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Crazy States By Yehezkel Dror

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Shortly after World War II, Hans J. Morgenthau developed the "grand theory" approach to international politics. Unlike previous political theorists, Morgenthau eschewed the emphasis on historical and descriptive study. Instead, he developed a theoretical model that emphasizes the role of power politics. This model focused on generalizations rather than analyzing current events; it identified patterns of behavior and emphasized sources of state power. Through such an analytical model it was hoped that realism and predictability could be added to the study of world politics. A thorough understanding and judicious manipulation of the inputs into the model could purportedly lead to more success in the control of world affairs.

Professor Yehezkel Dror has fashioned his own "grand theory" in Crazy States. The purpose of his book is to create the analytical model by which foreign policy makers can understand, predict and even manipulate the behavior of crazy states. Professor Dror's theoretical framework adds coherence to otherwise confusing recent world developments. Perhaps the most convincing demonstration of the importance of his study to modern western nations has been the United States' attempts to cope with the apparent irrationality of Khomeini's Iran. Certainly, Professor Dror, combining elements of Machiavellian statecraft and Bismarck's Real Politik, presents a viable analytical framework for dealing with the problem of crazy states.

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1. See H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1948).
2. E.g., Y. DROR, CRAZY STATES (1980) [hereinafter cited as DROR].
4. For a view of power politics, see N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1513).
Such an achievement makes *Crazy States* valuable reading. However, the failure of the author to develop this framework by citing specific examples throughout history and in recent events is a major disappointment.

Professor Dror is well qualified to write in the area of international politics. He resides in Israel, but has studied extensively in the United States. He was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, California, and was a senior professional staff member with the Rand Corporation. Professor Dror has served as Senior Planning and Policy Analysis Advisor for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Currently, he is Professor of Political Science and Wolfson Professor of Public Administration at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Professor Dror is also the editor of the *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*.

"Crazy state" is a term coined by Professor Dror. The term refers to a "multiactor" which possesses five attributes: (1) pursuing aggressive goals which are often harmful to others; (2) displaying an intensely radical commitment to such goals; (3) exhibiting a pervasive sense of moral superiority over others, despite a willingness to act immorally within the normal international framework; (4) realizing an ability to rationally select logical instruments to advance those goals; and (5) possessing external action capabilities sufficient to impact upon goal achievement. Naturally, a crazy state would conform to the model in varying degrees. For example, crazy states exhibit different external-action capabilities depending upon communication ability, economic power and military strength. Also, some crazy states may be more willing to violate international codes of conduct than others.

Today, the definition of crazy states applies to numerous multiactors on the world scene. Crazy state countries probably would include Qaddafi’s Libya, Khomeini’s Iran and Uganda before the fall of Idi Amin. Examples of non-country crazy states would be the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army and the Japanese Red Army. Present strategic studies are poorly equipped to deal with such multiactors. These multiactors are improving their ability to shape world events. Perhaps the ultimate in world terror would be a crazy state with possession of a nuclear weapon.

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6. The term is not intended to have psychiatric overtones as crazy states may act very rationally in choosing methods of achieving irrational goals. *Dror*, supra note 2, at 23. Substitute terms such as "fanatic" or "true believer" states are probably more appropriate. *Id.*, at xiv.

7. A multiactor is defined as a unit of more than one person. *Id.* at xxvi. Multiactors are not limited to countries but can also include non-country organizations. *Id.*

8. Crazy states often exhibit a willingness to undergo high risks in order to achieve certain benefits. This does not mean they are acting irrationally even if it may seem unreasonable to Western countries. *Id.* at xiv.

9. *Id.* at xiii.

10. See *id.* at 56, table 4-3.

11. *Id.*
According to Professor Dror, to avoid such a predicament the crazy state issue must be identified in international policy making. Responsible nations of the world must prepare to counter the menace of crazy states.

Professor Dror presents five theses upon which his analytic model is based. First, the present strategic models of western policy makers contain fallacies which prevent proper handling of crazy states. A good example of one such fallacy is the "convex mirror" effect which results when other nations are viewed as a miniature — albeit distorted — version of the United States. The fallacy holds that, as these nations develop, they will become more like the United States. As a result of the fallacy, military aid to other nations often fails to recognize the receiving nation's unique needs and abilities. Consequently, attempts may be made to superimpose U.S. military doctrine and equipment upon countries with varying circumstances and needs.

This fallacy holds true with economic aid. In the past, the U.S. has had a penchant toward foreign aid in the form of capital-intensive equipment. In a developing nation, labor-intensive equipment would be more appropriate. Such equipment requires fewer spare parts which are often in short supply, employs more persons and consumes a smaller amount of costly petroleum products.

