Can NATO Defend the Environment?

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CAN NATO DEFEND THE ENVIRONMENT?

By Charles F. Doran*

On April 10, 1969, President Nixon urged NATO to acquire a new “third dimension” devoted to improvement of the global environment.1 A Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) was established to administer the environmental effort. Under the auspices of CCMS, six states meeting in Ankara in 1970 organized a study of air pollution in Ankara and Frankfurt to assess techniques for controlling sulfur oxides and particulate matter. In one project, the United States and Italy examined disaster relief programs, preparedness activities, and scientific advances in relief assistance. Another project sought new means to cope with oil spills and new methods of coordinating national clean-up efforts. West Germany led a study probing ways to implement the research findings of the sub-committees, to translate scientific knowledge into political action, and to synchronize national and international planning.

In light of these activities, the choice of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the initial international agency to receive United States backing in the fight against pollution seems, at first glance, quite plausible.

STRUCTURAL CREDITS

Fashioned after military command structure, NATO’s administrative procedure is reliable, if comparatively austere. In the wake of the Korean conflict and the Cold War, the United States government increasingly centralized military and political coordination within the NATO Council. Despite widespread, legitimate disparagement of the North Atlantic Council as a “decision-ratifier” and “clearing house for individual national aspirations and anxieties,” the Council is active and responsive by the standards of most
international organizations. At the very least, it avoids getting in the way of decisions agreed upon by the principal members and it provides a milieu in which the United States can sometimes represent the interests of the smaller states against the demands of the more powerful.

Following reorganization in 1951, which increased the status of the Council of Deputies and made it a permanent working adjunct of the larger Council, and following the creation of integrated military staffs within the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) in the same year, NATO rapidly became the most durable and institutionalized alliance since the European Concert of the post-Napoleonic years. Further centralization occurred at the Lisbon Conference in 1952, and in the Paris agreements of 1954 (re-affirmed at the Defense Ministers' Conference in 1958) facilitating the accession of West Germany in 1955. Even the stormy withdrawal of French forces from the Organization in June of 1966 may have fostered tighter integration: the transferral of the important Military Committee from Washington to Brussels allegedly led to improved consultation between the military and civilian spheres of NATO. So much institutional vitality undoubtedly appealed to the architects of Washington's new environmental policies.

The Organization is expeditious, especially at the lower decision levels, in handling complex policy issues with adequate, not excessive deliberation. This efficiency stems from the skillful exploitation of two considerations—the existence of an elaborate committee system and insistence on unanimity rule—that would normally be expected to lead to delay, obstruction, and attrition of the ability to carry out whatever decisions might emerge. Over 290 committees practice a division of labor which channels and delineates security matters, economic and cultural relations, budgets, research, industrial and manpower planning, medical care and civil defense in an ordered hierarchy. Normally administered by a chairman and a secretary, these committees often form “nests” of closely affiliated groups working on common problems such as infrastructure and pipelines or civil emergency planning, thus preserving flexibility without sacrificing specialization. Second, since all decision-making within NATO follows the unanimity principle, compromise—often too much compromise—is accentuated, while the will of the leadership finds easy acceptance through a manipulation of issues under discussion, an appealing prospect for the ecologists. But unanimity has been relatively easy to maintain because, as Herbert...
Dinerstein points out, NATO’s goals, traditionally conceived, have been “modest,” limited to preventing the spread of Soviet influence in Europe. If NATO’s goals were broadened to provide Western Europe with a common economic policy or a general environmental program, the unanimity principle could become as self-defeating as it was in the 1962 EEC agricultural negotiations. These new areas of concern encompass far more subjects for policy conflict and disagreement than the relatively restricted military issues which NATO staffs and committees have learned to manage.

