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UNITED STATES V. SINGLETON: A WARNING SHOT HEARD 'ROUND THE CIRCUITS?

To none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right of justice.
—Magna Carta, Clause 40

INTRODUCTION

King John's reluctant concession to this principle led to the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 and marked one of the earliest foundations of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Although this concept has been significantly modified over the last seven centuries, the fundamental ideal that a government of laws exists to uphold justice, and not merely to sell it to the highest bidder, continues to guide our notions of fairness. Skeptics suggest that the modern application of this ideal, however, has much more strength as a rhetorical flourish than as a judicially enforced principle. Pointing to such noteworthy examples as the O.J. Simpson case and the JonBenet Ramsey investigation, many modern skeptics question whether individuals with vast financial resources can indeed buy justice. Some scholars go so as far as to argue that prosecutors' reliance on the plea bargaining system, where a defendant can "purchase" his freedom by testifying against a co-defendant, has effectively resulted in the governmental business of selling justice to the highest bidder.

In 1998, in United States v. Singleton, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of purchased testimony. In excluding testimony from a witness who had agreed to testify against his co-defendant in exchange for a prosecutorial promise of leniency, a three judge panel concluded that this plea bargain violated a federal statute governing bribery of witnesses. Although the panel's decision was

2 See id.
5 See 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
6 See 144 F.3d at 1360-61 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), the federal bribery statute).
overturned when reheard en banc in January of 1999, many scholars were intrigued that a respected federal court challenged the validity of witness-bargained agreements. Because plea bargaining has become such an ingrained practice in our modern criminal justice system, these scholars have closely examined the panel's rationale for excluding witness-bargained testimony.

The panel in Singleton reasoned that the prosecutor's agreement with the witness was essentially a payment for testimony. Even though attorneys for the government argued that the federal bribery statute was not applicable to the U.S. Attorney, the panel maintained that basic democratic principles as articulated in the Magna Carta mandated the statute's application to the government. Although the Singleton decision was overturned and the panel's rationale was expressly rejected when it was reheard en banc, the case is by no means final because defense attorneys have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.

The prospect of the Supreme Court possibly re-examining the rationales for plea bargaining has sent shock waves throughout the legal community. Criminal defense lawyers herald the original three judge panel's logic in Singleton as landmark, with implications as far reaching as the Miranda decision, because it seemed to signal the beginning of the end of plea bargaining for testimony. Larry Pozner, president-elect of the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-


8 See, e.g., id.

9 See 114 F.3d at 1348.

10 See id. at 1346-47. In fact, the panel quoted Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States noting,

Our Government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example . . . . [T]o declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.

Id. at 1346 (quoting 277 U.S. 438, 455 (1928)).

11 See 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 165 U.S.L.W. 3772 (U.S. June 21, 1999) (No. 98-—8758).

12 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

13 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (holding police must inform suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent and right to an attorney before an interrogation may proceed). Many scholars have noted that the Miranda decision fundamentally changed the way in which law enforcement officials can proceed in both the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. See generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 458-62 (2d ed. 1995). In equating Singleton to Miranda, some members of the legal community maintain that by excluding
yers, commented on the panel’s holding and said, "[t]he court has ended decades of government-sanctioned bribery. A system in which the government [can] exchange freedom for a story they wanted to hear is a system rampant with injustice."14 Also commenting on the panel’s ruling, Singleton’s attorney stated, "When the government wraps the American flag around a . . . [witness], juries believe them, because that witness is cloaked with the power and majesty of the United States."15 Singleton’s attorney further added that the decision could “completely change the plea bargaining system,” and force prosecutors to work, “harder and cleaner.”16

While criminal defense attorneys praise the panel’s rationale in Singleton, prosecutors contend that this decision runs contrary to years of precedent and are relieved that it was reversed en banc.17 San Diego Assistant United States Attorney and Criminal Division Head Bruce Castetter noted, “the [panel] ruling [was] really, really, stupid. Have you read it? Dumb.”18 Other prosecutors have argued, “It’s a horrible ruling. It [would] hamstring us and . . . become a nightmare.”19 Judge Smalkin of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland even stated that, “[t]he chances of . . . the Supreme Court reaching the same conclusion as the Singleton panel are . . . about the same as discovering that the entire roster of the Baltimore Orioles consists of cleverly disguised leprechauns.”20

While plea bargaining was a major subject of debate in the academic literature of the 1970s and 1980s, the Singleton case has caused many to examine the issue from a different perspective: namely, does the system effectively amount to bribery?21 In analyzing this question, Sections I and II of this Note examine the early development of plea bargaining in Anglo-American history as well as how the practice operates in the modern criminal justice system.22 Section III focuses on the United States constitutional justifications for plea bargaining and Section IV will address the academic debate surrounding the practice.23
Sections V and VI provide a detailed analysis of both the three judge panel's rationale in Singleton and the en banc decision that reversed that opinion. Section VII assesses the legislative history of the federal bribery statute on which the Singleton court based its decision and concludes that this statute is inapplicable to federal prosecutors negotiating plea bargains. Finally, Section VIII argues that the policy justifications for plea bargaining are weak in the context of witness-bargained agreements and the Singleton case could, therefore, be viewed as a "warning shot" to prosecutors who over-rely on plea bargaining as a tool for gaining testimony.

I. PLEA BARGAIN TERMINOLOGY AND PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

Plea bargaining is defined as "[t]he process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." In general, there are several methods by which plea bargaining operates in modern practice. The first is implicit plea bargaining, where the defendant, without the impetus of negotiations with the prosecutor, pleads guilty to a certain, usually lesser, offense. Scholars suggest that many defendants enter guilty pleas because they implicitly believe that this will result in a lesser sentence. The second, and most common plea bargaining method operates through formal discussions with a prosecutor and can be divided into two sub-categories. The first occurs when a defendant enters negotiations to plead guilty to a certain lesser offense in exchange for a reduced sentence. The second type involves a prosecutor promising something, usually leniency or a promise not to bring the accused up on any charges, in exchange for the person's valuable testimony implicating a defendant in another case. The focus of this Note is on the latter type of plea bargaining—promises made by a prosecutor in exchange for testimony.

24 See infra notes 142–258 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 265–353 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 265–353 and accompanying text.
28 See generally WAYNE LA FAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 766 (1985) (discussing the mechanics of modern day plea bargaining).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
The plea bargaining process is regulated by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the federal immunity statutes.\textsuperscript{34} Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) allows attorneys for the government and for the defendant to enter into negotiations in which the prosecutor can offer the following: (1) a move for dismissal of charges; (2) a recommendation, or agreement not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence; or (3) an agreement that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.\textsuperscript{35} Rule 11(e), however, explicitly precludes the court from being involved in these negotiations, thus leaving the process solely in the hands of the prosecution and the defense.\textsuperscript{36}

In addition, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, enacted in 1984, include provisions that impact plea bargaining.\textsuperscript{37} Section 3E1.1 allows for a reduction in sentence if the defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance or responsibility for his offense."\textsuperscript{38} The commentary to the rule lists several alternatives by which a defendant can manifest this acceptance, including truthfully admitting to conduct (pleading guilty).\textsuperscript{39} Section 5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allows for a reduction in sentence if the defendant offers substantial assistance to the authorities.\textsuperscript{40} The Sentencing Commission has noted that a defendant's assistance in the resolution of other criminal investigations should mitigate the severity of the sentence imposed because this kind of assistance helps resolve criminal cases.\textsuperscript{41}

The federal immunity statutes also regulate the plea bargaining process.\textsuperscript{42} Under these series of statutes enacted as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, courts are authorized to confer immunity (freedom from criminal prosecution) upon government witnesses in criminal trials.\textsuperscript{43} In upholding the validity of these immunity


\textsuperscript{35} See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (1)(a)-(c).

\textsuperscript{36} See id.

\textsuperscript{37} See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).

\textsuperscript{38} U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1997).

\textsuperscript{39} See id.

\textsuperscript{40} See id. § 5K1.1.

\textsuperscript{41} See id. § 5K1.1 sentencing commission's comments.


\textsuperscript{43} See 18 U.S.C. § 6003.
statutes, the Supreme Court has concluded that granting immunity for witnesses "reflects the importance of testimony, and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in the crime." The Supreme Court also determined that these immunity statutes are essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal statutes, and are "so familiar that they have become part of our 'constitutional fabric.'"

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PLEA BARGAINING

Although the debate surrounding plea bargaining has intensified within the last thirty years, it is certainly not a new controversy. Even its historical origins are the subject of much debate. Some scholars trace its development to tribal society where individuals exacted revenge, however they saw fit, against those who had wronged them. The plea bargaining concept developed from this human instinct for revenge. Over time, wronged parties began to accept some sort of payment, usually money, instead of seeking physical revenge. As Anglo-Saxon society developed even further, local communities drafted lists of compromises. Private parties could look at these lists to determine the adequate compensation for their injury. With the ascension of William the Conqueror in 1066, the state became involved in this previously private bargaining system through a concept known as the "King's Peace." Using this rationale to expand his power over local feudal territories, the King began to legislate on matters that previously had been enforced privately, including the prosecution of "breaches of the peace," and the imposition of penalties. As more and more cases were brought as "breaches of the King's peace," the practice of bargaining for punishment became a popular tool for courts.

