The "Dividend of Democracy": Analyzing U.S. Support for Nigerian Democratization

Philip C. Aka
THE "DIVIDEND OF DEMOCRACY": ANALYZING U.S. SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIZATION

PHILIP C. AKA*

Abstract: For centuries, United States foreign policy has been outwardly characterized by its diplomatic and economic encouragement of fledgling democracies around the world. In particular, the nations of Africa are seen to benefit from America's idealistic foreign agenda. After forty years of independent struggle and civil war, Nigeria has freely elected a leader who expresses willingness to strengthen his nation's global position through international trade and assistance. At this critical stage in Nigeria's political development, will U.S. policymakers pay lip service to democracy through limited "unrewarding social work" or will it recognize common national interests to further a "genuinely reciprocal and mutually beneficial" relationship? This Article critiques the quantity and quality of U.S. aid to Nigeria, examining underlying tensions and motivations, and the forces of globalization. In order for Nigeria to find a true and stable democracy, this Article contends, U.S. policy must establish Nigeria's role as an independent partner in the exchange of cultural and natural resources, as part of a genuine effort to bolster its domestic capability.

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INTRODUCTION

Although United States foreign policymakers have always articulated a desire to seek democracy in Africa,¹ they have not pursued this goal with any degree of consistency, particularly during the Cold War era.² Democracy scholars such as Professor Larry Diamond³ contend that U.S. policies toward Africa have, since 1990, been increasingly driven by a “concern for democracy, accountability, and human rights . . . .”⁴ But is there any basis for the position that the United States has become more earnest and circumspect in its efforts to promote African democratization? The impact of globalization further complicates this inquiry.

To address this issue, this Article analyzes U.S. support of “democratization” in Nigeria since May 29, 1999.⁵ The focus on Nigeria is mandated first because the nation is known throughout the world as a major regional power.⁶ Secondly, the September 11 attacks in New York City further complicated the contexts under which the United States decided to support Nigerian democratic development.

¹ See Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in Africa: U.S. and International Policies in Transition, in Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges 250 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 2nd ed. 1995) (stating that “[s]ince the first stirrings of Africa’s independence movements, self-determination, freedom, democracy, and human rights have been important foreign policy goals for the United States in Africa”); see also U.S. and Africa in the ’70s, Statement on African Policy by Hon. William P. Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State (Mar. 26, 1970), in Basic Documents on African Affairs 482 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1971) (conveying that America has “a preference for democratic procedures, but recognizes that the forces for change and nation-building which operate in Africa may create governmental patterns not necessarily consistent with such procedures”).

² See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1, at 250–51 (lambasting the history of U.S. policies in Africa as “sorry”). At the risk of oversimplification, the Cold War involved the competition between the United States (representing the First World) and the former Soviet Union (representing the Second World) for the hearts and minds of peoples in the developing (or Third) world. The competition was bloodless as between the two powers and their allies, but, like any war, exceedingly costly and bloody for the Third World whose territories served as the battleground for this conflict. One consequence of this war was the disappearance of the Second World and the disutility in all but the name of the “Third World” for designating the developmentally diverse peoples of the developing world. For an overview of the history of the Cold War, focusing on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, see generally Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991 (1998).

³ Professor Diamond wrote his doctoral dissertation on Nigeria and has much inside knowledge concerning the country. A Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, he has authored and edited numerous works on democratic development in the world and is a founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy as well as one of the leaders of the National Endowment for Democracy, based in Washington, D.C.

⁴ Diamond, supra note 1, at 252.

⁵ This date marked the inauguration of Nigeria’s latest democracy (and republic), one preceded by more than fifteen years of repressive military rule.

York and Washington D.C. have given rise to a debate about the character and "correctness" of U.S. foreign policy; exploring the policy toward Nigerian democratization lends important insight into the nature of American foreign policy at this moment of controversy. Part I contains a brief history and overview of Nigeria's current political status as it strives for a genuine democracy. Part II brings to light some of the tensions and motivations that underlie U.S.-Nigerian relations. In Part III, this Article describes the contours of the United States' diplomatic, military, and economic support for Nigeria, addressing each in turn. Part IV provides a working definition for globalization, followed by its potential and actual effects on Nigerian democratization. Finally, Part V concludes with four findings and argues that promoting democracy is an important element of U.S. policy, but that this ideal is often sacrificed in pursuit of pragmatic national interests.

I. A DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIA

A. Demographic Overview

Nigeria is a country about two times the size of California located on the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa.\(^7\) It is by far the most populous country in Africa, with a population estimated at over 110 million people.\(^9\) With about two hundred and fifty language or ethnic

\(^7\) See Ali A. Mazrui, Globalization: Between the Market and the Military—A Third World Perspective, Banquet Address at the 19th Annual Meeting of the Association of Third World Studies, Inc., Savannah, Ga. (Oct. 13, 2001), in 19 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. (forthcoming Spring 2002) (rebutting President George Bush’s characterization of the terrorist attacks as a "war" against American democracy or way of life and contending that detractors of the United States, particularly those in the Arab world, base their opposition on American foreign policy); see also Joseph Curl, Clinton Calls Terror a U.S. Debt to Past, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001 (conveying former President Bill Clinton’s view that the suicide attacks on the United States are the price the country is paying today for its past sin of slavery and the expropriation and near-extermination of native Americans); Fareed Zakaria, Why Do They Hate Us?, Special Report, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001. In an old work that is recently drawing attention, Professor Samuel Huntington argued that world politics is entering a new era in which the sources of conflict will be based on cultural divisions rather than on ideology or economic forces. He stated that the battle lines of the future will be the fault lines between civilizations. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY: A READER 1, 1–22 (Patrick O’Meara et al. eds., 2000). There will be more than a few people who will see the events of September 11, 2001 as Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” Armageddon.


\(^9\) Id. No other country on the continent has a population nearly as large as Nigeria's. As of 1998, the population far outranks that of large countries like Ethiopia (fifty-nine million), Egypt (fifty-two million), and South Africa (forty-two million). GLOBAL STUDIES,
groups,\textsuperscript{10} it is also one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa and in the world. Many of Nigeria’s ethnic groups are small communities with populations that number between tens and hundreds of thousands, but three of them, the Hausa-Fulanis in the North (two groups so interconnected they are usually counted as one), the Igbos in the East, and the Yorubas in the West, have populations that run into tens of millions. This “ethnic triumvirate” makes up about two-thirds of the country’s population.\textsuperscript{11}

Nigeria has large reserves of crude oil under its soil and is an important member of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC).\textsuperscript{12} Before the discovery of oil, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy was agriculture. Cocoa was produced in the West, groundnut (peanut) in the North, and palm oil in the East.\textsuperscript{13} Since the production of commercial quantities of crude oil began in the 1970s,\textsuperscript{14} Nigeria has depended on oil as its sole foreign exchange earner, to the virtual neglect of agriculture.\textsuperscript{15} One of the challenges successive governments in the country face is how to diversify the country’s economy away from its heavy dependence on oil.

B. Political History

Nigeria is a wholesale product of British colonialism.\textsuperscript{16} The nation was formed in 1914, when, for administrative and economic convenience, Britain lumped its three colonies in the area\textsuperscript{17} together into

\textsuperscript{10} ABORISADE \& MUNDT, supra note 6, at 57.

\textsuperscript{11} Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY 417, 419 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).

\textsuperscript{12} See, e.g., JEDRZEJ GEORG FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFLICT AND LITIGATION BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 16–18 (2000). Other mineral resources include coal, columbite, iron ore, lead, limestone, natural gas, tin, and zinc. Nigeria, supra note 8, at 52.

\textsuperscript{13} Nigeria, supra note 8, at 54.

\textsuperscript{14} FRYNAS, supra note 12, at 11.

\textsuperscript{15} Id. at 25.

\textsuperscript{16} Even the very name of the country came from Britain. See generally FREDERICK D. LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA (1922).

\textsuperscript{17} English presence in what is today Nigeria goes back to 1863 when Lagos came under British control.
one country in an event historians call "The Amalgamation."\textsuperscript{18} Some believe that Nigeria is too large and unwieldy to comprise one country. The country houses three of the largest (and most competitive) ethnic groups in Africa; seven percent of the world's languages are spoken in Nigeria, the highest number of languages in any single country.\textsuperscript{19} The Amalgamation brought together, without consultation, a multiplicity of groups which before 1914 had a history of little contact and interaction with one another. Attempts since independence to forge these groups into one nation have yielded little fruit. Nigeria remained under British rule for forty-six years until October 1, 1960, when it became independent from London.\textsuperscript{20}

At independence, the country experimented with a parliamentary system of government patterned on the British Westminster model consisting of an executive headed by a prime minister and a cabinet based on collective responsibility, a bicameral national assembly elected largely by universal suffrage, and an independent judiciary, among other features.\textsuperscript{21} From the outset, the political system came under severe stress brought about by ethnic rivalry.\textsuperscript{22} The

\textsuperscript{18} The three colonies were Lagos and the northern and southern “protectorates.” Because of the difficulty they have had in forging a sense of nationhood among inhabitants, the Amalgamation is an event many Nigerians remember with more regret than fondness. Some sections of the country, particularly the north, still rue the “mistake of 1914.” 1 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1969, at 3 (1971).

\textsuperscript{19} See Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 57 (citing Ethnologue: Languages of the World (Barbara F. Grimes, ed., 11th ed. 1988)).

\textsuperscript{20} There are some who have argued that British colonial rule in Nigeria did not last long enough to prepare the country for independent nationhood. One state governor in the 1980s even called for the re-colonization of the country! But, Britain did not use what little time it had in Nigeria judiciously. First, its policy of indirect rule (through local rulers) helped to ensure that the country became independent without the development of any sense of nationhood among groups. Second, its colonial policy favored the North to the detriment of other regions of the country. Attempts to correct these mistakes have not worked. See William D. Graf, The Nigerian State: Political Economy, State Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era 15, 24 n.11 (1988); Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence 6 (1998).

\textsuperscript{21} At independence, the country’s constitutional system departed from the British system in two main respects: Nigeria adopted a federal system (in response to its great diversity), and it also guaranteed fundamental rights for its citizens. British constitutionalism lacks both of these features.

\textsuperscript{22} See Diamond, supra note 11, at 466 (stating that the structure of the country’s federalism at independence made the three major ethnic groups “in effect, governmental as well as ethnic categories.”); see also Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria, 90 Afr. Aff. 237, 243 (1991) (conveying that federalism in Nigeria before the war, “was, for all practical purposes, a majorities’ enclave whose stability depended on the abil-
democratic experiment broke down in January 1966 when power shifted to the military in a trend that would mark the nature of Nigerian politics from that point forward. Worse still, ethnic disharmony soon degenerated into war between 1967 and 1970. The war claimed three million lives, most of them Igbos, who, with other easterners, seceded to form their own independent Republic of Biafra, displacing another three million people. The war has been ranked by one chronicler as "the bloodiest civil war of the 20th century." In 1970, following the successful termination of Biafran secession, the country reunited and continued its journey toward nationhood.

Nigeria has a federal system of government that operates as a unitary format, particularly during periods of military government. Over time, this system grew in complexity and is today made up of one national government, thirty-six state governments, and a federal capital territory (FCT) based in Abuja, and numerous local governments. Although Nigerians are a freedom-loving people with a passion for democratic rule, democracy has had a checkered history in Nigeria (see Table 1).

\[\text{\textit{Kirk-Greene supra note 18, at vii. Professor Kirk-Greene disclosed that this war to keep Nigeria unified had by 1969 earned "the unwanted distinction of becoming the biggest, best-weaponed, and bloodiest war in the whole history of Black Africa." See 2 Kirk-Greene, supra note 18, at 462. The war assaulted the consciences of the international community with pictures of starving Igbo children whose stomachs were distended from kwashiorkor; it was the result of the Nigerian federal government's ignominious use of hunger as a weapon of war against the seceding Biafrans.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Military governments in Nigeria cannot survive without promising to return power to civilians and then following that promise with the appearance of an earnest effort to transition to a civil rule program.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{Referring to the dilemma of democracy in Nigeria in 1996, one Nigerian political scholar pointed out that the country has had a long history of political experiments, "inspired by the finest democratic ideals," with, unfortunately, nothing to show for it but "a ravaged economy, a poorly functioning state, and recurrent social upheavals." See Richard Joseph, Nigeria: Inside the Dismal Tunnel, 95 CURRENT HIST. 194, 200 (1996).}}\]
Table 1
Nigerian Governments from Abubakar Balewa to Olusegun Obasanjo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Rule</th>
<th>Name of Ruler</th>
<th>Gov't Type</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>How Rule ended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1966</td>
<td>Abubakar Balewa</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Attempted coup/Assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Aguiyi Ironsi</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>Coup/Assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1975</td>
<td>Yakubu Gowon</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Middle Belt</td>
<td>Coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>Murtala Mohammed</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Attempted coup/Assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1983</td>
<td>Shehu Shagari</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>Coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>M. Buhari</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>Coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1993</td>
<td>I. Babangida</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Minority Group in Niger State</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Ernest Shonekan</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>Head of interim government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1998</td>
<td>Sani Abacha</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Kanuri</td>
<td>Death by heart attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998–1999</td>
<td>A. Abubakar</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Middle Belt</td>
<td>Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–</td>
<td>Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FRYNAS, supra note 12, at 43.

The first attempt at democratic rule lasted little more than five years. A second try lasted just over four years, while a projected third republic was still-born in 1993 when the military government under General Ibrahim Babangida annulled an election he himself had conducted. The present government, which is led by retired military general Olusegun Obasanjo, represents the country’s fourth attempt at democratic governance (and as Table 1 indicates, this is Obasanjo’s second time in office as political leader). Briefly, four generals preceded Obasanjo. The first, Muhammadu Buhari, would not even entertain the notion of handing power over to a democratically elected government. He was removed from office in a palace coup in 1985. The second, Babangida, pledged to hand power over to civil-

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29 For an assessment of the country’s first experiment with democracy or First Republic, see generally LARRY DIAMOND, CLASS, ETHNICITY, AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC (1988).