If a government’s environmental concern and its financial capacity to eliminate pollution are the principal factors which ought to correlate with its relative decision-making weight within an international agency, then NATO is perhaps again an appropriate choice because of Washington’s ascendancy in the alliance. At a time when the River Rhine is dying, the Baltic Sea and Lake Erie have become cesspools, air pollution chokes pedestrians in New York City and Lisbon, oil spills threaten the sands of Balboa Beach and the Amalfi Coast, the whale population approaches extinction and shellfish contain toxic levels of mercury and cyanide, urgency is a paramount consideration. Governments such as the United States which perceive this urgency should perhaps act where they are most accustomed to find compliance, in this case through a regional security pact.

Despite the pressing question of burden-sharing within NATO (a question of who should share the burdens rather than of whether the burdens should be shared), the key problem of funding is still not so immediate in a defense pact as in other international organizations such as the United Nations. Under the aura of national security, additional appropriations can normally be found to finance buildings, equipment, and salaries for office staffs and research personnel if the already substantial existing facilities (in Brussels, at the Defense College in Italy, and in the various affiliated research institutes throughout Europe) are deemed inadequate. In 1968, for example, nearly 4.5 million NATO dollars went into scientific research. In fields as nascent as environmental engineering and as urgent as ecology, where vast monitoring networks are needed and where so much applied research is required, the financial stature of NATO is compelling.

But perhaps the most attractive aspect of NATO for the international environmental planners is its relatively small size (14 members) that nevertheless includes most of the world’s major polluters.
and most of the nations with the technology to stop further degradation. Just as George F. Kennan favored an elite club of advanced industrial states to fight pollution, so the Nixon administration apparently favored a tightly-knit regional grouping. The motivation and objectives for the choice of NATO as an environmental institution are not, however, simple. The leadership may indeed wish to plaster over cracks in the alliance created recently by disputes over the allocation of defense costs. If the members perceive a new common task to which they are committed, even France may once again acknowledge NATO’s utility. If so, this would represent a victory for what Stanley Hoffman calls “high politics,” a victory achieved by the functional expedient of “low politics” accompanied by favorable environmental side-effects. Was the environmental issue exploited largely to save the alliance? Or was the alliance in fact a genuine first choice, among available international options, to save the environment?

STRUCTURAL DEBITS

Notwithstanding the President’s enthusiasm for a solution in the context of the Alliance revealed in his Message to Congress on the Environment (February 8, 1971), one must recognize a number of weaknesses which afflict regional security pacts as social or welfare institutions. First, in spite of Article 2 of the NATO Charter which encourages “economic collaboration” and “well-being” among members, of the Report of the Three on Non-Military Cooperation, and of Articles 25-36 of the North Atlantic Council Communiqué (Paris, 1957), NATO is largely an ad hoc military organization dependent upon a high degree of specialization for efficiency and reliability. What sets NATO apart from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or the European Economic Community is that the defense pact has a central military responsibility. If NATO tires to don both the worker’s apron and the soldier’s uniform, neither may fit. A problem of bigness already confronts the pact. Fragmentary, empirical evidence suggests that the amount of paper work, the number of sessions, and the strain on communications is growing at a much faster rate than the bureaucracy itself. To add tasks and functions to the bureaucracy is inevitably to reduce and impair the military effectiveness of the organization.

Second, and perhaps more serious, the “third dimension” concept explicitly excludes the developing nations where a majority
of the world's population live and where the bulk of the wilderness areas and unspoiled coast lines remain relatively free of man's carelessness. If the purpose of resource conservation and a sustained quality of life is to help man, then environmental standards and programs of environmental education are most essential where man is most abundant, especially in Asia and Latin America. Moreover, if a number of industrial processes such as strip mining and agricultural practices such as one-crop farming create virtually irreversible damage, then it would at the very least be callous for an international agency to set standards for the developed countries while in effect abetting abuses among the raw material producers which may be called upon to mine larger quantities of coal, for example, in lieu of foreign cut-backs induced by pollution restrictions. With only regional environmental solutions, additional pollution created by the flight of the dirty semi-manufactures from the more stringent controls of advanced industrial nations is likely to inundate the Third World.