Another example of a common fallacy in strategic studies is more problematic. This fallacy claims that ideologies will fade and, therefore, need not be taken seriously. The latter portion of the fallacy need not be argued, but the former is certainly proven by numerous historical examples. Professor Dror calls this "one of the most dangerous fallacies in the United States strategic thinking." Yet if there were not an element of truth to this fallacy the world would have, indeed, cause to despair. While, to the simple minded, it is pleasing to say that a leopard cannot change his spots, it is the assumption upon which present policies are based. Detente with the Soviet Union, while somewhat out of favor in an election year and in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion, resulted in significant reductions of tension between East and West. This would not have been possible if the Soviet Union had not chosen its own self-interest (upon which detente is based) over its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Other examples of fading ideologies might include the Camp David peace accords, Helmut Schmidt's Ostpolitik and the current U.S. reliance upon China's ability to play a role in the global balance of power. This is an area requiring further study, but, to the casual reader, Professor Dror's "fallacy" seems questionable.

12. For a list of such fallacies, See id. at 4-20.
14. See DROR, supra note 2, at xv-xvi.
15. For a unique and opposite treatment with respect to Iran, see R. Clark, We Must Trust the Iranians, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1980, at 40-43.
16. Perhaps there are times when ideology will rise above rational cost benefit analysis but
The second thesis upon which Crazy States is based may be self-evident to the observer of world affairs: crazy states are increasingly common. Professor Dror outlines the reasons for this trend, paralleling the thoughts of other writers on the various ways for political leadership to aggregate power. For example, Professor W. Howard Wriggins of Columbia University writes: "[a] foreign scapegoat can become a target outside the nation, attracting freefloating hostility which might otherwise be directed against the leadership." Such strategies can create liabilities for the multiactor. Future assistance upon which the multiactor depends may be endangered, as it was for Iran when the U.S. imposed an economic embargo.

Other factors which lead to the increasing occurrence of crazy states include: rapid modernization of traditional societies, thereby allowing insufficient time for the necessary social and political institutions to develop which can handle the stress created by modernization; ethnic diversity and longstanding hatreds; disillusionment with the values of Western culture; economic scarcity; and political systems having one dominating personality. An additional, implied factor is the inability of western nations to deal effectively with crazy states. Such inability often leads to positive reinforcement of crazy states. Another form of encouragement is the legitimization of crazy states through grants of recognition and the provision of a forum in international political organizations such as the United Nations. Professor Dror states that one point which the mass media should critically examine is its role in encouraging crazy states.

Professor Dror's third thesis is that crazy states can be effective in achieving their goals. Global interdependence for raw materials, especially oil, and global struggle for access to strategic locations has aided this effectiveness.

Ideology is continually being sacrificed when the cost incurred becomes too great. A case in point is Iran, which quickly searched for a solution to the hostage crisis when the war with Iraq greatly increased the costs. See What Price the Hostages?, NEWSWEEK Nov. 17, 1980, at 44-55.

17. DROR, supra note 2, at xvii.


19. Id. at 236.

20. DROR, supra note 2, at xvii. These "one personality" regimes often encourage a flamboyant and radical personality to lead a nation to "craziness." The personality embodies "charismatic" authority which may be the main source of political authority in some developing nations. Other sources which Max Weber has identified include "traditional" and "rational-legal" authority. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, 328, (T. Parsons, ed., 1964).

21. DROR, supra note 2, at xviii.

22. Certainly, global publicity has exacerbated the Iranian hostage crisis. It limited the U.S. from a political viewpoint in an election year and it has given a commanding forum to an otherwise unknown group of militants. Former Undersecretary of State, George Ball, recently stated: "Television has played this situation [the American hostages in Iran] up so that it has become the central issue of American policy which I think is absurd." The Hostages as "Soap Opera", NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1980, at 57.

23. DROR, supra note 2, at xviii-xix.
Such effectiveness bodes ill for the West as achievements encourage normally non-crazy states to adopt crazy state strategies. It may also have the effect of legitimizing the use of violence in obtaining goals; violence would become rampant if nations engage in low intensity warfare.  

Certain "countercrazy" strategies are suggested by Professor Dror. These recommendations are very specific. Professor Dror recommends the establishment of a working group for intelligence and planning on crazy states. Such a group would be sensitive to the crazy state analytical model and, consequently, would be better equipped to predict crazy behavior and to effectively counter it.