31 See, e.g., TRANSITION WITHOUT END: NIGERIAN POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER BABANGIDA 9 (LARRY DIAMOND et al. eds., 1997).
ians, and designed a complex transition program but changed the date for the transfer of power many times. Finally, in 1993, after many years driving a society broken by unceasing economic hardship, Babangida held a comparatively free and fair election which he, however, quickly annulled because he did not like the result. He left office in August 1993 under the cloud of controversy generated by the annulment, leaving power in the hands of an interim government. The third leader to precede Obasanjo, Sani Abacha, was the most crudely repressive of them all. He took over in November 1993 and remained in office until his death in June 1998. Not until the fourth leader, Abdulsami Abubakar was power finally transferred to civilians in May 1999.

Because of the failed transfers of power under these Nigerian generals, Nigeria lacks an experience of democracy of the kind of depth upon which a study like this can draw. Of its forty-one years of independent existence, Nigeria has spent approximately three decades under military rule and only eleven years, including the present Obasanjo period, under civilian rule. The Obasanjo government, like the Second Republic government in power from 1979 to 1983, is based on a federal constitution patterned after the U.S. system of government that is characterized by an executive branch headed by a president, a bicameral legislative assembly, an independent judiciary, and guarantees of basic rights. Since 1999, political power in Nigeria has been shared by three political parties. One of these three, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), General Obasanjo’s party, controls the presidency and both houses of the National Assembly.

C. Ethnicity and Religion

One notable feature which has characterized politics and society in Nigeria since independence is ethnicity. Expressions of ethnicity

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32 Political observers appropriately condemned the Babangida transition program as “one of the most sustained exercises in political chicanery ever visited on a people.” See Diamond, supra note 11, at 443.

33 The election Babangida annulled was presumably won by Chief Moshood Abiola. A Yoruba business tycoon, Abiola was charged with treason and imprisoned by the military government under General Abacha after he proceeded to declare himself president. He died in prison.

34 For a more elaborate discussion of the origins and effects of ethnicity on politics and society in Nigeria, see Philip C. Aka, Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic Reconciliation in the New Century, 14 TEMPL. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 327, 330–37 (2000). In Nigeria, ethnic groups are more commonly referred to as “tribes” and ethnicity as “tribalism.”
are frequently linked to exclusiveness, and most often "accompanied by nepotism and corruption" that is "expressed inevitably through interethnic discrimination in jobs, housing, admissions into educational institutions, marriages, business transactions or the distribution of social welfare services." Nigeria's ethnic structure impedes rather than encourages inter-ethnic cooperation. One of numerous social cleavages which reinforce and magnify, rather than crosscut, ethnicity in the country is religion. Although adherents of Christianity and Islam, Nigeria's two major religions, can be found in all parts of the country, most Hausa-Fulanis are Muslim, and most Igbos are Christian. The Yorubas are divided about equally between these two religions. The latest manifestation of ethnic-religious conflict in the country has resulted from the adoption of Islamic Sharia law in many of the country's northern states. By June 2001, eleven out of nineteen northern states had implemented Sharia law. Until this implementation, Sharia was a customary law applied only as civil law in the North. The more widespread adoption of this law, which involves replacing both civil and criminal legal systems with Muslim law, has led to deadly conflicts between Muslims and Christians in various parts of the country, resulting in the loss of lives and property. Approximately 10,000 people have died from violence traceable to ethnic-religious conflict since General Obasanjo took office.

Many observers correctly view these states' adoption of Sharia law as politically motivated attempts by Hausa-Fulani leaders to undermine the strength of Obasanjo's administration, whose policies they consider unfavorable to northern interests. Manifestation of regionalism in the country includes a northern fear of a "southern tyranny of skills" matched by a southern fear of a northern "tyranny of population." One reason for Nigeria's progressive division and subdivi-

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55 Graf, supra note 20, at 14 (quoting Okwudiba NNoli, Ethnic Politics In Nigeria (1978)).
57 See Aka, supra note 34, at 334 n.61.
58 See Talking Point, Interview by Robin Lustig with Olusegun Obasanjo, President, Nigeria, Abuja, Nig. (Feb. 16, 2002) (on file with author).
59 See Minabere Ibelema, Nigeria: The Politics of Marginalization, 99 Current Hist. 211, 213 (2000). The use of geographic adjectives and references to geography in analysis of Nigerian politics testifies to the continuing negative influence of regional divisions in the country. One major way this social cleavage manifests itself is a northern fear of the southern advantage in education ("tyranny of skills"), matched by a southern fear of a northern "tyranny of population".
60 See Richard Joseph et al., Nigeria, in Introduction To Comparative Politics 570 (Mark Kesselman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (quoting J. Isawa Elaigwu, The Nigerian Fed-
sion into greater numbers of states (from three regions in 1960 to thirty-six states in 1996)\textsuperscript{41} was to minimize the influence of ethnicity on the country's politics and to promote inter-ethnic cooperation. Every indication, however, including the recent manifestations of religion on the country's national life, suggests that these divisions have been to no avail.\textsuperscript{42} Unfortunately, the sole remaining issue to unite Nigerians, as a people, appears to be their common devotion to soccer as a national pastime.\textsuperscript{43} Recent studies in political science have unveiled the role of trust in the formation and maintenance of a political system.\textsuperscript{44} The severity of Nigeria's ethnic conflicts appears to suggest that the country lacks the trust necessary to maintain society.

D. Democratization

1. A Government in Transition

I designate the process of political change that has taken place in Nigeria since May 1999 as "democratization." This term refers to something ongoing and, as used here, signifies a transition away from dictatorial rule.\textsuperscript{45} It reflects political scientists' evaluation that changes in government, while important, do not always rise to the level of full-fledged democracy;\textsuperscript{46} this view accords with those of analysts such as William Minter who assessed the struggle for democracy in Nigeria as still "unresolved."\textsuperscript{47} While it is true that democracies are, by
definition, works in progress—journeys as opposed to final destinations—some democracies appear to be farther from their destination than others. A transfer of power from one soldier to a former soldier, in an economy rocked by official corruption and crushing austerity measures, does not a true democracy make.

A primary factor leading to this still-transitional assessment of Nigerian democracy under General Obasanjo is the tenuous character of the popular support for his leadership. Of Nigeria’s former three regions and main ethnic groups, Obasanjo won heavily in two, the North and East, but he and his party failed to carry the Yoruba West. In effect, as one analyst points out, “Obasanjo became the first Nigerian to be elected to the presidency without the support of his own ethnic group.” This fact is especially noteworthy because it has compromised the president’s ability to pursue policies he considers inclusive and equitable, but which Hausa-Fulani leaders consider unfa-

Nigeria’s struggle for democracy. Id. at 205–06. These issues include regional and ethnic inequality, division of governmental powers, and revenue allocation. Id.

Václav Havel, former president of Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic, once argued that even democratic veterans like the United States do nothing but merely approach democracy:

As long as people are people, democracy in the full sense of the word, will always be no more than an ideal. In this sense, you too are merely approaching democracy. But you have one great advantage: you have been approaching democracy uninterruptedly for more than 200 years, and your journey toward the horizon has never been disrupted by a totalitarian system.

Larry Berman & Bruce A. Murphy, Approaching Democracy 3 (2d ed. 1999); see also President William J. Clinton, Address to a Joint Session of the Nigerian National Assembly (Aug. 26, 2000), available at http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/wwwclin.html.


See Donald Rothchild, Conclusion: Management of Conflict in West Africa, in Governance as Conflict Management 197, 222 (I. William Zartman ed., 1997) (stating that “[t]he presence of democracy cannot be determined by one set of multiparty elections; rather it must be viewed as a developmental process over time”).

See Ibelema, supra note 39, at 213.

Id. Cf. Guest, supra note 50, at 15 (indicating that because he “drew most of his electoral support from non-Yorubas,” Obasanjo “is one of the few Nigerian politicians whose loyalties are not determined by his tribal origins”). For an interesting explanation of Yoruba attitudes toward Obasanjo and previous Yoruba leaders, see Bayo Onanuga, The Yoruba Complex, The NEWS (Lagos), June 7, 1999, at 3.

Ibelema, supra note 39, at 213.
vororable to the north.55 The result has been the widespread adoption of Islamic Sharia law in the northern states, increasing ethnic-religious violence and complicating governance for General Obasanjo.56 Although the greatest challenge to his rule comes now from the north, as this Article will demonstrate shortly, popular support for Obasanjo is also slipping in the east and among minorities in both the South and North of the country.

Another factor that contributes to the characterization of Nigeria’s political situation as transitional is the heavy militarized nature of the Obasanjo government.57 Since taking office, General Obasanjo has failed to adjust his leadership style to the tenets and imperatives of civil-democratic rule. Democratic consolidation is, in the parlance of conflict management, “the process of progressive elimination or minimization of force and coercion, extreme repression, and related negative conflict management techniques antithetical to democracy.”58 No such minimization of force has occurred under Obasanjo.59 Additionally, as his frosty relationship with the National Assembly illustrates, General Obasanjo tends to command, rather than conciliate or compromise.60

55 As Minabere Ibelema points out, although the North historically lags behind the rest of the country in educational and industrial development, Hausa-Fulanis, as an ethnic group, have exercised political leadership through much of Nigeria’s post-colonial history. Hausa-Fulani leaders believed northern votes put Obasanjo in office and that his election, to begin with, was a “concession” to the Yorubas designed to rectify the northern military establishment’s nullification of the 1993 election, presumed to have been won by Chief Abiola, who was Yoruba. Id.

56 Id. at 212 (arguing that “[a]lthough the present crisis is veiled in religious differences, it is at root political”).

57 In the wake of the killings of over 200 Tivs in the Middle Belt by Nigerian soldiers, it was reported that Nigeria’s President, Director of National Security, Defense Minister and Director of the State Security Service (national intelligence) are all retired military persons. See John Chiahemen, Nigerian Democracy Wobbles, Army’s Profile Rises, Reuters, Oct. 29, 2001 (on file with author) (citing Reverend Father Matthew Hassan Kuka, a respected Nigerian social commentator and member of a human rights commission that Obasanjo impaneled). The Nigerian experience since 1999 indicates that one central component of a healthy democracy is missing: a civilian presence in the government.

58 Aka, supra note 34, at 354; see also Richard Joseph, Nigeria and the Challenge of Leadership, TELL (Lagos), July 5, 1999, at 48, 49 (arguing that the political system must be demilitarized in order for Nigeria to become a constitutional democracy).

59 See Chiahemen, supra note 57 (quoting Nigerian attorney and social crusader Gani Fawehinmi’s suggestion that Obasanjo’s civilian government brings back bad memories of past military rule in Nigeria).

If, as some scholars suggest, democratic consolidation occurs when "democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate and so habitually practiced and observed that it is very unlikely to break down,"61 the present political situation in Nigeria is nowhere near democratic consolidation.62 One perceptive U.S. analyst foresaw these problems, remarking upon the questionable fairness of the 1999 election, Obasanjo's military background, and "his apparent initial assumption that input from pro-democracy, human rights, and other grassroots groups is no longer necessary . . . ."63 The analyst concluded, "[t]he temptation to rely primarily on repression rather than dialogue is still a major threat."64 This comment has turned out to be prophetic indeed.

2. Internal Conflict, External Consequences

As one Nigerian journalist noted, "[o]nly a people confident and a government strong at home can engage the rest of the world."65 Given the strong connection between domestic and foreign policy, the political situation within the borders of Nigeria necessarily affects relations with the United States and other foreign countries.66 With the

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62 The issue of the “quality” of Nigerian democracy is at times a sore spot for General Obasanjo, who is not known for his good temper. The following illustrates his reaction to a reporter’s description of Nigerian democracy as something that “continues to struggle to get off the ground.”

[I]t’s a new one on me that Nigerian democracy is struggling to get off the ground . . . . I am learning that from you; now that you have told me, I will have to go back to President Bush and ask him to come and help me get Nigerian democracy off the ground . . . . We are not struggling; we are a maturing democracy . . . . Nigerian democracy has gotten off the ground.


63 Minter, supra note 47, at 206.

64 Id.

65 Reuben Abati, What is Obasanjo’s Foreign Policy?, GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), Aug. 29, 1999 (on file with author); see also Peter Calvert, The Foreign Policy of New States, at viii (1986) (maintaining that foreign policy is “ancillary to domestic policy and serves its needs”).

66 Id.
numerosity of economic and centrifugal problems at home, Nigerians and their government now lack this much-needed internal confidence. Democracy has yet to produce any economic dividend for the masses. Over 10,000 people have died from ethnic-religious conflicts and other causes since General Obasanjo took office. Compounding these matters is the fact that his government is developing a reputation for being aloof and uncar ing. In short, the shambled nature of the country's internal organization threatens its place and image in the international community. Countries also need domestic strength to weather or stem the forces of globalization.

More specifically, the country's growing domestic weakness minimizes its chances of conducting "genuinely reciprocal and mutu-

67 See, e.g., Ibelema, supra note 39, at 211-14 (analyzing the climate of ethno-religious tensions in the country occasioned by the declaration or implementation of Islamic Sharia law by some northern states and the cry of marginalization by both major and minor ethnic groups in the country); Chiahemen, supra note 57 (commenting on the "unprecedented level of violence" in the country, including the massacre in Benue State, necessitating the placement of about half a dozen Nigerian cities under a military-enforced curfew).