47 See Wishingrad, supra note 46, at 500. For an excellent description of this historical period see Coquillette, supra note 1, at 37-42, 55-62.
48 See Wishingrad, supra note 46, at 501.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 504.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 505-06.
53 See Wishingrad, supra note 46, at 505-06.
54 See id. at 509, 511.
This historical interpretation of the plea bargaining system has been criticized.55 Most of its opponents contend that plea bargaining is essentially a modern invention that became a popular method of case management during the 1920s.56 In dismissing the idea that plea bargaining dates back to the eleventh century, critics point to such credible evidence as Sir Matthew Hale’s treatise, Pleas of the Crown, to show that as late as 1670 “it [was] usual for the judge to discourage an accused from pleading guilty, and to advise the party to plead [not guilty] and put himself upon his trial.”57 Most scholars contend that plea bargaining did not reach the United States until after the Civil War.58 These scholars note that as late as 1874 the United States Supreme Court condemned plea bargaining, when the Court stated that “[a] man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights.”59

Despite this judicial rebuke of plea bargaining, many urban jurisdictions employed the practice at the turn of the century.60 In an era when corruption dominated urban politics and law enforcement, it was a common practice for prosecutors to sell lesser sentences for a fee.61 It was not until the 1920s, when cities began to officially survey their criminal justice systems, that these corrupt bargaining practices were exposed.62 At this time, it was not uncommon for city prosecutors to resolve over seventy percent of their cases by defendants entering guilty pleas (a strong indication that prosecutors were bargaining for guilty pleas).63

The reliance on plea bargaining remained steady throughout the early part of the twentieth century and then increased dramatically

56 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 228-29.
57 Langbein, Short History, supra note 55, at 264-65.
58 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 221-25.
59 Id. at 227 (quoting Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874)). The Supreme Court also explicitly rejected agreements where co-defendants agreed to testify in order to be charged with lesser crimes. See generally Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878). In the Whiskey Cases, the Court held that although agreements which resulted in full pardons were permissible, bargains that “led to a reduction in punishment and an abandonment of the government’s claims w[ere] invalid.” See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 226 (interpreting the Whiskey Cases).
60 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 229.
61 See id. at 229, 233.
62 See id. at 229.
63 See id.
again in the 1960s. Today, it is estimated that ninety percent of all criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargaining. Most scholars attribute the increase in plea bargaining to the "due process" revolution of the 1960s. As the Warren Court afforded defendants more constitutional rights in state courts, prosecutors found it more difficult to convict. This difficulty in attaining convictions, combined with an overall caseload increase due to the criminalization of more activities, resulted in crowded dockets. Thus, in the latter half of this century, prosecutors have relied on plea bargaining simply to manage the overwhelming number of cases on their dockets.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL OF THE PLEA BARGAINING SYSTEM

The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of plea bargaining in several landmark cases during the 1970s. There have been two general categories of constitutional arguments surrounding plea bargaining. The first revolve around the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states, "[On all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... ."

Advocates who rely on this language maintain that plea discussions deny the accused the opportunity to be judged by a jury of his peers. This argument has been largely unsuccessful, however, because the Supreme Court has maintained that as long as the defendant enters his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, his Sixth Amendment rights have not been violated.

The second set of constitutional criticisms of plea bargaining revolve around the Fifth Amendment which provides that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ."

Proponents of this argument maintain that entering a
guilty plea to receive some benefit from the state (namely leniency, a reduced charge or sentence reduction) amounts to coercion. It, therefore, violates the protection against self-incrimination.\textsuperscript{74} The Court addressed this Fifth Amendment argument in 1970, in \textit{Brady v. United States}.\textsuperscript{75}

In \textit{Brady}, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity of a defendant’s guilty plea even though the defendant’s desire to avoid the death penalty motivated the plea.\textsuperscript{76} Brady, the defendant, was charged with kidnapping in violation of the Federal Lindbergh Act and faced a possible death sentence.\textsuperscript{77} When Brady learned that his co-defendant had entered into an agreement with the government to testify against him, he changed his plea to guilty.\textsuperscript{78} Brady subsequently appealed, arguing that his guilty plea was not voluntary because it was motivated by both his fear that he would be sentenced to death and his desire for a reduced sentence.\textsuperscript{79} In upholding the validity of his guilty plea, the Court reasoned that a guilty plea is not necessarily invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever it is motivated by a desire to accept a lesser penalty rather than risk the chances of a higher penalty at trial.\textsuperscript{80}

The Court discussed the mutual benefits of the plea bargaining system, stating that

for a defendant . . . the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious—his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt or in which there is a substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{74} See, e.g., \textit{Bordenkircher}, 434 U.S. at 357, 360; \textit{Alford}, 400 U.S. at 37–39; \textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. at 758.

\textsuperscript{75} See \textit{id} at 758.

\textsuperscript{76} See \textit{id}.

\textsuperscript{77} The Lindbergh Act allowed for a defendant to be punished by death if the victim of the kidnapping was not “liberated without harm.” See \textit{id} at 743.

\textsuperscript{78} See \textit{id}.

\textsuperscript{79} See \textit{id} at 744.

\textsuperscript{80} See \textit{id} at 751.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id} at 752.
In light of these mutual benefits, the Court held that plea bargaining was constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, as long as the defendant entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.\textsuperscript{82} Recognizing that defendants receive numerous advantages by pleading guilty, the Court held that a defendant's desire to get a lesser penalty or sentence does not, in and of itself, make his guilty plea involuntary.\textsuperscript{83}

One year after 	extit{Brady}, in 	extit{Santobello v. New York}, the Supreme Court again addressed the validity of plea bargaining.\textsuperscript{84} In 	extit{Santobello}, the Court held that a defendant who completes a plea agreement with the prosecution can claim specific performance of that agreement if it is not honored.\textsuperscript{85} The defendant in 	extit{Santobello} was indicted on two counts of felony gambling and initially entered a plea agreement where he would plead guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for the prosecutor's promise not to make a sentence recommendation.\textsuperscript{86} When Santobello changed his counsel and learned that the evidence against him was possibly the product of an illegal search, he motioned to withdraw his plea.\textsuperscript{87} The court denied this motion and proceeded to the sentencing phase where a new prosecutor, apparently unaware of the previous plea agreement, made a sentence recommendation of one year—the statutory maximum.\textsuperscript{88} Despite the defense's objection, Santobello was sentenced to one year in prison.\textsuperscript{89} The case was remanded to the lower court to determine whether the prosecutor's violation of the prior agreement influenced the judge's decision.\textsuperscript{90}

The Supreme Court upheld the initial agreement, reasoning that plea bargaining was both an essential and desirable part of the criminal process.\textsuperscript{91} The Court listed the benefits of plea bargaining, noting that it leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for those accused persons who are denied release pending trial; it protects the

\textsuperscript{82} See id. at 758.
\textsuperscript{83} See id.
\textsuperscript{84} See 404 U.S. 257.
\textsuperscript{85} See id. at 263.
\textsuperscript{86} See id. at 258.
\textsuperscript{87} See id. at 258–59.
\textsuperscript{88} See id. at 259.
\textsuperscript{89} Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259. The judge noted that the prosecution's recommendation did not influence his decision. See id. at 259–60.
\textsuperscript{90} See id. at 262–63.
\textsuperscript{91} See id. at 261.
public from those who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pre-trial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.92

Thus, since the Court in Santobello thought that plea bargaining was such an essential component of the American criminal justice system, it held that defendants can claim specific performance of plea agreements offered by prosecutors.93

The Court examined the constitutionality of plea bargaining again in 1978, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.94 In Bordenkircher, the Court held that a prosecutor could charge a defendant with additional crimes once plea negotiations broke down, because the power to negotiate bargains is solely within the prosecutor's discretion.95 In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor offered the defendant a reduced sentence if he pleaded guilty on a charge of uttering a forged instrument (writing false checks).96 The prosecutor said, however, that if the defendant did not plead guilty, he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act that had a mandatory life sentence.97 The defendant refused to accept the prosecutor's offer, was found guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.98

On appeal, the defendant contended that the prosecutor's charge based on the Kentucky Habitual Offender Act was a vindictive action that violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights.99 The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and reasoned that the defendant had the same bargaining power as the state.100 The Court stated that there was no element of punishment or retaliation on the part of the prosecution because in the "give and take" of plea bargaining the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.101 The Court further added,

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92 Id.
93 See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262–63.
94 See 434 U.S. 357.
95 See id. at 363–65.
96 See id. at 358.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 358–59.
99 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 359–60.
100 See id. at 363–65.
101 See id. at 363.
a rigid constitutional rule that would prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his dealings with the defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so recently emerged.\(^\text{102}\)

Thus, the *Bordenkircher* Court held that it was not a due process violation for the prosecution to file additional charges against the defendant once plea negotiations broke down.\(^\text{103}\) Commentators maintain that the *Bordenkircher* decision provides the prosecution with broad discretion in plea bargaining.\(^\text{104}\) Specifically, the commentators note that although the Court could have required lower courts to be more intimately involved in the plea negotiation system, "[t]he *Bordenkircher* Court made it clear that the role of the prosecutor was preeminent in the criminal justice system."\(^\text{105}\)

IV. THE ACADEMIC DEBATE\(^\text{106}\)

The most frequently cited reason for maintaining the plea bargaining system is judicial efficiency.\(^\text{107}\) Without this method of case disposal, it is widely believed that courts could never address all the cases before them.\(^\text{108}\) Scholars contend that if plea bargaining were to be prohibited, courts throughout the nation would be forced to significantly enhance their infrastructure (both in terms of staffing and physical plant) resulting in astronomical costs to taxpayers.\(^\text{109}\) Proponents of plea bargaining also contend that it allows both prosecutors

\(^{102}\) Id. at 365.

