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Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis

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BOARD TO DEATH: HOW BUSY DIRECTORS COULD CAUSE THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS

JEREMY C. KRESS

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Abstract: In the aftermath of the Great Recession, shareholders and regulators expect financial institution boards of directors to play an active role in risk management. To date, however, shareholders, policymakers, and academics have ignored a critical shortcoming: the directors of the United States’ largest financial institutions are too busy to fulfill their governance responsibilities. Many financial institution directors hold full-time executive positions, and most serve on the board of at least one other company. Although these outside commitments provide important learning and networking opportunities, they also contribute to cognitive overload and limit the time that directors spend assessing strategy and risk. This Article argues that overcommitted directors impair the governance of large financial institutions. These firms, by virtue of their complexity and systemic importance, require enhanced risk monitoring that busy directors are ill-equipped to provide. Nonetheless, the boards of many large financial institutions remain alarmingly overcommitted. Through a series of case studies—including Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts scandal and JPMorgan’s London Whale trades—this Article explores how busy directors inhibit oversight of management, increase the risk of firm failure, and could cause the next financial crisis. This Article proposes a series of reforms to alleviate director overcommitment and thereby enhance the stability of the financial system.

INTRODUCTION

The winter of 2012 was a busy time for James Crown. As the lead independent director of Sara Lee Corporation,1 Crown began the year by con-
ducting a search to replace Sara Lee’s CEO and overseeing a spin-off of half of Sara Lee’s business lines. Meanwhile, defense contractor General Dynamics Corporation—where Crown also served as lead independent director—was scrambling to cope with $1 trillion in congressionally mandated defense budget cuts. At the same time, Crown—the grandson of a wealthy industrialist—managed stakes in the Chicago Bulls, New York Yankees, Rockefeller Center, and the Aspen ski resort as president of his family’s multi-billion dollar investment company.

As if those responsibilities were not enough, Crown also served on the board of the largest financial institution in the United States, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (“JPMorgan”). Crown, in fact, occupied a crucial role on JPMorgan’s board—he chaired the Risk Policy Committee (“RPC”), which was in charge of overseeing significant risks facing the firm.

JPMorgan’s winter proved to be eventful. A trader in the firm’s London office began amassing risky credit derivatives. The trader’s position soon dominated the market—rival firms started referring to him as the “London Whale.” Neither the RPC nor JPMorgan’s risk management systems, however, detected the escalating risk within the company. While Crown attended to crises at Sara Lee and General Dynamics, the market turned against JPMorgan’s now-massive derivatives position. Just weeks before Crown

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3 See General Dynamics Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10, 18 (Feb. 17, 2012); General Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 7 (Mar. 16, 2012); see also Marjorie Censer, Defense Contractors’ Earnings Down as Pentagon Makes Cuts, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/defense-contractors-earnings-down-as-pentagon-makes-cuts/2012/01/24/gIQAicBlaQ_print.html [https://perma.cc/37L9-PL7T] (quoting General Dynamics’ CEO warning that the company is “bracing for significant change” as a result of cuts).

4 See Melissa Harris, JPMorgan Board Members Targeted: Advisory Firms Recommend Shareholders Reject Re-election After ‘London Whale,’ CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2013, § 2, at 1 (noting that Crown signs off on all of his family’s major investment decisions and oversees the management of all Crown family businesses); Luisa Kroll, The Forbes 400, FORBES, Oct. 11, 2010, at 88 (describing the Crown family’s investments).


6 See id. at 9.


8 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 25 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT].

9 See id. at 153.
finalized Sara Lee’s spin-off, JPMorgan publicly disclosed billions of dollars of losses on the London Whale trades.

America’s boardrooms are filled with directors who, like Crown, serve as board members or executives of other firms. Shareholders believe that leaders of other companies will be strong contributors in the boardroom. Directors with many affiliations—the conventional wisdom goes—are more effective because they acquire valuable knowledge and practice by serving in governance capacities at other firms. As a result, director candidates who sit on many corporate boards or serve as full-time executives are in high demand among the United States’ largest companies.

This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that more is better when it comes to directors’ professional commitments. To the contrary, this Article argues that other board seats and outside employment limit a director’s availability, contribute to cognitive overload, and thereby diminish the director’s effectiveness. Drawing on psychological principles and empirical evidence, this Article demonstrates that overcommitted directors withdraw from corporate decision making, tend not to challenge management, and experience attention shocks that distract them from company business.

This Article’s key insight is that the drawbacks of director busyness are especially severe for large, complex financial institutions because of the special governance demands imposed on their boards. In contrast to nonfinancial firms, financial institutions’ unique combination of high leverage and short-term funding can trigger sudden liquidity crises that spread rapid-

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12 See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.

13 See Johan S.G. Chu & Gerald F. Davis, Who Killed the Inner Circle? The Decline of the American Corporate Interlock Network, 122 AM. J. SOC. 714, 720 (2016) (“[D]irectors sitting on many boards gain[] broad-based business intelligence . . . thus making them attractive as codirectors.”).

14 See Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. FIN. 689, 690 (2006) (“There is a growing literature that shows that serving on multiple boards can be a source of . . . valuable experience . . . for outside directors.”).

15 See SPENCER STUART, 2017 SPENCER STUART U.S. BOARD INDEX 10, 14 (2017) [hereinafter SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX], https://www.spencerstuart.com/~media/ssbi2017/ssbi_2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AN2-DV34] (finding that more than half of new S&P 500 directors have prior board experience and more than half are “active senior executives and professionals”).

16 See infra notes 76–129 and accompanying text.
ly to other firms through interconnectedness and contagion. Shareholders and regulators, therefore, expect financial institution directors to implement and oversee monitoring systems to detect misconduct and excessive risk-taking. Enhanced risk monitoring, however, is precisely the type of oversight that busy directors are ill-equipped to provide.

This Article assesses the drawbacks of director busyness through case studies of Wells Fargo’s fraudulent accounts scandal and JPMorgan’s London Whale trades. In both cases, key directors who were overextended with outside commitments inhibited oversight and prevented the firms from responding more effectively to nascent risks. A third case study of PNC Financial Group (“PNC”), by contrast, demonstrates how directors who were unusually focused on their governance responsibilities helped PNC emerge as one of the biggest winners of the financial crisis. To be clear, this Article does not argue that directors with fewer outside commitments necessarily would have averted misconduct at Wells Fargo and JPMorgan. Rather, this Article contends that directors who were less busy would have been more likely to detect and deter wrongdoing.

Recognizing the risks of overcommitted directors, the European Union (“EU”) has adopted regulations limiting outside employment and board seats for directors of large, complex financial institutions. The United States, however, does not restrict board members’ professional engagements. Alarmingly, the directors of the largest and most complex U.S. financial institutions rank among the country’s busiest board members. For example, nearly two-thirds of Citigroup’s independent directors serve on three or more public company boards. This Article concludes that, absent policy reforms, overcommitted financial company boards will hinder oversight of management, increase the risk of firm failure, and perhaps cause the next financial crisis.

This Article contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance and board composition in four distinct ways. First, this Article applies psychological principles to assess how directors’ outside commitments affect their governance abilities. Second, this Article uses original case studies to advance the novel claim that director overcommitment is especially detrimental for large, complex financial institutions—firms whose miscon-
duct or excessive risk-taking could inflict harm on the broader economy. Third, this Article asserts that a financial institution’s key directors—namely, its lead independent director and the chairs of its risk and audit committees—should significantly limit their outside commitments because they bear special responsibility for overseeing the institution’s risk. Finally, this Article explains why private ordering, on its own, will not sufficiently restrain director overcommitment, and it proposes specific reforms to safeguard the financial system.22

This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores corporate governance generally and the role of the board of directors, focusing on the unique challenges of corporate governance in financial firms. Part II examines how director busyness affects corporate governance, drawing on psychological principles and existing empirical evidence. Part III presents original case studies analyzing how director busyness impairs the governance of large, complex financial institutions. Part IV provides evidence that the boards of many U.S. financial companies remain troublingly overcommitted. Part V offers recommendations for alleviating the problem of director overcommitment.

I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

A. The Dual Roles of the Board

The board of directors plays a central role—indeed, the central role—in U.S. corporate governance.23 As Berle and Means taught, agency problems arise when managerial control is separated from corporate ownership, as is the case in large, public companies.24 Unchecked by dispersed shareholders, who lack the incentive and ability to supervise the corporation, management might pursue ill-advised strategies or enrich themselves with corporate funds.25 A board helps alleviate these agency problems by centralizing control of the corporation in a group of shareholder-elected directors who are vested with plenary authority to govern the firm.26

22 See infra notes 250–297 and accompanying text.
25 See Fama & Jensen, supra note 24, at 304 (“Without effective control procedures, . . . decision managers are more likely to take actions that deviate from the interests of residual claimants.”).
26 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 47 (2012) (“The board of directors serves as one of the chief constraints on the problem . . . [of] agency costs.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017) (providing that “[t]he business
Boards of directors have traditionally fulfilled their governance responsibilities in two ways. First, boards of directors serve an advising role, using their expertise to provide strategic guidance to the firm’s management. Although management is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the firm, directors acting in their advisory capacity “consult[] with management regarding the . . . operational direction of the company.” For instance, directors may counsel management about new product offerings, geographic expansion, potential merger and acquisition activity, and other significant strategic decisions.

Second, boards of directors serve a monitoring role. In their capacity as monitors, directors oversee management to ensure that managers execute their responsibilities faithfully and effectively. Directors evaluate the performance of the firm’s CEO and other senior-level management, set the CEO’s compensation, and terminate the CEO when necessary.

Tensions invariably arise between a board’s advising and monitoring duties. As monitors, directors experience conflicts of interest when evaluating decisions in which they participated as advisors. More subtle con-
flicts arise when directors develop relationships with management and become psychologically invested in their success. Board “capture” inhibits directors from vigorously monitoring management. It may be untenable, therefore, for directors to serve equally as advisors to and monitors of management.

Perhaps to reconcile these tensions, boards of large, public corporations have, over time, largely abandoned their advising role and instead focused on monitoring. In response to shareholder pressure and regulatory requirements, companies have dramatically increased the proportion of independent directors comprising their boards in the last several decades. This shift away from manager-directors reflects shareholders’ and policymakers’ preferences for directors who primarily monitor, rather than advise, management.

At the same time, recent legal decisions and industry codes of conduct have enhanced directors’ monitoring responsibilities. A director’s monitoring role, it is now commonly recognized, extends beyond mere oversight of the firm’s top-level management. Indeed, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery recognized di-

35 See MACEY, supra note 23, at 57 (“The problem with boards is their unique susceptibility to capture by the managers they are supposed to monitor.”).
37 See MACEY, supra note 23, at 54 (arguing that it is “unreasonable to expect directors to perform both [advising and monitoring] functions simultaneously because there is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the monitoring function and the management function”).
38 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (2014) (“The role of the typical public corporation board shifted from a mainly advisory function in the 1970s to an emphasis by the late 1990s on active and independent monitoring of the top management team.”); Brown, supra note 27, at 163 (“The boards of the largest public companies do not perform an advisory role, at least in any systematic or meaningful fashion. . . . Instead, directors mostly ensure legal sufficiency and establish outer boundaries for management.”); Fisch, supra note 34, at 929 (“Corporations largely have sacrificed the potential value of managing boards in favor of the independent monitoring board.”);
39 See Gordon, supra note 38, at 1465 (noting that the percentage of independent directors on large public company boards increased from 20% in 1950 to 75% in 2005); see also Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 106–12 (2016) (assessing the shareholder- and regulatory-driven reasons for the increase in independent directors).
40 See MACEY, supra note 23, at 54–55 (“[A] board structure that emphasizes independent directors reflects a corporate governance policy of favoring monitoring over managing . . . .”); id. at 55 (“[T]he U.S. board structure . . . reflects an implicit policy choice promoting a monitoring corporate governance paradigm rather than an advising corporate governance paradigm.”).
41 See Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 720 (2010) (characterizing the board’s duty to monitor as “an obligation to prevent harm to the corporation”).
rectors’ duty to implement and oversee, on an ongoing basis, effective enterprise-wide risk monitoring systems. The Business Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance reinforce that a board of directors is responsible for “[s]etting the company’s risk appetite, reviewing and understanding the major risks, and overseeing the risk management processes.” The effectiveness of board-level risk oversight, moreover, is a key consideration in the Department of Justice’s determination of whether to charge a corporation with criminal wrongdoing and in subsequent sentencing decisions. Thus, management remains the first line of defense against risks, but directors have taken on an increasingly significant role in monitoring and responding to risks throughout the firm.