68 Abati, supra note 65.

69 See, e.g., Tayo Adesanya, Road Map to Economic Growth, The NEWS (Lagos), July 3, 2000 (stating that "the Nigerian economy is in [a] coma" and surmising that "[t]here is no doubt that Nigerians are becoming desperate by the day"); Ausbeth Ajagu, The Economy and Exchange Rate, THISDAY, Aug. 7, 2001, at 12 (pointing out the continued weakness of the national currency, the Naira, in relation to the U.S. dollar); Lynda Ikpeazu, Democracy and the Underprivileged, VANGUARD (Lagos), July 17, 2001, at 29 (noting that democracy has yielded no economic dividend for ordinary Nigerians); Nkiruka Obijulu, Workers and National Economy Policy, THISDAY, Aug. 7, 2001, at 12 (indicating that although the gross domestic product (GDP) grew modestly, no visible improvement occurred in living standards); Ayodele Teriba & Bayo Adeitan, The Nigerian Economy in 2000, THISDAY, July 17, 2001, at 2.

70 See Talking Point, supra note 38.

71 For example, in January 2002, an antiquated military arms depot exploded in a densely populated area of Lagos, killing more than 1,000. See Toll in Blast at Nigerian Armory Exceeds 1,000, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at 6.


73 See Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 253 (pointing out that the country's global position "has been compromised in recent years by her economic weakness, by the low legitimacy of her rulers both internally and abroad, and by the deepening fault lines along her regional and religious boundaries"); Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria 42 (1983) (decrying numerous vices, including the "bold and ravenous" political corruption, that plague the country). See generally Osaghae, supra note 20. The worrisome thing about Nigeria is that "[i]n comparison to other countries with equivalent natural resources, pool of skilled human resources, and size, [the country] has not done well." Aborisade & Mundt, supra note 6, at 245; see also Guest, supra note 50, at 5 (comparing the country with Indonesia).

ally beneficial"75 relations with the United States. Given the quicksand-like bases of support for the Obasanjo government and the country’s extensive internal weakness, it seems that U.S. policymakers should work toward “fundamental institutional change[s]” rather than attempt to build fragile American-style policy around “new leaders” like Obasanjo.76

II. TENSIONS AND MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING U.S.-NIGERIAN RELATIONS

In order to fully develop and evaluate the nature of U.S. foreign policy relating to Nigerian democracy, this study begins by bringing certain underlying tensions and motivations to light. This section addresses critics’ fundamental concerns about external support of African democratization efforts, both generally and with particular attention to the United States and Nigeria. It also discusses the economic and social interests at stake for both countries and the consequences of this reciprocity.

A. Tensions Regarding External Assistance for African Democratization

Nations must develop themselves or will not be developed at all.77 As one African proverb goes, no serious traveler depends entirely on the legs of another person for his journey.78 Critics of international support for African democratization efforts are primarily concerned about entrusting a critical stage of the country’s political development79 to foreign nations. These critics urge that Africans cannot depend solely or heavily on external actors, particularly the United States and other western countries, to realize their democratic aspirations.80

75 Minter, supra note 47, at 210.
76 See id. at 206.
78 DR. F. JEFFRESS RAMSAY, AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT, IN GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supra note 8, at 3, 9.
79 For a collection of essays on the meaning and complexity of the political development concept, see generally UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Myron Weiner & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 1987).
While such thinking has some merit, it incorrectly characterizes external support. Foreign support could be seen to reinforce rather than to detract or compromise self-development. The African proverb warns only about depending solely on others’ legs. Countries have ultimate ownership and responsibility for their own self-development, but external assistance is not necessarily contrary to this goal. As General Obasanjo argued during a spring 2001 interview, although Nigerian democracy “is essentially our own,” “development partners” such as the United States can contribute to bringing about the “democracy dividend” that will make Nigerian democracy more firm. Obasanjo characterized the “democracy dividend” as an opportunity for “getting resources to deal with essential quality of life enhancement in our own society . . . .” This definition connotes the usefulness of external support given that, as is often the case in Africa, the resources needed to enhance quality of life cannot be entirely generated at home.

Fledgling democracies are fragile constructs that have difficulty surviving in a “hostile environment.” External support can minimize such fragility along with the internal conflict and violence that threaten these political systems. It is in due recognition of this fact that the literature regarding consolidation of the latest wave of democracy in the world routinely integrates a discussion of the issue of international support. Thirdly, even the very meaning of foreign policy connotes the idea of assisting rather than co-opting another na-

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81. For an illustration of such sole dependence, rising to the level of abdication of ownership for one’s own self-development, see Dr. Julius O. Ihonvbere, Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80 (recounting the example of an unnamed African democratic leader who came to Washington in search of “democratic support” with a delegation of more than sixty members).

82. Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62.

83. Id. (emphasis added).

84. See Paul N. Ndue, Africa’s Turn Toward Pluralism, in Global Perspectives: International Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the View From Abroad 293, 302 (David Lai ed., 1997).


tion’s democracy building. These policies entail “the pursuit of vital domestic interests beyond [a country’s] own boundaries”\textsuperscript{87} and can both reflect and magnify domestic policies.\textsuperscript{88} Through foreign policy, African states are able to engage important external actors “in the search for solutions to domestic problems.”\textsuperscript{89} Foreign policy is only effective if it can both anticipate and minimize possible negative consequences of exerting external force on domestic programs.\textsuperscript{90}

Critics also contend that “externally assisted democratization”\textsuperscript{91} cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of sovereignty, which asserts that every country, regardless of its size, is the unquestioned master of its internal affairs and forbids other countries from interfering with those affairs.\textsuperscript{92} As one analyst inquired, is international intrusion on African domestic affairs “a new form of imperialism or the harbinger of new conflict between Africa and the West?”\textsuperscript{93} This Article contends that it need be neither one. The Universal Declaration of Human

\textsuperscript{87} James Zaffiro, Exceptionality in External Affairs: Botswana in the African and Global Arenas, in \textit{AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES}, supra note 74, at 66, 78.

\textsuperscript{88} See Abati, supra note 65 (stating, \textit{inter alia}, that “[d]omestic policy must be the starting point. Only a government that is strong at home can engage the rest of the world.”).

\textsuperscript{89} Assis Malaquias, Angola: The Foreign Policy of a Decaying State, in \textit{AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES}, supra note 74, at 23, 23.

\textsuperscript{90} In a study on human rights during the Babangida period, Professor Pita O. Agbese shows how external forces can abridge democracy and how removing those forces can enhance the chances of success for democracy. Pita O. Agbese, The State versus Human Rights Advocates in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, in \textit{AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM} 147, 152 (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et al. eds., 1994). Agbese blames Babangida’s turnaround with respect to these rights on the conditions necessary to implement the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). \textit{Id.} There was little chance that Nigerians would consent to the stringent budgetary cutbacks and fiscal controls that SAP entailed. \textit{Id.} at 153. Accordingly, once Babangida determined that the program was necessary, he had little choice but to muzzle public opinion and terminate any challenge to his policies, even as he called for a national debate on the issue. \textit{Id.} at 147, 152–56. Agbese concludes, persuasively in my view, that the external forces pushing SAP conditions on Nigeria effectively served to impede Nigerian democratization. \textit{Id.} at 168. Without meaning to rationalize Babangida’s cruel chicanery, the absence or minimization of those pressures could have represented positive support for political changes in Nigeria. \textit{Id.} For assessment of SAPs similar to Professor Agbese’s, see Naomi Chazan et al., \textit{POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA} 342–43 (3d ed. 1999) (arguing that basic elements in these programs were “prudent and necessary” given that many African economies needed adjustment, but that “the process of adjustment” was faulty in several dimensions).


\textsuperscript{92} For a concise elaboration of the doctrine of sovereignty, see, for example, Joshua S. Goldstein, \textit{INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS} 77–79 (3d ed. 1999); Bruce Russett et al., \textit{WORLD POLITICS: THE MENU FOR CHOICE} 49–52 (6th ed. 2000).

\textsuperscript{93} Diamond, \textit{supra} note 1, at 271.
Rights (UDHR) stipulates that every individual has the right to “social security” realized “through national effort and international cooperation.”94 Efforts to promote democratization exemplify the kind of international cooperation that contributes to this feeling of social security within one’s own country. The generous package of assistance extended to western European countries under the Marshall Plan after World War II rehabilitated their war-torn economies and helped build rather than inhibit the progress of democracy.95 Africa received no such help even though its devastation and deprivation rival that which Europe experienced as a result of World War II.96 At a minimum, international assistance is justified in that it enables democratizing “countries to address and mitigate discontinuities that [prior] external pressures for reform may have helped to exacerbate.”97 Indeed, international assistance “opens new opportunities for partnership in the search for development, social justice, and peaceful resolution of conflict in Africa.”98 As commentators argue, rather than pose an interventionist dilemma, properly implemented external support can advance democratization and lead to a more peaceful world.99

94 UDHR, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., art 22 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (emphasis added). The UDHR equates this right to social security as “economic, social, and cultural rights” required by every individual in order to promote “his dignity and the free development of his personality.” Id.

95 The Marshall Plan amounted to over $12 billion by 1952. Powsk, supra note 2, at 73.


97 Harbeson, supra note 91, at 241.

98 Diamond, supra note 1, at 271–72.

99 Harbeson, supra note 91, at 244. Diamond built this belief on his view that democracy is vital to the attainment of a “more just, peaceful, and stable world order, based on a global rule of law.” Diamond, supra note 1, at 269. As he explains:

[D]emocratic countries do not go to war with one another or sponsor terrorism against other democracies ... do not build weapons of mass destruction to threaten one another ... are more reliable, open, and enduring trading partners, and offer more stable climates for investments; are more environmentally responsible [given that they must answer to their own citizens] ... more likely to honor international treaties and value legal obligations [given that their openness makes it much more difficult to breach these agreements in secret] ... [and are a] reliable foundation on which to build a new world order of security and prosperity [given that they respect civil liberties, rights of property, and the rule of law within their own borders].
B. Tensions Regarding U.S. Assistance for Nigerian Democratization

Those who object to U.S. support for Nigerian democratization efforts do so on two discernible grounds. First, critics are quick to point out the United States' sorry record with respect to its past support for democracy in Africa. These critics suggest that America may be engaging in its same old "cynical calculations," advancing national interest under the guise of promoting democracy. Given this history, critics argue, Nigerians or other Africans blatantly delude themselves in relying on the United States to help them realize democracy in their countries. Although Nigerians have no way to be certain of what may truly motivate the United States to support democratization in Nigeria, scholars such as Larry Diamond have rightly commented that U.S. foreign policy of the past and at present is separated by markedly different eras. The United States' inconsistent record of democracy building during the Cold War does not necessarily indicate that it will pay the same lip service to democracy in the post-Cold War era. These themes will be developed in greater detail in later sections of this Article.

Critics' second objection to U.S. interference in Nigeria relates to what they consider the shallow nature of U.S. democracy when transferred to other nations. Democracy is not simply about, for example, elections and "protection of free markets." Critics worry that the United States will only be able to export a minimalistic, election-happy construct of democracy, when what Nigeria and other African countries need is an enriched, more meaningful system that responds to African conditions and is sensitive to the needs of various groups in the society. Nigeria needs, they contend, a democracy

Id. at 269-70.

100 Id. at 250-51.

101 Id. at 250. Historical examples of these calculations would include the U.S. government's support for Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko and the white minority regime in South Africa.

102 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80.

103 According to Diamond, the new political context is characterized by the absence of Soviet military and political influence and the spread of ideologies and economic systems hostile to U.S. interests. Diamond, supra note 1, at 253.


105 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80.

106 Id.; see also CONTEH-MORGAN, supra note 45, at 6 (describing democracy as "a process of establishing a form of governance in which mechanisms are created to ensure participation at all levels of politics, responsible leadership, and civil liberties")]; John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction to Multiparty Democracy and Political
that goes beyond ritualistic symbols such as free and fair elections that, while important, by themselves amount to little change.  

There fears appear to be ill founded, however, because no major nation in our time has developed a democracy without adapting it to suit local circumstances. Democracy, if and when it finally comes to Nigeria and other African countries, will be homegrown and responsive to the needs of each country or else the system will not survive.

Although individual countries may be under no moral obligation to follow through with the articulated goals of their foreign policies, those that do keep their promises project an aura of credibility in their dealings with other nations. The United States has long demonstrated a desire to win the "hearts and minds" of Third World peoples, Africans included, with offers of economic assistance. American leaders, such as President Kennedy, have asserted that this policy has been developed not out of self-interest, but "because it is right." U.S. sincerity is also bolstered by the fact that American

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107 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80; see also Julius O. Ihonvbere, How Not to Consolidate a Democracy: The Experience of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, in MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE, supra note 49, at 219, 221.


109 See THOMAS M. MAGSTADT, NATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS: COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 447 (3d ed. 1998). "When and if real democracy does come to sub-Saharan Africa, it will most likely bear a 'made in Africa' imprint." Id. But Magstadt makes his statement tongue-in-cheek, reviewing the complex evolution of democracy in African countries since 1990. This assessment, unlike his, is positive in tone.

110 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 92, at 53–54.

111 See, e.g., id. at 289 (stating that "[t]he rules that govern most interactions in I[nternational] R[elations] are rooted in moral norms" and that "morality is an element of power").

112 The appellation "Third World" designates a large category of countries at varying stages of economic development that are considered neither part of the First World of industrialized capitalist states nor of the Second World of socialist countries. Cold War terminology that, with the demise of most of the socialist world and with the advent of the post-Cold War, has lost much of its original meaning and utility. The word is used today only out of habit and for convenience, as here, to designate developing countries.


