual expenses, these still represent impressive returns on investment.


such as when control over one facilitates production of the other. 126 These kinds of combinations are known as “economies of scope.” 127 But the opposite is also possible: some combinations are worse off for one or both halves. A classic example is the branding problems faced by a conglomerate that tries to produce both pesticides and baby food: “Raid Products: Deadly for Bugs, Great for Your Kids!” 128 These are diseconomies of scope. My argument here is that in many cases combining charitable endeavors with lobbying produces diseconomies of scope that exceed any likely economies, and that avoiding these unwanted combinations could justify government restrictions on nonprofit lobbying whatever our rationale for the deduction.

A. Diseconomies

Combining lobbying with other charitable activity can reduce social welfare in five distinct ways. One of these is already familiar from debates over the separation of church and state. Commentators since before Madison have argued that politics can potentially distract private-sector enterprises from their original purposes. 129 I review that debate briefly here and add some new evidence from the management literature. I also raise four other ways in which combining the two functions may reduce the cost-effectiveness of either. Combined organizations can increase the infra-marginality of the government’s subsidies, raise donor and government agency monitoring costs, and reduce the “warm glow” that empowers the charitable sector. In addition, I argue that the economically ideal tools for reaching the socially optimal levels of charity and lobbying are incompatible with one another.

128 True story! See Rev. Rul. 2003-110 (using this combination as example of firm that has good business reasons for a tax-free split up).
1. Agency Costs

First, conducting charity and lobbying under one roof exacerbates the social costs of controlling nonprofit employees. Of course, when one set of people performs tasks for another, there is always some degree of “slack,” or divergence between the preferences of the principal and the performance of the agent. Principals must invest time and resources in monitoring their agents to reduce these slippages. It is a familiar point that this problem is especially acute in the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit outputs are hard to evaluate, and stakeholders tend to free ride on one another’s efforts at monitoring the officers of the firm, lack many legal tools for compelling accountability, and have no ownership shares they can distribute to managers to align managers’ incentives with their own. Churches do not even have to file tax returns, making their finances particularly opaque.

This is not to say that nonprofit managers are wholly unresponsive to outside incentives. Managers legally can be and often are rewarded for good performance with bonuses, additional donations, greater authority, or other perqs. Studies find that managers do respond both to

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132 *Schlozman & Tierney, supra* note 83, at 131--33; Ribstein, *supra* note 79, at 1045. *But see Crimm & Winer, supra* note 62, at 122 (asserting, without explanation, that churches “can protect themselves from being co-opted”).
134 IRC § 508(c)(1)(A); see Tobin, *supra* note 12, at 1341--42 (noting possibility this opacity offers for diverting funds into campaign activity).
explicit incentives, such as cost-cutting targets at hospitals, and also to implicit incentives such as their perception of potential donors’ preferences.¹³⁶

One well-known problem with these kinds of goal-oriented incentives is that they can be imprecise, and so if not carefully designed can severely distort desired managerial behavior. For example, when managers have multiple tasks, but their incentives measure one task more precisely, managers will tend to devote much more effort to hitting the better-measured target.¹³⁷ The manager’s lack of effort on the alternate task is easy to overlook or cover up, allowing her to focus on the task that she prefers or will earn her rewards.¹³⁸

Overcoming the distorting effects of mismatched incentives can be costly. The principal can attempt to mitigate the multiple-task problem by writing more detailed incentives. But then the principal and agent must bear the costs of drafting the more-detailed incentives, negotiating them, and measuring success or failure in meeting them.¹³⁹ And each of these steps becomes more complex if the tasks would pull managers in different directions.¹⁴⁰ For instance, CEOs of large firms serve at least two sets of investors: stockholders and creditors. Stockholders want the CEO to take risks; bondholders typically want the opposite.¹⁴¹ Providing the CEO with a set of


¹⁴¹ Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334--35 (1976); Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance,
incentives that simultaneously satisfies both is difficult; firms often resort to complex legal agreements with their creditors, granting the creditor extensive power to investigate and even control the firm’s behavior.\textsuperscript{142} Wealthier interest groups may be better able to invest in monitoring, further exacerbating the disparities of a lobbying subsidy.\textsuperscript{143}

My claim, then, is that combining lobbying and charitable functions within one nonprofit firm creates these kinds of tensions and costs. Asking managers to pursue both lobbying and charity seems to present both the problems of incentivizing multiple goals: each goal is hard to incentivize accurately and the two are sometimes in tension. Monitoring agents who lobby is even more difficult than monitoring direct production of charitable services.\textsuperscript{144} Managers might prefer to over-emphasize lobbying because that would allow them greater rents and lower accountability.\textsuperscript{145} Further, lobbying may conflict with other nonprofit goals, such as maintaining independence from government. And defining “success” for the production of public goods is, as I’ve noted, difficult.

Nonprofits lack the tools other firms can employ to overcome the dual-task problem. A for-profit firm might force managers to internalize the costs of their divided loyalty by giving managers an ownership stake in the firm.\textsuperscript{146} But nonprofits cannot employ that option, so that it

\footnotesize{\textit{in} RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW [1], [5] (Claire Hill & Brett McDonell eds., 2011).}


\textsuperscript{143} See Chisholm, Matching, supra note 12, at 281 (noting that “powerless” groups also cannot control their agents).

\textsuperscript{144} Supra text accompanying notes 71--80; see also Murphy, supra note 59, at 81 (noting that donors cannot prevent organization’s use of funds for unintended political purposes).

\textsuperscript{145} Cf. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 118, at 90--91 (arguing that for-profit managers will lobby to enact state rules favoring their interests over those of shareholders).

\textsuperscript{146} Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 19, at 40.
may instead be optimal simply to prohibit managers from lobbying or to split the tasks between two entities.\textsuperscript{147}

It is worth noting that conflicts between incentives to lobby and carry out other functions can arise even if charity supporters do not encourage managers to lobby. Lobbying offers managers opportunities for private gains, such as political ties that may facilitate outside career advancement, or vindication of personal ideological preferences.\textsuperscript{148}

Allowing lobbying also increases monitoring costs for the government. For one, it is state organizational law and federal tax law that donors primarily rely upon to protect their interests in the nonprofit firm. Therefore court time & other government-funded litigation expenses will rise as principals’ need for monitoring increases.

Further, the government will likely monitor to protect its own interests in seeing its subsidies properly spent. The government, too, wants managers to work hard and not simply collect their salaries and pretend to serve charitable interests. More importantly, there is no theory of the deduction that would grant unlimited license to organizations to lobby on any subject. Any lobbying by nonprofits would therefore still be subject to oversight to ensure that the organization engages only in permissible lobbying. That task is greatly complicated in an organization that carries out multiple tasks, because it is relatively easy to transfer value from one activity to another “off the books.”\textsuperscript{149} An e-mail list that is supposedly compiled to send

\textsuperscript{147} See Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 19, at 40--48 (arguing that dividing tasks between teams or prohibiting managers from engaging in some activities may be second-best result if outputs cannot be measured and incentive pay is not feasible); Bengt Holmstrom, \textit{The Firm as a Subeconomy}, 15 J.L. ECON. \& ORGS. 74, 90--99 (1999) (same, with more math).

\textsuperscript{148} Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 70, at 1652; Faith Stevelman Kahn, \textit{Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy}, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 615--20 (1997).

\textsuperscript{149} Leff, supra note 12, at 507--08; see Kahn, supra note 148, at 656 (suggesting these kinds of transfers are undetectable by IRS).
around the church newsletter can also be used to encourage members to call their member of Congress or to vote against a ballot initiative.\textsuperscript{150}

It might be argued in response to my claims so far that, although greater agent autonomy does frustrate the goals of principals, it does not necessarily reduce social welfare. Agents, after all, are people too, and if they get what they want we should count that as a gain for society. This response is unpersuasive for two reasons. For one, principals will typically respond to increased slack by spending more on monitoring, which is mostly deadweight loss: hours spent filling out time sheets and verifying them are hours both sides could have spent doing more productive tasks.\textsuperscript{151} For another, many of the gains for agents are private gains, while the losses to principals are public goods. In other words, it is not just donors to charity who are losing, but also all the beneficiaries as well. Donors will likely not invest the socially optimal amount of effort into increased monitoring, because by definition they do not fully internalize the benefits of the public good for society.\textsuperscript{152} Admittedly, sometimes nonprofit officers will use their slack to accomplish their own vision of the public good. But they may also use it for leisure time, or to pursue esoteric personal goals, or to leverage their own social or political standing.\textsuperscript{153}

2. Effects on Warm Glow

Another possible, but empirically open, question about political activity by nonprofits is that it may suppress the personal satisfaction or “warm glow” of donors and other charitable supporters. Warm glow is an important potential explanation for the success of the nonprofit

\textsuperscript{150} Galle, supra note 98, at 374--75; see Mosley, supra note , at 62 (“E-mail, in particular, facilitates advocacy activity….”). For detailed analysis of other transfers between (c)(3)’s, (c)(4), and PACs, see Kerlin & Reid, supra note 41, at 810--12, 817.

\textsuperscript{151} RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010).