B. Financial Firms Are Special

Risks associated with financial markets pose unique corporate governance challenges. Financial institutions differ from nonfinancial firms in at least three key respects: (1) they are opaque and highly leveraged with short-term debt, (2) they benefit from government support, and (3) their actual or

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[45] See Stephen J. Lubben, Separation and Dependence: Explaining Modern Corporate Governance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 900 (2013) (“This is not to say that the board is the corporation’s risk and compliance manager. That power belongs with management. The directors should determine the company’s reasonable risk appetite ... and satisfy themselves that the risk management processes designed and implemented by managers are consistent with the company’s goals.”); Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 17, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/12/17/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-2/ [https://perma.cc/89BH-ML9J] (“[T]he risk oversight function of the board of directors—has taken center stage ... and expectations for board engagement with risk are at all-time highs.”).
perceived instability may trigger systemic externalities. These characteristics have important implications for the way financial firms are governed.  

1. Differences Between Financial and Nonfinancial Firms

Financial firms are more opaque and more highly leveraged with short-term debt than their nonfinancial counterparts. Opacity—information asymmetries between a financial company’s risk-takers and other stakeholders—makes it difficult for a firm’s shareholders, creditors, and even its directors to monitor the firm’s asset quality and trading risks.48 A financial institution’s margin for error is smaller because financial companies tend to be funded with a greater proportion of debt relative to nonfinancial firms.49 Many financial firms rely primarily on short-term debt, which creditors may withdraw


48 See Marco Becht et al., Why Bank Governance Is Different, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 437, 438 (2011) (“Banks have the ability to take on risk very quickly, in a way that is not immediately visible to directors or outside investors.”); Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Corporate Governance in Finance: Concepts and International Observations, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 17, 29–35 (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the opacity problem in banking and implications for corporate governance); Luc Laeven, Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks?, 5 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 63, 67 (2013) (“Banks are more opaque than the typical nonfinancial firms because of large informational asymmetries surrounding loan quality . . . . Trading activities may also make banks more opaque than nonfinancial companies without such activities . . . . because trading positions and associated risk profiles can be easily changed in real time . . . . ”); see also Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance in the Modern Financial Sector, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 185, 185 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (“Unlike in industrial firms, it has become increasingly difficult for infrequently meeting boards to fully grasp the swiftness and forms by which risk profiles of [large, complex financial institutions] can be altered by traders and securities desks.”).

49 See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 91, 97 (“Although it is not uncommon for typical manufacturing firms to finance themselves with more equity than debt, banks typically receive 90 percent or more of their funding from debt.”); see also John et al., supra note 47, at 304 (“[T]he average leverage of banks, measured as the ratio of debt to assets, is between 87 and 95 percent, whereas the average leverage of nonfinancial companies is in the range of 20–30 percent.”) (internal citation omitted).
with little warning.\textsuperscript{50} This unique combination of opacity, high leverage, and short-term funding can trigger sudden liquidity and solvency crises.\textsuperscript{51}

Second, in contrast to nonfinancial companies, many financial institutions benefit from explicit or implicit government guarantees. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and, if necessary, the U.S. Treasury insure bank and thrift depositors against losses, up to a statutory limit.\textsuperscript{52} State guaranty funds provide similar protection to insurance policyholders.\textsuperscript{53} In times of crisis, however, the government has repeatedly bailed out uninsured depositors and other financial institution creditors, creating the expectation that the government will step in even when not required to do so.\textsuperscript{54} Government backing of financial institutions puts the public fisc at stake.\textsuperscript{55} Even more critically for purposes of corporate governance, explicit and implicit government guarantees reduce incentives for depositors and other creditors to monitor a financial institution’s risk-taking.\textsuperscript{56} Creditors of nonfinancial firms typically exert some level of control over the firm’s risk profile by entering into debt covenants or, if necessary, refusing to roll over

\textsuperscript{50} See Laeven, supra note 48, at 67 (”[M]uch of the debt held by banks is short-term, whereas assets tend to be longer-dated. Such maturity transformation exposes banks to liquidity risk and bank runs . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{51} See Tarullo, supra note 47 (“All firms bear the risk that problems may unexpectedly arise because of, say, product flaws . . . . But in the case of financial intermediaries, these problems can be incredibly fast-moving; including runs on funding that can quickly place the very survival of the firm in doubt.”).

\textsuperscript{52} See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2012) (providing that FDIC shall insure depositors up to $250,000 per ownership account category, per depositor, per institution); see also id. § 1824(a)(1) (providing the FDIC authority to borrow from the U.S. Treasury Department, as needed).


\textsuperscript{54} See, e.g., id. at 250–52 (discussing implicit guarantees of uninsured depositors and short-term wholesale creditors). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) limited the government’s authority to extend guarantees to uninsured creditors but did not completely eliminate it. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 1105, 12 U.S.C. § 5612 (2012) (prohibiting the FDIC from issuing broad-based guarantees of bank debt unless authorized by a joint resolution of Congress); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (permitting the FDIC, with the concurrence of the Federal Reserve and Secretary of the Treasury, to guarantee an institution’s uninsured deposits if failing to do so would “have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability”).

\textsuperscript{55} See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 51 (2011) (estimating that the federal government guaranteed at least $4.4 trillion of financial assets under emergency programs at the peak of the financial crisis).

\textsuperscript{56} See Caprio & Levine, supra note 48, at 36 (“Deposit insurance reduces the incentives of depositors (and any other creditors who believe the government insures their claims) to monitor banks and thus directly hinders corporate governance.”); see also BARR ET AL., supra note 53, at 248 (“Deposit insurance dampens depositors’ incentives to monitor their banks’ performance because the depositors are indemnified against loss even if risky activities lead to failure.”).
their loans.\textsuperscript{57} In the presence of explicit or implicit guarantees, however, financial institution creditors do not impose market discipline as effectively because they know they are protected from losses.\textsuperscript{58}

Finally, financial companies are unique in that interconnectedness and contagion create systemic externalities.\textsuperscript{59} Financial and nonfinancial firms alike impose losses on their shareholders and creditors when they fail. Financial companies are different, however, because their instability has the potential to trigger serious knock-on effects.\textsuperscript{60} Counterparties, for instance, may incur catastrophic losses when a financial institution defaults on its obligations.\textsuperscript{61} A financial institution’s actual or perceived insolvency, moreover, can cause not only that firm’s creditors to withdraw funding but also other firms’ creditors to run on their banks.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, as the recent crisis demonstrated, poorly managed financial firms can paralyze not only the entire financial system but also the real economy.\textsuperscript{63}

2. The Unique Role of a Financial Institution Board

These characteristics impose unique demands on a financial institution’s board of directors to establish effective risk monitoring systems with-

\textsuperscript{57} See, e.g., Caprio & Levine, \textit{supra} note 48, at 22 (discussing market discipline by creditors in a generic model of corporate governance).

\textsuperscript{58} See Tarullo, \textit{supra} note 47 (“[I]n traditional, deposit-reliant banks . . . market discipline associated with . . . creditor monitoring will be attenuated. . . . [T]o the degree uninsured depositors or other bank creditors expect that they will be protected by the government in the event the bank encounters serious difficulties, those same features of market discipline will again be weakened.”); see also Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, \textit{Bank Corporate Governance: A Proposal for the Post-Crisis World}, 20 \textit{FRBNY Econ. Pol’y Rev.}, Aug. 2016, at 85, 88 (“The moral hazard caused by deposit insurance . . . leads not only to excessive risk taking by banks but also to an industrywide reduction in levels of monitoring within the firm, resulting in a higher incidence of large losses and bank failures caused by fraud.”).

\textsuperscript{59} Andreas Kokkinis, \textit{A Primer on Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions: Are Banks Special?}, in \textit{THE LAW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS} 1, 2–3 (Michael McKee ed., 2015) (“Profit maximisation necessarily entails taking substantial risks that, even if desirable from the point of view of bank shareholders, may still be excessive from the society’s perspective, due to the systemic consequences of crises in any major bank. This problem is not unique to the banking sector, but is far more severe in banks than in other large companies . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{60} See HAL S. SCOTT, \textit{CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS} 5–11 (2016).


\textsuperscript{62} See id.

in the firm.\textsuperscript{64} Reflecting this imperative, shareholders expect a financial institution’s board to play an active role in preventing misconduct and excessive risk-taking.\textsuperscript{65}

Moreover, financial company boards have traditionally been subject to special legal and regulatory requirements to monitor risks within their firms.\textsuperscript{66} These risk-monitoring obligations exceed the relatively low bar established in \textit{Caremark}.\textsuperscript{67} All bank holding company (“\textit{BHC}”) boards, for instance, are subject to supervisory mandates to understand and address the key market, operational, compliance, and legal risks within their firms.\textsuperscript{68} More stringent risk-monitoring standards apply to the boards of the largest and most complex financial firms. For example, the Federal Reserve requires directors of companies engaged in an expanded range of financial activities to be “forward-looking and active participants in managing risk.”\textsuperscript{69}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} See Tarullo, supra note 47 (“\textit{[T]he information and monitoring processes and systems established for . . . boards of financial institutions may need to be more extensive than those in large, nonfinancial firms."}.
\item \textsuperscript{66} See Partnoy, supra note 46, at 5 (asserting that financial company directors are held to “significantly higher standards” than non-financial company directors).
\item \textsuperscript{67} See id. at 5–6.
\item \textsuperscript{68} See \textsc{Bd. Govs. Fed. Res. Sys.}, SR 95-51 (SUP), \textit{RATING THE ADEQUACY OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND INTERNAL CONTROLS AT STATE MEMBER BANKS AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES} (1995) [hereinafter \textit{RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES}], https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1995/sr9551.htm [https://perma.cc/W9EL-MTSQ] (“Boards of directors have ultimate responsibility for the level of risk taken by their institutions. . . . [A]ll boards of directors are responsible for understanding the nature of the risks significant to their organizations and for ensuring that management is taking the steps necessary to identify, measure, monitor, and control these risks . . . .”); see also id. (“Directors of large banking organizations that conduct a broad range of technically complex activities . . . should . . . have a clear understanding of the types of risks to which their institutions are exposed and should receive reports that identify the size and significance of the risks . . . .”); \textsc{Bd. Govs. Fed. Res. Sys.}, SR 16-11 (SUP), \textit{SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING RISK MANAGEMENT AT SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS WITH TOTAL CONSOLIDATED ASSETS LESS THAN $50 BILLION} (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1611.htm [https://perma.cc/VDD2-XFEL]. The Federal Reserve has proposed to revise the supervisory expectations for boards of directors of BHCs with more than $50 billion in assets. \textit{See infra} notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textsc{Bank Holding Company Rating System}, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,444, 70,450 (Dec. 6, 2004) (establishing criteria for a BHC to receive a “strong” risk management rating); \textit{see also} 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1)(C) (2012) (providing that a BHC must be “well managed” to engage in expanded
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Following the financial crisis, policymakers imposed new risk-monitoring requirements on the boards of directors of financial institutions. The Dodd-Frank Act, for instance, directs all BHCs with more than $10 billion in assets to maintain a risk committee on its board of directors that is responsible for the enterprise-wide risk-management practices of the company. The risk committee must oversee a risk-management framework that includes processes and systems for “identifying and reporting risks” and “ensuring effective and timely implementation of actions to address emerging risks.”

In August 2017, the Federal Reserve proposed new guidance that purports to strengthen supervisory expectations for directors of the largest U.S. banks. The proposal reflects the Federal Reserve’s view that financial company directors should spend more time on their core, risk-related responsibilities. In particular, the proposal emphasizes that directors are responsible for overseeing senior management, holding them accountable for effective risk management and compliance, guiding the development of the firm’s strategy and risk tolerance, and supporting the stature and independence of the firm’s risk management and audit functions.

Directors of financial companies, in sum, have special risk management responsibilities. While most large, public company boards have increased emphasis on their monitoring responsibilities, risk monitoring is particularly...
important for financial company directors due to the unique characteristics of their firms.

II. WHY DIRECTOR BUSYNESS MATTERS

The increased emphasis on risk monitoring for public company boards—and especially for boards of large, complex financial institutions—raises a question as to whether directors are equipped to fulfill their governance responsibilities. Drawing on psychological principles and empirical research, this Part explores the effect of directors’ outside professional commitments on their governance abilities.