114 "To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves . . . not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are
leaders consistently espouse that promoting democracy suppresses violence between nations, which is good for both the United States and the world at large. The proliferation of democracy engenders certainty and predictability in an exceedingly complex and sometimes chaotic world, which also facilitates the conduct of American foreign policy. As one State Department official remarked, the growth of democratic systems is both idealpolitik and realpolitik with respect to the United States. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that “America has a profound security and economic interest in helping to build an Africa that is stable, democratic and increasingly prosperous,” and Nigeria, as a “regional partner[,]” is a “‘bellwether’ nation.”

Additionally, U.S. foreign policy demonstrates a preference for political stability in any form. For instance, policymakers stuck with Zaire’s General Mobutu Sese Seko almost to the very end because the country was “obsessed with a fear that [his fall] would bring ‘the consequent disintegration of Zaire into unstable segments open to radical penetration.’” Similar concerns underlay the Reagan administration’s “constructive engagement” policy toward South Africa and its collaboration with the apartheid regime in that country. Turning to Nigeria, some scholars have pointed out that one reason the United States failed to move decisively against the Abacha regime (by, for ex-

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115 See RUSSETT ET AL., supra note 92, at 289 (citing Presidents Woodrow Wilson and William J. Clinton).
116 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY, supra note 7, at 112, 118.
118 Diamond, supra note 1, at 251 (quoting from the memoirs of former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance); see also James Ferguson, The Duvalier Dictatorship and Its Legacy of Crisis in Haiti, in MODERN CARIBBEAN POLITICS, supra note 113, at 73, 82 (describing how the American government, worried about “the threat of political instability” in Haiti, aligned itself with repressive military leaders whom it saw as “the most feasible agent of gradual democratic change” and “the most obvious vehicle for stopping any revolutionary impetus”); Paul Sutton, U.S. Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean, in MODERN CARIBBEAN POLITICS, supra note 113, at 277, 283 (disclosing that the Reagan administration’s invasion of Grenada was predicated on restoring stability in the country).
ample, boycotting Nigerian oil) was the multi-ethnic patchwork “complexity” of the country.\textsuperscript{120} General Sani Abacha, known for his knack for political survival, played to the American proclivity for “stability” by unveiling a massive public relations campaign in the United States, publicizing the “political, economic, and social stability” of his government.\textsuperscript{121} Political stability remains an important consideration for the United States with respect to Nigeria.\textsuperscript{122} This goal may be problematic, however, where it causes U.S. policymakers to overlook a militarized, non-democratic regime because it appears politically stable. Governments not built on popular support are by their very nature unstable: one unconstitutional militarized takeover begets another. In offering assistance to Nigerian democratization efforts, U.S. policymakers should be mindful of the fact that it compromises promotion of democracy when it hinges its support on the stability of undemocratic governments.

C. The United States’ Interest in Relations with Nigeria

One story goes that Leopold II, King of Belgium from 1865 to 1909, instructed a group of Belgian missionaries about to embark on an expedition to Africa, to interpret the Gospel in a way that protected Belgian interests. Few foreign political actions are based entirely in goodwill; they are more often rooted in prudence and practicality.\textsuperscript{123} Although promoting democracy may, as was indicated earlier, be a sufficient national interest in and of itself, such idealistic abstraction is usually augmented by more concrete or material considerations. This is certainly true for the United States. “Every nation,” President Kennedy once noted, “determines its policies in terms of its own [national] interests.”\textsuperscript{124} As students of American foreign policy

\textsuperscript{120} It is also possible, as Diamond points out, that Western countries have little leverage when it comes “to affect[ing] the political destiny of a relatively resourceful African country, even one so deep in debt and economic misery as Nigeria.” Diamond, supra note 1, at 261.

\textsuperscript{121} Aborisade & Munding, supra note 6, at 253.

\textsuperscript{122} See Minter, supra note 47, at 206 (enumerating a focus on stability among the common policy elements in current U.S. relations with Africa); see also Daniel Volman, \textit{Africa and the New World Order}, 31 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 1, 1 (1993) (observing a shift in the focus of U.S. security policy that includes among its goals “the struggle to preserve order”).

\textsuperscript{123} See generally Hans J. Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace} (5th ed., rev. 1978) (arguing that world politics is governed by objective, universal laws that are based on national interest which is defined in terms of power).

\textsuperscript{124} Goldstein, supra note 92, at 71 (citing President Kennedy’s address at the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt Lake City, Utah on September 26, 1963).
have asserted, "[t]he tradition of American foreign policy encompasses both moral idealism and raw self-interests."125 For instance, during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis in 1990–1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker traveled around the world stitching together a coalition against Iraq based on the moral principle of stopping aggression and building a "New World Order." At the same time, Baker openly indicated to U.S. reporters that the conflict was also "about jobs because cheap Middle Eastern oil would stimulate U.S. economic growth."126 The primacy of national interest overtaking the pursuit of ideals has deep roots in U.S. history. President Abraham Lincoln is fondly referred to by African Americans as the "great emancipator."127 Yet, Lincoln made black freedom (idealism) secondary to preserving the Union (national interest):

My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union . . . . If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union.128

The United States' primary interest in relation to Nigeria is oil. As a voracious consumer of the country's "sweet" (i.e., low-sulfur) pe-

126 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 92, at 186. Not even an exceedingly magnanimous act, such as the U.S. assistance to Europe under the Marshall Plan after World War II, is free from this general orientation of national interest calculation in U.S. policy. The Cold War played a major role in the design and introduction of the plan, with the U.S. fearing that continuing economic chaos in Europe could lead to Soviet control of Europe. See 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 365 (1995).
127 One textbook on black politics conveyed that "Abraham Lincoln is the paradigmatic president, setting an example . . . for the handful of other American presidents who have dealt in a positive way with the African American freedom quest." HANES WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 194 (2000).
128 Id. (citing Abraham Lincoln's letter to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862)). Precisely because of the strain of small idealism in U.S. foreign policy, African Americans, in their struggle for equality, have historically looked beyond the boundaries of the United States. At the time of his death, Malcolm X (1925-65) was attempting to develop support among African and other Third World countries for a United Nations' resolution condemning the United States for violating the human rights of its African-American citizens. Id. at 292.
troleum, America recognizes Nigeria's worth as the largest oil producer in Africa and the fifth largest in the OPEC. Since 1974, Nigeria has been one of the largest exporters of crude oil to the United States. Securing the United States' supply of Nigerian oil was one of the bases for then-Vice President George Bush's visit to Nigeria in 1982. American companies such as Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron have substantial investments in the lucrative Nigerian oil industry, which, along with other Western oil companies, they dominate.

Another of the United States' interests in Nigeria is to maintain ties (and with these, influence) to the nation once described as "the most African country" in the world. Nigeria is rich in both human and natural resources, despite the fact that these are, as indicated earlier, poorly managed. The country also plays a leadership role in Africa, particularly in West Africa, that advances other U.S. interests. Under General Abacha, Nigeria led a peacekeeping mission as part of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that helped to stabilize long-time U.S. allies Liberia and Sierra Leone. Paradoxically, Nigeria was able, through ECOMOG, to install democracy in Liberia and to reinstate it in Sierra Leone while leaving its own citizens under the darkness of military rule. Some scholars have described this mission as a ploy by the Abacha regime to enhance its "prestige at home and abroad." Nonetheless, this "extraordinary investment" in regional stability arguably contributed to...

129 Since the 1970s, there has been a sense of urgency in the U.S. concerning Western access to world resources, particularly oil. Nigeria continued to ship oil to the United States during the 1973–74 OPEC oil crisis. In 1975, fearing that the country might join a second oil boycott, entirely cutting off supplies to the U.S. and the West, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed his first-ever state visit to Nigeria, but was rebuffed by the military government then headed by General Murtala Muhammed. See Elizabeth Liagin, Obasango's U.S. Connections, THENEWS (Lagos), Apr. 19, 1999, at 16.


132 Osaghae, supra note 20, at 162.

133 See FALOLA ET AL., supra note 131, at 167; FRYNAS, supra note 12, at 8–58.


135 See, e.g., ACHIEBE, supra note 73, at 1–3.


137 ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 109.

138 Provision of regional security in West Africa has, over the last decade, cost Nigeria $10 billion and the lives of hundreds of Nigerian soldiers. See Leonard H. Robinson Jr., Clinton Visit Raises Hopes for Nigeria, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 27, 2000, at 43A; Clinton, supra
the American goal of making the world safe for democracy. As former U.S. Secretary of State Albright noted, Nigeria is “potentially a very valuable partner for us in promoting peace, democracy, and the rule of law throughout West Africa.”

A third U.S. interest is the maintenance of American cultural-historical linkages to the country of Nigeria. A great number of Americans trace their roots to Africa. Many of those Americans, including entertainer-scholar Paul B. Robeson (1898–1976), trace those origins to Nigeria.

Last, but certainly not least, America needs Nigeria’s help in its campaign against international drug trafficking. The economic hardships in Nigeria, beginning in the 1980s, resulted in the emergence of a significant drug-dependent culture and in the conversion of Nigerian borders into a major route for the trafficking of cocaine and heroin into the United States. In its 1997 report on international drug trafficking, the State Department noted that “Nigeria is the hub of African narcotics trafficking, and Nigerian poly-crime organizations continue to expand their role in narcotics trafficking worldwide.” American agencies look to Nigerian political and law enforcement authorities in helping to ameliorate the nation’s drug problem. Nigerian-U.S. cooperation on drug trafficking dates back to 1987 when

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note 48. As Leonard Robinson Jr., a former deputy assistant secretary of state for African Affairs, observed:

Nigeria has spent more on international peacekeeping operations than the United States, Britain, France or any of the other Western industrial powers. When Western European powers were debating whether to send troops to end the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, Nigerian peacekeepers were at work in west Africa.

Robinson, supra.

139 Akande, supra note 117.

140 As Secretary Rogers said in his 1970 African policy statement, “one of every ten Americans” originated from Africa. U.S. and Africa in the ’70s, supra note 1, at 480.

141 JOHN McCORMICK, COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN TRANSITION 386 (3d ed. 2001).

142 See, e.g., Axel Klein, Trapped in the Traffick: Growing Problems of Drug Consumption in Lagos, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 657, 659 (1994); see also ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 236 (indicating that as of 1991, about 2,000 Nigerians [were] in prison around the world for drug trafficking”). In 1990, Nigeria created the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency “to eliminate the growing, processing, manufacturing, selling, exporting, and trafficking of hard drugs.” Id.

143 ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 237. About thirty percent of the heroin intercepted at U.S. ports in 1999 is alleged to have been seized from “Nigerian-controlled carriers.” Laolu Akande, Verdict Day for Nigeria on Capitol Hill, GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), Aug. 11, 1999 (on file with author).

144 See infra Part III.B.
the two countries signed a mutual law enforcement agreement followed by a special anti-drug Memorandum of Understanding.\textsuperscript{145} The United States also looks to Nigeria to help reduce the number of Americans victimized by the offer of Nigerian business opportunities that are "too good to be true."\textsuperscript{146} According to one estimate, "Americans lose $2 billion annually to white [collar] crime syndicates based in Nigeria."\textsuperscript{147}

D. Nigeria’s Interest in Relations with the United States

Although this Article focuses on U.S. policy toward Nigeria, it is also important to discuss Nigeria’s interests given that we are dealing with bilateral relations.

1. Primary National Interests

First, Nigeria sees in the United States a steady buyer of its oil. Although Nigeria’s share of the U.S. market has fluctuated over the years, the United States remains a primary purchaser of Nigerian crude oil. Second, Nigeria values political ties with America. The United States is one of the most powerful countries in the world, and the two countries share similar demographic features such as ethnic, economic, and religious complexities.\textsuperscript{148} Nigeria relies on these political connections as it experiments with a presidential style of government. Third, like many developing countries, Nigeria seeks to tap into American "technological capabilities"\textsuperscript{149} for its manpower development needs. Tens of thousands of Nigerians have flocked to the United States in search of higher education, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Recently, the number of Nigerians seeking U.S. educations has decreased dramatically, due to a mixture of economic difficulties and shortsighted governmental policy.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{145} ABORISADE \& MUNDT, supra note 6, at 236.

\textsuperscript{146} These "advance fee scams" are designated "419"s in accordance with the section of the Nigerian criminal code that targets the offense.

\textsuperscript{147} Akande, supra note 117.

\textsuperscript{148} See Clinton, supra note 48. "America has people from over 200 racial, ethnic and religious groups. We have school districts in America where, in one school district, the parents of the children speak over 100 different languages." \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{149} U.S. and Africa in the '70s, supra note 1, at 481.

2. Complications Relating to Internal Tension

Naturally, a nation's needs fluctuate along with changes to its internal social and intellectual landscape. For instance, despite the United States' interest in the economic and political health of Nigeria, the nation occasionally appears more greatly motivated by a concern for Nigerian wildlife than for the welfare of its people. The structure of Nigerian interests has been affected both by the emigration of its intellectual manpower and by the violent ethnic conflict of recent years.

Ironically, it is the United States that now benefits from the development in Nigerian manpower, rather than vice versa. Many Nigerians who come to America for education continue to reside in the country rather than return to unfavorable political and economic conditions in their home country. These emigre Nigerian-Americans include Philip Emeagwali, the "Bill Gates of Africa," whose mathematical genius President Clinton praised during his address to a joint assembly of the Nigerian National Assembly on August 26, 2000.

Immigration policies such as the visa lottery compound this "brain drain" since many of the Nigerians who win these lotteries are educated individuals whose talents the country needs. A more balanced relationship between the United States and Nigeria would help stabilize this situation. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

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151 Consider the following story recounted by Professor Mbaku in which Western academics attending a conference on Africa spent an inordinate amount of time analyzing the protection of East African wildlife. John Mukum Mbaku, Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80. After the conference, Dr. Mbaku told me about a well-known American environmental group that offered to buy hundreds of acres of arable land in the Riverine area of Nigeria with an intent to leave the land idle in order to preserve snails and sea life. This group obviously had more concern for this sea life threatened with extinction than for the Nigerians who will have to make do without this land in a portion of the country that is already faced with high population pressure.