\textsuperscript{152} On the general theory of externalities, see GRUBER, supra note 119, at 122--29.

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. Theda Skocpol, Advocates Without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life, in SKOCPOL & FIORINA, supra note 106, at 461, 461--510 (developing extended argument that free riding by members of interest groups allows their agents to pool resources for agents’ own, often extreme, political views).
sector.\textsuperscript{154} American voluntary contributions to the purchase of public goods far exceed the amounts that could be explained easily by classic economics or the effect of the deduction.\textsuperscript{155} Perhaps donors are “pure” altruists who internalize the well-being of others, and who would give even if they experienced no rewards for themselves from their gift. A more psychologically realistic alternative is that many of us are “impure” altruists, and we give because being seen as generous carries public esteem and gratitude, sends a signal of wealth and power, makes us feel we are good people, or relieves a sense of moral or social obligation.\textsuperscript{156} It is this second set of motives that (following a large social science literature) I describe as “warm glow.”\textsuperscript{157}

Extensive evidence now points to warm glow as a rather larger component of the public’s reasons for giving than pure altruism.\textsuperscript{158} Laboratory and real-world studies both confirm the intuition of fundraising professionals that public acknowledgment of donors increases giving.\textsuperscript{159} Another important piece of evidence is donors’ response to the news that some other entity has already spent money pursuing the donors’ goals.\textsuperscript{160} If donors were pure altruists, this news should reduce their own spending, since they should care only about the beneficiaries’ welfare. But instead, donors do not much reduce, and in some cases even increase, their giving, suggesting that it is important to donors that they be the ones to support the cause.\textsuperscript{161} Warm

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.}; Lise Vesterlund, \textit{Why Do People Give?}, in \textit{POWELL & STEINBERG}, \textit{supra} note 13, at 568, 572.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{E.g.}, Susan Rose-Ackerman, \textit{Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory}, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 701, 712 (1996).
\textsuperscript{159} Vesterlund, \textit{supra} note 155, at 578.
\textsuperscript{160} David C. Ribar & Mark O. Wilhelm, \textit{Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior}, 110 J. POL. ECON. 425, 427 (2002); Vesterlund, \textit{supra} note 155, at 573--74.
\textsuperscript{161} Ribar & Wilhelm, \textit{supra} note 160, at 428; Vesterlund, \textit{supra} note 155, at 573.
glow motivation by charitable employees seems to lower the salary they demand, and this fact in
turn may motivate donors to choose the charitable form as an especially cost-effective tool.¹⁶²

Returning to politics, we might hypothesize two competing warm-glow effects of greatly expanded lobbying activity by charities. One possibility is that introducing politics will result in a kind of brand dilution for the nonprofit sector. I’ve argued previously that allowing for-profit firms to conduct charitable works would diminish the luster of charity by confusing donors and other observers.¹⁶³ Society would no longer be able easily to recognize which organizations were nobly sacrificing gain for the greater good, and which were trying to make a buck.

Employees who gave up cash rewards in exchange for public recognition of their virtue would find the non-cash portions drying up, leading to convergence between nonprofit and for-profit salaries.¹⁶⁴ And that, in turn, might lead donors who sought to leverage below-market nonprofit salaries to turn elsewhere.

One could tell a similar, and perhaps even broader, story about political activity. The public may realize that narrow private interests can more easily summon lobbying support,¹⁶⁵ and interpret charitable lobbying accordingly. There would be no ready way for the public to verify that a charity’s lobbying is more public-spirited, and few observers would have incentives to investigate on their own. Further, since lobbying in pursuit of a shared goal would be

¹⁶² Chapman, supra note 12, at 858; see GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 61–63 (1993) (hypothesizing that donors are attracted to firms where they can leverage value of other contributions).
¹⁶⁴ Galle, supra note 163, at 1224–25.
¹⁶⁵ OLSON, supra note 64, at 132–33. For review of the evidence on either side of Olson’s hypothesis, see Gary M. Anderson et al., The Economic Theory of Clubs, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 499–504 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2003).
susceptible to free riding across groups, lobbying by any one alone is likely a signal that the firm is instead pursuing some private purpose.\textsuperscript{166}

Organizations could not necessarily preserve their reputation by avoiding lobbying. While actual donors might take the trouble to read the firm’s tax return to verify its reported lobbying expenditures, casual observers will provide by far the bulk of the general goodwill prized by warm-glow motivated employees, and the general public is rather unlikely to be able to distinguish between firms that lobby and those that don’t. Even if only some firms lobby, all might suffer a reputational hit. Additionally, the branding effects of lobbying could reduce the warm glow of all potential donors, not just employees.\textsuperscript{167} Partisan politics, as others have suggested, may carry a taint or air of conflict that the nonprofit sector has until now largely avoided, diminishing the perceived returns of being known as a charitable benefactor.\textsuperscript{168}

On the other hand, there certainly are existing charities with a sharply defined ideological position, and the fact that these organizations sometimes thrive suggests a possible offsetting gain of increased politicization.\textsuperscript{169} Sociologists suggest that at least a portion of warm glow is

\textsuperscript{166} See Hsu, supra note 66, at 123–24 (suggesting that lobbying can be a signal of private benefit); cf. Jack L. Walker, Jr., Mobilizing Interest Groups in America 43, 46 (1991) (describing theories in which production of what look like public goods may depend on efforts of individuals who have a taste for personal political power); id. at 53–54 (arguing that most interest groups are supported by large institutional players or wealthy individuals).

\textsuperscript{167} See Stephanie Moulton & Adam Eckerd, Preserving the Publicness of the Nonprofit Sector: Resources, Roles, and Public Values, 41 Nonprofit & Vol. Sector Q. 656, 671 (2012) (reporting results of survey of 100 organizations, in which those more dependent on individual donations were less inclined to political advocacy).

\textsuperscript{168} Houck, supra note 12, at 85; Hsu, supra note 66, at 106, 116–20 (offering evidence of this effect).

\textsuperscript{169} See Jill Nicholson-Crotty, Does Reported Policy Activity Reduce Contributions to Nonprofit Service Providers?, 39 Pol. Studies J. 591, 596 (2011) (arguing that lobbying activity may be attractive to some donors). Nicholson-Crotty reports that increased lobbying activity is correlated with higher donations in her sample. Id. at 592. There are a number of econometric questions about that finding. Most significantly, Nicholson-Crotty does not appear to have accounted adequately for potential endogeneity problems: that is, rather than lobbying causing donations, it may be that a common unobserved factor causes both. In particular, if demand for public goods is increasing, we should expect demand for both charity and government services to rise, which in turn would likely be reflected both in more donations and more lobbying. Her findings could also simply be evidence that charities sold the value of their donation. She observes that firms that lobbied more in 2000 received more donations in 2001. Id. at 597. But this could simply mean that organizations lobbied in exchange for a pledge to contribute money in future years. Finally, the years 2000 and 2001 were an unusual period for charitable giving because of the vast amount of stock-market wealth in the hands of donors. Tax law greatly favors donations by owners of appreciated stock. [cite] Therefore, Nicholson-Crotty’s results could be driven in part by the fact that stock owners happened to prefer
likely related to donors’ feelings that they have personally participated in achieving their self-defined public-policy goals. That sense of ideological accomplishment also can help to explain voting and non-deductible contributions to political campaigns, both of which should be rare under a classic economic framework.

It is possible that both models could exist simultaneously in different “pools” of organizations. Some classes of entities will try to present a staid, apolitical image: think of museums and performing arts centers. Others, such as environmental groups or anti-abortion organizations, might embrace the more politically-engaged image. An important question would be to what extent the activities and image of one group spill over onto the other, or if some groups that cannot clearly shape their own image for the public will be pooled together, getting the benefits of neither extreme. As I said, these all seem plausible theoretical possibilities; further field work is needed to sort out which effects are the most important.

3. Regulatory Mismatch

Another potential negative consequence of combining lobbying and charity in one entity is that different regulatory tools are optimal for each, and in many instances cannot be simultaneously employed. In particular, it can be argued that political markets should be regulated with sticks while charity should be regulated with carrots. As I have explained in prior work, subsidies to encourage good behavior can potentially be replaced with a punishment for organizations with greater inclination to lobby. Cf. Cordes (providing statistical summary of differing donation preferences of wealthy and middle-class donors).

171 Hardin, supra note 76, at 108--12.
172 See Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 169, at 597.
173 Some studies report that political activity does not diminish contributions to the lobbying nonprofit. But the studies do not consider whether are reputational externalities -- whether lobbying by some firms affects giving to others.
those who fail to do good.\footnote{Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2012), manuscript at 52--53.} Both options have similar effects on the marginal incentives of donors.\footnote{POSNER, supra note 151, at 10.} Whether donors are rewarded, or non-donors fined, giving an additional dollar saves donors money relative to not giving.\footnote{Id.} However, the two mechanisms vary in a number of other important ways. Which option is the better choice for a particular policy depends largely on these other factors.\footnote{Galle, supra note 174, at 15--21.}

Sticks are, except in unusual circumstances, the more efficient tool for reigning in the social over-production of some negative-externality laden good.\footnote{Id.} Sticks earn the government money, while carrots drain the treasury, wasting hard-won tax revenues. Carrots give producers more resources to create the unwanted good, and may even increase their demand for it, a phenomenon known as the “income effect.”\footnote{GRUBER, supra note 119, at 36. For example, poorer commuters may take the bus, while richer ones may prefer to drive.} Carrots are wasteful if producers plan to cut back on their activities anyway. And over-producers who know they will be paid a carrot to curtail their activities in the future have an incentive to begin over-producing, while the opposite is true of sticks.