\(^{103}\) See id. at 363–65.


\(^{105}\) Id.

\(^{106}\) Most of the debate concerning plea bargaining has centered around bargains where the defendant directly pleads guilty to a lesser sentence. Little if any of the literature has discussed plea bargaining within the context of inducing witness testimony. In theory, however, the two practices operate in a very similar manner: In both instances the prosecution attempts to reduce its case load through the use of bargaining and the defendant/witness gives away the right to trial in lieu of a reduced sentence or charge. Therefore, the literature is applicable to the type of plea bargaining discussed in this Note.

\(^{107}\) Numerous scholars have advanced this argument. For an interesting study of this judicial efficiency rationale, see Milton Heumann, *Plea Bargaining* 114 (1978); see also Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 *MICH. L. REV.* 463, 524 (1980); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 *U. Pa. L. REV.* 439, 440 (1971).

\(^{108}\) See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 107, at 524; Heumann, supra note 107, at 114–17; White, supra note 107, at 440.

\(^{109}\) Former Chief Justice Burger has argued that "a reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent
and defendants to save their judicial resources for more serious disputes.110 These proponents argue that by weeding out cases early on, courts can spend more time on those cases that require more extensive debate.111

Many advocates also contend that defendants receive significant benefits and protections from the plea bargaining system.112 First, defendants are able to avoid the cumbersome burden and public spotlight that modern trials entail.113 Defendants, by entering a plea, avoid the uncertainties and rigors associated with cross examination and leaving their fate to twelve unknown jurors.114 Secondly, plea bargaining enables defendants to avoid the excessive punishments that legislatures have assigned to crimes through the Sentencing Guidelines.115 This practice of plea bargaining allows prosecutors to charge defendants with lesser crimes and thus tailor the sentence to the offender by manipulating the charges brought.116

Plea bargaining advocates also contend that there are substantial safety mechanisms in plea bargaining that ensure that the defendant does not receive unfair deals.117 Among the most powerful of these mechanisms is the "market for bargains."118 If the prosecution offers an unfair bargain, the defendant always has the option of going to trial to get a "better deal."119 If, however, the prosecutor offers a "good deal," the defendant need not go to trial.120

Proponents of plea bargaining also maintain that the system is inevitable.121 These scholars point to the concept of implicit plea bar-

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110 For a general discussion, see Arenella, supra note 107, at 524; Heumann, supra note 107, at 114-17; White, supra note 107, at 440.
111 See id.
112 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
113 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
114 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
115 See Heumann, supra note 107, at 161.
116 See id.
118 See Easterbrook, supra note 117, at 297-98.
120 See Easterbrook, supra note 117, at 297-98; see generally Adelstein, supra note 119.
121 For a general discussion, see Heumann, supra note 107, at 157-62.
gaining where a defendant enters a guilty plea without participating in formal negotiations with the prosecution. Recognizing that many defendants enter guilty pleas implicitly believing they will receive a reduced sentence, proponents maintain that even if formal plea negotiations are abolished, bargaining would still occur. 122

Despite all of the positive attributes of plea bargaining, the vast majority of academics criticize the practice as it currently operates. 123 Perhaps the most cited criticism is that plea bargaining coerces defendants and denies them their Fifth Amendment rights. 124 Much of this criticism centers around the belief that innocent defendants will be forced to enter guilty pleas out of fear that they will be punished if they pursue their right to trial. 125 These critics also maintain that guilty defendants benefit from the plea bargaining system. 126 Rather than face trial, these defendants plead guilty to lesser charges than they would otherwise have been charged with and thus receive excessive and undeserved leniency. 127

Opponents also maintain that plea bargaining hinders respect for the justice system. 128 When legal defenses are turned into bargaining chips and guilty defendants are encouraged to accept lesser charges,
it is inevitable that there will be a loss of respect for the judicial system. In the sense that the court is an "omnipresent teacher" of American democracy, critics argue that plea bargaining teaches defendants to lie early on to receive lesser punishment. As a result, both innocent defendants and victims of crimes feel as if the system has failed them.

Another criticism of current plea bargaining practices is that too much discretion is placed in the hands of the prosecutor in deciding the fate of individual defendants. In plea bargaining, two distinct procedural processes are combined into one decision. Prosecutors decide not only what the defendant will be found guilty of, but also what sentence will be imposed, without judicial involvement. When all of this power is placed within the hands of one individual, critics maintain that the potential for prejudice and unequal treatment increases exponentially. In this sense, the trial process is good, in and of itself, as it allows two distinct procedures with judicial, and perhaps jury, involvement to ensure that a defendant's rights have not been violated. Opponents of plea bargaining also argue that the privacy of plea negotiations allows for collusion and corruption by prosecutors with improper motives. Unlike most judges, prosecutors are not motivated by finding what is a just outcome in a given case, but rather in most instances by attaining a winning record and appearing tough on crime.

The ad hoc nature of plea bargaining has also been the subject of criticisms. Because there are no official guidelines governing how

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129 See id.

130 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 458 (1928); see also Rosette & Cressey, supra note 128, at 175–80.


132 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65–68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.

133 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65–68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.

134 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65–68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.

135 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65–68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.

136 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65–68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.

137 See, e.g., Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123, at 50; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65–68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.

138 See generally Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123, at 65–68; Misner, supra note 104, at 717.

139 See, e.g., Misner, supra note 104, at 718.
and what prosecutors offer in their plea agreements, the predictability and regularity of knowing the punishment a defendant will receive for a specific crime is eliminated. Recognizing these and many other inherent defects in the modern practice of plea bargaining, scholars have advocated a variety of alternatives, ranging from the complete abolishment of plea bargaining to simple additions including more judicial involvement in the process.

V. United States v. Singleton

In the shadow of the Supreme Court's constitutional approval of plea bargaining and the intensive academic debate surrounding the topic, in June of 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Singleton. In Singleton, a three judge panel held that a prosecutor's plea bargain with a witness that provided leniency in exchange for his testimony against a co-defendant violated a federal statute governing bribery of witnesses. Sonya Singleton, a pregnant twenty-four year-old African American woman, was one of several defendants convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The charges arose out of an investigation by the Wichita Police who were suspicious of a number of Western Union wire transfers. The police soon discovered that these transfers were linked to men who were suspected of drug trafficking.

Singleton was identified as one of several women who had either sent or received wire transfers on behalf of the drug business. This case centered on Singleton's motion to suppress the testimony of a witness, Napoleon Douglas, during trial. Douglas was a fellow defendant, with an extensive criminal record, who had entered a plea agreement with the Assistant United States Attorney. This agreement contained three promises from the government. The prosecution first promised not to indict Douglas for any violations of the Drug Abuse

140 See, e.g., id.
141 See generally Alschuler, Alternatives, supra note 123; Alschuler, Prosecutor's Role, supra note 123, at 50; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner, supra note 104.
142 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999).
143 See id. at 1360–61.
144 Id. at 1343; see also Saunders, supra note 7, at 9.
145 See 144 F.3d at 1343.
146 See id.
147 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343–44.
148 See id. at 1344.
149 See id.
150 See id.
Prevention and Control Act. The prosecution next promised "to advise the sentencing court, prior to sentencing, of the nature and extent of the cooperation provided" by Douglas in accordance with U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 5K1.1. The court noted that Douglas believed this would result in a lesser sentence than one he might otherwise receive at trial. Finally, the prosecution promised to advise the Mississippi parole board of the assistance Douglas provided. In exchange for these promises, Douglas agreed to "testify truthfully in federal and/or state court" against the other defendants including Singleton.

The trial court denied Singleton’s motion to suppress Douglas’ testimony. She was subsequently convicted and sentenced to forty-six months in prison followed by three years of probation. Singleton appealed this conviction alleging that the trial court erred in not granting her motion to suppress Douglas’ testimony.

A. Statutory Basis for the Exclusion of Testimony

Contrary to previous defendants who had attempted to suppress co-conspirator plea bargained testimony based on the Fifth Amendment, Singleton’s argument was that the government’s agreement with Douglas was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), a federal bribery statute. Thus, the Singleton panel first assessed the statutory plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), which states that

whoever, . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

151 See id.
152 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
153 See id. at 1350-51.
154 See id. at 1344.
155 Id.
156 See id. at 1343.
157 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343.
158 See id.
159 See id. Ms. Singleton’s argument seems to be based in large part on an article by a former government prosecutor. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 21.
The court analyzed each portion of the statute recognizing that Congress specifically intended that "§ 201 is to be broadly construed to further its legislative purpose of deterring corruption."\textsuperscript{161}

The court first examined the class of persons to whom the statute applies.\textsuperscript{162} Noting the use of the word "whoever," the court analyzed whether the U.S. Attorney, who was acting for the government, fit within this definition.\textsuperscript{163} The U.S. Attorney cited \textit{Nardone v. United States}, where the United States Supreme Court decided that the government is presumptively exempted from complying with a statute in two instances.\textsuperscript{164} These two instances are: (1) when the statute would deny the sovereign an established prerogative title or interest (i.e. the right to prosecute criminals), and (2) when the statute, as applied, would create an absurdity for government actors (i.e. applying speed limit laws to a police officer pursuing a suspect.)\textsuperscript{165}

The \textit{Singleton} court determined that the first exemption, inherent government prerogative, did not apply because in \textit{Singleton} "the operation of law is upon agents or servants of the government rather than on the sovereign itself."\textsuperscript{166} The \textit{Singleton} court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. 201(c)(2) was enacted to prevent bribery and fraud and was applied

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Singleton}, 144 F.3d at 1345.