A. The Psychology of Busyness

By any measure, public company directors lead exceptionally busy lives. More than half of new independent directors of S&P 500 firms, for example, are actively employed as corporate executives or in other professions.76 Most directors, moreover, serve on the board of at least one other public company.77 Many directors also serve on private company boards, nonprofit boards, councils, or advisory groups.78 Examples of extraordinarily busy directors abound.79 In 2015, for instance, former AOL, Inc. CEO Jonathan Miller served as a director of eight publicly traded companies, sat on the board of eleven private companies and nonprofit organizations, and held a day job as a partner in a venture capital company.80

In general, there are two ways in which a director’s outside professional commitments might affect his or her governance abilities. On one hand, outside engagements could enhance a director’s effectiveness. Directors might acquire valuable knowledge and practice by serving in governance capacities at other companies. Outside engagements are opportunities for

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76 SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 14 (reporting that 53% of new S&P 500 independent directors in 2017 were active senior executives or other professionals).
77 Id. at 16 (reporting that the average S&P 500 director serves on 2.1 public company boards).
the director to sharpen his or her oversight skills, refine decision-making processes, and observe what governance practices succeed or fail at other organizations.81 Professional engagements also broaden a director’s network and enable the director to facilitate strategic partnerships or suggest other strong director candidates.82

On the other hand, however, a director’s outside commitments could detract from his or her governance responsibilities. Director workloads have increased substantially since the early 2000s.83 Directors now devote, on average, more than twenty hours per month to each board on which they serve.84 Time commitments are even higher for board chairs, lead independent directors, and directors who chair board committees.85 Directors with many professional engagements, therefore, might lack time to carefully review reports, assess strategy and risk, and attend board and committee meetings for all of the companies with which they are affiliated.86

In addition to imposing time constraints, outside commitments could restrict a director’s cognitive capacity. Psychologists long ago established that humans suffer from innate cognitive limitations.87 Working memory, for example, can store only a finite amount of information.88 Even if directors had unlimited time, the “limited capacity of the human information-

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83 See James S. Linck et al., The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3287, 3306 (2009) (finding “dramatic increase in directors’ workload” following enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002).
85 See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 43, at 12.
86 See Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate Governance, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 669, 691 (2015) (“Sitting on many boards could also result in directors who are so busy that they cannot give sufficient attention to any given firm. At a certain point, board members might be too busy to conduct their monitoring role diligently and effectively.”).
87 See, e.g., George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 81–83, 95–96 (1956) (discussing limitations on humans’ capacity to retain information in working memory); see also Nelson Cowan, The Magical Number 4 in Short-term Memory: A Reconsideration of Mental Storage Capacity, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 87, 94–108 (2000) (providing evidence of even stricter capacity limits).
processing system” might cap the number of enterprises that a director can effectively understand, monitor, and advise. 89

The psychological literature, moreover, suggests that busy directors are particularly susceptible to a variety of situational factors that could further impair their cognition. Divided attention and distractedness, for example, have been shown to diminish executive functioning, memory, and workplace performance. 90 Burnout from stressful or time-consuming jobs likewise impairs cognition. 91 Sleep deficits, which are widespread among corporate directors, 92 weaken critical cognitive functions that directors need to succeed in their roles. 93 Age-related cognitive declines, moreover, exacerbate these limitations. 94 Age-related impairments may be especially worrisome, as the average age of corporate directors continues to climb. 95

Finally, psychological biases may blind corporate executives to their cognitive limitations, preventing self-regulation of their workloads. Indeed, the Dunning-Kruger Effect is a cognitive bias whereby individuals consistently overestimate their own abilities and underestimate their limitations. 96 Highly skilled and highly educated people are particularly vulnerable to

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89 Harris & Shimizu, supra note 82, at 777.
92 ‘Epidemic’ of Sleep Deprivation Spreads Among Busy Britons, DAILY MAIL (May 1, 2007, 12:50 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-451760/Epidemic-sleep-deprivation-spreads-busy-Britons.html [https://perma.cc/P24Y-3F2J] (reporting that company directors were the most sleep-deprived in a survey of more than five thousand individuals from thirty different careers).
94 See generally Timothy Salthouse, Consequences of Age-Related Cognitive Declines, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 201 (2012) (discussing the effects of aging on cognition and workplace functioning).
96 See Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1132 (1999) (“[P]eople tend to hold overly optimistic and miscalibrated views about themselves.”); see also David Dunning et al., Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own Incompetence, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 83, 83 (2003) (“[P]eople are not adept at spotting the limits of their knowledge and expertise.”).
misjudging their own abilities. In one of the most common manifestations of the Dunning-Kruger Effect, individuals regularly overestimate their ability to balance many tasks at once. Thus, ignorant of their cognitive limitations, directors may take on more professional obligations than they can competently handle.

In sum, notwithstanding a busy director’s talent and intelligence, time restrictions and cognitive limitations may prevent the director from understanding several complex, multinational corporations well enough to govern them effectively.

B. Market-Wide Empirical Evidence

It is not immediately obvious from the foregoing theoretical discussion whether the governance-enhancing effects of outside professional engagements outweigh the negative consequences of busyness, or vice versa. To assess which effect predominates, this Section draws on empirical studies that have analyzed how director busyness influences firm performance and risk across a wide variety of industries. At first glance, these studies appear to yield contradictory results.

In one of the earliest studies on director busyness, Professor Stephen Ferris et al. found no evidence that busy directors are associated with worse financial outcomes. To the contrary, Ferris et al. detected a positive, although statistically insignificant, association between director busyness and firm performance in a sample of more than three thousand publicly traded firms. Ferris et al., in addition, found that shareholders perceive the appointment of busy outside directors as value enhancing. Indeed, firms in their study experienced positive stock market returns after appointing a new director who held three or more board seats. This study, in sum, suggests that directors with multiple professional affiliations are more effective board members.

Professors Eliezer Fich and Anil Shivdasani, by contrast, concluded in another study that busy directors are associated with weak firm perfor-

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97 See Katherine A. Burson et al., Skilled or Unskilled, but Still Unaware of It: How Perceptions of Difficulty Drive Miscalibration in Relative Comparisons, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 60, 71 (2006) (finding that skilled test subjects predict their performance on difficult tasks less accurately than unskilled subjects).

98 See Jason R. Finley et al., Metacognition of Multi-Tasking: How Well Do We Predict the Costs of Divided Attention?, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 158, 158 (2014) (“[P]eople . . . have little metacognitive insight on the extent to which they are personally vulnerable to the risks of divided attention . . . .”).

99 Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 1088.

100 Id. at 1101–02 (finding that a firm’s market-to-book ratio is positively correlated with the average number of directorships held by its outside directors).

101 Id. at 1101–03.
Analyzing Forbes 500 firms, Fich and Shivdasani detected a strong link between busy directors and worse financial outcomes. They found that firms in which at least half of the independent directors held three or more board seats had market-to-book ratios 4.2% lower than other firms, as well as significantly lower return on assets. Further, shareholders in Fich and Shivdasani’s sample reacted negatively when directors took on many outside commitments. Indeed, the announcement of a director accepting his or her third board seat resulted in negative abnormal stock market returns for the other firms where the director served. Overall, these results support the view that busy directors detract from effective corporate governance.

These two early studies present a puzzle: why did Ferris et al. and Fich and Shivdasani reach contradictory results? Professor George Cashman et al. resolved the discrepancy in a subsequent study. Noting that Fich and Shivdasani analyzed Forbes 500 firms while Ferris et al. used a sample comprised primarily of smaller firms, Cashman et al. hypothesized that director busyness is more detrimental for larger firms than smaller firms. This explanation is intuitively appealing. Smaller, less established firms might benefit from busy directors’ connections and experience, while larger, more established firms might require more intense monitoring that busy directors are unable to provide. To test their hypothesis, Cashman et al. analyzed the effects of director busyness using two samples—one comprised of S&P 500 firms and the other comprised of non-S&P 500 firms. They found statistically significant evidence that busy directors detract from firm performance for S&P 500 firms but enhance performance for non-S&P 500 firms.
Further studies have confirmed that busy directors generally detract from firm performance\textsuperscript{111} and that the drawbacks of director busyness are more severe for larger firms.\textsuperscript{112} Researchers have determined that busy directors are associated with a lower return on assets,\textsuperscript{113} decreased market value,\textsuperscript{114} and deeper diversification discounts.\textsuperscript{115} These studies verify that the negative relationship between busy boards and firm performance holds across a wide range of time periods and industries.\textsuperscript{116} Several studies, moreover, establish that busy directors are not merely correlated with, but actually cause, decreased firm performance.\textsuperscript{117} These studies suggest that non-S&P 500 firms, the opposite is true—that is, consistent with the Ferris et al. (2003) findings, there is a positive association between busy directors and Tobin’s Q.”).\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{111} See LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 27, at 153 (finding that studies on director busyness “yield consistent and convincing results: [c]ompanies with busy boards tend to have worse long-term performance and worse oversight” than firms whose directors have fewer professional engagements); Christophe Volonte, Boards: Independent and Committed Directors?, 41 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 25, 27 (2015) (“Most empirical studies on multiple directorships find that there is a negative relationship with firm performance.”).


\textsuperscript{113} See Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3254 (finding a negative association between director busyness and return on assets in S&P 500 companies); Ferris et al., supra note 112, at 20–21 (finding a negative association between director busyness and return on assets in a sample of more than 54,000 global companies). See generally John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999) (finding a negative association between director busyness and return on assets in sample of large, publicly traded U.S. companies).

\textsuperscript{114} See Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3254 (finding a negative association between director busyness and Tobin’s Q—the ratio of a firm’s market value relative to its total assets—in S&P 500 companies); Ferris et al., supra note 112, at 17–20 (finding a negative association between director busyness and market-to-book ratio in a sample of more than 54,000 global companies). See generally John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999) (finding a negative association between director busyness and return on assets in sample of large, publicly traded U.S. companies).


\textsuperscript{116} Cashman et al., for instance, find that one-to-three year lagged values of director busyness are correlated with lower firm performance. See Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3253. Fich and Shivdasani use a similar lagging technique and find a negative association between lagged values of director busyness and firm performance. See Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 14, at 703–05. This approach confirms that director busyness causes poor performance because “director busyness in prior years could not have been caused by the firm’s [performance] in subsequent years.” Cash-
three total boards is the threshold at which directors’ professional commit-
ments begin to detract most strongly from their governance abilities.\textsuperscript{118}

The empirical evidence points to three behaviors by busy directors that lead to weaker firm performance. Specifically, busy directors impair corpo-
rate governance because they are (1) less likely to participate in corporate
decision making, (2) less likely to challenge management, and (3) subject to
attention shocks that draw focus away from company business.

First, busy directors are less inclined to participate actively in corpo-
rate decision making. Busy directors, for example, are more likely to miss
board meetings\textsuperscript{119} and are less likely to serve on board committees.\textsuperscript{120} Cru-
cially, board committees meet less frequently when their members have

\textsuperscript{118} See, e.g., Cashman et al., supra note 106, at 3254. Using another approach to control for endogeneity, a separate
study finds that exogenous reductions in directors’ professional commitments lead to increases in
firm performance. See Roie Hauser, \textit{Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mer-
abstract_id=2945206 [https://perma.cc/3DGZ-6GVF] (finding that an exogenous reduction in a
director’s professional commitments—i.e., the termination of an outside directorship by merger or
acquisition—is associated with increases in earnings and market-to-book ratios for the firms with
which the director remains affiliated). Exogenous increases in directors’ workloads, meanwhile,
are associated with decreases in firm performance. See generally Antonio Falato et al., \textit{Distracted
Directors: Does Board Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?}, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 404 (2014) (finding
a long-term reduction in market value when an S&P 1500 firm’s director sits on the board of an-
other firm that experiences an “attention shock”—i.e., the sudden death of a co-director or CEO
that necessitates the director’s increased attention on the affected firm). These findings thus help
resolve the issue of causality and provide strong support that busy directors detract from firm
performance.

\textsuperscript{119} See Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, \textit{Do Directors Perform for Pay?}, 46 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 154, 161–62 (2008) (finding that directors holding a higher number of outside board seats
are more likely to miss board meetings); Pornsit Jiraporn et al., \textit{Too Busy to Show Up? An Analy-

\textsuperscript{120} See Pornsit Jiraporn et al., \textit{Ineffective Corporate Governance: Director Busyness and
Board Committee Memberships}, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 819, 823 (2009) (finding that directors
who sit on three corporate boards serve on fewer board committees relative to other directors); see
also Kevin D. Chen & Andy Wu, \textit{The Structure of Board Committees} 9 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 17-032, 2016), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/17-032_22ea
9e7a-4f26-4645-a33d-042f2b4e058c.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP9J-9H4M] (concluding that busy
directors are less likely to serve on multiple committees). But see Ferris et al., supra note 81, at
1103–05 (finding that directors with three or more public company board seats serve on more
committees than directors with fewer board seats).
many outside professional commitments, and fewer committee meetings are associated with worse financial outcomes.