There is a strong possibility that NATO was selected in part so as to avoid the more complicated environmental problems of the developing areas. Ethical indignation apart, the policy of turning away from the developing world could become self-defeating in a pragmatic sense, destroying the last virgin areas which are a pleasure and a topic of study for tourists and natural scientists from the developed countries. Believing themselves exploited by exclusionary regional environmental deals, otherwise cooperative Third World countries may in the future also raise the price of their participation in standard-setting and monitoring, if they participate at all.

A possible counter-argument is that nations in the Third World have shown no alacritous interest in environmental protection. There can be no doubt that the opportunity costs of pollution controls are greater in a country where millions starve than in countries where millions suffer from over-weight. But we must also remember that some types of pollution, e.g., problems of urban sewage, are as great in New Delhi as in New York; this could furnish a stimulus for environmental reform on an international scale if the terms are right. An international environmental agency has obligations to everyone, not just the systemic elite. And lack of information, or governmental inertia, is perhaps more an obstacle than poverty to cleaner surroundings—ecological awareness has been a recent thing in the United States.
Third, and conversely, one can question whether in the medium-term a regional organization like NATO with primary military responsibilities can ever, in the last analysis, put environmental values against security sought through military operations. NATO automatically cuts itself off from cooperation with Communist nations on grounds which have nothing to do with air and water pollution. Soviet participation in the follow-up of the CCMS resolution to end all deliberate oil discharges at sea by 1975, for instance, occurred not in the original NATO conference on oil spills itself but only subsequently in the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, an institution with a far broader scope of membership. Since environmental politics is always sensitive and frequently subordinate to security or prestige aspects of international politics, environmental betterment must be removed from centers of unnecessary political tensions. The damage these tensions may cause is exemplified by the boycott of the East European nations at the U.N. Stockholm Convention on the environment (presaged by a similar partial boycott at the Prague meeting a year earlier) over the exclusion of East Germany. Without the participation of East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, little can be achieved toward cleaning up the Baltic, to say nothing of the grosser impact of these tensions on collaboration elsewhere in the world.

With NATO as environmentalist, ideological differences will find a focus in the very institution which seeks to negotiate pollution standards among states. The image of the security pact is coercive, while the image of environmental protection has been accommodating, although not always conciliatory. The training and personal Weltanschauung of the pact's administrators, if not contentious, are inward-looking and cautious rather than imaginative and encompassing as demanded by the novelty and global purview of environmental degradation. In terms of purpose, diplomatic style, and scope of membership, NATO is not the ideal benefactor of nature.

Fourth, much of the research undertaken on behalf of NATO is of necessity classified, creating all of the problems of security checks, bans on the publication of certain materials, restrictions on archival use, and prohibitions on communication or personal contacts with scholars outside the Atlantic Community which scientists have learned to eschew. Combined with a natural proclivity to look at ecology in the narrow sense of industrial pollution because of the
particular limited focus of the members' interests, these impedi-
ments to unfettered research may lead to unfortunate scientific
compromises. A mere 10 percent of the scientists invited to NATO
congresses, for example, come from non-member nations. As a
military organization, moreover, NATO could hardly be expected
to open its files on radiation exposure or meteorological patterns of
fall-out to scholars, or indeed to allow scholars to publish materials
which would endanger secrecy or damage the organization's
prestige.

The fifth and more general dilemma, more encompassing than
the secrecy problem, is that of conflicts of interest. NATO-
sponsored environmental research may consciously or quite sub-
consciously come to emphasize projects of demonstrable military
significance. NATO's behavioral science program is indicative.
Begun in September of 1959 under the title "Advisory Group on
Defense Psychology," it held conferences on topics largely of in-
terest to military psychologists during the period 1960–65. So
weighted in this direction were its activities that the Group re-
ported to both the Science Committee and the Defense Group.
Just as the United States Navy decided on security grounds to
oppose placing whales on the endangered species list in 1970, so a
regional defense pact will oppose environmental controls which
threaten its particular security interests.