\textsuperscript{162} See id.

\textsuperscript{163} See id. at 1345-48.

\textsuperscript{164} See id. at 1345. In 1937, in \textit{Nardone v. United States}, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a federal statute governing the interception of wire communications was applicable to federal agents who used wire taps to listen to the phone conversations of suspected bootleggers. See 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937). In \textit{Nardone}, the defendants were charged with the smuggling and concealment of alcohol in violation of the Volstead Act. See id. at 380. At trial, federal agents testified to conversations they had overheard through tapping of the defendants' telephones. See \textit{id}. In appealing their subsequent conviction, the defendants argued that the agents' testimony should have been excluded because it was obtained illegally in violation of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. See \textit{id}. at 380-81. This statute stated: "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person." \textit{id} at 381. In deciding whether this statute was applicable to the government, the Court determined that there are two instances when a statute does not apply to government: (1) when the statute would deny the government a recognized or established title or interest; and (2) where the application to the government would be an obvious absurdity. See \textit{id}. at 383-84. The Court held that in deciding whether applying a statute to the government denies an established right or acts as an absurdity is a question "of policy." See \textit{id}. at 383. The Court went to great lengths to discuss the "moral" debate surrounding the general application of legislation, specifically prohibition of wiretapping, to government actors and noted that it is the "view of many that the practice [wiretapping] involves a grave wrong." \textit{id}. at 384. In applying these policy arguments, the \textit{Nardone} Court determined the wiretapping statute to be applicable to the government, stating that "the sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended to prevent injury and wrong." \textit{id}.

\textsuperscript{165} See \textit{Singleton}, 144 F.3d at 1345-46.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{id}. at 1346.
not to the government as an entity but rather to a government agent, namely the U.S. Attorney. Since the statute applied merely to a government agent, and not the government itself, the first Nardone exemption was inapplicable.

The court further reasoned that under the first Nardone exemption (government prerogative), there are two requirements. The first requirement is that the statute is being applied to the government. Once it is established that the statute is applied to the government, the second requirement is that the statute would deny the government an established right or prerogative. In this case, since the U.S. Attorney was merely an agent and not the government, the initial requirement of the first Nardone exemption was not met.

The judges in the panel, in a dissent to the en banc appeal, also stated that the second requirement of the Nardone government prerogative exemption was not met. The judges stated that since the statute applied merely to an agent of the United States, the government retained its power to prosecute criminals (its governmental prerogative). The judges reasoned that applying § 201(c)(2) would merely limit the manner by which the U.S. government's agent, the U.S. Attorney, could exercise the established governmental prerogative to prosecute criminals.

The Singleton panel also held that Nardone's second category of government exemption, the absurdity exemption, was inapplicable. In reviewing the concept of a limited sovereign from the Magna Carta to present day, the court determined that § 201(c)(2)'s anti-corruption policy has long been enforced by the common law. In articulating the policy of judicial integrity, the court stated,

\[
\text{[t]he judicial process is tainted and justice is cheapened when factual testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or money. Because prosecutors bear a weighty responsibility to}
\]

\[167 \text{ See id.}\]
\[168 \text{ See id.}\]
\[169 \text{ See id.}\]
\[170 \text{ See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.}\]
\[171 \text{ See id.}\]
\[172 \text{ See id.}\]
\[173 \text{ See id.}\]
\[174 \text{ See id.}\]
\[175 \text{ See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-48.}\]
\[176 \text{ See id. at 1346-47; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.}\]
do justice and observe the law in the course of a prosecution, it is particularly appropriate to apply the strictures of § 201(c)(2) to their activities.  

The Singleton panel thus concluded that applying § 201(c)(2) to government officials is far from absurd—rather, it is an essential component of the Anglo-American legal tradition.

After the court held that the statute applied to the U.S. Attorney, it next determined whether the promises made to Douglas were, as the statute requires, "for or because of" his testimony. The court noted that this requirement does not mandate a quid pro quo relationship, but rather that the promises motivate the testimony. The three judge panel found that, because the promises and testimony mutually induced each other in this case, the statute's requirement was met.

Finally, the panel examined the statutory requirement that the gift or promise be "something of value." It noted that objects of value are not restricted to things of monetary, commercial, objective or tangible value. The court further articulated that the test of value is whether the person receiving the object subjectively attaches value to it. In determining that Douglas valued the U.S. Attorney's promises, the court said that the promise not to prosecute was of great value to him: "besides guaranteed physical freedom, he was guaranteed freedom from the burden of defending himself and from the stigma of prosecution and conviction." Thus, the statutory requirement that the witness subjectively value the promise was met.

B. The Legislative History of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)

In quoting the House Report on § 201, the Singleton panel maintained that the "legislative history confirms Congress's purpose that giving or receiving anything of value by witnesses 'for' or 'because of' . . . testimony . . . should be prohibited." The panel noted that the majority of the debate concerning the bill was centered around new conflicts of interest provisions regulating government employees, in-

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177 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1347-48.
178 See id.
179 Id. at 1348.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1348-49.
183 See id. at 1349.
184 See id.
185 Id. at 1350.
186 Id. at 1352 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-748, at 16 (1961)).
cluding attorneys, and their private non-official actions. The Singleton panel also noted that most statements concerning the bill related to the general topic of government corruption and not specifically to the inducement of testimony in criminal trials.

Despite the general nature of the debate surrounding the statute, the panel stated that the legislative history also confirms the Senate's intent to hold the government to high ethical standards in its increasingly complicated realm of activities. In specifically addressing § 201(h) [now (c)(2)], the panel pointed to the Congressional Record which states that the amendments were not intended to "restrict the broad scope of the present bribery statutes as construed by the courts." Furthermore, the panel acknowledged that the House recognized that the exchange of testimony for something of value has "the appearance of evil and the capacity of serving as a cover for evil." Relying on both the policy of the general anti-corruption bill, as well as the specific language concerning the broad scope of the bribery provisions, the Singleton panel determined that its holding was consistent with Congress's express legislative intent.

The panel also examined the manner in which Congress structured § 201. It noted that Congress specifically divided the legislation into two provisions: bribery prohibitions and gratuity prohibitions. In examining this structure, the panel concluded that § 201(c)(2) is included under gratuity prohibitions and therefore does not require a corrupt intent to influence. Thus, the Singleton panel stated that the promise of leniency to Douglas did not have to be based upon any corrupt intent of the prosecutor to influence testimony. Rather, it was enough that the prosecutor made the promise of leniency and that Douglas subjectively valued it.

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188 See id. at 3853.
189 See id.
190 Id. The federal bribery statute was significantly altered to its present statutory language in 1962 as part of a Congressional attempt to root out graft within the government. See id. at 3852-68. This provision was originally codified as 18 U.S.C. § 201(h) but a 1986 amendment, which did not change any of the statutory language, re-codified the provision as 18 U.S.C. § 210(c)(2).
191 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1352.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 1351-52.
194 See id. at 1351.
195 See id.
196 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1351.
197 See id.
The panel also examined the language of the other § 201 provisions. It stated that in sharp contrast to § 201(c)(2), § 201(c)(1) expressly exempts the Executive Branch from its operation. In reviewing the language of “whoever” in (c)(2), the panel noted that the government exemption language is conspicuously absent, therefore pointing to Congress’s intent to apply the provision to government actors.

C. Law Enforcement Justifications for Exclusion

In addition to the previously discussed reasons, the panel also raised an issue sua sponte: namely whether some overriding policy should prevent application of this statute to the U.S. Attorney. For example, criminal prohibitions do not generally apply to reasonable enforcement actions by officers of the law. The court, however, rejected this argument because the promise of leniency was not made by a police officer acting in exigent circumstances to prevent a crime. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that “Once the exigencies of field enforcement are satisfied, we can find no policy by which prosecutors may be excused from statutes regulating testimony presented to the federal courts.”

D. Sentencing Guidelines

The court also discussed whether holding § 201(c)(2) applicable to the government runs contrary to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Section 5K1.1 of these guidelines provides reduced sentences to defendants who offer “substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” In holding that § 201(c)(2) and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are not contradictory, the panel determined that substantial assistance does not include testimony and that Congress enacted the sentencing provisions recognizing the illegality of giving anything of value for testimony. In maintaining that its decision would not impede federal

198 See id. at 1350–51.
199 See id. at 1350.
200 See id.
201 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1352.
202 See id. at 1353.
203 Id.
204 See id. at 1354–55; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n).
205 Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1354 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)).
206 See id. at 1355.
prosecutions and defeat the purpose of § 5K1.1, the court stated that "a defendant can substantially assist an investigation or prosecution in myriad ways other than by testifying." Although the panel maintained that substantial assistance could include a variety of other actions beyond merely testifying, it did not enumerate any other methods of assistance.