153 Clinton, supra note 48. The term Nigerian-American is borrowed from President Clinton who used it in his speech.

154 The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) uses this program to increase the migration into the United States of people from certain countries or parts of the world the INS determines to be under-represented on migration into the U.S.

for African Affairs Leonard H. Robinson Jr. noted on the eve of President Clinton’s 2000 visit to Nigeria, “one of the most important things the United States can do is to help the Obasanjo government reverse the trend that has sent the best and brightest Nigerians fleeing to the U.S. and elsewhere.”

Nigeria may also need creative external help in containing the rash of deadly religious-ethnic conflicts that have rocked the country under General Obasanjo. In a survey released just before President Clinton’s visit in 2000, Professor Wole Soyinka portended that Clinton “may prove to be the last serving U.S. President to have visited a nation called Nigeria.” Impelling this prediction was the fact that one northern state after another was declaring its adoption of Islamic Sharia law over its former secular system of government. Not without reason, Professor Soyinka regards these declarations as effective acts of secession from the country. Recent upheavals in the country reinforce this thinking.

Although the pressing nature of these national concerns may seem fairly straightforward, Nigeria’s pursuit of international assistance is complicated by the fact that Nigeria’s leaders must be the ones to request it. There is little evidence that the Obasanjo government is seeking American help in combating its “brain drain” problem. With respect to ethnic-religious conflicts, General Obasanjo’s response has been to either minimize the magnitude of the problem or to react temperamentally to any suggestion by Westerners...

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156 Robinson, supra note 138.
159 Id.; see also Chukwudi Abiandu et al., Southern Leaders Meet, Reject Sharia, GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), July 11, 2000 (on file with author).
160 Soyinka, supra note 158; see also Laolu Akande, Soyinka Faults Sharia, Brings Home Radio Kudirat, GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), Nov. 3, 1999 (on file with author) (describing the adoption of Sharia as legal code in Zamfara state as “a tacit act of secession from the nation”).
161 See, e.g., Troubled Times in Nigeria, supra note 60.
162 Compare Nigeria’s failure to seek help here, for example, to a country like South Africa which is fighting to stem the tide of its medical doctors leaving for Canada. See Rachel L. Swarns, West Lures Its Doctors; South Africa Fights Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at 5.
163 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62. When asked by two U.S. reporters how a person like the General can “manage a nation in which a chunk of it seems to be governed by a different set of laws,” he replied unconvincingly that “political Shar’ia is new and [it] will...
that Nigerian democracy is wobbling from the stress of these conflicts. Positing that national unity is not a negotiable proposition, he has ruled out the possibility of any sort of national conference of ethnic groups to resolve some of the conflicts before they expand. While one understands Obasanjo’s fear that convening a national conference might spell the disintegration of the country, it demonstrates the extraordinary fragility of the country if the simple attempt to convene a meeting threatens its stability. Nigeria needs a leader who “does not assume anything automatic about Nigeria’s ‘unity,’” but rather is “willing to engage in a far-reaching fundamental reform of the state.”

Some writers have advocated for reorientation of Nigerian foreign policy to meet the internal needs of the country. Analyst Reuben Abati urges that the country pursue a “common man’s foreign policy,” “defined in terms of the interests of the common man.” Such a policy would “enhance[] national pride” without “wast[ing] our scarce resources . . . .” Abati wants Nigeria to “shed [the] father Christmas” image in its relations with the rest of Africa. Nigerian foreign policy, he said, must be defined “in terms of [the nation’s own] gains and interests;” the country “must gain strength not weakness, from [its] relationship with outsiders.”

3. Finding Common Ground

Nigeria will maximize the benefit of its relationship with the United States by identifying and exploiting the points at which the

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164 See General Obasanjo’s response, Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62, to a U.S. reporter’s suggestion that Nigerian democracy is continuing “to struggle to get off the ground.” Obasanjo replied, inter alia, that “it’s a new one on me that Nigerian democracy is struggling to get off the ground. . . . I am learning that from you . . . .” Id.

165 Madu Onuora & Saxone Akhaine, Obasanjo Rules Out Sovereign National Conference, GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), July 8, 2001 (on file with author).

166 Tayo Oke, Why Obasanjo Must Succeed: Why He Cannot, THE NEWS (Lagos), Feb. 7, 2000, at 49; see also Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria: A Mere Geographical Expression?, THE GUARDIAN (Lagos), July 6, 2001, at 8-9; Peter Ekeh, Breakdown in Nigeria’s National Consensus, THE GUARDIAN (Lagos), July 2, 2001. Both articles argue that the country must adopt genuine or true federalism if it is to avert disintegration.

167 Abati, supra note 65.

168 Id.

169 Id.

170 Id.

171 Id.

172 Abati, supra note 65.
two nations' interests overlap. Nigerian and U.S. interests converge with respect to the purchase and sale of crude oil and the necessity of maintaining cordial political relations. Concerning the first, U.S. consumers need Nigerian oil, and Nigeria sees a strong and steady partner in the market for its export. On the second point, U.S. policymakers see the need to maintain a diplomatic foothold in one of the most important and influential African countries. For its part, Nigeria needs strong and stable ties with the United States to improve its image in the international community. Although these ties may also provide vital assistance in Nigeria's pursuit of the material "democracy dividend," even if no substantive help results, the Nigerian government can still flaunt the mere existence of cordial relations with "the leading nation of the world today . . . ."

This appearance of accord and mutual benefit will always be questioned, however, by those political analysts who see U.S.-Nigerian relations as imbalanced and imperialistic. They contrast Nigeria's chummy relationship with the West against its more African-centered policies from 1975 to 1983, including those during Obasanjo's first regime between 1976 and 1979. These critics lament the "near-disappearance of anti-imperialism from the politics of the Nigerian state and the civil society," maintaining ruefully, "our country is now the chief client of the global dictatorship."

III. CHARACTERIZING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN DEMOCRATIZATION

When General Obasanjo came into office in May 1999, the United States government sent a delegation to his inauguration. A few months later, President Clinton undertook a visit to Africa that was praised as "the first cabinet-level meeting between American and African representatives from around the continent," including Nige-

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174 These are General Obasanjo's own words from a Spring 2001 interview. See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62.
175 See ABOYADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 250–51; Falola ET AL., supra note 131, at 166; Osaghae, supra note 20, at 104–09; Stephen Wright & Julius Emeka Okolo, Nigeria: Aspirations of Regional Power, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 74, at 118–19.
177 Minter, supra note 47, at 200.
The Clinton-era policy toward Africa was marked by his active engagement and included the following: the unveiling of new initiatives on debt; support for the fight against HIV/AIDS by significant financial donation and by re-classifying the epidemic as a security issue; passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act opening American markets to more of the continent's manufactured goods; and the creation of a high-profile "month of Africa" at the UN Security Council. Clinton believed Nigeria must clean up domestic acts of corruption and other governmental imperfections to realize its potential as "a pivot point on which all Africa's future turns." After Clinton left office, the mantle for U.S. policy towards Nigeria and Africa fell on his successor, President George W. Bush. This Article will make a few preliminary statements, illustrated through Table 2, before proceeding to closely examine each form of American foreign policy enumerated in the profile.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Illustrative Activity</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>exchange of visits, including presidential trips; lifting of restrictions on visits to Nigeria by American officials and to the U.S. by Nigerian government officials; lifting of ban on flights to Lagos airport; electoral support; certification of Nigeria as drug-free</td>
<td>Expanded/Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>military training; arms supply; U.S.-Nigeria defense cooperation agreements</td>
<td>Expanded/Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>AIDS support; debt rescheduling help; electoral support; birth control and family planning</td>
<td>About the same as under Clinton administration or declining</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 2, the activities under each category heading are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Political relations is a broad category that

178 See Greg Myre, Clinton Asks Nigeria to Clean up its Act, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 27, 2000, at 36A; Nakashima, supra note 60; Robinson, supra note 138; Clinton, supra note 48.


180 Minter, supra note 47, at 200–01; Milan Vesely, After the Clinton Smile, Will It Be the Bush Snarl?, US-AFRICA ONLINE, Feb. 2001 (on file with author).

181 Myre, supra note 178.
includes diplomatic and cultural-historical activities. Some activities, such as electoral support, appear in two separate categories. Other activities that have been classified in only one category could actually illustrate others, as well. For example, birth control and family planning are included under the “economic” category but are also sensitive issues that could be classified as political. Given the dependent nature of U.S.-Nigerian relations, there are some who will regard American purchase of Nigerian crude oil as U.S. economic “assistance” to Nigeria. This study does not take that view; rather, it regards those ties as a bilateral trade relationship. On a final note, there are also some forms of United States assistance that are not easily categorized. For example, between October 1998 and September 1999, Nigeria was said to have received assistance from the U.S. amounting to $27.5 million that is uncategorized.

Given this Article’s assessment that U.S. support has expanded in the political and military realms, and is declining only in the economic realm, a reader might conclude that American support for Nigerian democracy is sufficient. However, such an interpretation is incorrect, as a closer analytical perspective will demonstrate.

A. Political-Diplomatic Relations

Political-diplomatic initiatives are low cost and can greatly influence the success or failure of Nigerian democratization. For instance, what did it cost to remove the U.S. order suspending direct flights to Lagos, Nigeria which was allegedly imposed due to ineffective security? America routinely forges and severs diplomatic ties

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183 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62, in which General Obasanjo argues that Nigeria’s sale of oil to America is “trad[e]” and not “help.” Id. He noted that he found the word help “a little bit unpalatable.” Id. But Obasanjo did not consider the term unpalatable in an interview two weeks later with the Los Angeles Times. When asked what the United States could do to help Nigerian democratization, he responded in pertinent part, “We adopted democracy not just for the intrinsic value of democracy, but because our people believe that democracy can enhance their quality of life . . . . They expect, rightly, a democracy dividend. If that doesn’t come, they will feel disenchanted. The United States can help us with that.” Wright, supra note 173, at M3 (emphasis added).

184 Akande, supra note 117.

185 One state department justification for the ban on direct flights to Lagos was a concern about “extortion by law enforcement and immigration officials.” Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century, supra note 7, at 34, 35. As Kaplan points out, “[t]his is one of the few times that the U.S. government has embargoed a foreign airport for reasons that are linked purely to crime.” Id.
with nations, even where no U.S. interest is at stake. With respect to Nigeria, the United States maintained political ties even in the face of atrocities perpetrated by the prior Babangida and Abacha governments; it merely cut back contact with the leaders themselves. Now, with the inauguration of the Obasanjo government, Nigeria has succeeded in casting off its "bad boy" image, leaving the United States ample room to encourage development through diplomatic initiatives created with General Obasanjo's cooperation. Such initiatives could be invaluable to the United States as well, securing Nigerian cooperation in the war against international drug trafficking and perhaps even minimizing Nigerian business scams targeted at Americans. Through increased political-diplomatic relationships, the United States can advance many of the other shared national interests. As William Minter explained:

[T]he stated goals in Washington and those of African democracy advocates are much more compatible today than during the cold war period. A considerable degree of overlap can be found in statements of desirable objectives, whether they come from United States policymakers, international conferences, or pro-democracy groups in African countries.

These shared interests include a commitment to democracy, human rights, the rule of law, citizen participation, a free press, and increased governmental accountability and transparency.

**B. Military Relations**

Like political-diplomatic initiatives, creating initiatives that address military relations can also be very cost effective, considering the potential payback in political influence. As is the case with political relations, Nigeria's improved political status also smoothes the way to creating military-focused initiatives. Two initiatives at the heart of U.S. military relations with Africa and Nigeria alike are the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

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186 See Akande, supra note 117 (quoting testimony of Ambassador Howard Jeter, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who connected "increased assistance to Nigeria" with "cooperation in countering narcotics" and declaring that America will not "provide direct assistance to any government not meeting the standards for either certification or a waiver"). Mr. Jeter is now U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria.

187 Minter, supra note 47, at 205.

188 Id. at 204.
(ACSS) under the Defense Department. The ACRI provides short-term military training for battalions from selected African countries to participate in peacekeeping missions. The ACSS is designed to train executive-level military officers and civilian counterparts. The Center’s mission statement stipulates that it will “encourage an appreciation of appropriate civil-military relationships and an understanding of effective defense resource management across African governments.” The ACSS’ curriculum stresses democratic civil-military relations, national security-oriented decision making, and management tools.