In contrast, carrots are more defensible for encouraging the production of a good with positive externalities, where we would expect social under-production.\footnote{Galle, supra note 174, at 43--50.} In that case, the fact that carrot recipients have more resources is desirable, since we want them to produce or demand more of the good. On the other hand, it is still the case that the expectation of future carrots has unwanted incentive effects, encouraging producers to delay producing the good until the government agrees to pay them. And carrots remain costlier, especially when factoring in the
possibility that some might altruistically produce the good without subsidy. So though carrots are less clearly dominated by sticks in the positive externality setting, there remains a question whether they are worth the cost.

On this account the subsidy for contributions to charity is at least plausibly efficient. The central question would be whether the increased donations we see as a result of donors’ greater wealth from receiving carrots is worth the cost of the subsidy. As part of this cost, we would also have to consider the extent to which many donors would be willing to give even without government reward; again, data suggest that personal motives for giving are widespread and quite substantial.\(^{181}\)

At the same time, these factors suggest that failures in the political market should probably be corrected with sticks.\(^{182}\) As we saw earlier, lobbying expenditures are like driving a car: a great way to get somewhere if no one else is on the road, but at rush hour, you might be better off walking.\(^{183}\) More technically, lobbying is likely subject to “congestion,” in which use of a shared resource creates negative externalities for other users. Of course, lobbying also provides positive externalities to those with similar goals as the lobbyists. So it represents a hybrid good, falling somewhere between pure positive-externality and pure negative-externality goods. As such, the argument for political carrots is tenuous. Carrots would enrich donors to lobbying organizations, leading to more lobbying, which contributes both to congestion as well as to political expression for the organization’s other supporters. Theory thus doesn’t clearly predict whether the net income effect from enriching donors would increase social welfare.

\(^{181}\) Vesterlund, supra note 155, at 569--78.

\(^{182}\) Cf. David S. Gamage, Note, Taxing Political Donations: The Case for Corrective Taxes in Campaign Finance, 113 YALE L.J. 1283, 1288--1321 (arguing that corrective tax is superior to campaign spending limits under some assumption).

\(^{183}\) Hsu, supra note 66, at 95 (analogizing traffic to campaign spending).
Since the income effect is the only argument in favor of carrots, this point significantly weakens the case for lobbying carrots.

This mismatch between the regulation of charity and lobbying is a reason to separate the two functions. Granting carrots to some of an organization’s donors and imposing sticks on others would be prohibitively difficult. Donors would have to earmark the purpose of their money, but since money is fungible this earmarking wouldn’t actually be meaningful in most cases. Even if it were, enforcement would be challenging, since money can buy resources, such as staff time and office space, that can be shared between purposes easily and invisibly.184 Segregating lobbying and charity therefore better enables society to choose the more efficient regulatory tool for each activity.

Finally on the mismatch issue, even if lobbying and charity would both be best regulated with the same tool, they may have different marginal values. That is, it’s very unlikely that both would happen to be under-produced by the same amount. For reasons I just noted, it would be difficult to subsidize one more than the other. As a result, if they are bound together, subsidizing one to an optimal degree means over- or under-subsidizing the other.

4. Infra-marginality of the deduction

Next, allowing charities to lobby may reduce the cost-effectiveness of subsidies for charitable activities by increasing the portion of infra-marginal recipients of the subsidy. The efficacy of any subsidy is limited by the possibility that some of those who will receive it might have undertaken the desired activity anyway.185 These recipients are “infra-marginal”: they are not among the group of beneficiaries whose choice is tipped over the edge from inaction to action by a bonus payment. Dollars given to infra-marginal recipients are wasted, from the

184 Leff, supra note 12, at 707--08.
government’s perspective, because (aside from possible income effects) each dollar spent in that way increases the subsidized activity by $0.186

If subsidized nonprofits can lobby, then they can also drive up the infra-marginality of their donors. To explain this point, I first have to offer some background on why so many donors to charity are marginal. Infra-marginality depends to a significant degree on a donor’s menu of options. As I’ve argued, some nonprofits compete directly with governments. When acting alone, however, individual donors would typically have little influence over government policy. Thus, as other studies have found, public spending “crowds out” private alternatives.187 Would-be donors to private institutions know they cannot also reduce the taxes they will pay for the competing public institution, and so they are willing to accept a less-than-ideal government substitute rather than pay the entire cost of a charitable rival that might be only a bit better.188 As a result, in the presence of government competition, many potential donors are marginal: they would not give unless they received a subsidy.189

Subsidies for lobbying change this calculus, allowing charities to reduce government competition, and therefore increasing the infra-marginality of their donors.190 Though individual voters are likely to free ride on one another’s efforts to offset competing government services,

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186 Even if income effects are significant, dollars given to infra-marginal donors will still very likely be less cost-effective than money for marginal donors, because the latter will experience both income and substitution effects. Only in the improbable event that income effects are systematically larger for infra-marginal than marginal donors would the infra-marginal subsidy be more efficacious. A more plausible scenario in which the usefulness of the two dollars would be comparable is if the substitution effect for the subsidized good is very small, such as where demand is highly inelastic.
188 GRUBER, supra note 119, at 295--96.
189 Galle, supra note 75, at 820--21.
190 Admittedly, not all charities compete with government. I’ve argued that competition should be the key feature for eligibility, id. at 790--835, but my view isn’t current law. And churches, I acknowledge, simply fill a gap government constitutionally cannot. Id. at 813.
that is exactly the obstacle the lobbying subsidy would be designed to overcome.\textsuperscript{191} Once government services are reduced, many donors would be willing to contribute without any subsidy.\textsuperscript{192} Allowing the charity to help direct the efforts of their lobbying compatriots against government competitors also wastes some of the resources that the lobbying wing of the organization could have devoted to its own priorities.\textsuperscript{193}

5. Entanglement and Executive Attention

Finally, the long-standing claim that politics distracts nonprofit managers and distorts their goals can be understood as a diseconomy of scope argument. Madison believed that the irresistible temptation of political power would corrupt churches.\textsuperscript{194} Modern commentators echo that concern for the nonprofit sector in general, worrying that managers would bargain away aspects of their own goals in exchange for greater power or money to achieve others, or to pay off hold-ups by officials who want their support.\textsuperscript{195} Since independence from majoritarian government decisions is key to all the rationales for the deduction, this problem is an existential threat to the sector.\textsuperscript{196} It is especially perilous when combined with the problem of agency costs. Managers may trade their organization’s goals for personal advancement or their own ideological

\textsuperscript{191} It might be argued that a privatization theorist should welcome even infra-marginal spending on the deduction, since at a minimum such spending reduces the size of government. But this would be a mistake. Treasury money lost through the deduction does not necessarily reduce other spending programs; it might simply be offset through a higher tax rate. Since higher marginal tax rates result in greater deadweight loss, GRUBER, \textit{supra} note 119, at 594--95, this is a bad outcome even for the privatization advocate: government is no smaller, and society is poorer.

\textsuperscript{192} One might think that reducing duplicative services should be a social gain. But the government services exist because voters didn’t want the quantity or kind of services the charity offers. By changing the government’s choices, lobbying reduces welfare for those voters. For example, parochial-school parents may vote to lower public-school quality, which obviously is not welfare-increasing for public-school families.

\textsuperscript{193} In theory nonprofit law could respond to this problem by reducing the amount of the subsidy directed to organizations whose donors are more likely to be infra-marginal, but that solution has serious practical problems. Louis Kaplow, \textit{A Note on Subsidizing Gifts}, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 471 (1995).

\textsuperscript{194} Madison, \textit{supra} note 129.

\textsuperscript{195} Chisolm, \textit{supra} note 12, at 338; Clemens, \textit{supra} note 104, at 215; Tobin, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1320--24, 1329--30; Steven R. Smith & Kirsten A. Gronbjerg, \textit{Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in Powell & Steinberg, \textit{supra} note 13, at 221, 227.