Second, busy directors tend not to challenge management. As a result, firms with busy directors are more susceptible to managerial self-dealing, misconduct, and excessive risk-taking. Firms with busy directors, for example, are less likely to replace underperforming CEOs and are more likely to overpay their CEOs. Busy directors, moreover, are more likely to be associated with severe governance problems, including bankruptcies, major litigation, regulatory violations, and major accounting restatements. Further, companies in which outside directors hold a greater number of board seats are more likely to commit accounting fraud. Corporate misconduct is particularly prevalent when key directors—such as committee chairs—are busy.
Third, busy directors detract from firm performance because they are susceptible to attention shocks that distract them from company business. When a firm with which a director is associated experiences a major event—for example, a merger or acquisition proposal, the departure of a key officer or director, or a sustained period of poor performance—the director’s time commitment to that firm increases.\footnote{See, e.g., JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 115–16 (1989) (describing directors’ elevated time commitments during corporate crises).} The director, in turn, neglects other board memberships, leading to poor performance by those firms.\footnote{See Falato et al., supra note 117 (finding a long-term reduction in market value when an S&P 1500 firm’s director sits on the board of another firm that experiences the sudden death of a co-director or CEO that necessitates the director’s increased attention on the affected firm); Ronald. W. Masulis & Emma Jincheng Zhang, Preoccupied Independent Directors, 2, 21–25 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 522, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816470 [https://perma.cc/U558-YPKA] (finding that 22% of S&P 1500 independent directors are preoccupied with major distractions every year and that firms with a “higher proportion of preoccupied independent directors . . . [have] lower firm value and worse [merger-and-acquisition] performance”); Luke C.D. Stein & Hong Zhao, Distracted Directors: Evidence from Directors’ Outside Employment 12–14 (Aug. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946579 [https://perma.cc/GEW9-HT4Q] (finding that companies with directors whose employing firms experience periods of poor results suffer declines in performance and value).}

In sum, the empirical evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion: directors with many professional commitments are detrimental for large, public companies. Although busy directors may benefit smaller companies, they lack the time and attention to provide the monitoring and oversight that larger, more complex companies require.

\subsection*{C. Evidence from Financial Firms}

Financial institutions are particularly aggressive in seeking out other companies’ directors or executives to serve on their boards. Commercial banks, for example, recruit directors affiliated with other companies to develop lending relationships with those firms.\footnote{See Gerald F. Davis & Mark S. Mizruchi, The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U.S. System of Corporate Governance, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 215, 219 (1999) (discussing reasons that financial institutions appoint well-connected directors).} Financial institutions, moreover, prefer well-connected directors who can provide information about other sectors of the economy and broader economic trends.\footnote{See id. at 219, 225.} As a result, financial institution directors rank among the busiest corporate board members.\footnote{See infra notes 242–249 and accompanying text.}

The empirical evidence discussed above suggests that busy directors weaken corporate governance for large, complex financial institutions.
may not be appropriate, however, to draw conclusions from market-wide data about the effect of director busyness on financial firms. 133 Indeed, as Part I explores, governance of financial firms differs from nonfinancial firms in meaningful ways. 134 Directors’ outside professional commitments might therefore affect financial firms differently than nonfinancial firms. On one hand, directors’ outside commitments might uniquely benefit financial companies, as directors could connect financial firms to potential corporate borrowers or investment banking clients. 135 On the other hand, however, too many outside commitments could be particularly detrimental for directors of financial firms in light of the intensive monitoring demanded by those companies. 136

Recent developments in financial firm governance suggest that busy directors may, in fact, be especially problematic for financial institutions. Although all directors’ corporate governance responsibilities became more involved after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, financial firm directors experienced unique increases in their monitoring duties following the financial crisis. 137 Financial institution directors receive more voluminous information—in the form of management reports and supervisory assessments—than directors of nonfinancial firms. 138 Directors of financial companies, moreover, tend to serve on more board committees than directors of nonfinancial firms. 139 Service on the board of a large, complex financial institution thus requires considerably more time and attention than a nonfinancial company board. 140

Financial institutions, moreover, are unlikely to realize the benefits that directors with governance experience at other companies might provide. According to an empirical study, busy directors enhance a firm’s corporate

133 See Elyas Elyasiani & Ling Zhang, Bank Holding Company Performance, Risk, and “Busy” Board of Directors, 60 J. BANKING & FIN. 239, 240 (2015) (“[T]he governance dynamics of BHCs and nonfinancial firms are dissimilar and, therefore, it is improper to draw conclusions about BHC boards from research on nonfinancial firm boards.”).
134 See supra notes 46–75 and accompanying text.
135 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 49 (noting that directors who are affiliated with both financial and nonfinancial firms frequently facilitate access to capital); Davis & Mizruchi, supra note 130, at 219 (1999) (same).
136 See supra notes 64–75 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
138 See Partnoy, supra note 46, at 5 (asserting that risk management systems “should deliver much more information to the board of firms that have substantial exposure to financial risk than boards of firms that do not”).
139 See Jiraporn, supra note 120, at 825 (finding that directors of regulated firms, including finance and utility companies, serve on more committees than directors of firms in unregulated industries).
140 See Andy Peters, Are Some Bank Directors Spread Too Thin?, AM. BANKER, May 5, 2016, at 1 (“Directors of banks and [BHCs] spend a lot more time with their companies than directors in other industries.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
governance effectiveness only when they serve on boards of companies in a similar industry.\textsuperscript{141} Busy directors, in other words, confer governance benefits only if the other companies with which they are affiliated are in a related business.\textsuperscript{142} The Depository Institutions Management Interlocks Act (the “Interlocks Act”), however, prevents directors and executives of a large banking organization from serving on the board of another banking organization.\textsuperscript{143} Since their other professional commitments must be in unrelated industries, busy directors do not enhance the governance of financial firms.

Consistent with this intuition, a handful of financial sector-specific studies have concluded that director busyness is detrimental for financial companies. Professors Renée Adams and Hamid Mehran, for instance, studied thirty-five of the largest BHCs from 1986 to 1999 and found “a negative and significant relationship between performance and . . . the average number of external directorships held by” a BHC’s independent directors.\textsuperscript{144} They found, in particular, that BHC directors holding a greater number of board seats are associated with a lower Tobin’s Q, the ratio of a firm’s market value relative to its total assets.\textsuperscript{145}

Other studies confirm that director busyness is associated with increased risk in financial firms. Professors Elizabeth Cooper and Hatice Uzun, for example, analyzed 147 of the largest BHCs in 2006 and found that director busyness is correlated with higher levels of risk, as measured by


\textsuperscript{142} See Clements et al., \textit{supra} note 141.

\textsuperscript{143} Depository Institutions Management Interlocks Act § 204, 12 U.S.C. § 3203 (2012) (prohibiting the officers and directors of a depository institution holding company with more than $2.5 billion in total assets from serving as an officer or director of a depository institution holding company with more than $1.5 billion in total assets). The Interlocks Act prohibitions are even more stringent than the Clayton Act’s general prohibition on serving on the boards of direct competitors. See Renée Birgit Adams, \textit{Governance of Banking Institutions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE} 451, 455 (H. Kent Baker & Ronald Anderson eds., 2010) (comparing the Interlocks Act and Clayton Act).


\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 257; see also Grove et al., \textit{supra} note 122, at 431 (finding significant negative association between busy directors and return on assets in U.S. commercial banks between 2006–2008).
They determined, in fact, that one additional directorship per BHC director is associated with up to an 8.4% increase in risk. Cooper and Uzun conclude that “directors with less distraction in terms of other directorships . . . tend to monitor banks that ultimately have less risk than banks with busy directors.”

Director busyness appears to be associated with increased risks for nonbank financial companies, as well. Professors Maureen Muller-Kahle and Krista Lewellyn studied a sample of publicly-traded nonbank lenders from 1997–2005 and determined that outside directors holding a greater number of board seats were associated with higher concentrations in subprime lending relative to safer, prime lending. Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn posited that firms with busy boards were likely to be distracted by other professional commitments, leading to “ineffective group decision making” and increased concentrations in subprime loans. They concluded that “busy boards may not be the most effective boards when it comes to overseeing risky strategic initiatives.”

Although the foregoing evidence strongly suggests that director busyness is problematic for financial firms, some caution is appropriate in light of a single study suggesting that director busyness is associated with better BHC performance and lower risk. In a study of 116 BHCs from 2001–2010, Professor Elyas Elyasiani and Ling Zhang found that firms with a greater number of busy directors had better performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets. Elyasiani and Zhang also determined that busy boards were associated with higher asset quality and lower levels of total, market, and idiosyncratic risk, as measured by stock market returns. They argue that their results show that directors with multiple directorships are more capable of fulfilling BHCs’ monitoring and advising needs “due to the extensive knowledge, information, and experience they have accumulated by sitting on multiple boards.”

This study, however, suffers from a number of serious flaws. For one, Elyasiani and Zhang fail to acknowledge the studies discussed earlier that

146 Elizabeth Cooper & Hatice Uzun, Directors with a Full Plate: The Impact of Busy Directors on Bank Risk, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN. 571, 580–83 (2012) (using directorships per independent director and the percentage of directors with three or more directorships as proxies for director busyness).
147 Id. at 583.
148 Id.
150 Id. at 408.
151 Id. at 413.
152 Elyasiani & Zhang, supra note 133, at 244–45.
153 Id. at 245–46.
154 Id. at 248–49.
show director busyness has a detrimental effect on financial firms, and they thus do not attempt to distinguish contradictory evidence. ¹⁵⁵ Elyasiani and Zhang, moreover, exclude the largest BHCs from their sample. ¹⁵⁶ This omission calls into question whether their conclusions are applicable to the largest and most complex BHCs. Further, they limit their sample to BHCs, and their study thus fails to detect the effect of busy directors on nonbank financial companies. Finally, Elyasiani and Zhang acknowledge that the alleged association between director busyness and lower riskiness did not hold true during the financial crisis. ¹⁵⁷ The study, therefore, is far from conclusive.

On balance, the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that busy directors are associated with worse performance and higher risk in large financial firms, just as they are in large nonfinancial companies. The studies by Adams and Mehran, Cooper and Uzun, and Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn are more strongly weighted to the largest financial firms and cover a broader range of nonbank financial companies than the sole contradictory study by Elyasiani and Zhang. Therefore, the most plausible conclusion, based on the entirety of the empirical evidence, is that busy directors increase risk and decrease performance for large, complex financial firms.

III. CASE STUDIES

Although the empirical literature strongly suggests that director busyness is detrimental for large financial companies, to date no one has explored how director busyness harms financial companies. The following case studies examine—for the first time—the ways in which directors’ outside commitments affect the operation of corporate governance mechanisms in financial

¹⁵⁵ See id. at 239 (“To date, no study has looked at the association between busy boards and [BHC] behavior.”); see also id. at 241 (“To our knowledge, no similar studies [of director busyness] have been conducted for BHCs.”).

¹⁵⁶ See id. at 243 (noting that the largest BHC in the study had total assets of $707 billion). By 2010 (the end of the study period), six BHCs—Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo—had assets in excess of $707 billion. See NAT’L INFO. CTR., BHC PEER GROUP DATA (2011), https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/BHCPRRPT/REPORTS/BHCPR_PEER/Dec2010/PeerGroup_1_december2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3G2-5R9G]. Thus, it appears that Elyasiani and Zhang excluded these BHCs from their sample. The other studies discussed in this Section, by contrast, generally included the largest BHCs. See, e.g., E-mail from Elizabeth Webb Cooper, Assoc. Professor of Fin., La Salle Univ., to Jeremy C. Kress, Senior Research Fellow, Ctr. on Fin., Law, & Policy, Univ. Mich. (July 15, 2016) (on file with author) (confirming that Cooper’s and Uzun’s sample included Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo).

¹⁵⁷ Elyasiani and Zhang, supra note 133, at 246 (“[D]uring the crisis, the benefits of busy directors in reducing risk were smaller than they were in non-crisis times. It appears that the strong effect of the crisis overpowered the directors’ skills, curtailing their influence on risk . . . .”).
firms. The case studies focus, in particular, on how director busyness affects a board’s ability to implement and oversee monitoring systems to detect and deter misconduct and excessive risks. Taken together, the case studies demonstrate that boards of large, complex financial firms are better able to mitigate risks when directors have fewer outside professional engagements.

A. Wells Fargo’s Fraudulent Accounts Scandal

In late 2016, Wells Fargo infamously lost $25 billion in market capitalization when it agreed to settle charges that its employees had opened as many as 3.5 million unauthorized customer accounts to meet aggressive cross-selling targets. Key members of Wells Fargo’s board of directors learned of potential sales practices violations as early as 2005, and Wells Fargo’s full board became aware of the misconduct no later than 2013, when the Los Angeles Times published an exposé on customer abuses in the bank’s west-coast branches. The sales practices violations, however, persisted for three more years. The important governance question, then, is why Wells Fargo’s directors failed to stop the misconduct when they first learned of the violations.