After establishing these points, the Singleton panel held that the federal bribery statute was applicable to the U.S. Attorney. The court reasoned that in promising the witness prosecutorial leniency in exchange for his testimony, the U.S. Attorney essentially bribed the witness and violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). Recognizing the impact that this decision might have upon other criminal prosecutions, the panel ordered that the appeal be reheard en banc, and that the opinion be vacated until the full panel decision.

VI. Singleton En Banc Decision

In January of 1999, with Judge Porfillo speaking for the majority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned the Singleton three judge panel’s decision. The en banc majority held that the federal prosecutor’s plea agreement with Douglas was not subject to 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2). Thus, the trial court properly denied Singleton’s motion to suppress the testimony.

The majority first reasoned that under the first Nardone exemption, § 201(c) (2) denied the government an established prerogative. The government, therefore, was presumptively exempt from adhering to the statute. The majority held that plea agreements between defendants and the United States Attorney were really agreements between the defendant and the United States government (not an agent of the government as the Singleton panel maintained) and thus met with the federal prosecutor's plea agreement.
the first requirement of the initial *Nardone* exemption.\(^{217}\) After establishing that the statute operated on the government, the court moved to the second requirement and held that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) denied the government of an established and long-standing right, namely the ability to prosecute criminal cases.\(^{218}\) Thus, because § 201(c)(2) both applied to the government and denied an established right, U.S. Attorneys were presumptively exempt from adhering to it when entering plea agreements under the first *Nardone* exemption.\(^{219}\)

Additionally, the majority held that under the second *Nardone* exemption, applying § 201(c)(2) to plea agreements would operate as an absurdity.\(^{220}\) The court reasoned that providing leniency for testimony is an established practice in American jurisprudence.\(^{221}\) It stated that "we must presume if Congress had intended that section 201(c)(2) overturn this ingrained aspect of American legal culture, it would have done so in clear, unmistakable, and unarguable language."\(^{222}\) Thus, the majority held that it would be absurd to apply this statute to the U.S. Attorney because the statute did not specifically mandate application to prosecutors entering plea agreements.\(^{223}\) It would be counter-intuitive to apply such a general statute as § 201(c)(2) to these plea agreements.\(^{224}\) The majority reasoned that if Congress had really intended to overturn this long standing practice, it would have said so using much clearer and specific language.\(^{225}\)

Furthermore, the majority stated that when § 201(c)(2) was enacted, Congress did not intend to limit prosecutors' ability to plea

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\(^{217}\) See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301. Reasoning that the government's sovereign authority to prosecute is vested solely in the United States Attorney, the court concluded that a criminal case can not even be heard unless a U.S. Attorney files a motion and begins prosecution. See id. The majority opined that the U.S. Attorney is the alter ego of the government and therefore "when an assistant U.S. Attorney enters into a plea agreement with a defendant, that plea agreement is between the United States government and the defendant." Id.

\(^{218}\) See id. at 1300–01.

\(^{219}\) See id.

\(^{220}\) See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301.

\(^{221}\) See id. at 1301–02.

\(^{222}\) Id. at 1302.

\(^{223}\) See id. at 1301–02.

\(^{224}\) See id.

bargain.\textsuperscript{226} The majority noted that the plain meaning of the term "whoever" in the statute does not logically mean the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{227} Quoting the Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the majority held that the term "whoever" means "whatever person" or "any person."\textsuperscript{228} Because the U.S. government is an inanimate object, the majority reasoned that Congress purposefully excluded the government from adherence to the statute.\textsuperscript{229} The majority stated that if Congress had intended the statute to apply to the government, the term "whatever" would have been used.\textsuperscript{230} Thus, applying § 201(c)(2) to prosecutors entering plea agreements would run contrary to Congress's intent.\textsuperscript{231}

Finally, the majority held that it was unnecessary to address the conflicts between § 201(c)(2) and other congressional enactments such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.\textsuperscript{232} The court stated, "we simply believe this particular statute [§ 201(c)(2)] does not exist for the government."\textsuperscript{233} Thus, by virtue of the \textit{Nardone} test for government exemption as well as Congress's intent to exempt prosecutors from § 201(c)(2), the court held that the practice of bargaining for testimony was not subject to the federal bribery statute.\textsuperscript{234}

In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Henry and Judge Lucero criticized the majority's reasoning.\textsuperscript{235} Concurring in the judgement that § 201(c)(2) did not apply to prosecutors entering plea agreements, Lucero and Henry maintained that the conflicts between § 201(c)(2) and other statutes are "dispositive" in allowing prosecutors to enter plea agreements.\textsuperscript{236} The concurring judges reasoned that subsequent statutes, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the federal immunity statutes, reveal a legislative intent to override § 201(c)(2) and permit the practice of bargaining for testimony.\textsuperscript{237}

These concurring judges maintained, however, that the majority misapplied the two \textit{Nardone} exemptions in the \textit{Singleton} case.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{226} See \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1300-01.
\textsuperscript{227} See \textit{id.} at 1300 (quoting \textit{WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY} 2611 (1993)).
\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{229} See \textit{id.} at 1300-01.
\textsuperscript{230} See \textit{id.} at 1300.
\textsuperscript{231} See \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1300-01.
\textsuperscript{232} See \textit{id.} at 1302.
\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{234} See \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{235} See \textit{id.} at 1303-08.
\textsuperscript{236} See \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1303.
\textsuperscript{237} See \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{238} See \textit{id.} at 1304-05.
ing the first *Nardone* exemption (government prerogative), the concur-
currence maintained that this exemption only applied where “the
operation of the law is upon the sovereign itself rather than the agents
or servants of the government.”

The concurring judges thus dis-
agreed with the majority’s holding that the U.S. Attorney was the
government and that § 201(c) (2) would deny the government a pre-
rogative. These judges reasoned that because § 201(c) (2) operated
merely on government agents and not the sovereign itself, the govern-
ment prerogative exemption was inapplicable. Furthermore, the con-
curring judges determined that the second *Nardone* exemption (obvi-
ous absurdity) did not apply in *Singleton.*

They held that “the major-
ity’s holding itself worked an obvious absurdity by implying that
a federal prosecutor who bribes a witness to supply false testimony is
not subject to the criminal prohibitions of § 201.”

Although the concurring judges stated that the majority misap-
plied the two *Nardone* exemptions, they maintained that prosecutors
entering plea agreements are nonetheless exempt from adhering to
§ 201(c) (2). In coming to this conclusion, these judges noted that it
is an elementary tenant of statutory construction that “where there is
no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled
or nullified by a general one." Thus, they reasoned that subsequent
congressional provisions overruled the general prohibitions of
§ 201(c) (2). The concurrence pointed to specific statutes including
the federal immunity statutes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and noted,

these various statutes create both a substantive and proce-
dural framework for bargaining between government agents
and potential witnesses. The result is a coherent, narrowly
defined set of laws that operate in the same field as the more
general prohibitions of § 201(c) (2) . . . [and therefore these

239 Id. at 1304.
240 See id. at 1304–05.
241 See *Singleton*, 165 F.3d 1304–05.
242 Id. at 1304. In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Judge Henry said that the application
of state codes of professional ethics, an issue not addressed by either the majority nor this Note,
is an issue of extreme importance. See id. at 1302–03. Noting recent federal legislation holding
federal prosecutors to state standards of professional conduct, Judge Henry opined that the issue
raised in this case is “a problem that may arise again.” *Id.*
243 See id. at 1305–08.
244 *Singleton*, 165 F.3d at 1305.
245 See id. at 1305–08.
general prohibitions] must give way, insofar as it would pro-
hibit that which the narrow statutes would allow.\textsuperscript{246}

The dissent in the \textit{Singleton} en banc decision, the same three
judges who sat on the original panel, continued to maintain that plea
agreements offering leniency for testimony are prohibited under
§ 201.\textsuperscript{247} The dissent reasoned that these agreements violated § 201’s
policy of preventing inducements to provide false and misleading tes-
mimony.\textsuperscript{248} The dissent stated that § 201 is applicable to federal prose-
cutors, and that the statute does not contradict subsequent congres-
sional statutes such as the Sentencing Guidelines.\textsuperscript{249}

The dissent maintained that the statutory plain meaning of the
word “whoever” as well as the statute’s construction indicated the
legislature’s intent to apply § 201 to the government.\textsuperscript{250} The dissent
argued that the statute did not restrict any government prerogative. It
reasoned that § 201 did not affect the government’s core prerogative
to prosecute or to withhold prosecution. “It le [ft] unfettered the sov-
ereign’s established prerogative to charge; it merely place[d] a restric-
tion on one method of gathering admissible evidence.”\textsuperscript{251}

In addressing whether the application of § 201 to plea agreements
contradicts subsequent statues, the dissent examined the substantial
assistance language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.\textsuperscript{252} It noted that neither source uses
the word “testimony” to define manners of providing substantial assis-
tance.\textsuperscript{253} The dissent conceded that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
do provide a sentence reduction for truthful testimony.\textsuperscript{254} The dissent
noted, however, that this rule contemplates rewarding a defendant
only after the testimony is given and not offering or extending leniency
in advance of testimony as an inducement.\textsuperscript{255}