\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Cf.} Tobin, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1337 (arguing that opportunities to campaign would compromise nonprofit independence).
aims, and most stakeholders will be relatively powerless to stop them.\textsuperscript{197} Even politics that align perfectly with the organization’s mission can distract managers from their other tasks.\textsuperscript{198}

It has been argued that if these were serious concerns, organizations would simply self-commit not to engage in politics.\textsuperscript{199} In fact, any 501(c)(3)’s organizational documents prohibit electioneering or substantial lobbying, because that is a requirement for eligibility.\textsuperscript{200} But few nonprofits would self-limit if they were not required to. Many nonprofits compete in the policy arena with other firms; why unilaterally disarm?\textsuperscript{201} Drafting, monitoring, and enforcing individualized contractual terms is also expensive.\textsuperscript{202} Because of the higher transaction costs a diffuse group of members face in organizing to limit the behavior of their agents, default rules should in general be set to protect members against opportunistic manager behavior.\textsuperscript{203}

What is more, organizational resources and the government’s subsidy dollars are commons shared by the firm’s founders and their successors. Each stakeholder with influence over the firm thus actually has incentives to use up the opportunities to divert the organization

\textsuperscript{197} See Jenkins, supra note 62, at 315 (noting that political interests of managers “constrain” their other values). For qualitative evidence of the phenomenon, see Frederick C. Harris, Black Churches and Civic Traditions: Outreach, Activism, and the Politics of Public Funding of Faith-Based Ministries, in CAN CHARITABLE CHOICE WORK? COVERING RELIGION’S IMPACT ON URBAN AFFAIRS AND SOCIAL SERVICES 140, 153 (A. Walsh ed., 2001); Debra C. Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission: Constancy, Responsiveness, or Deflection?, in POWELL & STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 591, 595--97; Galston supra note 12, at 1397--9 (reporting findings of Filer Commission and other studies).

The role of managers also explains why, contrary to Buckles, Reply, supra note 12, at 1094, the Establishment Clause does not mitigate the temptation problem for churches. While government cannot easily give direct rewards to churches, nothing in the First Amendment prevents political actors from rewarding church officers, especially if the reward is paid out through policy success or prestige rather than cash\textsuperscript{198} See Ellen P. Aprill, Lessons from the UBIT Debate, 45 TAX NOTES 1105, 1108 (1989) (making this point about rule against substantial commercial activity); cf. Eleanor Brown & Al Slivinski, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in POWELL & STEINBERG, supra note 13, at 140, 149--50 (noting that commercial activities divert scarce organization resources).


\textsuperscript{200} 26 CFR 1.501(c)(3)-1(b).

\textsuperscript{201} See Hines et al., supra note 133, at 1195--96 (discussing competition among nonprofits).

\textsuperscript{202} Hsu, supra note 66, at 126.

\textsuperscript{203} See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 118, at 103--04 (making this point about for-profit shareholders).
into politics before other managers do so.\textsuperscript{204} Though these tragedies of the commons are pervasive, not many resolve themselves without government assistance, and it is not obvious why nonprofits would be different.\textsuperscript{205} Among other problems, the benefits of solving the collective-action problem are good for the firm in the long run, but present managers will not be around to collect those benefits; they therefore are prone to over-weight their own present opportunities for rents.\textsuperscript{206} Endowment effects, framing, and over-optimistic belief in the founders’ own ability to avoid problems may contribute to this miscalculation.\textsuperscript{207} Participants may also worry that they will unfairly be bound by any shared commitment to refrain when others get away with cheating.\textsuperscript{208} This seems like a reasonable concern for nonprofits, where oversight by outsiders is particularly difficult.

\textbf{B. Economies}

On the other side of the ledger, there are some clear and well-recognized cost advantages of combining lobbying and charity together in one organization. I’ll argue, though, that this cost advantage may actually cut against nonprofit politics, as it exaggerates some of the dangers I’ve already mentioned.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[205] Hsu, \textit{supra} note 66, at 125. Scholars of the commons problem report many instances in which small communities have used norms and other forms of interpersonal commitment to constrain overuse of common resources. Elinor Ostrom, \textit{Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action} 35-37, 88-89, 205-07 (1990); Robert C. Ellickson, \textit{Property in Land}, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1390–91 (1993). But these kinds of interactions cannot easily arise when the players are spread across time rather than space; there is no ready sanction of shaming or exclusion that today’s managers can use to punish the managers of twenty years later.
\item[208] Hsu, \textit{supra} note 66, at 127--28.
\end{footnotes}
1. Cost Advantages of Combined Activities

Staff who are already expert in delivering charitable services are likely to be particularly knowledgeable lobbyists. They have direct experience serving their target population, have learned close-up the key problems or issues facing their clientele, and may have hard-earned information about which solutions work and which don’t.209 Nonprofit staff can also help government to coordinate its efforts with their own, perhaps avoiding wasteful duplication or allowing one program to build on the strengths of another.

Sharing personnel between lobbying and direct charitable activities also makes for more effective lobbying. Obviously, expert lobbyists are often more credible. Beyond that, though, shared staff may be more cost-effective lobbyists because of warm glow and personal connection to the organization’s mission.210 Although this warm glow would presumably dissipate for some workers if they had to spend all their time lobbying, a charity can attract top talent at bargain prices and then “lend” them to its lobbying efforts on a part-time basis.

More generally, overlapping lobbying and charity allows each activity to leverage the resources that staff and supporters have contributed for one purpose to the service of the other. Some are fairly tangible, such as office space, e-mail and phone lists, and well-trained volunteers.211 Others are more abstract. For example, political theorists believe that a key source of lobbyist influence is the threat, often implicit, that the lobbyist can mobilize her constituency to vote against the official she is lobbying, or at least to contribute to the official’s

209 Mayer, supra note 41, at 539.

The tax definition of lobbying excludes testimony or simple responses to legislative inquiries, I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(B) (2000), which would allow a fair amount of information flow irrespective of other limits.

210 See sources cited supra note 162.

political opposition.212 A charity offers the lobbyist a built-in grassroots constituency she can use in this way, saving her---and, if she is subsidized, the government---the costs of building a separate organization.213

Relatedly, a long-established charity likely has a substantial store of “good will” and public reputation it can use to sway officials or rally the public behind a lobbying campaign.214 Donors may prefer to purchase both charity and lobbying from the same organization because they have invested effort in verifying the quality or trustworthiness of that entity.215 Perhaps lobbying organizations could build similar reputations, but presumably that would be a long and expensive process. And perhaps lobbying organizations, standing alone, could never equal the influence of charities. Many charities can draw on a long tradition of relative non-partisanship, as well as the broad social consensus in favor of charity, giving them special weight when they choose to speak.216 Of course, if that is an important factor, it suggests that charities and their subsidizers should want to limit the sector’s political adventures, lest it spend down its hard-won store of public good will.

Finally, combining what might otherwise be two or more sets of organizations allows for economies of scale as well as scope.217 If donors would tend to split contributions to charities and lobbying firms, or if either half of the combined entity can attract donors that the other couldn’t, then the whole will be greater than would either of its two parts. Donors may also give

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214 Mayer, supra note 41, at 535--36.
216 Tobin, supra note 12, at 1319--20.
217 Economies of scale are simply savings that result from producing goods in quantity.
more when they know that their dollars will benefit from economies of scope.\textsuperscript{218} And many charities have very significant sources of revenue independent of donors. For example, hospitals derive less than 5% of their revenues, on average, from donations.\textsuperscript{219}

2. The Downside of Cost Advantages
At the same time that economies of scale and scope may benefit donors to lobbying charities, they may also threaten to create yet more social headaches, or to exacerbate problems I’ve already identified. First, and probably most importantly, the two economies magnify the political power of wealthy donors. As other commentators have recognized, because of the upside-down nature of § 170, letting donors who wish to lobby tap into the charitable contribution deduction would direct a larger government matching grant to donors who already are rich and politically powerful.\textsuperscript{220} If combining the two activities in fact is cost-effective, that would magnify yet further the inequality of the subsidies.\textsuperscript{221} Low-income donors would benefit from the dollar-multiplying effect of economies of scale and scope, but those who can afford to donate more would also see that advantage multiplied, potentially further crowding out the voices of the less powerful.\textsuperscript{222}

Greater returns on lobbying expenditures also heightens the danger of capture and entanglement for charities. As charities become more potent tools for effecting political change, political actors’ incentives for influencing and even coopting charity grow.\textsuperscript{223} Donors with only tenuous connections to the mission of the organization may also seek to purchase a portion of the

\textsuperscript{218} MARWELL & OLIVER, supra note 162, at 61--63.
\textsuperscript{219} Molly F. Sherlock & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R 40919, An Overview of the Nonprofit and Charitable Sector 19 Fig. 5 (2009).
\textsuperscript{220} Tobin, supra note 12, at 1327.
\textsuperscript{221} As I noted earlier, and will take up again later, this problem can also be addressed with campaign finance regulation or caps on organizational spending.
\textsuperscript{222} Again, it is worth noting that the crowd-out result depends to some extent on the shape of the marginal-returns-on-lobbying curve. See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.
\textsuperscript{223} Tobin, supra note 12, at 1322.
surplus created by the economies of scale and scope, making more plausible the possibility, which I alluded to in Part III.A.5, that lobbying could become a distracting profit center for the firm.

Further, the problems of infra-marginality and agency costs grow when nonprofit lobbying becomes more cost effective. The better charities are at driving down government competition, the less necessary the subsidy for charity becomes — and the less genuine the competition between the two sectors. And managers, like the tenuously-connected donors of the last paragraph, are more tempted to use the organization’s resources for their own ends when those resources are a better bargain than spending the manager’s own money.