To avoid such conflicts within the federal government, the
Nixon Administration withdrew environmental functions from the
Departments of Interior, Agriculture and Commerce, among
others, while centralizing these activities in a single governmental
organ less compromised—the Environmental Protection Agency.
To practice the opposite policy at the international level suggests
not so much hypocrisy but failure to think through the conse-
quences of this policy for the global effort to protect the biosphere.

Sixth, one can ask whether global environmental protection can
prosper in an agency as hierarchic as NATO. Is a multilateral strat-
ey of codetermination more desirable than the monopolistic deci-
sion-making approach employed in the pact? According to the
French military strategist André Beaufre, Americans "in all in-
ocence think of collaboration as a one-way street;" they "exert
their leadership quite naturally without imagining for a moment
that this kind of association is not 'democratic.'" No paucity of
examples indicates the unrest of America’s allies regarding her
military dominance. Anthony Eden favored a "general staff" or
group of experts to advise member governments; deGaulle proposed a big power "directorate" of the chiefs of state; the NATO Citizens Convention (January 1962) passed resolutions calling for a Parliamentarians Conference or an Atlantic Assembly in which the smaller nations would be more broadly represented.\textsuperscript{19} As a palliative, the United States ultimately devised the mixed-manning of surface ships (MLF), which was, however, unacceptable to the Europeans in part because it left unresolved decision-making problems at the highest levels.\textsuperscript{20} Has this same pattern of dominance carried over into NATO's committee structure dealing with environmental matters? Empirical evidence in Tables I and II suggests that this unfortunately is the case.

The United States is a member of one-half (four) of the environmental committees and chairs three. Even bearing in mind the reputation for United States ascendency in the alliance, the degree of United States dominance over environmental matters only becomes obvious in contrast to committee participation in other areas. On six major Parliamentarian Conference Committees (i.e., the Political, Military, Economic, Scientific and Technical, and Cultural Affairs and Information Committees, and the Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries), United States participation averages 10 percent of the membership.\textsuperscript{21} Even the important Military Committee records only a 12 percent United States participation level. Likewise, although the total United States delegation to NATO is the largest, when one considers officials ranked according to grades on the International Staff, United States representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I</th>
<th>NATO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION COMMITTEES</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMITTEE</td>
<td>Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Pollution</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-Water Pollution</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Water Pollution</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Knowledge and Decision-Making</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Satisfaction in a Technological Era</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment in the Strategy of Regional Development</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Safety</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Assistance Project</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Importance of committee coded in terms of centrality and scope of jurisdiction. (4) high; (3) moderately high; (2) average; (1) low.
TABLE II
NATO INDEX OF COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Committee Salience Score</th>
<th>Chairman Salience Score</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(about 10 percent of the total) is not shifted disproportionately towards the upper end. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany all exceed the United States in representation. Thus, in contrast to the normal individual presence of American nationals on NATO committees, the average figure of 50 percent for the gross level of participation on the environmental committees is strikingly high. Whatever the proposals which emerge from these committees, they will not merely carry Washington’s approval but are also likely to establish the kind of environmental standards which the United States believes the world should accept.

When one considers committee salience, France, Canada, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany do somewhat better. But the United States still chairs the crucial Committee on Air Pollution which, within NATO, alone develops quality standards and control techniques for such commercially sensitive pollutants as sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides. Since in most committee systems the chairmen wield unusual power, it is well to compare the environmental with the general committees on this measure. On the average, the United States provides 13 percent of the chairmen for the North Atlantic Council Committees, a figure exceeded by the United Kingdom, France and the International Staff itself; this contrasts with 38 percent for the environmental committees. Through membership on the Inland Water Committee, the United States can exercise influence over coastal as well as river basin management criteria wherever national jurisdiction is divided. By selecting control of one or two of the top committees in this way,
the United States is likely to possess far more authority than even the above data indicate. It is well known, for example, that much of United States administrative dominance in NATO stems from the authority of the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) and the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), positions which have never been occupied by a European. To be sure, habits of control are not easily relinquished. The possibility of similar American supremacy in environmental affairs is bound to create tensions.