The dissent also maintained that “much of this case has been
about policy.”\textsuperscript{256} They noted that their constitutional duty was to apply
the statute’s plain meaning.\textsuperscript{257} Thus, the dissenting judges said that “if

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{246} \textit{Id.} at 1307.
\item \textsuperscript{247} \textit{See id.} at 1308.
\item \textsuperscript{248} \textit{See id.} at 1308-09.
\item \textsuperscript{249} \textit{See Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1312-13.
\item \textsuperscript{250} \textit{See id.} at 1310-11.
\item \textsuperscript{251} \textit{Id.} at 1311.
\item \textsuperscript{252} \textit{See id.} at 1311-13.
\item \textsuperscript{253} \textit{See id.} at 1312.
\item \textsuperscript{254} \textit{See Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1312.
\item \textsuperscript{255} \textit{See id.} at 1312-13.
\item \textsuperscript{256} \textit{Id.} at 1309.
\item \textsuperscript{257} \textit{See id.} at 1309-10.
\end{itemize}
the balance struck by § 201 is to be re-weighed, that re-weighing should be done by the policymaking branch of the government—the Congress, and not the courts.\textsuperscript{258}

\section*{VII. Legislative Action}

While the \textit{Singleton} panel decision was still awaiting an en banc hearing before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Senator Kohl of Vermont introduced a bill in Congress to limit the impact of its potential as precedent.\textsuperscript{259} Introduced before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on July 15, 1998, the Effective Prosecution and Public Safety Act was aimed at preventing defendants from using § 201(c)(2) to suppress the testimony of "government turned witnesses."\textsuperscript{260} The bill sought to amend 18 U.S.C § 201 by inserting the following clause:

\begin{quote}
(a) IN GENERAL—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in section 201 of title 18, United States Code, or any other provision of law, shall be construed to prohibit any otherwise lawful giving, promising, or offering by a prosecutor of leniency, witness protection, or any other thing of value
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{258} Id. at 1310.
\textsuperscript{259} S. 2311, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). In fact, prior to the Congressional hearings on the bill, two federal district courts in 1998 cited the \textit{Singleton} three judge panel decision as authority to exclude witness bargained testimony. See \textit{United States v. Fraguela}, 1998 WL 560352 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998); \textit{United States v. Lowery}, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 1998). In \textit{Lowery}, Judge Zloch of the Southern District of Florida excluded the testimony of three co-conspirators in a drug case because of their plea agreement with the prosecution. See 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1360. Citing the exact rationale of the \textit{Singleton} court, Judge Zloch maintained that the federal prosecutor purchased the testimony of a co-defendant through his promise of leniency. See id. at 1359–60. He reasoned that the witness, therefore, had good reason to falsify his testimony in order to please the prosecutor. See id. at 1359. Judge Zloch, commenting on judicial activism, stated that "if any changes are to be made to § 201(c)(2) . . . it is solely for Congress, and not for the courts or the Executive Branch to make them." \textit{Id.} at 1360.

In \textit{Fraguela}, Justice Berrigan of the Eastern District of Louisiana also followed the holding of \textit{Singleton}. See 1998 WL 560352 at *1–2. In that case, Justice Berrigan granted a new trial for a defendant who argued that several witnesses that testified against him because of the prosecution's plea agreement, violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). See id. Justice Berrigan noted "[t]o find § 201(c)(2) inapplicable to the prosecution, just gives the prosecution yet another powerful weapon that is not shared by the defense for no, frankly, logical reason." \textit{Id.} at *2. Despite these two courts adopting the \textit{Singleton} panel rationale, federal district courts throughout the nation have expressly rejected the \textit{Singleton} panel's reasoning. See, e.g., \textit{United States v. Guillaume}, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 1998); \textit{United States v. Reid}, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538 (E.D. Va. 1998); \textit{United States v. Eisenhardt}, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521 (D. Md. 1998). Most of these courts focused on the \textit{Nardone} precedent and maintained that the government is presumptively exempt from adherence to U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). See, e.g., \textit{id.}

within the reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in exchange for the testimony of any person, including any—

(1) offer or grant of immunity for prosecution;

(2) offer to advise a court or parole board of the extent of the cooperation by the person with the prosecutor, or any advice so given; or

(3) plea bargain agreement.261

In introducing this bill, Senator Kohl stated that the Singleton three judge panel ruling is “simply a case of Scalia-ism taken to the extreme, beyond the bounds of common sense and in the face of established practices. I cannot believe that even Justice Scalia, the high priest of literalism, would agree with this result.”262 Kohl maintained that the potential for courts to follow the Singleton panel decision is too great for the legislature to wait for the Supreme Court to make a decision, as “jailhouse lawyers are probably foaming at the mouth anticipating making this argument in courts all over the nation.”263 At the close of the 105th Congress, however, the bill remained in the Senate Judiciary Committee and there had been no floor action taken on the proposal.264

VIII. THE FUTURE OF WITNESS-BARGAINED AGREEMENTS

In analyzing the impact of Singleton, it is significant to note that the Tenth Circuit’s decision was based purely upon a federal bribery statute and not on any constitutional provision.265 Thus, the central issues in this case center around: (1) whether the application of § 201(c)(2) would either deny the U.S. government of an established prerogative or operate as an obvious absurdity, and (2) whether Congress ever intended § 201(c)(2) to apply to witness bargained agreements.266 When closely examined, it seems clear that § 201(c)(2) does not operate as an absurdity nor does it deprive the U.S. government of an established prerogative.267 It does, however, appear that Congress, through various enactments including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, intended to exclude prosecutors entering plea agreements from

262 See Statements on S. 2311, supra note 260.
263 Id.
265 See 144 F.3d 1346, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
266 See id. at 1345–48; see also Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301–02 (10th Cir. 1999).
267 See 144 F.3d at 1345–48; see also 165 F.3d at 1304–05 (Lucero, J., concurring).
adherence to § 201(c)(2). Based on this reasoning, it is likely that the United States Supreme Court will determine that § 201(c)(2) does not bar witness bargained plea agreements.

The Singleton case does, however, offer both Congress and the Supreme Court the opportunity to readdress the policy issues surrounding plea bargaining. Recognizing the differences between the policies the Supreme Court addressed in cases such as Brady, Santobello and Bordenkircher, the Singleton case provides an excellent opportunity for Congress to address several defects in the modern plea bargaining system. Paramount among these defects are the problems associated with broad prosecutorial discretion.

A. Government Prerogative

Under the first Nardone exemption, the U.S. government is presumptively exempt from adhering to any statute when its application would deny the government of an established right or prerogative. As the Singleton panel noted, the government must satisfy two requirements in order to qualify for this initial exemption. The first requirement mandates the court to determine whether the U.S. Attorney, when acting in an official capacity, is acting as the government or merely as the government’s agent. If the U.S. Attorney is found to be an agent of the government and not the sovereign itself, then the statute will be treated as applying to the U.S. Attorney himself. As such, the statute will not deny the government an established right and the second requirement need not be addressed.

If, however, the U.S. Attorney is deemed to be the sovereign itself, the court must move to the second requirement and determine whether the statute denies the government of a long established prerogative or right. While the Singleton majority maintains that the U.S. Attorney is for all intents and purposes the government while prosecuting criminal cases, the dissent’s opinion that the prosecution is merely an agent or servant of the sovereign seems more logical.

268 The Singleton concurrence made this argument. See 165 F.3d at 1306-07.
271 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
272 See id.
273 See id.; see also Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
274 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
275 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1300-02.
276 See id. at 1300-01; supra note 217 and accompanying text.
277 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
As the dissent argued, if federal prosecutors are held to be the government itself rather than agents, than all other government employees representing the sovereign should also be deemed the government itself. The majority maintains that it is logical to deem prosecutors the government since criminal prosecutions (an established government right) can not commence unless a prosecutor is involved. Following this same logic, all law enforcement officers, including the local beat cop, should be considered the government, since the criminal law can not be enforced without their direct involvement. If all of these officers are considered "alter egos" of the government, however, then where is the line of government authority to be drawn? It would simply be too unwieldy to consider so many of these individuals the government.

Furthermore, if all of these employees are deemed the sovereign and are therefore presumptively exempt from adhering to a statute, the government prerogative exemption would be extremely broad, encompassing millions of individuals across a broad spectrum of activities. This broad government exemption, however, is contrary to our constitutional notions of limited government and the idea that those who enforce the law are also subject to its rigors. In order to prevent broadening the scope of the government exemption to all these individuals, therefore, it seems unlikely that the U.S. Supreme Court will determine that federal prosecutors are the government itself. Thus, the government prerogative exemption does not exempt federal prosecutors from adhering to § 201(c)(2).

Even if the Supreme Court were to decide that the U.S. Attorney was the sovereign itself and not merely its agent, it seems logical that applying § 201(c)(2) to plea negotiations would not deny any established prerogative under the second requirement of the Nardone government prerogative exemption. As the dissenting and concurring justices in the Singleton appeal persuasively argue, plea bargaining is not a long-standing government right. Although the ability to prose-

278 See id.
279 See id. at 1299-1300.
280 The judges in the Singleton concurrence also made this point. See id. at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
281 See id. at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
282 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
283 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346.
284 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
285 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
286 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
287 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
cute, or conversely not to prosecute, is an established government practice dating back to the earliest developments of the common law, the practice of plea bargaining was not constitutionally sanctioned until the late 1970s. The fact that the Supreme Court officially condemned the practice as late as the Civil War proves that, at best, plea bargaining is a century-old concept. To argue otherwise would be a distortion of constitutional history. Thus, because plea bargaining is essentially a modern practice, it can not be an established government right.