Money derived from interest on an endowment or fees paid by customers can be yet more tempting for managers than donated funds. As I argued earlier, even donors who are relatively attentive to the uses of their contributions may have difficulty detecting when managers political choices begin to stray from the donors’. Hospital patients and museum-goers have no authority over the board, strong incentives to free ride on other monitors, and no legal authority over nonprofit managers’ political choices, giving managers with access to the revenue streams a freer hand to pursue their own personal or ideological interests.

Taken to an extreme, managerial lobbying threatens the meaningfulness of the firm’s supposed nonprofit status, especially in firms with significant non-donative revenue. The nondistribution constraint—that is, the promise that a nonprofit will remain not-for-profit—is supposed to assure customers that managers won’t cut corners on quality in order to line their own pockets. As Hansmann argues, customers can’t observe or can’t easily measure that quality, and so without the promise of limited profiteering would likely be unwilling to contract

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with the firm.225 If, however, managers can lawfully derive personal consumption from the firm’s funds, they will again have incentives to short-change customers on quality in order to maximize their opportunity to spend on their own goals. In other words, lobbying can become profits in disguise.

To some extent “profits in disguise” are always a possibility when revenue-driven organizations carry out some functions that please the firm’s employees and don’t fully satisfy customers.226 Nonprofit law does prohibit organizations from devoting resources to the private goals of their managers.227 But there is no rule preventing managers from shifting resources from one permissible public purpose to another. If lobbying were permissible, managers could freely spend customers’ money lobbying, rather than on quality services. And, as I argued earlier, lobbying is especially likely to create these opportunities for managerial rent-taking.

Finally, economies of scope and scale also worsen the problem of regulatory mismatch. Recall that subsidizing lobbying contributions probably increases crowding in the political marketplace, which implies that sticks are more likely to be the better choice than for charitable contributions. Suppose that it were possible for donors to earmark their contributions for the two purposes very clearly, that firms could not shift money around to offset that earmarking, and that government could perfectly monitor uses of the earmarked funds. Then the two functions could be combined in one firm, and the two different regulatory tools applied to the two different kinds of donations, without much conflict. But economies from combining the two into one firm would spoil that utopia, because then contributions to the charity side of the house would also

225 Id. at 506--07.
226 Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 457, 463 (1996); cf. Mayer, supra note 110, at 109--11 (describing ways in which management may be able to resist preferences of consumers, but claiming this is a good outcome because it preserves the charity’s public benefit goals).
227 IRC § 4958.
allow for more lobbying output per dollar spent on lobbying. Lobbying donors might be taxed, and so donate less, but each dollar would go farther, contributing to crowding.

C. Summary

Overall, combining politics and charity together in one organization looks like it would lead to serious watering-down of the benefits of the nonprofit sector. The two together reduce the efficacy of social incentives for charitable behavior, increase the costs of monitoring the resulting organization, distort its outputs, and degrade their quality. That there are savings to be found, too, may simply worsen these problems, since the savings make the combined form especially tempting for politically-motivated donors and managers.

It could be argued that we should simply leave to donors the decision whether on net combined organizations are worth their costs.228 Indeed, as I’ve mentioned, one of the stated goals of the deduction is to permit private decisions about the most effective way to get things done.

The problem, again, is externalities. Many of the costs of combined entities are borne mostly by people who are not their donors. Damage to the independence and zest of the sector, political crowding, undermining warm glow, the decreased marginal efficacy of the government’s subsidy dollars, its increased monitoring effort—-all these burden the entire charitable sector, if not all of society.229 Even donors’ agency costs are an externality, as individual donors do not directly internalize the increased agency costs of other donors. Thus donors will be drawn to the combined form by the fact that it makes their own dollars go farther, while neglecting the harms those dollars do.


229 Hsu, supra note 66, at 110–11.
We could tell much the same story about letting nonprofit managers decide the most efficient organizational structure. Rationally self-maximizing managers would have little reason to choose separate firms for lobbying and charity. To the contrary, since combined organizations probably allow managers more autonomy and therefore more rents, they likely prefer combinations, all else equal.

To be sure, not everyone is a rational self-maximizer who ignores all externalities, and probably very few of us really are. Again, the nonprofit sector depends on our collective willingness to do good for one another. But surely some causes are more important and more salient to us than others. We should not expect the environmental advocate to turn down the most effective instrument for preserving wetlands because that instrument will result in greater deadweight loss from taxation. The data confirm this intuition, finding that personal ideology matters in giving; donors give to what is most important to them.

IV. Legal Implications

So far, I have focused on the fairly general question of whether charitable organizations should also lobby. Translating these principles into legal rules requires a bit more effort. For example, even if in the abstract we would prefer that charities not lobby, in practice defining “lobbying” is difficult, especially in the case of organizations whose charitable mission is to educate the public---an activity that looks a lot like lobbying. Another example is the question of how far lobbying limits should reach: should they apply to the entire organization, or just the use of money it raises through deductible contributions? In the absence of a clear theory about why

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230 See Gergen, supra note 55, at 1412--14 (suggesting donors do not account for negative fiscal externality of deduction).

231 Rene Bekkers & Pamala Wiepking, A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy, 40 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 924, 942--43 (2010). Even if the observed variation in giving is a result of differences in donor information, see id. at 930--32, not ideological beliefs or other preferences, that would still support my argument. Donors are unlikely to even be aware of many of the social costs I identify here, and certainly not aware of them with a degree of precision needed to compare them meaningfully against the benefits of contributing.
we would want to prohibit some kinds of conduct and not others, these kind of line-drawing exercises are challenging, not to mention the fact that the results are often confusing, frustrating, and hard to predict. Now that our theory is clearer, though, the legal task of definition and administration should be easier. To illustrate—and also because it might be useful—this part plays out some of the more important legal details that follow from the theory so far.

A. Defining Lobbying

Although the basic meaning of lobbying is straightforward, some difficult borderline cases do arise. Borderline cases are not necessarily rare or unimportant. If organizations can easily change their behavior to toggle back and forth across a legal border as necessary, then what begins as a rare exception can quickly become the norm. It’s therefore worthwhile to consider the limits of what we mean by “lobbying.”

My working definition of lobbying to this point has comprised efforts to achieve outcomes through political rather than private means. Or, put another way, lobbying seeks to extend an organization’s control from the use of its own funds to the direction of taxpayer dollars. That distinction also matches fairly well my suggested policy rationales for limiting lobbying by charities. It is influence over the federal treasury that allows organizations to reduce the infra-marginality of donations, and that most strongly tempts the entity and its officers to change their mission in exchange for greater resources. The scramble to leverage the government’s scarce resources may generate resentment towards and political friction for the nonprofit sector, and regulating that scramble may require tools that would be incompatible with tools for encouraging the private production of public goods.

232 See Tobin, supra note 12, at 1356–58 (noting that unclear rules make IRS enforcement actions difficult to predict).
This logic implies two significant legal implications, one of which is contrary to current law. For one, notwithstanding existing IRS regulations authorizing administrative lobbying, “lobbying” limits should extend to efforts to influence regulations.233 Admittedly, section 501(c)(3)’s plain text focuses on “propaganda” or other efforts to affect “legislation.”234 But many regulations have long been held to be the equivalent of “law” for most purposes,235 and the term “propaganda” on its face is broad enough to include administrative lobbying. As a policy matter, regulation can direct the uses of public resources as effectively as legislation, raising the dangers of distraction, agency costs, warm-glow diminishment, and infra-marginality. Although the size of most agencies is not usually constitutionally limited, practically speaking the size of bureaucracies is determined by their budgets, and so their time and attention, like a legislature’s, is subject to crowding.236 Routine interactions with low-level bureaucrats may not raise these concerns as sharply, and so perhaps, as Mayer proffers, “lobbying” might be limited only to contacts with political leadership of an agency.237

My analysis also suggests, consistent with existing law, that efforts to sway the outcome of ballot initiatives and referenda are “lobbying.”238 Again, there is some linguistic ambiguity in whether these kinds of lawmaking would fall within the literal ambit of the terms “propaganda” or “legislation.” Again, too, it is clear that when voters control government outcomes directly, there are significant opportunities for nonprofit involvement to lead to temptation, infra-

233 26 CFR § 56.4911-2(d)(3).
234 IRC § 501(c)(3).
237 Mayer, supra note 41, at 554.
238 26 CFR § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (2007). But see Mayer, supra note 41, at 562 (arguing that efforts to influence referenda should not be “lobbying”).
marginality, and politicization. A number of studies also confirm that voter attention in advance of a referendum, as well as tools for reaching voters such as tv advertising time, are scarce resources, so the crowding arguments are still important, as well. 239 On the other hand, the agency cost problem is likely less than when nonprofits lobby government directly, since unlike a phone call, backroom meeting, or handshake agreement the organization’s efforts at changing public opinion cannot easily be hidden from its stakeholders. But on balance the policy case for regulating charitable involvement in direct democracy still seems quite strong.