These initiatives, however, can also create tensions in the donee country, such as those that have surfaced in Nigeria. Some civilian Nigerians are fearful of U.S. military presence in their country, and more than a few Nigerian military officers question the United States’ motivation to seek expanded military ties. For example, former Nigerian Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Victor Malu considered American military presence overbearing, protesting that “[y]our best foreign friend today can be your worst enemy tomorrow.” He objected to the United States’ request for Nigeria’s military contingency plan, which is “supposed to be our secret.” Many attribute General Obasanjo’s replacement of Malu as Chief of Army Staff to Malu’s strident and open opposition to increased military cooperation with the United States. Nigerian military officers—especially those of General Malu’s generation—are more comfortable receiving military assistance from Britain, the country’s former colonial overlord, than from the United States. Such strong opposition to U.S. involvement has been seen as a stumbling block in Obasanjo’s attempt to consolidate

189 Id. at 209.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Minter, supra note 47, at 209.
193 Id.
195 Id. The military’s contingency plan is a restricted secret document containing classified information on the army, such as its strength and tactical operations, among other details. Uchegbu Achilleus, The Ultimate Price, THE SOURCE, May 7, 2001, at 10, 11.
the Nigerian government and to subject the coup-prone military to
civilian control and oversight.\textsuperscript{197}

Another major complication with this form of initiative is the po-
tential for U.S. training program operatives to interfere in preexisting
cultural disputes, building "unexamined links" between the U.S. mil-
tary and the armies of the countries they seek to assist.\textsuperscript{198} There is no
evidence that these training programs promote the values of democ-
I\textsuperscript{racy among the foreign trainees for whom they were designed.\textsuperscript{199}}
Trainees who graduated from U.S. programs in Latin America and
Indonesia have been implicated in widespread human rights
abuses.\textsuperscript{200} Although the ACSS professes to guard against these
abuses,\textsuperscript{201} the peacekeeping capacity of these programs is still un-
tested and unproven.\textsuperscript{202} Manuals for some of these training programs
claim that the programs will "organize, train, advise, and assist" the
affected foreign military so that it can "free and protect its society
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."\textsuperscript{203} But, as one percep-
tive analyst points out, these functions are more appropriately the re-
sponsibility of a nation's police force, rather than its military.\textsuperscript{204} A fi-
nal concern is the problem of militarization. In the Caribbean during
the 1980s, expansion of U.S. military assistance under President
Reagan served primarily to heighten the U.S. military profile, milita-
rizing a region that had formerly been regarded as a "zone of peace"
at the expense of more pressing problems.\textsuperscript{205} As Paul Sutton ex-
plained with reference to the Caribbean:

The distinction between the military and the police func-
tions that holds in the United States became blurred in the
Caribbean, as the Department of Defense, the FBI, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the CIA, and a host of other U.S.

\textsuperscript{197} See generally Joseph, supra note 58, at 48–50; Mohammed Haruna, Beheading the Mon-
ster, \textsc{TElL} (Lagos), June 28, 1999, at 48–49; and Fayemi's articles on the dilemma of civilian
control, supra note 196.

\textsuperscript{198} Minter, supra note 47, at 209. According to Minter, unexamined links arise from
military training programs when those programs "send signals of partisan support or ap-
proval for military forces involved in conflict or human rights abuses." \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Id.} at 209–10

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Id.} at 210.

\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Id.} at 209.

\textsuperscript{202} Minter, supra note 47, at 210.

\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{205} See Sutton, supra note 118, at 283–87.
agencies sought to meet the threats from drug trafficking, money laundering . . . . Borders also were breaking down.\footnote{Id. at 290.}

C. Economic Relations

Although economic initiatives appear to be the form of support most needed in Nigerian democratization efforts, the United States sponsors fewer economic initiatives than any other kind of initiative. During the 1998-99 fiscal year, the United States provided only $27.5 million in aid to Nigeria.\footnote{Akande, supra note 117.} Although President Clinton brought a $20 million aid package to help in Nigeria's fight against HIV/AIDS,\footnote{Nakashima, supra note 60.} the United States has not been receptive to the Obasanjo government's repeated appeals for the forgiveness of Nigeria's $37 billion foreign debt. President Clinton was only willing to allow for debt rescheduling\footnote{Clinton, supra note 48 (stating that America is "prepared to support a substantial reduction of Nigeria's debts on a multilateral basis . . .").} in spite of his August 2000 statement to the Nigerian National Assembly that "Nigeria shouldn't have to choose between paying interest on debt and meeting basic human needs, especially in education and health."\footnote{Id.}

One scholar noted that democratization assistance to sub-Saharan Africa for the decade as a whole represented just under six percent of total U.S. nonmilitary development assistance.\footnote{Harbeson, supra note 91, at 250–51.} Of the resources set aside for democratization in Africa by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1996, only ten percent went to West Africa.\footnote{Id. at 252.}
Diamond insists that this situation is changing, given the shift from self-interested Cold War politics to a more idealistic notion of democracy for its own sake.\textsuperscript{213} He discusses a multiplicity of U.S. assistance programs, pointing to organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID and their efforts to promote democracy in Africa.\textsuperscript{214} He proclaims that U.S. economic investments in African democracy are "without precedent,"\textsuperscript{215} describing America's contribution to African democratization as "substantial and growing."\textsuperscript{216}

There are a number of problems with this optimistic assessment, however. At the outset, it is important to note that Diamond's article was written in 1995 and thus fails to account for developments—or the lack thereof—in recent years. Secondly, many of the initiatives he discusses are programs for Africa as a whole and are not specifically targeted at Nigeria. Thirdly, most of these programs are small, often poorly coordinated initiatives that did not rise to the level of substantial economic assistance.

In sum, American economic assistance for Nigerian democratization has been modest rather than substantial.\textsuperscript{217} Despite the fact that, as Diamond points out, the context of United States foreign policy has shifted, America has largely maintained its formerly low level of economic assistance to Nigeria. The likelihood of a renewed idealistic commitment is also undermined by the fact that many U.S.-sponsored institutions were created during the Cold War to promote U.S. security.\textsuperscript{218} America's lukewarm financial commitment to democratization in Nigeria goes a long way to explain the significant gap between rhetoric and reality in U.S. policy toward Africa.\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{213} Diamond, \textit{supra} note 1, at 252--62. These changes include the fact that America no longer needs to worry about countering the spread of Soviet military and political influence in Africa, or about the spread of hostile ideological and economic systems. \textit{Id.} at 253.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{See id.} at 262--68 (identifying these programs).

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Id.} at 264.

\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Id.} at 267.

\textsuperscript{217} \textit{See} Nakashima, \textit{supra} note 60 (outlining the comments of Professor Jean Herskovits of the State University of New York who assessed the aid package Clinton brought with him on his visit to Nigeria as "more symbolic than concrete").

\textsuperscript{218} For example, the National Endowment for Democracy was created during the Cold War days of the Reagan presidency as a vehicle to promote U.S. national security interests in the developing world, including the Caribbean and Latin America. Sutton, \textit{supra} note 118, at 282--83.

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{See} Minter, \textit{supra} note 47, at 200--01, 204. America's tight-fisted nature in the area of economic assistance rings eerily similar to the nature of the Soviet Union with respect to some of Africa's socialist-oriented countries during the the Cold War era. \textit{See} John R. Heil-
D. Summation

During his run for the White House, President George W. Bush expressed little interest in foreign affairs, especially as they relate to Africa. The new president fears over-extending American resources in favor of a “more humble foreign policy” that is well-attuned to America’s “national interests.” Equally significant, his administration includes individuals like General Colin Powell who view involvement with Africa as unrewarding “social work.” Despite these disinclinations, Bush’s initiatives in Africa have turned out better than expected. He has pledged his government’s support for the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa and the United States is part of a G-8 projected development plan for Africa. Although Table 2 shows U.S. economic initiatives to be “about the same as under Clinton or declining,” political-diplomatic initiatives are indicated as “ex-
panded/growing.” So too are U.S. military initiatives.\textsuperscript{226} With respect to Nigeria, both Nigerian policymakers\textsuperscript{227} and their U.S. counterparts\textsuperscript{228} insist that ties between the two countries are developing normally under President Bush.

IV. GLOBALIZATION AND U.S.-NIGERIA RELATIONS

A. Defining Globalization

The concept of globalization is difficult to describe, partly because the term is so loosely used and is applied to so many different processes.\textsuperscript{229} One use of the word involves global restructuring,\textsuperscript{230} characterized by “widespread economic liberalization and tremendous surges in international trade and investment.”\textsuperscript{231} Within the past two decades, processes within the international system have “produced a qualitatively different world economy.”\textsuperscript{232} These processes include the vastly increased integration of international markets through new patterns of trade, finance, production, flows of capital, and an increasingly dense web of treaties and international institutions.\textsuperscript{233} This economic-based definition, however, is not sufficiently


\textsuperscript{227} See Folabi Lawal, \textit{Dividends of Democracy Will Take Time}, THISDAY, Aug. 7, 2001, at 11 (interviewing Nigeria’s Ambassador to the United States, Professor Jibril Aminu and, among other things, articulating a multiplicity of reasons why the Bush administration appears to be taking “more than a passing interest” in Nigerian and African affairs).

\textsuperscript{228} See Nosa Igiebor et al., supra note 179, at 86 (responding to the question whether President Bush will engage in African affairs like Clinton did).

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Stalker}, supra note 155, at 2.


\textsuperscript{231} Dunoff, supra note 104, at 136. Globalization is a much-discussed subject; an entire industry of works on globalization has already surfaced. For a sampling of this rich literature, see generally the collection of essays in \textit{GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY}, supra note 7; \textit{GLOBALIZATION}, supra note 230; and Keohane & Nye, supra note 230, at 237–57.

\textsuperscript{232} Dunoff, supra note 104, at 136.

\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Id.}; see also Christopher Clapham, \textit{Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival} 24 (1996) (embodying a more comprehensive list of changes, including a rapid increase in the mobility of capital; a resulting increase in levels of structural differentiation and functional integration in the global economy; a shift away from resources and toward human skills as the critical element in wealth creation; a startling
inclusive.\textsuperscript{234} As opposed to a mere economic event, globalization is a process that integrates economics, politics, culture, and ideology.\textsuperscript{235} In this way it is a “worldwide phenomenon” involving a “coalescence of varied transnational processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, culture, and ideology of one country to penetrate another.”\textsuperscript{236} In short, globalization refers “both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.”\textsuperscript{237}

It is important to note that globalization is not a completely new or recent phenomenon. Rather, it is the “intensification”\textsuperscript{238} of economic, political, social, and cultural relations that were already at work;\textsuperscript{239} for instance, the movement of people across borders goes back to the very beginning of time.\textsuperscript{240} Building on this notion of ancient processes in a new world, writers such as Peter Stalker have argued that it is more realistic to view globalization “as the latest phase in a long historical process.”\textsuperscript{241} Stalker maintains that what is truly new about the phenomenon—and is therefore at its essence—is the fact that barriers between relatively independent entities like states, economies, and cultures are dissolving and, in the process, opening up the possibility of some kind of global consciousness.\textsuperscript{242} Nonetheless, even
growth in information flows and the capacity to process information; the emergence of a global culture; and pressures on governments to manage their economies in accordance with a global search for comparative advantage, and by the impact of values derived from the global culture).


\textsuperscript{235} James H. Mittelman, The Dynamics of Globalization, in \textsc{Globalization}, supra note 230, at 1, 2.

\textsuperscript{236} Id. at 3.

\textsuperscript{237} Roland Robertson, \textsc{Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture} 8 (1992); see also Mazrui, supra note 7 (describing globalization as the “gradual villagization of the world”).

\textsuperscript{238} Holm & Sørensen, supra note 234, at 4.

\textsuperscript{239} As far back as 1957, Karl Polanyi talked about a “double movement” consisting of the expansion of market forces and a reaction to those forces in the form of demands for self-protection against capital’s socially disruptive and polarizing effects. Karl Polanyi, \textsc{The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time} 219 (1957).

\textsuperscript{240} For specific examples, some of which date back to the period of the Middle Ages in Europe, see Stalker, supra note 155, at 3. Professor Mazrui, supra note 7, most appropriately describes globalization as involving “ancient processes in a new world.”

\textsuperscript{241} Stalker, supra note 155, at 10.

\textsuperscript{242} Id. at 8.
these changes have accompanied the end of the Cold War and must therefore be associated with the post-Cold War era.

Although globalization involves processes that may be described as inter-national, it is not a process of internationalization such that an increasing number of events are taking place simultaneously in more than one country. Rather, globalization, in its strongest sense, goes beyond internationalization and implies a higher plane of organization—one at which discrete national entities are themselves dissolving so that all major political and economic decisions will ultimately be transmitted globally. This new world may witness the death of geography and also, for one, the demise of the nation-state. A significant concern about this process is its tendency to constrain national options and erode the integrity of national boundaries. Professor Mittelman elaborates that "[s]tatecraft, tested as it is by non-state actors, is reduced in efficacy relative to transnational forces." He argues that "the drive to bring the state back to the forefront of social theory requires fresh analysis in light of globalization."

B. Two Views on the Effects of Globalization on Africa

In discussing the effects of globalization on Africa, one can adopt either of two outlooks. The first paints a roundly negative picture of globalization’s effects, characterizing the Third World as “the battle-ground of globalization” and Africa as “the Third World’s Third

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243 CLAPHAM, supra note 233, at 24. But, scholars continue to disagree as to whether globalization is a new international system that has replaced the Cold War. For the debate, see Thomas L. Friedman (contending that it is) and Ignacio Ramonet (maintaining contra), Dueling Globalizations, in WORLD POLITICS 10, 10-20 (Helen Purkitt ed., 21st ed. 2001-01). One point on which they agree, however, is that modern globalization dominates international relations.

244 CLAPHAM, supra note 234, at 2.

245 Id.


247 STALKER, supra note 155, at 9.

248 See id. at 8; Slaughter, supra note 116, at 118: see also ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 33 (1996) (stating that the landscapes of globalization give way to idioscapes, ethnoscapes, mediascapes, financescapes, and technoscapes); James N. Rosenau, Preface, in LONGMAN ATLAS OF WAR AND PEACE 1 (Joshua S. Goldstein ed., 1999) (characterizing globalization as the unfolding of the "[p]rocesses of de-territorialization and technological diffusion that are altering our notions of space and time").

249 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 7.