An additional countercrazy strategy would be to establish limits beyond which crazy states would not be permitted to transgress. The most obvious embodiment of this strategy is Israel. It has indeed worked well for it on many occasions, including the Entebbe operation. The effectiveness of air strikes against targets outside Israeli borders in retaliation for terrorist acts is debatable. Those strikes have also helped to isolate Israel in the world community. The drawbacks of the "limits" strategy are apparent. Crazy states are willing to trespass beyond the realm of accepted international law. Therefore, failure to meet their demands could lead to human tragedy. Not all would agree with Professor Dror and with Israel that the short term benefits of negotiations are outweighed by the long term costs of capitulation. The basic idea is sound; however, crazy states should not be positively rewarded as such reward could encourage craziness.

Perhaps the most alarming countercrazy strategy is the action which Professor Dror suggests in order to limit the external-action capabilities of crazy states, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. While preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a worthy objective, engaging in violence to meet that goal may be counterproductive. Self defense traditionally is a justification for armed intervention, but it is an exception to generally accepted norms. Professor Dror seems to have an alarming tendency for recommending violence as a means of counteracting crazy states. The

24. Id. at xix.
25. For a complete listing, see DROR, supra note 2, at xx-xxiii, 73-91.
26. DROR, supra note 2, at xxi.
27. Id. at 87.
29. Professor Dror advocates such ideas as "stimulation of revolt," DROR, supra note 2, at 84; "occupation of a crazy state may be unavoidable," id. at 84; and destroying external-action capabilities through a "counterforce nuclear strike, sabotage, airborne strike, [and] conventional spot bombing." Id. at 84. Finally, he believes that when capitulation is unavoidable, it should only be accompanied by "various activities to build up an underground working against the crazy state and directed toward its ultimate defeat, reversal. and — if nothing else works — destruction." Id. at 87.
United States would pay an enormous price in the loss of international standing by adopting such tactics except under the limited circumstances of defending the most vital of strategic interests. In part, the present ostracization of Israel is due to its use of violence as a countercrazy strategy. Is it in the interest of the U.S. to pay such a price?

Professor Dror ends, somewhat pessimistically, with his final thesis that western policy makers will not innovate the strategies that are necessary to blunt the effect of crazy states. In other words, he believes that his recommendations will not be adopted. Some readers might view that conclusion with optimism and would prefer that international affairs be handled with a moral and legal orientation. Professor Dror offers no solutions but merely an area of further speculation and future study.

Perhaps the major criticism of *Crazy States* is its lack of historical perspective to the analytical model. In fairness to Professor Dror, it should be noted that his expressed purpose was not to relate historical or current events to his model, but to establish a "global systems framework." He wanted to encourage further theoretical and applied studies of crazy states. Although he considers the past an unreliable guide for the future, he makes allusions to crazy states of the past and future, such as Nazi Germany, the Crusades, Islam Holy Warriors, and contemporary terrorist groups. Unfortunately, Professor Dror fails to develop those examples within the context of his analytical model. Failure to apply historical analysis skews his viewpoint of present reality. For example, in discussing the dangers of nuclear proliferation, Professor Dror states that there are no historical examples of failure to use available weapons. Yet, in World War II, all parties refrained from the use of poison gas despite its availability and despite the fact that Nazi Germany fit the definition of a crazy state.

Another disappointment of *Crazy States* is a failure to apply the model to a framework of international legal principles. Even crazy states can recognize the reality of international law: they make excuses as to why their immoral behavior is justified rather than flatly stating that international law does not exist. Perhaps some of these disputes could be resolved within the context of international arbitration and adjudication, as provided by international law.

30. *Id.* at xxiii-xxiv.
31. *Id.* at xxv.
32. *Id.* at xxvi.
33. *Id.* at xxvi, 16.
34. *Id.* at 23.
35. *Id.* at 16.
38. See Jessup, *The Reality of International Law*, 18 *Foreign Affairs* 244 (Jan. 1940).
It is to the credit of the United States that it continued to exhaust every legal remedy available, such as the World Court and the United Nations, in attempting to secure the release of the American hostages in Iran.40

The United States will increasingly become the target of crazy states.41 Part of the attractiveness of making the U.S. a target is due to the self-restraint it often exercises as a civilized nation. Also, the U.S. symbolizes the ultimate in Western culture and is both the scorn and envy of the have-nots. As a world power, the U.S. maintains a global presence which offers attractive, dispersed targets to crazy states in their own remote corner of the world. Certainly, the U.S. will have to improve its ability to counter crazy states. Professor Dror's own "grand theory" of crazy states goes a long way in achieving that end, especially as Crazy States spawns further study and thought on this important issue.

40. The World Court did render final judgment in the U.S. case against Iran. For text of the judgment and the State Department statement of May 24, 1980, see, DEPT. STATE BULL. 80: 43-70, (July 1980).
41. DROR, supra note 2, at xix.