Two anomalies stand out. Great Britain participates far less than either the dimensions of her problems or her relative wealth would predict. Britain is the sole member on the Committee on Work Satisfaction in a Technological Era, a committee focusing upon the relationship between worker satisfaction and productivity, but one somewhat outside the main ecological current. On the other hand, Britain is not a member of the air pollution committee in spite of her smog experience in London, Manchester and other heavy industrial cities. The other anomaly is France since, despite her withdrawal from the alliance (though not the treaty), she is a member of the Committees on Open-Water Pollution, Inland Water Pollution, and Environment in the Strategy of Regional Development. The reason for the massive French participation is not openly discussed, but it may stem from a desire to offset the American hegemony in international environmental affairs by getting an early start on the guidelines for later discussions affecting trade patterns, tariffs, and aid relationships.

In general, from the perspective of the environment, NATO is an unsatisfactory administrative instrument whatever may have been the political motives of individual governments for the choice. The environmental issue must necessarily play a secondary role in the organization; too many governments are alienated or excluded from the membership; and the decision-making framework of the organization can quickly and dangerously become (because of the less compulsory character of environmental participation) a center of tensions observed again and again in the military sphere.

The Environmental Balance Sheet

A significant policy decision awaits Washington in the wake of the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Where shall the United States place major international environmental emphasis? Is the NATO "third dimension" worth pursuing with additional increments of
funds and expanded research projects, including perhaps the exploration of enforcement criteria? Or is the U.N.-proposed environmental agency involving some 54 nations and led by a smaller secretariat a far better functional alternative?

Because of NATO's structural debits, the latter agency may in the long-run be more acceptable internationally. The modest 100 million dollar funding of the U.N.-sponsored agency, two-fifths of which the United States has elected to absorb over a five year period is, however, clearly insufficient. It is precisely on such questions as finance that Washington will have to choose between two very different, contending approaches to environmental protection. The situation resembles in microcosm the "guns plus butter" rationale of the early Vietnam War years. Resources are always limited for any given project even in an affluent democracy where, especially prior to elections, policy is flexible and where the margins of economic choice are comparatively broad. If start-up costs are high and institutional expenditures must pass thresholds before genuine economies of scale are observed in research, monitoring activity, staff size and the potential for effective mediation, then progress has been decisively hampered where two similar programs are supported coincidently. To attempt to fund both is merely to procrastinate while denying the better administrative solution adequate resources and proper leadership.

This appraisal is not alone in advocating a re-evaluation of the "third dimension" as the major international environmental forum. Brian Johnson has pointed out that European reactions to the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society have been "a good deal less than enthusiastic;" that NATO's membership covers a geographic area "that makes no sense in environmental terms;" and finally that there is no reason why the scientific findings of CCMS could not have been discussed "in another forum." Richard N. Gardner has long held that the "central machinery" for environmental cooperation must be global. "It was inappropriate," he argues, for the United States to make its "first concrete proposal [for international environmental collaboration] in NATO."

Enthusiasts of a larger environmental role for NATO may note that the activities of CCMS were essentially research-oriented pilot projects undertaken at a time when it was difficult to stimulate any international concern for ecological betterment. While the projects may at first have been research-oriented, talk of standard-setting and monitoring is now current within NATO; and while
CCMS may have been considered by some a temporary expedient, it has gained stature and permanence rivaling subsequent proposals. A kind of self-fulfilling prophecy adds momentum to such extensions of bureaucratic activity. Just as the creation of the MLF schema helped solidify belief in the alleged German desire for a "finger on the nuclear trigger," so a larger environmental role for NATO may foster a belief that the role is necessary and that better institutional options are unavailable. When the momentum of the prophecy finally stalls, the effect on international cooperation may be traumatic as was true for a time following the demise of the MLF.