250 Id.

251 Mazrui, supra note 7.
One African scholar, Fantu Cheru, identified five major trends in the world economy resulting from globalization; four of these (advancement in biotechnology and micro-technology, decreased diffusion of investment, structural adjustment as an ideology of development, and low regional cooperation) can be seen to work against Africa. Those with this critical perspective portend that Africa will be barred from “gaining access to world society’s productive processes.” They also indicate that Africa has become “the locus of world poverty,” that it has experienced a shift from reliance on bilateral assistance to multilateral concessionary loans, and that it has lost $148 billion in capital flight. Globalization is said to spell the absence of agreement over a vision of a common agenda for Africa in the post-Cold War era. “The greatest challenge” for Africa, as Mittleman says, “is to demarginalize when national options are severely constrained by the forces of globalization.” Professor Paul Kennedy’s analysis, forecasting which states stand the best chance of surviving materially in the twenty-first century, projects that Africans will be the losers. These statements and predictions are not recorded

252 David E. Duncan, Africa: The Long Good-Bye, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1990, at 20. The expression is meant to signify that Africa ranks as the least-developed region in the developing world.

253 Fantu Cheru, New Social Movements: Democratic Struggles and Human Rights in Africa, in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 230, at 145, 146. The only one of these five factors that does not pose a problem is the increasing differentiation among developing countries, given that this process could favor some African countries. Id. at 147.

254 See Mittleman, supra note 230, at 234 (conveying that the loss of control from structural adjustment “is most pronounced in parts of Africa . . . ”).

255 Id. at 18.

256 Diamond, supra note 1, at 255. The continent’s share of the world’s poor grew from sixteen percent in 1985 to thirty percent by the turn of the century. Id. Also, as another scholar points out, half of the countries in the continent are under World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programs. Wright, supra note 74, at 17.

257 An important distinction between default on bilateral and multilateral loans is the fact that a country may default on bilateral loans with manageable disruptions to the national economy. Heilbrunn, supra note 219, at 64 n.47. Most defaults precipitate negotiations to reschedule payments. Id. Unlike bilateral loans, however, multilateral debts must be dutifully repaid according to a prearranged schedule. Id. In the event of a default, a country will lose all access to international credit. Given that few governments can endure such sanction, very few nations have ever gone into arrears on multilateral debt. Id.

258 Wright, supra note 74, at 11 (quoting the Economic Commission for Africa).

259 Id. at 9.

260 Mittleman, supra note 235, at 18.

261 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY, supra note 7, at 323, 338. Professor Kennedy’s forecast consid-
here for their accuracy, but to demonstrate the way in which many of the contemporary views on how Africa has fared, and will fare, with respect to globalization tend to be static and one-sided.

Another view on the effects of globalization paints a more complex picture. A recent illustration of this alternate view is Christopher Clapham’s book on Africa and the international system, which asserts that the impact of globalization on Africa is “in many ways peculiar.”262 The continent was first “globalized,” he notes, by European colonists during the late nineteenth century who imposed structures of economic production, systems of government, and cultural changes in language and education.263 European colonialism has already linked the continent to the processes of global capitalist development.264 In this sense, Clapham writes, the increased economic and political external control beginning in the 1980s represented a “return to familiar conditions of subordination.”265 Interestingly, he notes, Africa was less affected by most of these recent changes than any region in the world.266 For example, he explains, the spread of global capital scarcely affected the continent given that, even prior to globalization, there were so few places where transnational corporations could find safe and potentially profitable investment opportunities.267 Additionally, the effect of increased access to information through global channels was likewise negligible.268 Clapham’s depiction accords with this Article’s caution against a wholesale and undifferentiated application of the notion of globalization.269

Professor James Mittelman depicts globalization as “changing structured hierarchies,”270 conceptualizing the divisions of labor associated with global restructuring as a series of interacting relation-

262 CLAPHAM, supra note 233, at 24.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 25.
267 Id., supra note 233, at 25.
268 Id.

269 See generally Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the Notion of African Marginalization, 9 TuL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 187 (critiquing the concept of “marginalization”—a notion tied to globalization—as it is applied to analyses of Africa in the post-Cold War era).
270 James H. Mittelman, Preface, in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 230, at i, xi (emphasis added).
This second, more dynamic view reflects this portrayal of globalization. It is also more realistic. States are not "merely passive objects exposed to the swell of globalization;" rather, they "may push, resist, attempt to circumscribe or twist" the forces of globalization to their own advantage. In 1957, Karl Polanyi described the double movement that propels modern society as both an expansion of market forces and a reaction to that expansion, in the form of demands for self-protection against the socially disruptive and polarizing effects of capital. Mittelman and his colleagues have updated this double movement by reiterating the proposition in the context of opportunities and constraints presented by changing structured hierarchies in a new millennium. Globalization involves a multiplicity of authors trying to write their own histories. These include, in addition to government entities, non-state actors such as multinational corporations, labor unions, religious movements, and the poor. These disparate forces engendered in diverse and occasionally opposing contexts severely call into question the image of globalization as a unified force that will bulldoze the world around it. In short, as Stalker asserts, "[g]lobalization is not a monolithic, unstoppable juggernaut, but rather a complex web of interrelated processes—some of which are subject to greater control than others." This second view does not portray nations as reduced to helplessness by the forces of globalization and is thus more workable and realistic.

C. The Effects of Globalization on U.S.-Nigerian Relations

The force of globalization directs international attention to some of the "fundamental changes underway in the post-Cold War era" of foreign policy and compels dependent nations like Nigeria to

271 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 6-7.
272 Holm & Sorensen, supra note 234, at 7. As Mittelman points out, even the United Nations system, together with the doctrine of sovereignty that it enshrines, provides a defense (albeit today a weak and ineffectual one) for developing countries against the forces of globalization. Mittelman, supra note 230, at 239.
273 Polanyi, supra note 239, at 219.
274 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi.
275 Mittelman, supra note 230, at 232.
276 See id.
277 Id.
278 Stalker, supra note 155, at 10; see also Clapham, supra note 233, at 24 (stating that the emergence of a global culture is being challenged by a reaction favoring particularist ideas, and that the impact of globalization is complex and often contradictory).
279 Keohane & Nye, supra note 230, at 228-29; Mittelman, supra note 235, at 2.
280 ATE, supra note 182, at 2-3.
find creative responses.281 This Article examines some of these changes before turning to how Nigeria, the dependent country in a bilateral relationship with the United States, might respond. This approach accords with Professor Mittelman’s depiction of the globalization process as involving changing structured hierarchies282 and his conceptualization of the divisions of labor associated with global restructuring as a series of interacting relationships.283

1. Characterizing the Changes and Challenges

The latest return to democracy in Nigeria is part of the emerging worldwide preference for democracy that has marked the post-Cold War era. Although domestic forces also played a role, the reinstitution of Nigerian civil rule was due in large part to this globalization of democracy and human rights. With this global movement, and the weak economic performance of authoritarian regimes, militarized governments were isolated as illegitimate, and dictators were forced to defend the basis of their power. Thus, former leader Babangida was eventually compelled to leave office after he annulled the fair election that was organized by his own government and initiated a transition so insincere that democratic transition program observers called it “one of the most sustained exercises in political chicanery ever visited on a people.”284 Similar pressures led General Abacha to resort to the unprecedented scheme of self-succession designed to “regularize his dictatorship.”285 The process of globalization brought Nigerian military rule into sharp contrast with Abacha’s practice of promoting democracy for other West African countries while withholding it from his own people. In a recent interview, General Obasanjo was likely thinking of globalization when he stated that the “parameters have changed.” He elaborated, “[W]e are no longer in the Cold War. Dur-

282 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi.
283 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 6–7.
284 Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 417, 443.
285 Peter M. Lewis, Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 228, 233–34 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999); see also Larry Diamond, Postscript and Postmortem, in TRANSITION WITHOUT END, supra note 49, at 465, 465–84 (discussing, inter alia, the five political parties that Abacha allowed to form).
ing the Cold War, it became fashionable for a man to come to power through the barrel of a gun and for the world to accept it." 286

Globalization has also wrought some negative changes for Nigeria. Among the negative consequences, felt in other African nations as well, are the lag in science and technology, growing impoverishment, capital flight, ceding of economic autonomy to multilateral institutions, and the exaggeration of problems such as drug usage and trafficking. 287 Whether the era which replaced the Cold War period constitutes a new international system is immaterial. The fact remains that, more than any other country, "America stands at the center of this world of globalization." 288 The United States benefits from globalization in its ability to conduct foreign affairs in Africa unconstrained as in the past-by the political, military, ideological, and economic competition from the Soviet Union. This benefit is magnified by the fact that developing countries that maintain bilateral economic relationships with this lone superpower no longer have the leeway to play one superpower against another. 289

Globalization manifests itself in such a way that bilateral relations between the United States and Nigeria tend to favor the United States. But these manifestations are not entirely detrimental to Nigeria. As discussed, states are not "merely passive objects exposed to the swell of globalization" but instead may "push, resist" and "attempt to circumscribe or twist" the forces of globalization to their own advantage. 290 A mutually rewarding relationship between the United States and Nigeria, based on more than simple cooperation in the drug war, is possible if built upon the positive manifestations of globalization

286 Wright, supra note 173.
287 See, e.g., Shaw & E. Nyang’oro, supra note 281, at 240; Wright, supra note 74, at 9, 11, 12; Campbell & Weiss, supra note 96, at 91, 98, 101–102.
288 Zakaria, supra note 7, at 30; see also RONALD W. COX & DANIEL SKIDMORE-HESS, U.S. POLITICS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: CORPORATE POWER, CONSERVATIVE SHIFT 2 (1999) (stating that many of the political actors that have formed the process of globalization “originated in the overlapping worlds of business and politics in the United States”).
289 A 1992 London Times editorial most aptly summarized the dilemma Africa faced following the end of the Cold War:

Time was when African states could rely on a post-colonial superpower patronage to build their infrastructure, or at least subsidize their elites. One superpower has collapsed and the other is devoting its energies to propping it up. Africa must look to the once vilified multinational companies . . . for sponsorship, and it will be painful.

(Cited in Peter Lyon, The Ending of the Cold War in Africa, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA 179 (Oliver Furley ed., 1995)).
290 See infra Part IV.B.
rather than the negative. Even with the Cold War over, the reality of African international relations is still that "Africans "have so much to ask for and so little to bargain with."
291 It is a dilemma that African leaders will have to face.

2. Nigeria's Response

A developing country engaged in a bilateral relationship with a major world power needs domestic capability in order to "push, resist," and "attempt to circumscribe or twist the forces of globalization to [its] advantage."292 Does Nigeria possess the domestic capability necessary for weathering globalization? The point is simple but profound: in an era of globalization, as the context for African foreign policy is shifting,293 Nigerian foreign policy cannot proceed business as usual. Foreign policies "are strategies governments use to guide their actions toward other states."294 A sound political and economic base should underlie the conduct of such policy.295 Only a people confident and a government strong at home "can engage the rest of the world."296 The evolution of economic policy from "low politics" to "high,"297 and the shift in foreign relations away from diplomatic posturing and toward economic restructuring are two components of the aftermath of globalization.298 Important domestic debates regarding foreign policy have moved from the political arena to economic arenas such as finance ministries and central banks.299

292 Holm & Sørensen, supra note 234, at 7.
293 Wright, supra note 74, at 6-10.
294 Goldstein, supra note 92, at 189.
295 See Maria Nzomo, The Foreign Policy of Tanzania: From Cold War to Post-Cold War, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 74, at 182, 188 (commenting on the desirability of "strengthening [the] national economy for a stronger foreign policy," citing the party program of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Tanzania's ruling party.); Wright, supra note 74, at 19 (stating that "[w]ithout strengthening the economic base of African societies, foreign policies will be severely limited . . ."); James Zaffiro, Exceptionality in External Affairs: Botswana in the African and Global Arenas, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 74, at 66, 78 (noting that the success of foreign policy ultimately "rest[s] on [a] country's long-term economic strategy").
296 Abati, supra note 65.
297 Wright, supra note 74, at 17. In the esoteric parlance of international relations, "high politics" involve issues of national security upon which the survival of the state is said to hinge, while "low politics" concern non-security matters such as economic development.
298 Nzomo, supra note 295, at 182.
299 Wright, supra note 74, at 17.
In sum, a nation’s domestic prerequisite for functional foreign policy is a stable and inclusive political system with space for civil society, attention to the rule of law, and economic development anchored in diversification, accountability, and economic transparency.\textsuperscript{300} After over fifteen years of military rule and with recent events in the country, Nigeria does not seem to have acquired the requisite political stability that would enable effective foreign policy vis-à-vis a major power like the United States. These recent developments negate or seriously bring into question General Obasanjo’s optimism that democracy has come to stay.

IV. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: FOUR FINDINGS

First, this Article concludes that idealism, operationalized here as support for democracy in Nigeria, does play a role in U.S. foreign policy. President Clinton’s visit to Nigeria just a few months after General Obasanjo took office,\textsuperscript{301} the lifting of the ban on flights to the Lagos airport, and the certification of the country as drug-free after many fruitless attempts under the military to get that clearance\textsuperscript{302} are all gestures that indicate the United States’ genuine support for Nigerian democracy.

Although these gestures are not unimportant, it appears that national interest, and not idealism, is still at the forefront for U.S. policymakers. In the aftermath of the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States government moved to build a global coalition in its fight against terrorism. President Bush announced his willingness to do business with “\textit{any} country or party”\textsuperscript{303} that can help the United States realize its objectives of combating terrorism. It appears that any country includes even illegitimate military regimes such as those in Pakistan. America’s growing cooperation with the regime of General Pervez Musharraf has given that government an air of legitimacy that it does not have and should not have received.\textsuperscript{304}

\textsuperscript{300} Malaquias, \textit{supra} note 89, at 23, 39.
\textsuperscript{301} This visit was the first in twenty-two years by an American president. The last such visit, also by a Democratic president, was made by Jimmy Carter in 1979 when, coincidentally, General Obasanjo was the military Head of State.
\textsuperscript{304} General Musharraf came into office on October 12, 1999, following a military coup he led against the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff, who appointed Musharraf
Increased cooperation between the United States and Pakistan in the war against terrorism will shelve all previous attempts to pressure the regime to return to democratic rule so long as Islamabad’s cooperation is deemed necessary for successful resolution of the U.S. government’s war on terrorism.