Direct democracy does raise more sharply an issue that all lobbying restrictions face, which is how to identify when communications aimed at the general public, rather than directly at policy makers, should count as lobbying. Under current law, this form of “grassroots” lobbying can sometimes count as the equivalent of a direct communication. 240 Whether any given communication counts as “lobbying” or not depends on a set of balancing tests, with the exact content of the test varying depending on which of several possible legal regimes the organization is subject to. 241

Because public opinion is a key lever for moving government officials, at least some grassroots communications must count as lobbying for any lobbying limits to be meaningful. As popular opinion changes, democratically accountable officials are likely to change positions, too, making grassroots lobbying a powerful, if indirect, tool for accomplishing social change. 242 Charitable organizations are key players in developing public opinion because rationally ignorant

240 Vladeck, supra note 3, at 326--27.
241 Hopkins, supra note 29, at 579--89.
voters often rely on credible intermediaries for their information. Organizations’ advertising and other political communications can also manipulate the framing and emotional content of a political message to shape voter opinion.

Interest groups’ power to shape opinion calls into question the current definition of grassroots lobbying as limited to communications that urge the public to contact an official. Direct contact between officials and the public is important, but isn’t the only pathway to grassroots influence. Officials do often depend on their contacts with lobbyists or more active constituents to get a sense of their constituency’s leanings. But given the efficacy of interest groups’ messaging to their constituents, officials can also get a general sense of possible shifts in public opinion simply by observing the communications from the organization to the public. That makes most grassroots lobbying a kind of indirect message to officials.

Even grassroots lobbying aimed only at “members” of the organization or those with close ties to it can impact officials’ decisions. As I’ve mentioned, lobbyists derive a good measure of their power from their ability to “whip” the individual members of the coalition they represent. Since it is costless for any given lobbyist to claim that she represents a powerful and easily-motivated coalition, all lobbyists presumably would do so. In order to distinguish themselves, intermediaries who actually represent real interests must be able to demonstrate that

247 Galston, supra note 12, at 1349–50.
248 See sources cited supra note 212.
the troops can be mobilized. So calls to action from the organizer to the coalition, even if not public, are at the heart of effective lobbying. The proposal by some commentators to exempt from regulation all “internal” communications from the organization to its members would accordingly weaken most meaningful lobbying restrictions.

At the same time, any lobbying regulation regime has to acknowledge that information is a public good separate and apart from any political consequences. Organizations that seek to understand the world, or to share existing understandings with a wider public, are therefore at the core of almost any rationale for a nonprofit subsidy. Knowledge, of course, can also motivate the public to change its mind about what the law should be. Even an objective observer might therefore have trouble distinguishing “lobbying” from public education. And, as courts have recognized, the government officials who would have to make this distinction are not always objective.

Existing law seems to have evolved to a reasonable compromise. Organizations can escape the “lobbying” label by following a particular procedure for how they inform the public. Grassroots communications are not lobbying if they are “education,” that is, based in fact, offer contrary evidence where appropriate, and avoid claims based purely in emotion; or, alternatively, if they simply comment in a roundabout way about legislation without directly calling on the public to act. To be sure, these rules likely allow for a fair amount of what is

249 Berry & Wilcox, supra note 212, at 116.
251 Mayer, supra note 41, at 561.
252 Chisholm, Matching, supra note 12, at 288.
255 26 CFR 56.4911-2(b)(2) (defining “grassroots lobbying” as communications aimed at public that identify specific legislation, reflect a view on the legislation, and encourage recipients to take appropriate action); see also 26 CFR
functionally lobbying under my proposed definition. But the price of being allowed to lobby is that the organization must often provide society with a genuine public good---real, honest-to-goodness facts. The added costs of having to verify its claims and avoid using manipulative advertising serve effectively as a tax on the crowding effects of the lobbying communication.256

Indeed, current law could probably go farther in the direction of requiring organizations to substantiate their arguments, so as to increase the size of this tax and to heighten the value of the information society receives. For example, the amended rule might oblige organizations to disclose any reasonable factual evidence contrary to their public statements, even for statements that do not include a “call to action.” Studies of deliberation suggest that having to craft a message that acknowledges opposing opinions would also have the side-benefit of moderating the extremity of an organization’s positions.257 That could mitigate the tendency of lobbying subsidies to polarize the political debate.

B. “Substantial”

From what I have said so far, it should be clear that no test that seeks to separate lobbying from education is going to be exact. If we want to avoid deterring a significant amount of activity that could be close to the line, there should likely be room for organizations to make some mistakes before they are seriously penalized. That brings us to the question of how much lobbying activity should be permissible. Historically, courts have refused to revoke an

56.4911-2(c)(1) (1990) (stating that “independent and objective exposition of a particular subject matter” is not lobbying).
256 There is an analogy here to tax shelter regulation. Government often restricts socially wasteful tax sheltering activity by imposing formal requirements that must be met before the shelterer can prevail---what David Weisbach calls “backflips.” David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222--23 (2002). Weisbach’s point is that meeting the formal requirements is itself wasteful for the shelterer, so it is ambiguous whether such requirements actually improve total welfare on net. Id. In the case of the education requirements, though, the “backflip” also produces a public good, making it rather more likely that the “distortive” effect of the educational requirement actually betters society overall.
257 Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., supra note 101, at 658; see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
organization’s 501(c)(3) status for conducting non-exempt activities unless those activities were “substantial,” and Congress now has codified the substantiality rule for lobbying. More recently, Congress has also added penalties short of revocation for certain kinds of organizations.

Both these approaches make sense as a way of balancing the deterrence of grassroots lobbying against the encouragement of education. Balancing can also make sense even in the case of direct communications with officials, since society will often want government to use the knowledge gathered by nonprofits.

Although my theory here does not by itself tell us exactly where to draw the line that constitutes “too much” lobbying, it does at least help to clarify how to go about drawing that line. Most commentators assume that the portion of the organization’s time or resources devoted to lobbying determines whether its lobbying is “substantial.” For example, observers of the Mormon Church’s multi-million dollar efforts in support of Proposition 8 in California suggested that even $10 million in expenditures would be a tiny fraction of the Church’s annual revenues, and so were not “substantial.”

This view of “substantial” is too narrow to fit with most justifications for the lobbying limits. As I’ve argued in abbreviated form elsewhere, “substantial” lobbying should likely also include efforts that have a significant real-world policy impact, even if small as a fraction of an

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258 Galle, supra note 98, at 372–73.
259 IRC § 4955. Private foundations are always subject to monetary penalties for some kinds of political activity. IRC § 4945(d). Most public charities (other than churches) can also opt to be subject to an intermediate sanction regime. IRC § 501(h). The opt-in is attractive because it also expressly limits when organizations can lose their exemption. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 322.
260 E.g., Hopkins, supra note 29, at 579.
organization’s budget. Almost all of the rationales for lobbying limits make more sense if they’re measured by lobbying’s real policy impact. For example, it is an organization’s total expenditures, not the fraction of its budget spent on lobbying, that determine how much it congests the political market.

Consider also the temptation, warm glow, and “entanglement” issues. A charity willing single-handedly to shape legislative outcomes is going to be an important political player. Officials will put considerable pressure on the managers to conform to the politicians’ views, and managers will be sorely tempted to use their power for their own goals. Similarly, public perceptions of charities as “political” rather than charitable are likely to depend on the organization’s impact on the political scene. If the Gates Foundation decided to spend $500 million to push for a carbon tax, it’s doubtful that views of them as “partisan” would be dampened by the fact that the Foundation still had another $39.5 billion to throw around.

Even the arguments offered by critics of the deduction seem to counsel for limits on a charity’s overall policy impact. Recall that a central problem for the “interest representation” and “political pluralism” claims was that more powerful or traditional interests could also benefit from the deduction, and their magnified voices could then crowd out or even counteract less influential groups. This problem could be curtailed if each organization faced some kind of cap on its lobbying activities. The cap could not increase significantly as the size of the entity grew, since if it did powerful interests would still be able to drown out others. We thus would want something like what I’ve just suggested: a limit (or perhaps a “soft cap” along the lines of

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262 Galle, supra note 98, at 374--79.
263 Id. at 378.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 85--97.
the “luxury tax” model common in professional sports) on the influence any one interest group could exert.

C. Donations or Organizations?

Although current law is clear that limits on lobbying apply to all of a § 501(c)(3) organization’s activities, no matter the source of the funds expended, several commentators argue that this interpretation is mistaken. For example, Laura Chisholm argued that the rationale for the limitations should apply only to donations that have benefitted from the government’s subsidy. According to Chisholm, revenues from other sources, such as paying customers, or presumably even non-deductible contributions, should not face any limits. Her claim, essentially, is that the only reason to limit lobbying is to prevent government subsidies from supporting political activities. Thus organizations should be able to spend their unsubsidized funds freely. These kinds of arguments tend to sidestep the economies of scope and scale issues, but otherwise seem reasonable given their premise.

But what if the purpose of the lobbying limits is much broader than simply cording off the government’s subsidy? The diseconomy of scope rationales I’ve offered, if persuasive, require that lobbying limits apply to the entire organization. Nearly all of the diseconomies result from the simple fact that the two purposes are conducted by a single organization. Whether lobbying dollars are subsidized by the government does not affect whether monitoring costs are higher, whether warm glow diminishes, or whether the infra-marginality of the deduction declines.