Although many factors undoubtedly contributed to a governance failure of this magnitude, the extent to which Wells Fargo’s directors were distracted from their responsibilities by outside professional engagements is


\[162\] See, e.g., Aaron Back, Wells Fargo Shows Case for a Divide, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2016, at C8 (asserting that Wells Fargo’s combined CEO-chairman position impaired oversight of management); see also WELLS FARGO DIRS.’ REPORT, supra note 160, at 4–9 (identifying decentralized organizational structure and deference to bank-level leadership as root causes of misconduct).
a key—and, until now, unexplored—cause of the scandal. A close evaluation of Wells Fargo’s board reveals that overcommitment inhibited its ability to diagnose the firm’s sales practices problems and to implement and follow up on corrective measures.

While Wells Fargo’s employees opened millions of fake customer accounts in response to incentives established by the bank’s senior management, its directors were extraordinarily busy with other professional obligations. Wells Fargo’s directors, in fact, were busier than the directors of any other U.S. banking organization. 163 As depicted in Table 1, for instance, nine of Wells Fargo’s thirteen independent directors served on three or more public company boards in 2014, just after the bank’s sales practices became subject to public scrutiny.

Table 1 164

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Director</th>
<th>Board Role</th>
<th>Executive Employment</th>
<th>Other Public Company Board Seats</th>
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<tr>
<td>John D. Baker II</td>
<td></td>
<td>Patriot Transportation Holding, Inc.; Texas Industries, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elaine L. Chao</td>
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<td>News Corp.; Protective Life Corp.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>John S. Chen</td>
<td>Chair, Human Resources Committee</td>
<td>CEO, BlackBerry Ltd.</td>
<td>BlackBerry Ltd.; The Walt Disney Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd H. Dean</td>
<td>Chair, Human Resources Committee</td>
<td>CEO, Dignity Health</td>
<td>Cytori Therapeutics, Inc.; Premier, Inc.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Susan E. Engel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enrique Hernandez</td>
<td>Chair, Risk and Finance Committees</td>
<td>CEO, Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc.</td>
<td>Chevron Corp.; McDonald’s Corp.; Nordstrom, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia H. Milligan</td>
<td>Chair, Credit Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td>Calvert Funds; Kellogg Co.; Raven Industries, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Federico F. Pena</td>
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163 See Peters, supra note 140, at 1 (noting that Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and FCB Holdings had the three busiest bank boards nationwide). A higher proportion of Wells Fargo’s directors served on three or more boards when compared to Citigroup and FCB Holdings. See Citigroup, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 1–2 (Mar. 15, 2017) (8 of 16 directors); FCB Financial Holdings, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 5–8 (Apr. 5, 2016) (6 of 11 directors); Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 4–11 (Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Wells Fargo 2016 Proxy Statement] (9 of 15 directors).

164 See Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 2–9 (Mar. 18, 2014). This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM].
Three key Wells Fargo directors bore particular responsibility for addressing the bank’s sales practices issues. As the firm’s lead independent director, Stephen Sanger scheduled the board’s meetings, approved the board’s agenda, and coordinated coverage of governance issues among the board’s committees.165 James Quigley chaired the audit committee, which oversaw legal and regulatory compliance.166 Enrique Hernandez chaired the risk committee, which oversaw the firm’s enterprise-wide risk management framework and became primarily responsible for addressing the sales practices problems.167

Each of these key directors was stretched thin with outside professional commitments during the period of Wells Fargo’s misconduct. Sanger and Quigley both served on the boards of two other multinational, public companies in addition to Wells Fargo.168 Hernandez’s commitments were even more extensive. Hernandez served on the boards of three other public companies: Chevron Corporation, McDonald’s Corporation, and Nordstrom, Inc., of which he was the chairman of the board.169 Hernandez’s four public company boards placed him in the top 5% of the most “overboarded” corporate directors in America.170 Furthermore, Hernandez was the CEO of Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc., one of the largest private security services companies in the United States.171

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Company</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James H. Quigley</td>
<td>Chair, Audit Committee</td>
<td>Hess Corp.; Merrimack Pharmaceuticals, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judith M. Runstad</td>
<td>Chair, Corporate Responsibility Committee</td>
<td>Pfizer, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen W. Sanger</td>
<td>Lead Independent Director</td>
<td>Harmonic, Inc.; Novatel Wireless, Inc.; Spirent Communications plc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan G. Swenson</td>
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</table>

165 Wells Fargo 2016 Proxy Statement, supra note 163, at 19, 78.
166 Id. at 9.
167 Id. at 12; see also Wells Fargo Dirs.’ Report, supra note 160, at 100–08 (describing the risk committee’s engagement on sales practices issues).
168 See Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 7–8 (Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Wells Fargo 2014 Proxy Statement]. In addition to Pfizer, Inc., Sanger served on the board of Target Corporation until his retirement in March 2013. See Target Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 24 (May 19, 2014).
169 See Wells Fargo 2014 Proxy Statement, supra note 168, at 5.
170 See Lublin, supra note 79 (noting that 5% of S&P 500 directors served on four or more public company boards in 2015).
Wells Fargo’s busy directors missed crucial opportunities to eliminate customer abuses at the bank. Following the settlements, an ad hoc committee of Wells Fargo’s independent directors commissioned a report on the root causes of the sales practices violations. The report identifies several key areas in which the Wells Fargo board fell short. The report, for instance, acknowledges that senior risk managers highlighted sales practices as one of the top ten risks facing the firm in meetings with the risk committee and board. Despite these warnings, the board failed to act. The risk committee and board did not insist that management prepare detailed and concrete plans to address the sales practices abuses. Nor did the directors press forcefully to change leadership in the parts of the bank where the abuses originated. It was not until after the Los Angeles City Attorney filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo that the board of directors began to follow up on these issues more diligently.

Wells Fargo’s board missed opportunities to address the bank’s sales practices issues, at least in part, because its busy directors were missing in action. As discussed above, boards comprised of busy directors meet less frequently, and fewer meetings are associated with worse financial outcomes. Wells Fargo’s directors were so busy that they rarely met as a full board or in their committees. Indeed, as depicted in Table 2, Wells Fargo’s full board and risk and audit committees met significantly less frequently than those of peer U.S. banking organizations during the period of the misconduct. Every year between 2012 and 2015, for example, Wells Fargo held fewer board and risk committee meetings than any of its peer banks.

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174 See *id.* at 17.

175 See *id.*

176 See *id.* at 103–10.

177 See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.

178 This Article considers Wells Fargo’s peer banking organizations to be the seven other U.S. companies, in addition to Wells Fargo, that the Financial Stability Board deems “global systemically important banks” (“G-SIB”). G-SIBs are banking organizations whose failure would cause significant disruption to the financial system and broader economy, based on their size, interconnectedness, substitutability, cross-jurisdictional activity, and complexity. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: UPDATED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE HIGHER LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 5 (2013), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZ4U-BEK2]. The eight U.S. G-SIBs are Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. See FIN. STABILITY BD., 2016 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBS) 3 (2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-
In sum, from at least 2005 until 2016, Wells Fargo’s directors failed to respond to red flags regarding sales practices violations, and they permitted the bank to operate with substandard risk management infrastructure. They did this, in part, because they were more overcommitted than the directors of any other bank. The three independent directors most responsible for addressing Wells Fargo’s sales practices issues—Sanger, Quigley, and Hernandez—were especially busy, leading to insufficient time and attention spent on risk oversight. Wells Fargo’s fake account scandal, therefore, is a cautionary tale as to how director busyness inhibits oversight of traditional banking risks.

B. JPMorgan and the London Whale

Director busyness also detracts from oversight of trading risks, as was the case in JPMorgan’s London Whale trading losses. The London Whale was the nickname eventually given to Bruno Iksil, a trader in JPMorgan’s

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180 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bcl/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. Data for Table 2 were hand-collected from the 2011–2015 proxy statements of the eight U.S. G-SIBs, as filed on the SEC’s EDGAR database. See supra note 178 for a list of Wells Fargo’s peer banking organizations.
Chief Investment Office (“CIO”). In late 2011, Iksil began amassing credit derivatives, allegedly to hedge JPMorgan’s exposure to credit markets.\footnote{SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 50–53.} Iksil’s trading positions, however, were imperfectly calibrated to JPMorgan’s actual exposures, and the derivatives portfolio lost value.\footnote{Id. at 76–77.} Desperate to offset his initial losses, Iksil doubled down on his strategy, purchasing even more derivatives and breaching JPMorgan’s risk limits more than three hundred times in the process.\footnote{Id. at 75–85, 153.} Iksil’s positions dominated the market by early February 2012.\footnote{Id. at 81.} Rival traders ganged up on Iksil, driving down the value of his massive derivatives portfolio.\footnote{Id. at 88–90.} By the time the dust settled, JPMorgan lost more than $6 billion on Iksil’s ill-conceived trades and incurred more than $1 billion in fines for inadequate risk monitoring.\footnote{Id. at 94; see also Douglas, supra note 11 (discussing fines).}

The seeds of the London Whale trading loss were sown in 2005, when JPMorgan created the CIO as a separate division within its bank. JPMorgan charged the CIO with managing the firm’s excess deposits, a portfolio that quickly grew to more than $350 billion.\footnote{SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 21–22. If the CIO had been a stand-alone bank, it would have been the seventh largest bank in the United States. See id. at 22.} The CIO typically invested these funds in safe, low-yielding assets like Treasury securities, but leaders within the bank soon came to view the CIO as a potential profit center.\footnote{Id. at 55, 63.} Shortly after its establishment, the CIO received approval to begin trading synthetic credit derivatives.\footnote{Id. at 37.} Iksil and other CIO traders used this authority to generate windfall profits in 2011, leading to expectations among JPMorgan’s senior leaders that CIO would repeat its performance.\footnote{Id. at 53–55, 63.}

JPMorgan maintained a Risk Policy Committee (“RPC”) on its board of directors that was responsible for overseeing senior management’s efforts to address significant risks facing the firm.\footnote{JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6 (Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter JPMorgan 2007 Proxy Statement] (providing that the RPC is “responsible for oversight of the CEO’s and senior management’s responsibilities to assess and manage the Firm’s credit risk, market risk, interest rate risk, investment risk, liquidity risk and reputational risk . . . .”).} The RPC, among other functions, reviewed policies for assessing and managing risks, assisted management in establishing risk limits, and oversaw reports of JPMorgan’s major risk exposures and management’s efforts to control significant risks.\footnote{JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., RISK POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER, https://web.archive.org/web/20100125110431/http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/about-jpmc/risk-committee-charter.htm (reflecting version of RPC charter in effect as of January 25, 2010).}
JPMorgan’s firm-wide chief risk officer and other senior risk managers regularly reported to the RPC. 193

James Crown became the chair of the RPC around the time that JPMorgan established the CIO as a separate division. 194 As chairman of the RPC, Crown was responsible for setting the committee’s agenda. 195 Crown, a former investment banker at Salomon Brothers, Inc., had served on the board of JPMorgan or its predecessor for more than a decade. 196 The grandson of a wealthy industrialist, Crown left investment banking in the mid-1980s to join his family’s multi-billion dollar investment company, Henry Crown & Co., where he took over as president in 2003. 197 In addition to running Henry Crown & Co. and chairing JPMorgan’s RPC, Crown also served as the lead independent director of both Sara Lee and General Dynamics. 198 With his leadership role in the family business and with key governance positions on the boards of three large, public companies, Crown ranked among the busiest corporate directors in the United States. 199 On top of those commitments, Crown also chaired the University of Chicago Medical Center Board of Trustees and served as a trustee of the Museum of Science and Industry, The Aspen Institute, the University of Chicago, and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. 200

While Crown juggled his professional responsibilities, the RPC failed to ensure that the new CIO division established an effective risk management infrastructure. The RPC, for example, did not address the fact that, unlike all of JPMorgan’s other business lines, the CIO lacked a line-of-business chief risk officer (“CRO”). 201 The RPC, moreover, permitted the CIO’s senior-most risk officer to report directly to the head of the CIO, rather than to the firm-wide chief risk officer. 202 This reporting structure created conflicts of interest, with CIO risk managers more beholden to CIO

193 See, e.g., SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 157.
196 Id. at 3.
197 Id.
198 See General Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 7 (Mar. 18, 2011); Sara Lee Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6 (Sept. 14, 2007). Prior to becoming the lead independent director of General Dynamics in May 2010, Crown served as chair of the nominating and corporate governance committee. See General Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 13 (Mar 23, 2007).
199 In 2012, for example, one-third of S&P 500 directors served on three or more public company boards. See SPENCER STUART 2012 BOARD INDEX, supra note 95, at 16.
200 See JPMorgan 2010 Proxy Statement, supra note 195, at 3.
201 See SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 155. When the CIO finally hired a business-line CRO in early 2012, it hired the brother-in-law of JPMorgan’s firm-wide CRO. See id. at 162.
202 See id. at 160.
management than to the firm-wide risk organization. The RPC also failed to ensure that the firm paid its risk managers competitive salaries. In sum, in the early years of Crown’s tenure as chair of the RPC, the RPC continually failed to identify or address shortcomings in the CIO’s risk management.