Although it is undeniable that entering plea negotiations is a legitimate exercise of state authority, it is by no means a vested prerogative to which there are no limitations. While the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher sanctioned broad prosecutorial discretion in plea negotiations, the Court has not left the practice completely unregulated. The Court has enforced some limitations on plea bargaining including the requirement of final judicial approval on all pleas entered, as well as on any sentence imposed. Thus, the dissenting opinion in Singleton that argues that the government right to prosecute is conceptually different from the power to enter plea bargains seems persuasive. The former is a government prerogative, while the latter is merely a means of achieving that end. The U.S. Attorney, therefore, is not exempt from adhering to § 210(c)(2). To hold otherwise and allow prosecutors to use any method, however dubious, in achieving the legitimate end of prosecuting criminals seems disjointed from modern constitutional practice.

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288 See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 751; see also Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46, at 239-40; Langbein, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 55, at 262.
290 See 165 F.3d at 1311-12 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346-47.
291 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b); Misner, supra note 104, at 754-55.
292 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b); Misner, supra note 104, at 754-55.
293 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
294 See 165 F.3d at 1311 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
295 See id.
296 See id.
297 In fact, if one closely studies late twentieth century jurisprudence in criminal procedure, the Supreme Court has severely limited the government's ability to interrogate, induce confessions and search an individual's person and property. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding police must inform suspects of right to silence and counsel before an interrogation may proceed); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding custodial interrogation must cease once right to counsel has been invoked); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1968) (holding suspect must be advised of right to counsel before an interrogation may proceed). The Court has found these activities to be dubious means in achieving the legitimate end of enforcing the criminal law. See id. Although the current court has made significant cutbacks
B. Obvious Absurdity

Under the second Nardone exemption, the U.S. Attorney would be exempt from adhering to § 201(c)(2) if the application of the statute would operate as an obvious absurdity. As the concurring justices in the Singleton en banc decision persuasively argued, applying this statute to federal prosecutors entering plea agreements is far from being absurd. While the majority infers that the historic use of plea bargaining in criminal prosecutions makes the application of § 201(c)(2) absurd, they fail to develop a detailed analysis of this statement. Although they point to a series of cases interpreting the Singleton panel’s decision, the majority does not provide any other specific reason why applying § 201 would be absurd and merely opines that “if Congress had intended that § 201(c)(2) overturn this ingrained aspect of American legal culture [plea bargaining], it would have done so in clear, unmistakable, and unarguable language.”

The majority’s reasoning on this point is problematic. First, § 201(c)(2) was enacted decades before the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of plea bargaining. Thus, Congress was not considering, nor did it ever envision, the implications § 201(c)(2) would have on plea bargaining when the statute was drafted. More convincing, however, is the concurring opinion which maintains that by exempting prosecutors from adherence to the statute, the court “impl[ies] that a federal prosecutor who bribes [with monetary inducements] a witness to supply false testimony is not subject to the criminal prohibitions of § 201.” To argue that federal prosecutors who bribe witnesses with money are exempt from adhering to § 201(c)(2) is problematic because Congress’s very intent in enacting the statute was to root out bribery and corruption within government. Furthermore, it is preposterous to contend that, “in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means.” Thus, the fundamental concept to these Warren Court innovations, it seems unlikely that they will completely overturn these established limits of government and law enforcement authority.

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298 See Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384.
299 See Singleton, 165 F.3d 1304-05 (Lucero, J., concurring).
300 See id. at 1301.
301 See id.
302 Id. at 1302.
303 See generally Brady, 397 U.S. 758; see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2).
305 Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring).
307 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1947.
of limited government, dating back to the Magna Carta, holds that even those charged with upholding the law are subject to its rigors.\textsuperscript{308} Federal prosecutors entering plea agreements are therefore subject to the provisions of § 201(c)(2) and prohibited from providing inducements for testimony.\textsuperscript{309} To hold otherwise is an absurdity that defies centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudential thought.\textsuperscript{310}

C. Congressional Intent in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

Although the two \textit{Nardone} exemptions do not provide a government exemption from adherence to § 201(c)(2), subsequent congressional enactments such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the federal immunity statutes provide a limited exception.\textsuperscript{311} These laws point to a specific congressional intent to override the application of § 201(c)(2) to prosecutors entering plea agreements for testimony.\textsuperscript{312} Simply stated, prosecutors are no longer governed by § 201(c)(2), but rather by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the federal immunity statutes.\textsuperscript{313}

It is significant to note that the general provisions of § 201(c)(2) were written decades before the Court specifically condoned the practice of plea bargaining.\textsuperscript{314} Thus, the concurring justices’ statement that “where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,” is applicable.\textsuperscript{315} An example of a specific statutory scheme overriding § 201(c)(2) is the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.\textsuperscript{316} Section 5K1.1 of these guidelines provides for a reduction in sentence if a defendant offers “substantial assistance” in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.\textsuperscript{317} Although the dissenting \textit{Singleton} justices contend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not override § 201(c)(2) and that

\textsuperscript{308} See generally Coquillette, \textit{supra} note 1, at 37–42; see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346–47.
\textsuperscript{309} See generally Coquillette, \textit{supra} note 1, at 37–42; see also Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1346–47.
\textsuperscript{311} See \textit{FED. R. CRIM. P.} 11(e); 18 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1994); \textit{see supra} notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{312} See \textit{FED. R. CRIM. P.} 11(e); 18 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1994); \textit{see supra} notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{313} See \textit{FED. R. CRIM. P.} 11(e); 18 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 6003(a); \textit{see also} Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1305–07 (Lucero, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{314} See generally \textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. 742; \textit{see also} 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)(1994).
\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1305 (Lucero, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{316} \textit{See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL} § 5K1.1 (1994).
\textsuperscript{317} \textit{See id.}
substantial assistance can be provided in various other ways, including only providing testimony after the entering of their own guilty plea and not before, this argument is problematic. First, to maintain that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines only purport to provide leniency after a witness has entered his own guilty plea, and not before hand, falsely assumes that agreeing to testify will not be motivated by a desire for a decreased sentence. As the facts in the Singleton case illustrate, when a criminal defendant, particularly a habitual criminal, is confronted with the prospect of significant jail time, it is naive to assume that a potential offer for a reduced sentence will not motivate his willingness to testify, regardless of its timing.

Secondly, with the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that provide a specific framework on how defendants can receive reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony, it is unrealistic to believe that Congress was still applying the general provisions of § 201(c)(2). Congress was obviously envisioning the practice of providing leniency for testimony when it enacted the Guidelines. Section 201(c)(2), therefore, does not prevent U.S. Attorneys from entering these plea agreements.

D. Plea Bargaining Policy

Despite the improbability that the Supreme Court will overturn the Tenth Circuit en banc decision and apply § 201(c)(2) to federal prosecutors, the Singleton case presents an excellent opportunity for both the Supreme Court and Congress to readdress the policy issues surrounding plea bargaining. Based on Congressional reaction to the Singleton three judge panel decision, the issue of bargaining for testimony is obviously a topic of concern for politicians and the law enforcement community. Thus, even if the Supreme Court is unwilling to readdress this issue, Congress should act upon Senator Kohl’s Effective Prosecution and Public Safety Act and seriously consider whether plea bargaining policies justify the granting of leniency to conspirators willing to testify.
In the United States Supreme Court decisions upholding the validity of plea bargaining, the central issue was whether the practice of plea bargaining unconstitutionally coerced defendants into pleading guilty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.\(^{325}\) Although in several landmark decisions (including \textit{Miranda} and \textit{Escobedo}) the Court has held that coerced confessions are constitutionally impermissible because they are inherently unreliable, the Court has refused to find guilty pleas unreliable in the realm of plea bargaining.\(^{326}\) As \textit{Brady} and its progeny illustrate, the Court has found mutual advantages in the plea bargaining system.\(^{327}\) While the judicial system benefits from prompt case disposition, defendants are able to avoid the rigors and uncertainties of trial and receive punishments more tailored to their crimes.\(^{328}\) As a result of these mutual advantages, the Court has held that plea bargaining does not unconstitutionally coerce defendants into pleading guilty.\(^{329}\)

In contrast, the \textit{Singleton} three judge panel and dissent recognized that witness-bargained testimony is unreliable.\(^{330}\) Similar to coerced confessions, providing leniency for testimony has the potential for encouraging false testimony.\(^{331}\) Motivated by a desire to avoid punishment, co-conspirators have incentive to embellish stories about other defendants in order to gain favorable prosecutorial treatment.\(^{332}\) Although the Court has found the unreliability argument opposing plea bargaining unpersuasive,\(^{333}\) witness-bargained agreements present a different policy issue than those previously addressed by the Court. When a defendant is convicted because of testimony from a witness who has entered a plea agreement, the mutual benefits of the plea bargaining system cease to exist for that defendant. Although the witness who has received leniency receives a benefit from the bargain, the defendant does not. In fact, the defendant is confronted with the obstacle of proving his or her own innocence as well as undermining the credibility of a witness against him or her.\(^{334}\)

\(^{325}\) See generally \textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. 742; see also \textit{Bordenkircher}, 434 U.S. 357; \textit{Santobello}, 404 U.S. 257.