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266 Chisholm, supra note 12, at 328, 352; Totten, supra note 228, at 307; see also Buckles, Reply, supra note 12, at 1122--23 (suggesting government could achieve its purpose by recapturing economic value of deductible contributions spent on politics).

267 Chisholm, supra note 12, at 328.

268 Id.

269 That is, they neglect the possibility that any subsidy for the organization could benefit all of its activities, even those not funded directly. See Leff, supra note 12, at 707--08; Volokh, supra note 37, at 1942--43.
Indeed, lobbying in firms that don’t depend much on subsidized donations also suggests a more fundamental challenge to the rationale of the *Citizens United* anti-regulatory regime. The premise of *Citizens United* appears to be that spending by organizations represents political expression by the organization’s members, shareholders, and donors.\(^{270}\) The money that the entity spends, the Court assumes, is a proxy for speech by its financial supporters.\(^{271}\) As others have noted, that assumption is problematic in most nonprofits, where monitoring and oversight of managers who make spending decisions is sporadic and weakly enforced.\(^{272}\) The Court itself had at one time recognized that the speech-proxy assumption is especially improbable at organizations with revenues not derived from donations.\(^{273}\) When hospitals lobby, they are not focusing the pooled time and money of a community of like-minded individuals; they are spending a portion of fees from paying customers.

The same is true of most for-profit firms. But at least directors of those firms are in theory bound by their obligations to shareholders who can vote them out of office or (in some states) bring suit for breach of duty. Many revenue-supported nonprofits have no members at all; their boards are “self-perpetuating,” subject only to the choices of the existing members of the board.\(^{274}\) If the board or the officers breach their duties, they often can be sued only by the entity itself, another board member, or the Attorney General of the state.\(^{275}\)

### V. Electioneering

At this point, having read so much about lobbying, the reader may have forgotten that charities also face a nominal ban on any involvement in campaigns for public office.

\(^{270}\) *Citizens United v. FEC*, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904--08 (2010).

\(^{271}\) *See id.* at 899, 904, 911 (describing entity’s communications as “speech” controlled by shareholder “democracy”).

\(^{272}\) *Ribstein, supra* note 79, at 1044--45.


\(^{274}\) *Brody, supra* note 226, at 466--67.

\(^{275}\) *Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations* 325--36 (2004).
Fortunately, much of what I’ve said about lobbying also applies to the electioneering ban, in many cases even more so.

To review, the “ban” on electioneering permits the IRS to revoke exemption for any amount of electioneering activity, however insubstantial. In reality, though, the government permits a fair amount of involvement in campaigns by defining some campaign-related activities as something other than impermissible electioneering. For example, organizational leaders can endorse candidates, and identify themselves with the organization, so long as they are not acting in an “official capacity.”\textsuperscript{276} Charities can comment on issues that are related to an ongoing campaign, as long as on balance the issue-related observations are not tied too closely to candidates.\textsuperscript{277} Organizations can hold candidate forums, on the condition that the invitation is extended to all major candidates---even if the organization knows full well candidates who expect to be booed will not show.\textsuperscript{278} And a charity can present “nonpartisan” voter guides evaluating how officer-holders have stood on issues important to the organization, but only if the organization makes no particular effort to connect the evaluation to an ongoing campaign.\textsuperscript{279}

My analysis of the previous three Parts suggests these limits are defensible in both directions. That is, there are good nonprofit policy reasons to limit substantial electioneering by a charity. But there are also good reasons to have some exceptions to the limits, and the principles implicit in the exceptions I mentioned are sensible. Or, at least, they would be sensible if the funding stream for nonprofits were more transparent. Each of these points needs a bit more explanation.

\textsuperscript{276} Rev. Rul. 2007-41.
\textsuperscript{277} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{278} Rev. Rul. 86-95.
\textsuperscript{279} Rev. Rul. 80-282.
A. Defending the Electioneering Ban

In many ways the case against combining charity and electoral politics is stronger than the case against nonprofit lobbying. For one thing, as earlier commentators have recognized, the connection between electioneering and the purposes of the deduction is attenuated.\textsuperscript{280} Electing sympathetic candidates can be one way for a coalition to “get stuff,” including public goods. The promise of electoral support can be a lever to strengthen lobbying efforts.\textsuperscript{281} But in the American duopolistic political system, candidates run on broad slates of many issues bundled together.\textsuperscript{282} Electing a candidate who will produce more of one good in the bundle may also mean less of many of the others, reducing net utility per subsidy dollar for both donors and their opponents. Further, bundling implies that there will often be government subsidy dollars on both sides of an election, which hardly seems like the most efficient way to use tax dollars for the production of public goods.\textsuperscript{283}

Public support for campaign contributions might give more voice to poorer voters, but as with lobbying the design of the charitable contribution deduction is ill-fitted to that purpose. Proponents of campaign-contribution subsidies favor vouchers in a fixed amount, often in combination with caps on individual and corporate contributions.\textsuperscript{284} Others recommend tax credits, but only with a very low cap on the available credit.\textsuperscript{285} As all these commentators

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{280} Chisholm, \textit{supra} note 12, at 349--50; Tobin, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1337--38.
\textsuperscript{281} Simon et al., \textit{supra} note 13, at 288, 298 n.86.
\textsuperscript{282} The IRS has pointed to this difference as a reason to distinguish between lobbying and electioneering, although without any particularly deep explanation of why the difference matters. IRS Gen. Counsel Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969).
\textsuperscript{284} BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS 14 (2002); Thomas Cmar, \textit{Toward a Small Donor Democracy: The Past and Future of Incentive Programs for Small Political Contributions}, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 443, 449--50 (2005); Hasen, \textit{supra} note 17, at 20--35.
\textsuperscript{285} de Figueiredo & Garrett, \textit{supra} note 93, at 640--66; Overton, \textit{supra} note 90, at 107--08.
\end{footnotesize}
recognize, with unlimited matching public support could simply be hijacked by already-powerful interests who would use the money to further entrench their own influence.286

Several diseconomies of scope also seem worse in the electioneering context. Agency problems are more severe because of the issue-bundling problem. An organization’s mission could encompass issues that do not line up perfectly with candidate positions, leaving the entity’s managers freedom to choose which issues and candidates to favor. The Catholic Bishops Association’s apparent electoral preference for candidates focused on reproduction and family planning, rather than those who accord with the Church’s views on immigration and poverty, is one of many possible prominent examples.287 Of course, managers might well choose the exact balance contributors would, but given the challenges of effective monitoring they will also face temptations to choose based on self-serving factors.

Electioneering also may exacerbate the effects of politics on warm glow. Electioneering seems more likely than lobbying to send a signal that managers are self-serving. Candidates generally represent a broader array of interests than any one issue organization. There are therefore greater opportunities for supporters of a candidate to free ride, so that a rational observer would conclude that campaign contributors are more likely pursuing some purely self-serving interest. Indeed, the literature on campaign contributions suggests that, to overcome the free-rider problem, candidates strive to create private benefit for their donors.288 The broader array of positions a candidate takes also increases the chance that the charity’s choice will

286 E.g., de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 93, at 645.
contradict the preferences of some of its potential donors.\textsuperscript{289} More generally, voters seem to just have a limited tolerance for political advertising, in part because they seem to resent the culture of bargained exchange it represents.\textsuperscript{290}

This latter point suggests that combined charity/electioneering entities also present a regulatory mismatch problem. Unlike lobbying, campaign expenditures are not aimed at a small group of people whose composition is limited by a Constitution and whose staff resources are limited. So there isn’t a crowd-out problem in the same sense. But campaign expenditures do seem to give rise to other negative externalities. One, as I just mentioned, is that as expenditures rise their marginal efficacy diminishes because of public campaign fatigue. Additionally, when one side in a campaign spends, the other side usually must respond or lose.\textsuperscript{291} So spending by either side has a double-negative effect, both triggering an arms race and also upping the cost of effective competition in the race. It is also unclear whether there are any strong positive externalities associated with most campaign spending; many campaign ads are aimed at viewer emotions and offer little new informational content.\textsuperscript{292} The optimal price instrument for campaign spending, therefore, is a stick, not the carrot that charities currently collect.

\textsuperscript{289} Cf. Tobin, supra note 12, at 1339 (noting that supporting political candidates might make fundraising more difficult for charities).

\textsuperscript{290} Cmar, supra note 284, at 446--47; Hsu, supra note 66, at 109; see Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics (A Partial Review of the Literature), 124 PUB. CHOICE 135, 137 (2005) (summarizing evidence that voters distrust messages paid for by “special interests”).