Troublingly, Crown’s outside professional commitments became particularly time-consuming in 2011, just as Iksil began building his credit derivative portfolio. Crown had just been promoted to chairman of Sara Lee’s board after the prior chairman and CEO suffered a stroke and resigned. In January 2011, Sara Lee announced its intention to undergo a large-scale reorganization, spinning off its international beverage and bakery business into a separate public company. Throughout 2011, therefore, while Iksil dramatically increased the risk profile of the CIO, Crown faced the extraordinary tasks of overseeing Sara Lee’s CEO search and spin-off. After a contentious and protracted search, Sara Lee ultimately hired a new CEO in early 2012. Sara Lee completed its spin-off in June 2012, just one month after JPMorgan disclosed the London Whale losses.

Crown experienced additional attention shocks around the time that Iksil began amassing credit derivatives. General Dynamics, a defense contractor primarily reliant on government contracts, was coping with the effects of sequestration—congressionally mandated reductions in the defense budget of up to $1 trillion that were enacted in August 2011. Crown, recently elevated to become General Dynamic’s first lead director, became primarily responsible for exercising independent oversight of the firm while

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203 See id. In response to regulatory pressure, JPMorgan eventually changed the reporting lines so that the senior risk manager reported directly to the firm-wide CRO and indirectly to the head of CIO. The senior risk manager, however, later testified that the functional reorganization did not, in practice, diminish his loyalty to CIO’s management. See id.


205 See SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 51 (noting that CIO’s credit derivative portfolio grew by more than tenfold to $51 billion during 2011).

206 See Sara Lee Chief Is Leaving After a Stroke, supra note 2.

207 See Korn & Brat, supra note 2.

208 See Joann S. Lublin & Julie Jargon, Sara Lee Changes Horses, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2011, at B2 (noting that Sara Lee’s board suddenly “reversed course” and decided not to promote an internal candidate to CEO).

209 See York, supra note 2.

210 See Press Release, Hillshire Brands Co., supra note 10; see also Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 11.

211 See General Dynamics Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10, 19 (Feb. 17, 2012); see also Censer, supra note 3.
it reformulated its corporate strategy. 212 In the meantime, Crown continued to oversee Henry Crown & Co.’s sprawling network of operating companies and exercised authority to sign off on all of the firm’s investment decisions. 213

These attention shocks drew Crown’s focus away from JPMorgan’s risk governance at an especially inopportune time. Shareholders warned Crown about risk management deficiencies at JPMorgan in early 2011, just before Iksil began trading credit derivatives; yet the RPC failed to act. 214 Among other shortcomings, the CIO’s line-of-business risk committee—comprised of the CIO’s top managers and risk officers—met only three times in 2011 and, unlike other line-of-business risk committees at JPMorgan, did not include personnel from other divisions to provide independent evaluation of the CIO’s trading strategies. 215 The RPC, in the meantime, received periodic reports on CIO’s risk profile, and management alerted the RPC when the CIO breached company-wide risk limits. 216 With Crown’s attention diverted elsewhere, however, the RPC failed to correct CIO’s risk management deficiencies in time to prevent Iksil’s trading losses. 217

There is, of course, no guarantee that JPMorgan would have prevented the London Whale trading losses had Crown been less overcommitted. Indeed, other shortcomings undoubtedly contributed to such a significant breakdown in risk governance. JPMorgan’s management, for instance, could have been more forthcoming about risks in the CIO, which might have focused the board’s attention in time to prevent or mitigate the loss-

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212 See General Dynamics Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 14 (Mar. 16, 2012) (describing lead director’s authority and responsibilities).

213 See Harris, supra note 4.

214 See Schwartz & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 204 (noting that shareholder advocates warned Crown about risk management deficiencies during an April 2011 meeting).

215 SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 162–63; see also JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., REPORT OF JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE REGARDING 2012 CIO LOSSES 100 (2013) [hereinafter JPMORGAN TASK FORCE REPORT], http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/2272984969x0x628656/4cb574a0-0bf5-4728-9582-625e4519b5ab/Task_Force_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUF7-6R75] (“There was no official membership or charter for the CIO Risk Committee and attendees typically included only personnel from CIO . . . . Had there been senior traders or risk managers from outside CIO or had the CIO Risk Committee met more often, the process might have been used to more pointedly vet the traders’ strategies in the first quarter of 2012.”).

216 See JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. 877, 880 (2013) (CIO risk summary report); id. at 1728, 1730 (noting that JPMorgan’s CRO alerted the RPC that CIO increased a key risk limit). Management did not, however, specifically inform the RPC of the burgeoning risks in Iksil’s credit derivatives portfolio until after the media publicly reported on the trades in April 2012. See SENATE JPMORGAN REPORT, supra note 8, at 162.

es. JPMorgan’s board, moreover, could have appointed directors with more risk management expertise to serve alongside Crown on the RPC.

Crown’s overcommitment, however, inhibited effective risk governance at JPMorgan. Crown’s early tenure as chair of the RPC overlapped with his elevation to president of his family’s investment company and his assumption of leadership roles on the boards of Sara Lee and General Dynamics. With so many competing commitments, Crown failed to ensure that the nascent CIO established an appropriate risk management infrastructure. As the empirical evidence predicts, moreover, Crown’s outside commitments created attention shocks—and they did so at a particularly inopportune time. Just as Iksil began building his massive credit derivatives portfolio, Crown was distracted by Sara Lee’s CEO search and spin-off as well as General Dynamic’s sequestration challenge. Had Crown been less overcommitted, the RPC would have been more likely to address shareholders’ concerns about risk management deficiencies and would have been better able to detect the emerging risks in CIO. Crown’s busyness, therefore, was a key contributing factor to the London Whale losses.

* * * *

All of this is not to say, of course, that Wells Fargo would have averted its fake account scandal and JPMorgan would have avoided the London Whale losses had their respective boards been less overcommitted. Indeed, a banking organization’s officers and employees bear front-line responsibility for ferreting out misconduct and minimizing excessive risks. Rather, this Part’s primary contention is that Wells Fargo and JPMorgan would have been more likely to detect and deter the nascent problems if the boards—and especially their key directors—had been less overcommitted.

C. PNC and the Financial Crisis

Although busy directors impair governance, the inverse is also true: directors with few outside commitments are better able to mitigate risks. A case study of PNC during the financial crisis demonstrates how directors with few outside commitments enhance governance of large financial companies. PNC, the eighth largest banking organization in the United States,

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218 See JPMORGAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 215, at 42–43 (noting that CIO management did not disclose increasing risks in March 20, 2012, meeting with the RPC).

219 See Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, A Call for New Blood on the JPMorgan Board, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2013, 7:27 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/a-call-for-new-blood-on-the-jpmorgan-board/ [https://perma.cc/9HUG-A8CA] (noting that the two members of the RPC other than Crown had never before worked in finance).

220 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.

221 See RISK MANAGEMENT RATING PROCESSES, supra note 68 (discussing senior management’s responsibility for risk management).
was one of the strongest and most resilient banks during the market crash, with one analyst calling PNC the “biggest winner of the financial crisis.”

PNC achieved this success under the leadership of directors who were unusually focused on their governance responsibilities, with few competing professional commitments. In the lead-up to the crisis, twelve of PNC’s seventeen independent directors served only on PNC’s board or on the board of just one other company. No independent director with a full-time executive position held more than three board seats. Crucially, two of PNC’s key directors—the chairmen of its risk and audit committees—were both retired and served on no other public company boards. PNC’s board, in sum, was among the least busy of all U.S. banking organization boards.

PNC’s board of directors made several critical strategic decisions in the lead-up to and during the financial crisis that positioned the firm for success. PNC, for example, decided in 2000 to divest its mortgage origination and servicing business lines. PNC’s chairman presciently explained that PNC sold its mortgage business because PNC was not being adequately compensated to assume the risk that borrowers would default.

By limiting its residential mortgage exposure, PNC positioned itself for a series of strategic acquisitions during the crisis. Most notably, PNC

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223 See PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 6–7, 15 (Mar. 23, 2007) (noting that twelve of PNC’s seventeen independent directors held, at most, one other public company directorship).
224 Id.
225 See id. at 6–7, 25 (noting that neither audit committee chair Paul Chellgren nor risk committee chair Stephen Thieke held a full-time executive position or served on another public company board).
226 PNC’s independent directors served, on average, on 2.06 public company boards in 2007. See id. at 6–7, 15. The mean U.S. BHC board in 2007, by contrast, was comprised of outside directors with an average of 2.5 board appointments. See Marco Becht et al., supra note 48, at 448 (sample of 500 U.S. banking organizations).
228 See Rob Garver, Jim Rohr Makes Right Choices in Trying Times for PNC, Industry, AM. BANKER, Nov. 30, 2007, at 2 (quoting PNC chairman and CEO Jim Rohr explaining that PNC divested its mortgage business because “[w]e didn’t think we were getting paid for [taking credit risk]”).
purchased troubled National City Corporation (“National City”) at the peak of the crisis, nearly doubling in size and expanding its geographic footprint. All the while, PNC’s board maintained a robust risk management framework, and PNC avoided major lawsuits and enforcement actions, in contrast to most banks its size.

PNC’s improved competitive position since the financial crisis is attributable, at least in part, to its uncharacteristically focused and committed board of directors. PNC’s directors, with few outside engagements, met more frequently than Wells Fargo’s overcommitted directors, despite PNC being roughly one-fifth the size of Wells Fargo. The chairmen of PNC’s risk and audit committees were unaffiliated with other large, public companies and therefore were not susceptible to attention shocks like those experienced by JPMorgan’s Crown.

Most importantly, however, PNC directors had sufficient time and attention to monitor PNC’s management. Indeed, PNC’s CEO attested to the degree to which PNC’s board challenged management. As the CEO later recounted in a media interview, when PNC was close to buying National City, the chairman of PNC’s risk committee confronted the CEO, saying, “[W]e’re in the middle of the worst recession since the Great Depression. We’ve had a housing collapse, a political uprising with a lot of regulatory change. And you’re proposing to buy a troubled bank larger than we are?” In sharp contrast to Wells Fargo and JPMorgan, PNC’s directors had the bandwidth to ask these difficult questions because they were not stretched thin by outside commitments.

IV. FINANCIAL COMPANY BOARDS ARE ALARMINGLY OVERCOMMITTED

Encouragingly, the empirical evidence on director busyness has convinced some corporate boards to reign in their outside commitments. Some firms, for example, have declined to appoint director candidates with many


231 See Garver, supra note 228, at 2A (describing risk management at PNC).

232 In 2013, for example, PNC’s board, risk committee, and audit committee met 12, 9, and 12 times, respectively. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 28 (Mar. 13, 2014). Wells Fargo’s board, risk committee, and audit committee, by contrast, met 9, 6, and 9 times, respectively. See Wells Fargo 2014 Proxy Statement, supra note 168, at 9–12.

233 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.

professional engagements, and certain directors have voluntarily limited their outside commitments as board workloads have increased. More than half of S&P 500 companies, moreover, have adopted caps on the number of outside boards on which their directors may serve. These limits tend to be relatively high, and firms routinely grant waivers from their restrictions. Nonetheless, extreme overboarding—in which a director holds eight or more board seats—has all but disappeared. As a result of these changes, directors of large, public companies generally have fewer outside professional commitments today than they had decades ago.

Despite this progress, however, many financial institution boards remain severely overcommitted. This Part analyzes director busyness at the United States’ largest and most complex financial institutions. Included in the analysis are the eight U.S. banking organizations that the Financial Stability Board deems to be Global Systemically Important Banks (“G-SIBs”): Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo. Also included is Prudential Financial, Inc., a nonbank insurance company that could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability, according to the Financial Stability Oversight Council. The Article refers to such companies as “systemically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”).

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235 See Chu & Davis, supra note 13, at 726–35 (providing evidence of firms’ declining preference for busy directors); see also Lublin, supra note 79 (providing examples of firms that refuse to appoint busy directors and directors who choose to limit their board service).

236 SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 17 (noting that 61% of S&P 500 boards establish a numerical limit for directors’ outside board seats).

237 See id. (reporting that, of the companies that establish numerical limits on board service, 19% cap total directorships at six or seven, 40% at five, 36% at four, and 5% at three); see also Lublin, supra note 79 (discussing waivers).