President Bush announced on November 10, 2001, that his government was providing an aid package worth more than $1 billion to Pakistan as a reward for its support in the war in Afghanistan. General Musharraf, in a recent speech in New York, announced the “dawn of a new era of a relationship between Pakistan and the United States.” The major media houses evidence America’s acceptance of Islamabad’s illegitimate regime, referring to the Pakistani strongman as “President” rather than by his military title. Washington’s open dalliance and fraternization with the regime of General Musharraf suggest that U.S. leaders are still quick to resort to the kind of national interest-oriented expedience for which they have been criticized in the past. Moreover, there are indications that the regime in Pakistan may be taking advantage of the U.S. government’s attentiveness to the war on terrorism to violate the human rights of its people. Pakistan ranked number one in human rights violations according to the State Department’s most recent human rights report.

While U.S. policymakers still include idealism among the articulated motivations for American foreign policy, pragmatic national

army chief in 1997, Musharraf announced he took over to prevent the country from destabilization, and he accused Shariff of politicizing the army. The change of government provoked international condemnation. A statement released by the U.S. State Department described the takeover as a step backward, served Pakistan notice that U.S. relations with the country would not be “business as usual,” and disclosed that only a return to democratic rule within the shortest possible time would restore normalcy. Bamidele Adebayo, Coup in Pakistan, THENEWS (Lagos), Oct. 25, 1999, at 30.

505 Elisabeth Bumiller, All Must Join Fight Against Terror, Bush Tells U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at A1. It is not clear whether this aid included the $500 million already announced by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in Islamabad in October. Id.

506 Id.

507 ABC Evening News (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 4, 2002).

508 Id.

509 See id. Secretary Powell argued:

In this global campaign, the United States welcomes the help of any country or party that is genuinely prepared to work with us, but we will not relax our standards and we will continue to advance our fundamental interests in human rights, accountable government, free markets ... for we believe that a world of democracy, opportunity and stability is a world in which terrorism cannot thrive.

Id.
interest considerations obviously dominate. As a student of American foreign policy accurately notes, "[U.S. n]ational interests in the end must set limits on messianic passions." 310 Although globalization and the end of the Cold War have provided a changed context for the conduct of U.S. policy, the nation's leaders appear to have no more qualms about sacrificing ideology for domestic concerns than they did during the Cold War.

A second finding relates to the obviously low level of U.S. economic support for Nigerian democratization. Since military and political-diplomatic initiatives rank so highly above economic initiatives in U.S. policy toward Nigeria, it could be argued that the United States has done little more since 1999 than to normalize or "regularize" its relations with Nigeria after the regimes of Generals Babangida and Abacha. From 1983 to 1998, Nigeria experienced the "long spell of crude despotism" 311 associated with military rule, resulting in the nation's reclassification by the United Nations from a middle-income economy to one of the poorest countries in the world. 312 The people's agitation for democratic rule has something to do with Nigerians' general belief that economic progress is possible only under a civilian government. 313 General Obasanjo has repeatedly confirmed that economic progress will provide the "democratic dividend" that will help to sustain democracy in Nigeria.

Nonetheless, the United States has refused to cancel Nigeria's foreign debt and has provided economic assistance that can only be described as modest and symbolic. 314 Despite the objections of parts of Nigeria's Muslim majority in the North who support Osama bin Laden, 315 Nigeria has joined the United States' global coalition in the

310 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Foreign Policy and the American Character, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 8 (1983).
311 Guest, supra note 50, at 5.
312 From 1980 to 1992, the strength of the Nigerian economy declined 0.4%. The country's per capita income dropped dramatically from about $1,000 in 1980 to $345 in 1998. See Guest, supra note 50, at 5.
313 Aka, supra note 150, at 22.
314 The Obasanjo government has had to lobby Congress to help it recover the estimated $5.5 billion that corrupt Nigerian officials were said to have stashed away in foreign banks while other Western countries had no difficulty acceding to its request. This is the same form of help the United States rendered to the German government after World War II, when it assisted in the recovery of assets stolen by the Nazis. See Akande, supra note 117.
315 See 350 Died in Nigerian Riots, Christian Leader Says, Reuters, Nov. 8, 2001. Osama (or Usama) bin Laden is a Saudi fugitive living in Afghanistan whom the U.S. government alleges to have masterminded the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.
war against terrorism. General Obasanjo continues to show his government’s solidarity with the United States in its war on terrorism, yet Nigeria has not been rewarded economically, as has Pakistan. This holds true even as U.S. strikes on Afghanistan have produced “collateral damage” in Nigeria, signified by bloody clashes between Nigerian Muslims and Christians that have resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and massive property damage.316 Despite these facts, and despite all the talk of a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy,317 the growth of U.S.-Nigerian bilateral trade has been slow, and U.S. investment is primarily within the oil sector of the economy. American policymakers blame this occurrence on the lack of a conducive environment,318 but these trends have varied very little from what they were during the repressive era of military rule under Abacha, when U.S. relations with Nigeria reached their lowest point.319 This situation goes to validate some of the questions raised by African scholars about the depth of the U.S. commitment to democracy; it feeds the sneering cynicism with which these scholars react to the very notion of U.S. support for African democratization.320 Compared to the Clinton presidency and despite appearing to take “more than a passing interest” in Nigerian and African affairs,321 the Bush administration’s economic initiatives remain modest and symbolic. Under President George W. Bush, U.S. economic initiatives are advanced only through the G-8 group, a situation the Nigerian government seems to have resignedly accepted.322 Even here, however, countries other than the United States are driving these initiatives.323

Thirdly, although the United States recognizes that Nigeria is an important “regional partner,”324 its policy toward Nigeria has been

316 Id. (reporting that “[a]t least 350 people were killed in four days of riots in northern Nigeria triggered by protests against the U.S.-led strikes on Afghanistan . . . .”).
317 See Minter, supra note 47, at 202.
318 For example, Ambassador Jeter explained during his interview with some Nigerian reporters that “American companies will invest where they make the assessment that it will be profitable to do so. And I think that the conditions have to be right.” Igiebor et al., supra note 179, at 85.
319 Id. at 205.
320 See Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80.
321 Lawal, supra note 227, at 11.
323 For example, the British and Canadian governments lobbied for the rescue plan for Africa that will be featured on the agenda for the next summit in Canada in 2002. G-8 Rescue Plan for Africa, supra note 225, at 18.
324 Akande, supra note 117.
strongly, if not inextricably, tied to its policy toward Africa as a whole. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act is a law for all of Africa. And on issues from disease to debt relief, the United States does not have a distinct policy toward Nigeria as it has toward Africa more generally. Indeed, as Clinton Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, Nigeria is the “key example” of the “stable, democratic and increasingly prosperous [Africa]” that America wants to help in building, and yet U.S. investment in Nigeria itself has been minimal. The use of the G-8 as a channel for U.S. economic assistance may reinforce this one-policy orientation.

The significance of this observation is that American foreign policy toward Nigeria has become subject to most, if not all, of the constraints that affect U.S.-African policy. In an important critique of current U.S. policy toward Africa, William Minter argued that the Clinton presidency marked a watershed in U.S. relations with the continent. He said that Clinton had empathy for Africa and that, more than any recent U.S. government, his administration injected a positive tone in American policy toward Africa. Before Clinton, U.S. engagement with the continent was considered unrewarding “social work.” But under his leadership, the tone of American policy changed from “what to do about Africa” to “what to do with Africa.” Minter found that “an extensive and continuing dialogue” is the exchange necessary “for the emergence of a genuine new partnership that is about listening, learning, and compromising.” More than any previous U.S. government, the Clinton administration took greater steps toward meeting this important prerequisite.

Yet with all the changes introduced by the Clinton presidency, “Africa still receives token rather than serious responses from Wash-

325 Id.
326 Minter, supra note 47, at 201.
327 See generally Minter, supra note 47, at 200–10. In particular, see President Clinton’s statements during his 1998 trip to Africa such as the following: “Very often we dealt with countries in Africa based more on how they stood in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the struggle for their own people’s aspirations.” Id. at 205. Also note the statements of then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher, intimating that U.S. policy toward Africa is now focused on how it might affect Africans themselves, rather than how it might “affect the shipping lanes next to Africa . . . .” Diamond, supra note 1, at 252.
328 See Gordon, supra note 223, at 59.
329 See supra notes 327, 328 and accompanying text.
330 Minter, supra note 47, at 210 (internal quotes omitted).
331 Id.
ington," and America is still far from implementing a policy that is "genuinely reciprocal and mutually beneficial." Minter asserts that the "profound gap between promises to Africa and realities as expressed in allocation of resources" may be partially attributable to a "racial double standard" that serves as "the invisible backdrop for [U.S.] policymaking on Africa." Minter describes this invisible backdrop as follows:

The particular place that Africa occupies on the United States policy agenda, and the consequent difficulty in changing it, cannot be separated from the 500 years of history in which Africa's place in the world system was defined first by the slave trade and then by colonialism, each reality paralleled by deeply rooted racial stereotyping. Neither inheritance has yet been overcome, while more recent cold war scenarios and home-grown African disasters have overlaid their own simplistic images on the mind-sets of policymakers and the public.

This racial double standard might go a long way to explain what little change is occurring in U.S. policy toward Africa, even in the post-

532 Id. at 200. The genocide in Rwanda is one example of this tokenism. Despite President Clinton's high-profile apology for his administration's failure to respond to this genocide, he was unreceptive to calls for an independent investigation of his administration's responsibility for that failure, as Belgium, France, and the United Nations had already done. Id. at 200-01. High-level officials at the White House and the State Department who dismissed warnings of genocide and lobbied to stop international action were not held accountable. Id.

533 Id. at 210; see also Peter J. Schraeder, African International Relations, in Understanding Contemporary Africa 129, 151 (April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996) (noting three underlying principles of Cold War foreign policy that continue to characterize U.S. policy toward Africa). These policies are as follows: "(1) 'Do not spend much money [on Africa] unless Congress makes you'; (2) 'Do not let African issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world; and, above all else,' (3) 'Do not take stands that might create political controversies in the United States.'" Schraeder, supra, at 151.

534 Minter, supra note 47, at 200.

535 Id.

536 Id.

537 Black presence in the U.S. has little ameliorative effect on the racial orientation of U.S. policy toward Africa. See Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy 143 (1992) (arguing that U.S. policymakers rarely take "the wishes" of African Americans into account); Walton & Smith, supra note 127, at 288 (positing that blacks have "a continuing presence" but by no means "commanding influence" in American foreign policy, including its policy toward Africa).
Cold War era.\textsuperscript{338} In sum, like the rest of Africa, Nigeria is not taken seriously by U.S. foreign policy.

Fourth and finally, the significance of globalization is to underscore the necessity for new approaches in the pursuit of foreign affairs in a changed era. Nigerian scholars have characterized Nigeria’s relationship to the United States as dependent.\textsuperscript{359} Globalization reinforces that dependency, with the “opportunities and constraints presented by changing structured hierarchies,”\textsuperscript{340} and instructs developing countries to build domestic capability in order to survive their relationships with major powers.\textsuperscript{341}

Since the 1970s, the United States and Nigeria have had a relationship built on mutual national interests. The U.S. government stood by the Nigerian people during their struggle against military dictatorship.\textsuperscript{342} American support for Nigeria should now be stronger than ever, with the re-institution of democratic government. The touchstone should be “genuinely reciprocal and mutually beneficial”\textsuperscript{343} relationships unaffected by the vagaries of power and party affiliation in Washington; a policy that constantly engages the people and the leaders of Nigeria, that is not an appendage of any general policy, and that recognizes the fact that only a fundamental

\textsuperscript{338} The United States has made no attempt to intervene in the ongoing war in the Congo Republic (formerly Zaïre) which has involved almost all of the Congo’s neighbors and is being called by some “Africa’s first World War.” Commenting on this conflict, one U.S. specialist on Africa notes ruefully that this “first continental war, a painful test facing the region in the new millennium, is relegated ‘pretty much to the bottom of the barrel’ of U.S. foreign policy.” Paul Salopek, \textit{Torrents of Civil War Pound Ravaged Congo Nation of Riches Impoverished by Legacy of Greed}, \textit{CHI. TRIB.}, Dec. 10, 2000, at 1, 16 (quoting I. William Zartman, an analyst at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.); \textit{see also} Minter, \textit{supra} note 47, at 200.

\textsuperscript{339} ATE, \textit{supra} note 182, at 248.

\textsuperscript{340} Mittelman, \textit{supra} note 270, at xi.

\textsuperscript{341} Minter blames African policymakers, in part, for the lack of a coherent framework for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the Cold War era. Minter, \textit{supra} note 47, at 201. While these policymakers have been vocal and at times effective on selected issues, he said, they have failed to build consensus around convincing and coherent policy-related frameworks, have not adequately addressed the complex issues at stake, and have stressed criticism when they should offer alternative policy options. \textit{Id.} In short, “[u]nlike the period of clear-focused campaigns against colonialism and apartheid, no overall framework is being advanced collectively by African states and non-state movements.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{342} In denying legitimacy to Nigerian military rulers, the U.S. government helped to frustrate their ambition for self-perpetuation in office. Another way in which the U.S. government proved itself an important ally of the Nigerian people was the succor and welcome America gave to notable individuals in the pro-democracy movement in their opposition to military rule. \textit{See Impetus for Nigeria-U.S. Relations, GUARDIAN ONLINE} (Lagos), Aug. 16, 1999 (on file with author).

\textsuperscript{343} Minter, \textit{supra} note 47, at 210.
restructuring of the political and economic systems can bring about true democracy in Nigeria.