\textsuperscript{291} Mark Gius, An Analysis of the 2006 Congressional Elections: Does Campaign Spending Matter?, 15 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 703, 705 (2008); see Cmar, supra note 284, at 443--44 (noting “overwhelming correlation between fundraising success and electoral victory”). As is well known, there are serious endogeneity problems (i.e., possible reverse-causality issues) with measuring the effects of spending on campaign outcomes; for example, being perceived as the likely winner can attract donations. Stratmann, supra note 290, at 136. Modern studies using instrumental-variable techniques confirm, though, that outspending rivals increases electoral success. Kenneth Benoit & Michael Marsh, The Campaign Value of Incumbency: A New Solution to the Puzzle of Less Effective Incumbent Spending, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874, 888 (2008).

\textsuperscript{292} TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN POLITICAL ADS WORK 13--16 (2006); see Alan S. Gerber et al., How Large and Long-Lasting are the Persuasive Effects of Televized Campaign Ads? Results from a Randomized Field Experiment, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 135, 148--49 (2011) (suggesting their results are more consistent with emotional than informational view of advertising). But see Paul Freedman et al., Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 723, 725--40 (2004) (arguing that political advertising contains “some” information and that its emotional content encourages voters to learn more). It’s worth
B. Defending Exceptions to the Ban

On the other hand, charities can play a socially important role in gathering and sharing information about public officials. As is well known, interest groups allow voters to overcome their individual rational ignorance of politics, mainly through the device of agents who are paid to collect that information and share it with the group. But of course group members also attempt to free ride on others’ willingness to pay their agents. Subsidies for agents who will monitor government on behalf of the public, or at least on behalf of a group large enough to experience free riding, therefore make sense as a way of overcoming “market” failures.

Charities are especially well-positioned to play this monitoring role. Their issue-specific expertise allows charitable employees to gather information about good public policy cheaply, often as a sideline to their main mission. That same expertise, and the at-least nominal loyalty of the charity to its mission rather than to outsiders, makes the information it releases especially credible. Credibility is key to useful information-gatherers, since it is easy to imagine that those subject to monitoring would set up bogus or captive “monitors.” And the social ties the charity can foster among those committed to its mission help to ensure that participants also pay up for their share of the added costs of monitoring.

With these benefits come the now-familiar caveats. Charities’ efficacy at tracking elected officials makes them especially tempting targets for officials and their foes. Managers, too, might be tempted to take advantage of the unique position their control of a credible charity offers in pursuit of their personal ideology or rewards from outsiders.

noting that the “information” Freedman et al. find evidence of consists mostly of voters’ ability to name the candidates. Id. at 729.

293 Issacharoff & Ortiz, supra note 70, at 1649--1650; see Andrews & Edwards, supra note 213, at 497--98 (explaining importance of professional staff in monitoring complex modern regulation).


295 See Leff, supra note 12, at 713.

But there may be ways to disentangle the public good from the private misappropriations of it. A possible dividing line falls between pure information and active endorsement. One suspects that those who hijack a charity for their own political ends will rarely be content with a simple statement of the facts of a candidate’s record. Instead, the temptation will be to push the audience to draw voting conclusions from the facts, and to leverage the charity’s other resources to spread the combined information/advocacy message. Drawing the line at some kind of active advocacy therefore rules out subsidies for many would-be misappropriators. Note also that from society’s perspective the informational value of a charity’s endorsement is much lower than a simple voter scorecard reporting whether a candidate has performed well on the issues that matter to the charity. The charity has expertise in its own issues, not in the separate question whether on balance the officeholder has enough other good or bad qualities, relative to the opposition, to outweigh her performance on the scorecard.

Many of the current law’s definitions of impermissible electioneering roughly track this line. Scorecards, candidate fora, and discussions of issues are (as I noted earlier) all currently permissible in some circumstances, and all permit charities to share a significant amount of their knowledge with the public. Each of these activities then tips into a violation when it’s used more directly as an advocacy tool, especially when it seems to allow candidates to make use of the organization’s financial resources on an unequal basis. The voter scorecard revenue rulings, for example, emphasize that organizations that blast out thousands of copies of their card near an election risk their exempt status. Endorsements by leaders acting in their “individual capacity” are harder to explain as purely informational, but at least they do not typically consume much of the entity’s tangible resources.

298 Rev. Rul. 78-248 Sit. 4; Rev. Rul. 80-282.
Obviously the exact balance between these interests, and the corresponding line between permissible and impermissible, is hard to state with precision. Information is itself persuasive; that’s why it’s valuable to the electorate. Building credibility itself takes a serious resource commitment. Probably, then, the better approach would be to mirror the lobbying rules and to more officially recognize that organizations can commit “insubstantial” missteps without losing their exemption.\textsuperscript{299} Existing money penalties for political expenditures will help discourage abuse of this leeway. \textsuperscript{300}

C. Transparency as a Precondition for the Exceptions

I should note one important qualification to my argument of the last sub-section. A key assumption I made was that charities would at least sometimes genuinely be independent of politicians or their allies. The problem is that it won’t be easy for the public to observe when that isn’t the case. And it is a well-known feature of reputation markets that, in the absence of some way to credibly sort posers from objective opinion-makers, the market unravels and no one’s reputation is worth much.\textsuperscript{301} Tech-savvy readers may recognize this as the “Yelp!” problem: it’s hard to tell if someone with no “user rating” who’s reviewed a restaurant is a satisfied customer or the owner. If much of the “education” offered by charities is not useful to the public, the case for carving out an exception for “educational” communications appears weak.

\textsuperscript{299} See Buckles, Reply, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1077 (suggesting adding “substantiality” exception or other intermediate sanctions for electioneering).
\textsuperscript{300} IRC §§ 527, 4955, 4958.
\textsuperscript{301} That is, unless there is some costly, and therefore credible, signal that objective raters can offer to separate themselves from the pool of fakers, observers cannot distinguish the two. Keith Weigelt & Colin Camerer, \textit{Reputation and Corporate Strategy: A Review of Recent Theory and Applications}, \textit{9 Strategic Mgmt. J.} 443, 448--49 (1988).
It thus seems crucial that the public have information about who funds nonprofits that are opining about politics.\textsuperscript{302} Political scientists report that voters can and do use data about who paid for a political message to draw inferences about its reliability.\textsuperscript{303} Obviously, not all donations would have to be made public. The identity of many small donors is less important than the fact that they exist at all: widespread public support can serve as evidence for voters that others believe in the expertise of the organization, just as user ratings of Yelp! reviewers helps to confirm their credibility. But relatively large donations can clearly impact the objectivity of the organization, and so that information is properly relevant, under my informational theory, for the voting public.

I therefore agree, albeit for different reasons, with those who have called for more transparency in the nonprofit sector.\textsuperscript{304} Organizations that do not want to avail themselves of the information/education safe harbor from the electioneering ban need not disclose their donors. But any organization that wanted to rely on a claim that they are informing the public should have to acknowledge who it is that is paying for their information.

**Conclusion**

Economic theory explains the lobbying limits and electioneering ban more thoroughly than any prior approach has. While subsidies may be justified to overcome collective-action problems in information-gathering and political representation for group interests, theory also suggests that extending the charitable contribution deduction to include politics is a poor design for such a subsidy. I have limited my discussion to nonprofit policy, not the Constitution. For

\textsuperscript{302} But see Issacharoff & Ortiz, *supra* note 70, at 1664 (doubting that information about individual donors would be useful).


example, I don’t dispute here the suggestion that government funding decisions seriously impair liberty and can only be justified, if at all, by very good reasons.\textsuperscript{305} I’m just interested in identifying what those reasons might be.

My arguments also may counsel for closing the “(c)(4) loophole.” As I’ve noted, many charities routinely avoid legal scrutiny of their political activities by shunting those tasks to an affiliated (c)(4) organization.\textsuperscript{306} Given that the boundary between the boundary between the two firms may exist only on paper, the multi-firm structure will likely not mitigate many of the diseconomies of scope I’ve mentioned. Until now it’s appeared that the (c)(4) outlet is constitutionally required. But permitting the (c)(4) structure merely allows the government to escape strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{307} If strict scrutiny is inevitable in the wake of Citizens United, as many commentators believe, then the (c)(4) loophole no longer has any function. Further, given that my arguments imply that the existing regulations can potentially survive strict scrutiny, my arguments also suggest there is little need for the loophole to stay open.

As for free-standing (c)(4)’s and other non-charitable nonprofits, at least some of my analysis also extends to them, as well. Exemption, I’ve noted, is a subsidy in the sense that similar U.S. entities would usually pay tax on money used to fund their political expenditures.\textsuperscript{308} Exemption therefore magnifies the resources wealthier interests have available for politics, and contributes to crowding of the political marketplace. On the other hand, since it is unclear whether non-charitable nonprofits get any other subsidy, few of the diseconomies of scope I’ve described seem to apply to them, while some economies do. Thus, my analysis probably prescribes at least some limits on lobbying and electioneering for these organizations, but not a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{305} E.g., CRIMM & WINER, supra note 62, at 292.
\item \textsuperscript{306} See sources cited supra note 41.
\item \textsuperscript{307} See supra text accompanying notes 35--41.
\item \textsuperscript{308} See supra note 53.
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total ban. Electioneering subsidies for non-charitable nonprofits also likely should be accompanied by disclosure requirements, for the reasons I’ve described.

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309 See Vladeck, supra note 3, at 322.