238 See David Yermack, Board Members and Company Value, 20 FIN. MKTS. & PORTFOLIO MGMT. 33, 39 (2006) (“[I]n 1995, more than 120 persons held eight or more board seats simultaneously in major American companies, and that number has dropped to only two persons five years later.”); see also Lublin, supra note 79 (reporting that five directors occupied six or more board seats in 2015, down from 308 in 2005).

239 See, e.g., Chu & Davis, supra note 13, at 726 (showing a decline in number of board seats among S&P 1500 directors between 2000–2010).

240 For an explanation of the G-SIB designation, see supra note 178.

241 See generally FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (2013) (analyzing “material financial distress at Prudential Financial,” and concluding that it “could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability”) (on file with U.S. Treasury Department). This analysis excludes American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) and MetLife, Inc., each of which the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) initially designated as a nonbank financial company that could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability but has since had its designation rescinded or overturned. See infra notes 245–246. The analysis also excludes General Electric Capital Corporation, Inc., which had its FSOC designation rescinded and, in any event, is not a publicly traded company.
SIFI directors continue to be extraordinarily busy. As demonstrated in Table 3, when compared to the directors of all S&P 500 firms, directors of SIFIs are less likely to sit on only one public company board. SIFI directors, moreover, are much more likely than their S&P 500 counterparts to sit on three or more public company boards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Directors’ Corporate Board Affiliations (as of 2016)</th>
<th>SIFIs</th>
<th>S&amp;P 500</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Board</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3+ Boards</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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This discrepancy is worrisome for several reasons. As discussed above, directors of financial institutions have historically held more outside professional engagements than directors of non-financial firms, at least in part because financial institutions want professional connections to other companies who might become commercial or investment banking clients. But it is not clear that SIFIs actually benefit from directors who hold multiple professional commitments. Indeed, one would expect that institutions as established as Wells Fargo and JPMorgan, for instance, would not need directors to introduce them to other large, multinational companies. Not only are SIFIs unlikely to benefit from busy directors but they are most likely to suffer negative consequences when directors become distracted. Because large financial firms are more opaque, leveraged, and systemically risky than non-financial firms, good governance should require that SIFI directors have fewer outside professional commitments.

The boards of a few SIFIs are especially overcommitted. As demonstrated in Table 4, Citigroup is an outlier, with nearly two-thirds of its independent directors serving on three or more public company boards. Five

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242 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bcl/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. SIFI data were hand-collected from the proxy statements of the relevant companies, as filed on the SEC’s EDGAR database. For S&P 500 data, see SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 18.

243 See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.

244 See Field, supra note 108, at 73 (“Firms such as those in the Forbes 500 are likely to have large networks of connections, suggesting that the connectedness of busy directors would be less advantageous to them.”).

additional SIFIs have boards on which at least 40% of independent directors meet the same threshold. Disturbingly, the SIFIs with the busiest boards are also those recognized as being the most systemically important. Indeed, the Financial Stability Board ranks Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and Wells Fargo as four of the five most systemically important U.S. banking organizations; yet, nearly half of their independent directors serve on at least three public company boards. As the firms most likely to inflict damage on the broader economy, these firms require the closest monitoring. They are unlikely to receive such monitoring, however, because their directors are particularly overcommitted.

### Table 4

| Proportion of Independent Directors Serving on 3+ Public Company Boards (as of 2017)* |
|---------------------------------|------------------|
| Citigroup                       | 61.5%            |
| Bank of America                 | 46.2%            |
| Morgan Stanley                  | 45.4%            |
| Goldman Sachs                   | 44.4%            |
| Wells Fargo                     | 42.8%            |
| Prudential                      | 40.0%            |
| Bank of New York Mellon         | 33.3%            |
| JPMorgan                        | 27.3%            |
| State Street                    | 22.2%            |

Most troublingly, busy directors are serving in key leadership roles at many SIFIs. For most SIFIs, in fact, the directors with the most important monitoring roles—the lead independent director, the audit committee chair, and the risk committee chair—have the most outside commitments. As demonstrated in Table 5, more than half of all SIFI audit and risk committee chairs serve on three or more boards. By contrast, only two SIFIs—Bank of

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246 AIG, which the FSOC designated as systemically important in 2013, also has a board on which more than 40% of independent directors serve on at least three public company boards. See American International Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 2 (Apr. 19, 2017) (41.7% of independent directors). The FSOC rescinded AIG’s designation in September 2017. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (AIG) (2017) (on file with U.S. Treasury Department).

247 See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 178, at 3.

248 This Table is permanently available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bcl/assets/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. Data for Table 4 were hand-collected from the SIFIs’ 2017 proxy statements, as filed on the SEC’s EDGAR database.
America and Prudential—appoint directors with fewer than three board seats to all three key leadership positions.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key SIFI Directors Serving on 3+ Public Company Boards (as of 2017)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lead Independent Director</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of New York Mellon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citigroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldman Sachs</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPMorgan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morgan Stanley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prudential</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells Fargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This level of overcommitment among SIFI directors is cause for alarm. SIFIs—the same institutions that, if mismanaged, could inflict material distress on the broader economy—are being governed by extraordinarily busy directors. These directors are less inclined to participate in corporate decision making, less likely to monitor management, and more susceptible to attention shocks. Directors with key leadership positions are especially busy and, as the Wells Fargo and JPMorgan cases demonstrate, particularly vulnerable to distractedness. In sum, as a result of their many outside professional commitments, the directors of the United States’ most systemically important financial institutions are ill-equipped to detect and deter misconduct and excessive risk-taking.

V. ALLEVIATING DIRECTOR OVERCOMMITMENT

What, then, should be done to alleviate director overcommitment in large, complex financial institutions? One might believe that private order-

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249 This Table is permanently available at [http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bcl/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf](http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bcl/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/59-3/kress-graphics.pdf) [https://perma.cc/AU65-LXDM]. Data for Table 5 were hand-collected from the SIFIs’ 2017 proxy statements, as filed on the SEC’s EDGAR database. After its annual shareholders meeting, Wells Fargo announced that Karen Peetz would replace Enrique Hernandez as risk committee chair, effective on September 1, 2017. See Emily Glazer, *Wells Fargo Picks Duke to Be Chairman*, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 2017, at B1. Peetz serves on no other public company boards. See Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 21 (Mar. 15, 2017).
ing, or self-regulation by private actors, will solve the problem.\textsuperscript{250} Indeed, companies and shareholders could replace overcommitted directors with candidates better able to focus on their governance responsibilities, and directors might choose to limit their outside commitments to protect themselves from liability. Some commentators, in fact, point to recent declines in directors’ outside commitments as evidence that further interventions are unnecessary.\textsuperscript{251}

Private ordering, however, is unlikely to reduce directors’ outside commitments to a socially optimal level. Private ordering inadequately restrains directors’ overcommitment for four reasons: (1) managers influence director selection and may prefer weak monitors, (2) shareholders face steep barriers to replacing incumbent directors, (3) bank regulation further entrenches existing directors, and (4) directors lack appropriate incentives to limit their outside commitments. This Part discusses limitations of private ordering and then recommends policies for reform.

\textit{A. Limitations of Private Ordering}

Private ordering alone will not solve the problem of director busyness for several reasons. First, management’s influential role in the director selection process exacerbates the overcommitment problem. It is well established that inside directors wield outsized influence on the board’s selection of director candidates.\textsuperscript{252} To preserve their autonomy, however, many inside directors prefer director candidates who are unlikely to monitor management closely.\textsuperscript{253} When selecting new directors, therefore, managers prioritize candidates with many outside commitments who are more likely to be lax monitors.\textsuperscript{254}


\textsuperscript{251} See, e.g., Katherine W. Keally, \textit{Public Company Directorships: Are Corporate Directors Over the Limit?}, NACD DIRECTORSHIP, May–June 2016, at 16, 17 (“[I]mposing a numeric restriction on [outside board seats held by] individual director candidates is not the optimal approach. . . . Most directors are . . . capable of regulating their own time commitments.”).


\textsuperscript{253} See Brown, \textit{supra} note 27, at 138 n.37 (noting that “management dislikes” board monitoring).

\textsuperscript{254} See David A. Becher et al., \textit{Board Changes and the Director Labor Market: The Case of Mergers} 10 (Aug. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/12176/Becher_2016_board.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH9A-YTST] (“CEOs involved in the director selection process are more likely to appoint busy directors, which could be consistent with
Corporate governance reforms have attempted to reduce management’s influence over director selection by, for instance, prohibiting inside directors from serving on a company’s nominating committee. These reforms, however, have not meaningfully limited management’s role in the selection process, and inside directors continue to exert disproportionate influence. Opportunities for managerial influence in the director selection process are particularly prevalent at large financial institutions, where CEOs overwhelmingly serve as chair of the board.

Second, legal and practical barriers often prevent shareholders from replacing overcommitted directors. Shareholders of companies that retain plurality voting generally cannot defeat a nominee chosen by the board without waging a prohibitively expensive proxy contest. Even in companies that have switched to majority voting, defeating an incumbent director remains exceedingly rare. Of more than 24,000 S&P 1500 director nominations, the appointment of less valuable monitors.”; see also Judith H. Dobzynski, Seats on Too Many Boards Spell Problems for Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/17/business/seats-on-too-many-boards-spell-problems-for-investors.html [https://perma.cc/LQY3-TGBP] (quoting Professor Charles Elson as saying “[a] CEO who doesn’t want to be monitored closely wants a director with lots of board seats”).

See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM [https://perma.cc/6PPC-LZ2Y] (providing that listed companies must have a nominating committee composed entirely of independent directors).

See Brown, supra note 27, at 142 (“Although not a member [of the nominating committee], the CEO retains the ability to consult with the committee, submit nominees, and veto objectionable candidates.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 159 (2010) (“[N]otwithstanding the creation of independent nominating committees, evidence reveals that CEOs continue to influence the director-nomination process through informal consultations and recommendations of directorial candidates.”); Murphy, supra note 252, at 148 (“It is clear that CEOs may have the dominant voice in the nominating process even if not included in the membership of a nominating committee [sic] composed of independent directors.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 767 (2002) (“[E]ven when the CEO does not sit on the nominating committee, his influence on the nomination process is still generally thought to be considerable.”).


See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 26, at 48–49 (“[S]hareholders of public corporations lack the legal right [and] the practical ability . . . to exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful monitoring of the corporation’s [directors].”).

See Brown, supra note 27, at 139–40. In a plurality voting system, a nominee is elected as long as he or she receives more votes than a competing candidate. A nominee who runs unopposed, therefore, requires only one vote to be elected. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1124–25 (2016).

In a majority voting system, a nominee is elected only if he or she receives a majority of the votes cast. See Bo Becker & Guhan Subramanian, Improving Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013).
nees subject to majority voting between 2007 and 2013, only eight did not receive a majority of votes.\textsuperscript{261} Most majority voting systems, moreover, do not automatically unseat an incumbent director who fails to obtain a majority. Instead, such a director must only submit his or her resignation, which the board is not obligated to accept.\textsuperscript{262} It is not uncommon for a board to retain a director who failed to receive a majority of shareholders’ votes.\textsuperscript{263} Corporate election processes, therefore, generally entrench overcommitted directors.

Third, replacing directors is especially difficult for shareholders of BHCs, as banking laws perversely entrench sitting directors. Large block holders seeking to remove underperforming directors of nonfinancial companies frequently coordinate opposition campaigns.\textsuperscript{264} Such coordination, however, is rarely possible for BHC shareholders. Under the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”), a shareholder or association of shareholders that “directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies” of the banking organization becomes subject to onerous regulation as a BHC.\textsuperscript{265} The Federal Reserve Board has interpreted this provision strictly. Indeed, in several instances, the Federal Reserve has found that a shareholder who attempted to wage a proxy contest against a banking organization would “control” the institution and thus become subject to bank regulation.\textsuperscript{266} The Federal Reserve’s interpretation of the BHC Act’s control provisions thereby dissuades shareholders from seeking to replace entrenched directors, as shareholders fear becoming subject to banking laws.\textsuperscript{267}

\textsuperscript{261} See Choi et al., supra note 259, at 1122.
\textsuperscript{262} See id.
\textsuperscript{263} See id. at 1122 & nn.15–16 (noting that, of the eight directors at majority voting firms who failed to receive a majority, only three actually lost their board seats).
\textsuperscript{267} See Solomon, supra note 266 (arguing that the Federal Reserve’s strict interpretation of control “limit[s] shareholder efforts to oust entrenched bank directors” because being subject to
Finally, directors themselves will not voluntarily reduce their outside commitments to a socially optimal level. Board service and full-time employment are extraordinarily lucrative for many directors. Directors, moreover, enjoy enhanced reputations and prestige stemming from outside commitments. Countering these monetary and psychic incentives to overcommit, directors face potential legal liability and damaged reputations if their firms perform poorly. These countervailing forces, however, are unlikely to offset directors’ powerful incentives to take on additional outside commitments. Claims against directors for failure to monitor are subject to exceedingly high legal standards, effectively shielding directors from liability. Recent evidence further suggests that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, outside directors do not suffer reputational consequences when their firms perform poorly. For many directors, therefore, the benefits of overcommitting will continue to outweigh the costs.