\(^{326}\) See generally \textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. 742; see also \textit{Miranda}, 384 U.S. 436; \textit{Escobedo}, 978 U.S. 478.

\(^{327}\) See \textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. at 752; see also \textit{Bordenkircher}, 434 U.S. at 363.

\(^{328}\) See \textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. at 752.

\(^{329}\) See \textit{id}.

\(^{330}\) See \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1313–14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also \textit{Singleton}, 144 F.3d at 1350.

\(^{331}\) See \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1313–14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also \textit{Singleton}, 144 F.3d at 1350.

\(^{332}\) See \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1313–14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also \textit{Singleton}, 144 F.3d at 1350.

\(^{333}\) See generally \textit{Brady}, 397 U.S. 742; see also \textit{Bordenkircher}, 434 U.S. 357; \textit{Santobello}, 404 U.S. 257.

\(^{334}\) See \textit{Singleton}, 165 F.3d at 1313–14 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
argument that the Court has used to justify the reliability of plea bargaining, therefore, does not apply in this context since the mutual benefits are lost.335

Although the judicial economy rationale for plea bargaining remains valid in the leniency for testimony context,336 the negative aspects of plea bargaining take on increased significance. Paramount among these is a loss of judicial integrity.337 First, a defendant is potentially exposed to false testimony that is cloaked with the power and majesty of the U.S. government leading many jurors to presumptively believe its validity.338 In addition, a guilty conspirator receives favorable treatment merely because the prosecutor was able to strike a better bargain with him or her than with the defendant.339 In this sense, the judicial system is reduced to a bartering system wherein whoever is willing to confess earlier and tell the better story can purchase favorable treatment.340 Although critics maintain that providing leniency for testimony has deep historical roots dating back at least to the post-Civil War period, it is difficult to deny that the ability to purchase favorable prosecutorial treatment runs contrary to our notions of American justice as articulated in the Magna Carta.341

It is equally difficult to ignore, however, that many in the law enforcement community find the ability to offer leniency for testimony an essential tool for solving crimes.342 As the Supreme Court said in Mandujano, providing leniency for testimony is essential to the effective enforcement of various criminal statutes.343 Presented with this practical reality, it seems clear that the practice of bargaining for testimony is a necessary evil in modern criminal practice.344

Confronted with this, perhaps the best course of action Congress can pursue in attempting to balance the realities of modern criminal practice with the due process and fairness concerns of criminal defendants is to limit prosecutorial discretion in witness-bargained agree-

335 See id.
337 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
340 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 117; Adelstein, supra note 119.
341 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1313-14 (Kelly, J., dissenting); see generally Alschuler, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 46; Langbein, Plea Bargaining History, supra note 55; Wishingrad, supra note 46.
342 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446; Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576.
343 See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 575-76.
344 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446; Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576.
ments.\textsuperscript{545} Although the Supreme Court has advocated broad prosecutorial discretion in cases like \textit{Bordenkircher}, the \textit{Singleton} case provides an excellent example of a fact situation that challenges the wisdom of broad discretion.\textsuperscript{546} Why did the U.S. Attorney choose to strike a bargain with Douglas, a man with an extensive criminal background, rather than Singleton, a woman without any previous criminal record? In fact, Douglas had the most incentive to enter an agreement because he was faced with the potential of significant jail time under the habitual criminal statute.\textsuperscript{547} Because of this, Douglas also had the incentive to embellish his story or lie about Singleton's involvement. Although Singleton retained the right to cross-examine Douglas, once he was cloaked with the power of the United States government, Singleton faced an uphill battle in order to discredit Douglas' potentially embellished story.\textsuperscript{548}

By limiting prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining, the potential corruption and collusion from backroom deals as well as excessive and undeserved leniency can be avoided.\textsuperscript{549} By simply limiting the persons with whom prosecutors can deal and limiting the offers that can be made, it is less likely that an innocent defendant will be convicted based on false testimony from a witness seeking favor with the prosecutor.\textsuperscript{550} With clearer guidelines governing the persons with whom prosecutors can deal, individuals such as Singleton could avoid being unjustly convicted merely because a co-defendant wanted to avoid extensive jail time and was, therefore, willing to give potentially untruthful information to the prosecutor. By prohibiting prosecutors from making deals with habitual criminals like Douglas, defendants will have protection from those individuals who have proven their untrustworthiness through consistent criminal behavior.\textsuperscript{551}

In addition, by limiting what prosecutors can offer for testimony, courts can prevent undeserved offers of grossly lenient sentences to witnesses.\textsuperscript{552} As noted earlier, these offers for extremely lenient sen-

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\textsuperscript{545} See generally Alschuler, \textit{Changing Debate}, supra note 123; Gilford, \textit{supra} note 123; Misner, \textit{supra} note 104.
\textsuperscript{546} See 434 U.S. at 357; see also Saunders, \textit{supra} note 7, at 9.
\textsuperscript{547} See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1344.
\textsuperscript{548} See generally Dinell, \textit{supra} note 7; Saunders, \textit{supra} note 7, at 9.
\textsuperscript{549} See generally Alschuler, \textit{Changing Debate}, \textit{supra} note 123; Gilford, \textit{supra} note 123; Misner, \textit{supra} note 104.
\textsuperscript{550} See generally Alschuler, \textit{Changing Debate}, \textit{supra} note 123; Gilford, \textit{supra} note 123; Misner, \textit{supra} note 104.
\textsuperscript{551} See generally Alschuler, \textit{Changing Debate}, \textit{supra} note 123; Gilford, \textit{supra} note 123; Misner, \textit{supra} note 104.
\textsuperscript{552} See generally Alschuler, \textit{Changing Debate}, \textit{supra} note 123; Gilford, \textit{supra} note 123; Misner, \textit{supra} note 104.
tences provide a tremendous incentive to provide false and damaging testimony.\textsuperscript{353} If prosecutors were given guidelines, similar to the current Sentencing Guidelines, detailing the lowest sentence that can be offered for a given crime, courts could insure that witnesses do not receive excessive and undeserved leniency as a result of striking a bargain with the prosecutor.\textsuperscript{354} At the same time, defendants would have increased protection from potentially false or misleading testimony.

CONCLUSION

Although the initial Singleton three judge panel decision sent shock waves throughout the legal community, the Tenth Circuit's en banc reversal has calmed many critics' fears. While it is questionable whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari, the policy questions which the case has brought to the surface have shed a different light on the academic debate surrounding plea bargaining. The Singleton three judge panel has forced many attorneys to examine whether, in fact, the practice of providing leniency for testimony is bribery in violation of § 201(c)(2).\textsuperscript{355}

The Singleton en banc majority's ruling that prosecutors entering plea agreements are presumptively exempt from adhering to § 201(c)(2) because the statute denies the government an established right, however, evidences the Tenth Circuits' opinion that the practice is not government sanctioned bribery.\textsuperscript{356} Although the majority's application of the government prerogative exemption and its holding that prosecutors are exempt from adhering to § 201(c)(2) may be incorrect, the concurring judges' opinion that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines clearly and specifically sanction the practice of providing leniency for testimony seems accurate.\textsuperscript{357} As the concurring judges recognize, Congress has expressed a specific intent to permit witness bargained agreements and, therefore, U.S. Attorneys are exempted from adhering to § 201(c)(2).\textsuperscript{358}

\textsuperscript{353} See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner, supra note 104; see also supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{354} See generally Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 123; Gilford, supra note 123; Misner, supra note 104.

\textsuperscript{355} See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1361.

\textsuperscript{356} See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1301–02.

\textsuperscript{357} See id. at 1305–07 (Lucero, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{358} See id.
Despite these specific congressional enactments that seem to trump the general provisions of § 201(c)(2), one cannot deny that the practice of witness plea bargaining presents distinct policy issues from those the Court has discussed in Brady and its progeny. Although the judicial efficiency arguments and the realities of criminal practice suggest a legitimate practical need for witness-bargained testimony, the mutuality of benefits rationale for plea bargaining lacks merit for defendants convicted because of witness-bargained testimony. As discussed earlier, a defendant convicted as a result of witness-bargained testimony does not receive a benefit, but rather is confronted with potentially false and damaging testimony.

Recognizing this, the Court must confront a new dilemma—do the merits of judicial efficiency and economy outweigh the fairness arguments of those who are convicted through the use of bargained testimony? For now, the Tenth Circuit has answered this question in the affirmative. Perhaps the time has come to reassess both the scholarly debate concerning the benefits of plea bargaining in the realm of witness-bargained agreements and the alternatives that have been suggested including the limitation of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining. Unless the Supreme Court or Congress takes further action on this issue, however, the Singleton panel’s “warning shot” that was originally heralded as the beginning of the end of plea bargaining remains nothing more than a false alarm.

JAMES P. DOWDEN

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359 See supra notes 325–51 and accompanying text.
360 See supra notes 356–41 and accompanying text.
361 See supra notes 325–48 and accompanying text.
362 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1302.
363 Numerous scholars have proposed alternatives to plea bargaining. For some interesting viewpoints, see Alschuler, Alternatives, supra note 123; Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 123 at 50; Arenella, supra note 107; Gilford, supra note 123, at 37; White, supra note 107.