The issue is not whether regional environmental activity is appropriate, because no one doubts this. The issue is whether NATO is a better forum than alternative regional bodies such as the OECD, the Council of Europe, or the U.N. regional economic commissions for discussion and negotiation of pollution standards. Nor is the utility of CCMS research on oil spillage, for example, in doubt. It is the political framework which ultimately must urge acceptance of the research findings upon individual governments which is at issue. Even were the choice a regional organization devoid of military or ideological potential for conflict, a division of labor would best be established between it and systems-wide institutions such as the U.N.-sponsored environmental agency in order to prevent redundancy and bureaucratic competition. One of the easiest corporate escapes from domestic pollution controls occurs when jurisdictional disputes tie up environmental enforcement agencies. There is no reason to expect less procrastination emerging from similar quarrels at the international level.

A possible mode of specialization to minimize this strife would channel three activities: (1) monitoring and data aggregation toward global organizations; (2) standard-setting and bargaining in the direction of non-defense-oriented regional organizations capable of achieving agreement within regions without jeopardizing future cooperation between regions; and (3) enforcement toward national governments within the administrative capacity to patrol their own borders and off-shore jurisdictions. Negotiation of these functional areas of competence will be difficult enough without the unnecessary baggage of interregional military suspicion and accusation. While this institutional division of labor may be regarded as optimal from the viewpoint of the environmentalist, it may be less than ideal politically if military, status, or economic
demands carry greater weight. Forced by its primary military role to exclude the Soviet Union and Japan, the second and third largest industrial producers and polluters respectively, NATO's "third dimension" does not have a firm basis for generalized action; on the other hand, the North Atlantic countries have put status considerations aside and shown some willingness to submit to United States environmental direction.

Given the desire by the Western leadership to test the NATO option or at least to hold it open for a time, in which areas might NATO concentrate, and what environmental strategy might it pursue?

The technical skills which NATO staffs have learned in the military context, for instance cost/benefit analysis, operations research procedures and data storage and retrieval, ought to find an ecological application. Insofar as the Organization focuses on problems largely internal to NATO countries such as air pollution over cities (e.g., the Ankara-Frankfurt air pollution study), inter-regional complications can be minimized. Since the problems are essentially domestic, the solutions are not likely to have a negative political impact outside the region. International exchanges of data, patent information, and technical expertise can accelerate the search for solutions, but the solutions themselves are not in most cases dependent upon international cooperation with non-aligned countries, nor are the technical solutions likely to damage political cooperation elsewhere. Truly international environmental problems such as the attempt to clean up the Baltic or the Mediterranean are another matter, since Eastern European countries, Israel and the Arab nations are not likely to be pleased with political decisions about standards, notwithstanding the technical basis, which they have not helped to determine.

Second, provided NATO adopts a strategy of generalized research rather than standard-setting or enforcement, the Organization can make an environmental contribution. If consultation with foreign experts and dissemination of the results is not hindered, research funded by NATO on the decomposition of exhaust fumes or on the chemical catalysis of eutrophication would be of considerable international significance. When applied for example to an equitable settlement of pollution disputes involving the Danube Basin or to limitations on the production of the huge supersonic jet transports, however, the research acquires a policy focus which NATO is far less equipped to mediate. Standard-
setting and enforcement will also be affected even within the Atlantic community by the non-participation of the neutral states such as Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia which either act as a cause of, or become a target for, major international pollution.

Most environmentalists will interpret these recommendations as "second-best," appropriate unfortunately to a less-than-optimal ecological instrument. Moreover, at a time when foreign reaction to United States environmental initiative is uneasy, tact and ingenuity appear crucial. On issues in which diplomatic style, rhetorical tone, and merits were seminal, the United States often found itself in a "derisory minority" of two to a half-dozen governments at the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Further emphasis on the "third dimension" in the shadow of the new U.N. Secretariat for Environmental Affairs can only too easily give substance to private assertions of American "rigidity" and "arrogance," terms heard at Stockholm.