B. Recommendations for Reform

Private ordering will not solve the problem of director overcommitment in financial companies. Alleviating director overcommitment requires something more. This Section proposes a series of reforms targeted to large, complex financial institutions. The proposals range from stricter proxy ad-

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regulation as a BHC would be “a death knell” for the shareholder); see also Lewkow, supra note 266 (“[I]t is not uncommon . . . for the target of a proxy contest to use BHC [Act] control concerns as a defensive tactic (e.g., by arguing to the [Federal Reserve] that the [opposing shareholder] cannot solicit proxies without prior [Federal Reserve] approval.").

268 See, e.g., SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 34 (noting that independent directors of S&P 500 firms earn, on average, $288,909 in compensation per board seat).

269 See David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 59 J. Fin. 2281, 2301–05 (2004) (providing evidence that outside directors who develop reputations as effective board members are more likely to acquire additional directorships).

270 See, e.g., Ferris et al., supra note 81, at 1098–99 (finding that directors of underperforming firms experience diminished reputations in the form of fewer board seats).
visory “overboarding” thresholds to regulatory caps on outside commitments. This Section also recommends safeguards to ensure that the proposed reforms will not deplete the pool of qualified and interested director candidates.

1. Stricter Proxy Advisor Voting Standards

First, proxy advisory firms should adopt more stringent “overboarding” standards for directors of large, complex financial institutions. The two largest proxy advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis, recently lowered the maximum number of outside commitments that a director may hold before being considered “overboarded.” ISS and Glass Lewis now recommend that shareholders vote against any director who serves on the board of six or more public companies. ISS and Glass Lewis, in addition, generally recommend against a director who serves as the CEO of a public company and on three or more public company boards. These revised thresholds—although arguably satisfactory for directors of nonfinancial companies—are still far too high for directors of financial firms.

Proxy advisory firms should adopt an overboarding policy specifically for large, complex financial firms. This policy should recommend against the election of any director who sits on three or more public company boards—the threshold most indicative of when a director becomes distracted. Recognizing that full-time employment represents a significant bur-


275 The proxy advisory firms differ slightly in their overboarding thresholds for sitting executives. ISS generally recommends against a director who serves as the CEO of a public company and on the board of three or more public companies (excluding his or her own). See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 274, at 16. Glass Lewis, by contrast, generally recommends against a director who serves as any executive officer of a public company and on the board of three or more public companies (including his or her own). See GLASS LEWIS, supra note 274, at 15.

276 Some commenters have criticized the revised standards as inadequate. See, e.g., Keally, supra note 251, at 17 (arguing that the threshold reductions “will remain largely inconsequential” because “[m]ost directors are already well below these new limits”).

277 See Cashman, supra note 106, at 3255 (“[T]he negative association between busy directors and firm performance is strongest when the definition of busy is a director serving on three or more boards.”).
den on a director’s time and attention, the overboarding policy should, in addition, recommend against a director who serves as an executive officer of a public company and on two or more public company boards (including his or her own). Proxy advisory firms should also, at their discretion, recommend against directors who satisfy these standards but nonetheless are overcommitted by virtue of other employment or service on private company boards, philanthropic boards, councils, or advisory groups. Finally, proxy advisory firms should recommend against the lead independent director and members of the nominating committee of a large, complex financial company that fails to adequately limit director overcommitment.

Although shareholders of financial firms face steep barriers to defeating board nominees, a negative recommendation by a proxy advisory firm can influence a significant proportion of votes. Proxy advisory firms’ policies, moreover, encourage companies to adapt their corporate governance practices to avoid negative recommendations. The proxy advisory firms should bring this power to bear on large, complex financial firms by adopting more stringent overboarding standards.

2. Enhanced Supervisory Assessments

If financial company directors remain overcommitted despite enhanced proxy advisory thresholds, then the financial regulatory agencies should adopt policies to address the problem directly. The Federal Reserve, as the umbrella supervisor of BHCs and systemically important nonbank financial companies, would be best suited to implement policies to limit director overcommitment.

As an initial step, the Federal Reserve should downgrade a company’s supervisory rating if its directors are too overcommitted to monitor risks effectively. The Federal Reserve annually evaluates a BHC’s “ability to monitor and manage all risks” and assigns a numeric risk management rating. Companies with weak risk management ratings are subject to a va-

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278 See supra notes 252–267 and accompanying text.
279 See Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. Fin. 2389, 2404 (2009) (finding that directors with a negative recommendation from ISS receive 19% fewer votes); Stephen J. Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (concluding that a negative recommendation by ISS shifts up to 10% of shareholder votes).
281 See BARR ET AL., supra note 53, at 664, 705 (identifying the Federal Reserve as the consolidated supervisor of BHCs and nonbank financial companies designated by the FSOC).
282 See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 70,444, 70,446 (Dec. 6, 2004) (explaining that the Federal Reserve rates a company’s risk management on a one to five
riety of sanctions, including limitations on activities and geographic expansion. Although board engagement comprises a portion of the risk management rating, the current evaluation process does not expressly take into account directors’ outside commitments. The Federal Reserve should begin assigning an unsatisfactory risk management rating to a company if, in the Federal Reserve’s supervisory discretion, the company’s directors are too busy to execute their governance roles effectively.

3. Targeted Regulatory Intervention

As a further step, the Federal Reserve should enact a regulatory cap on directors’ outside professional commitments to disqualify extraordinarily busy candidates from serving on boards of large, complex financial companies. In crafting regulatory requirements, the Federal Reserve should look to the EU as a model. In 2013, the EU enacted Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD IV”), limiting the outside commitments of directors of a financial institution that is “significant in terms of its size, internal organization and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities.” Under CRD IV, a director of such a firm may not hold more than four board seats or, if the director is a full-time executive, more than two board seats (excluding his or her own company). These limitations ensure that directors of a financial institution “allot sufficient time and attention to discharge their duties in the institution and thus reduce the riskiness of its activity.”

The Federal Reserve should adopt limitations similar to CRD IV to eliminate the most severely overcommitted directors of large, complex financial companies in the United States. The Federal Reserve’s numeric limit on directorships, however, should be more stringent than under CRD IV. EU regulators apply the CRD IV limits to many financial companies, in-

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283 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(4)(B)(i) (2012) (providing that a BHC may not engage in expanded financial activities if it has not received at least a satisfactory risk management rating); id. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (authorizing the Federal Reserve to approve an interstate acquisition otherwise prohibited by state law only if the acquiring BHC has received a satisfactory risk management rating).

284 See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. at 70,446 (noting that the risk management rating “represents an evaluation of the ability of the BHC’s board of directors and senior management . . . to identify, measure, monitor, and control risk”).

285 CRD IV, supra note 19, at art. 90.

286 See id.

cluding some with as little as $730 million in assets. The Federal Reserve, by contrast, typically applies enhanced prudential standards to a much more limited set of firms with $50 billion or more in assets, and it reserves its most stringent standards for the nine SIFIs. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve should prohibit directors of a BHC with $50 billion or more in assets or a systemically important nonbank financial company from serving on the board of more than three public companies or, if the director is a public company executive, more than two public companies (including his or her own).

The Federal Reserve should go beyond CRD IV and adopt additional restrictions for key directors. The directorship limitations in CRD IV apply uniformly to all members of a financial institution’s board. As discussed above, however, some financial institution directors bear special responsibility for ensuring the firm’s safety and soundness. A firm’s lead independent director, risk committee chair, and audit committee chair, in particular, are critical to effective risk management. These directors, therefore, should be uniquely focused on the firm. The Federal Reserve should establish more stringent restrictions for the three key directors of each SIFI. Specifically, the Federal Reserve should limit SIFI lead independent directors, risk committee chairs, and audit committee chairs to serving on the board of one other public company. The Federal Reserve, moreover, should not permit a current public company executive to serve in one of these key leadership roles, as it is unlikely that a sitting executive would be able to devote sufficient time and attention to the role.

4. Increased Director Compensation

There is, of course, a tension between trying to attract the strongest and most highly qualified directors for large, complex financial companies and limiting their outside professional commitments. Director candidates already complain that serving on a financial company’s board is unattractive

288 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK, IFPRU § 1.2.3 (2014), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/IFPRU/1/2.html [https://perma.cc/NAL6-Q734] (applying CRD IV limits on directorships to investment firms with total assets exceeding £530 million). 530 million pounds is equivalent to approximately 744 million U.S. dollars as of February 2018.

289 See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (directing the Federal Reserve to adopt enhanced risk management requirements for BHCs with more than $50 billion in assets and systemically important nonbank financial companies that increase in stringency based on the institution’s systemic importance). In December 2017, the Senate Banking Committee passed a bipartisan bill that would increase the enhanced prudential standard threshold to $250 billion in assets. S. 2155, 115th Cong. § 401 (2018).

290 See CRD IV, supra note 19.

291 See Tarullo, supra note 47 (emphasizing the importance of a firm’s lead independent director, risk committee chair, and audit committee chair).
due to onerous regulations and potential liability.\textsuperscript{292} Imposing limits on directors’ outside commitments is likely to further dissuade well-qualified candidates from serving.\textsuperscript{293} The Federal Reserve can limit the depletion of qualified and interested director candidates by applying the most stringent regulatory caps only to key SIFI directors—less than thirty directors in total—as previously suggested. Further safeguards may be needed, however, to ensure a consistent supply of well-qualified candidates who are willing to comply with limits on their professional obligations.

To that end, large, complex financial companies should substantially increase directors’ pay to compensate them for foregone professional opportunities. Financial firms already compensate their directors generously. Indeed, in 2017, average outside director compensation among the eight U.S. G-SIBs ranged from $275,000 at Bank of New York Mellon to more than $600,000 at Goldman Sachs.\textsuperscript{294} Large financial companies, however, generally cap their board members’ compensation to deter shareholder litigation over directors’ earnings.\textsuperscript{295}

Directors are likely to require higher pay if they are going to be subject to limits on their outside engagements.\textsuperscript{296} Key SIFI directors, in particular, should receive substantial raises in exchange for severely limiting their outside board seats. To align directors’ interests with those of other stakeholders in the firm, financial companies should, to the extent possible, structure enhanced pay packages in compliance with compensation guidelines pro-

\textsuperscript{292} See Lisa DiCarlo, America’s Most Overworked Directors, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2002, 12:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2002/08/06/0806directors.html [https://perma.cc/APM7-4MPU] (“[H]eadhunters are having a tough time filling board seats, partly out of concern for personal liability. . . . [S]ome are backing off because of . . . greater scrutiny from shareholders and U.S. federal agencies.”); Ben Marlow, Overboarding Is Corporate Governance Gone Mad, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 30, 2017, at 2 (“[B]ig banks . . . say it is painfully difficult to find people willing to deal with the dizzying complexities and regulation that has been piled on to financial institutions since the financial crisis.”). See generally Vartanian, supra note 270 (discussing liability risk for bank directors); John Engen, Take a Seat, Please, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2017, at 12 (describing difficulties banks face in finding director candidates).

\textsuperscript{293} Cf. Francesco Guerrera & Peter Thal Larsen, Gone by the Board? Why Bank Directors Did Not Spot Credit Risks, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/6e6fe18-42e8-11dd-81d0-0000779fd2ac [https://perma.cc/L89Y-3EJD] (quoting an anonymous former banking executive who declined several financial company board seats because they would have conflicted the executive out of working in the financial sector).

\textsuperscript{294} SPENCER STUART 2017 BOARD INDEX, supra note 15, at 47.


\textsuperscript{296} See id. (noting that “competitive pay can help lure qualified directors who otherwise would choose less time-consuming and highly scrutinized jobs”). But see LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 128, at 26 (reporting that compensation and stock ownership are among the least important reasons that directors give for joining a board).
posed by the financial regulatory agencies for executives and significant risk takers.297

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that busy directors detract from effective governance at large financial institutions. These institutions, by virtue of their complexity and systemic importance, require enhanced monitoring from their boards—oversight that busy directors are ill-equipped to provide. The directors of the United States’ largest and most complex financial institutions, however, remain alarmingly busy. Preserving the safety and soundness of the financial system, therefore, requires that financial company directors—and especially those with key board leadership positions—reduce their outside commitments. This Article has proposed a series of reforms to ensure that financial company directors focus on their governance responsibilities. The reforms outlined in this Article will enhance oversight of management, deter misconduct and excessive risk-taking, and—potentially—help prevent the next financial crisis.