There is a time for bold diplomatic action and, perhaps, a time for maneuver. In the present setting, could a delicate turn toward less Americanized environmental institutions better serve United States interests and the global community?

Those who believe that NATO can become the primary international institution to defend man's environment clearly do not favor a re-orientation of American effort. They see the opportunity costs of loading NATO with environmental tasks as bearable, though burdensome. They accept the exclusion of the developing countries from decisions which inevitably affect the Third World and which to some degree depend upon its compliance as the price for efficiency, less inhibited action (at least in the North Atlantic area) and conclusive agreements. They downgrade the impact of secrecy, the military focus of research, and the effect of exclusionary membership on unfettered scientific dialogue. They disclaim that environmental activities will interfere with the essential military purpose of NATO, just as they doubt that that purpose overwhelms and subordinates environmental concern. In so arguing, they imply that the effort to stop pollution will not socialize the military bureaucracy toward a new consciousness, nor in contrast that the effort will tend to militarize social values underlying the environmental movement. Finally, the advocates of the third dimension view the dominance of the United States in NATO not as a presence which in the medium-term is likely to stifle the processes of standard-setting, monitoring and enforcement, especially between
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regions, but as leverage to pry less informed or less zealous governments into appropriate action.

Which perspective is the valid one—the view on the one hand that NATO can supply a credible defense of clean air and water and a higher quality of life, or, on the other, the view that the machinery and purposes of military security are incompatible with environmental values? A hard look at institutional priorities continues to be in order while the process of commitment is still reversible.

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FOOTNOTES

* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Rice University.


11 Rational management of ecosystems and constraints on population growth are first and second priorities for the scientific elite in these developing areas. F. Di Castri, *Survey of the Opinion of Scientists from Less Developed Countries*, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, Proceedings of the Committee on Commerce and Committee on Science and Astronautics, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 25–26, 1971.


15 NATO FACTS AND FIGURES, supra n. 6, at 128.


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21 These figures are calculated for the participation of individual nationals on committees in 1965, based on tabular data provided in THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM OF THE NATO COUNCIL, supra n.10, at 41. It must be remembered that, in contrast, our data on environmental committee participation indicate gross participation levels, namely, whether a government is represented at all on a committee.

22 This analysis is based on tabular data for grade and nationality of category in 1964. THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM OF THE NATO COUNCIL, supra n.10, at 39.

23 Id. at 31; T. W. Wilson, Jr., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION: A GLOBAL SURVEY (Cambridge, Mass.: Dunellen, University Press of Cambridge, 1971) Appendix U.

24 For a critique of how far NATO myths have come to exceed reality, see, D. Calleo, THE ATLANTIC FANTASY: THE U.S., NATO, AND EUROPE, International Affairs Series, No. 13 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) Ch. II.

Political tensions often lead to indirect environmental solutions. For a study of this phenomenon, see, C. F. Doran, M. Hinz, and P. C. Mayer-Tasch, DIE POLITIK DES PERIPHEREN EINGRIFFS: EINFUHRUNG DIE POLITISCHE OEKOLOGIE (Frankfurt a M.: Alfred Metzner-Verlag, forthcoming, 1973).


26 New York Times, June 16, 1972. The purpose of these funds is only to aid the exploration of internal abatement problems in the developing countries. Nothing has been appropriated by any of the contributing nations for initiating the abatement projects themselves.


29 "Active work toward reaching internationally agreed upon [environmental] criteria is underway in the WHO and in the Committee
That proponents see CCMS as the dominant international environmental agency is made clear by the planned scope of its activities. See, J.K. Huntley, MAN'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 2d ed. 1972).


Id.