Informational Standing After *Summers*

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Abstract: In its recent Wilderness Society v. Rey decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed the difficult question of when a statute may establish a right to informational standing. The decision interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, and concluded that general notice and appeal provisions in a statute that do not establish an explicit public right to information from the government are insufficient to establish informational standing. The Wilderness Society decision indirectly raised the broader question of when Congress may modify common law injury requirements or even Article III constitutional standing requirements. Although the Wilderness Society decision relied on the implications of Summers, the Ninth Circuit would have been better advised to examine Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Summers. His opinions suggest that Congress has significant authority to expand citizen suit standing as long as it carefully defines the statutory injuries it seeks to remedy. Wilderness Society is important because it is the first court of appeals decision that attempts to reconcile Summers and FEC v. Akins, the crucial informational standing case. Although the result in Wilderness Society may be correct, the Ninth Circuit failed to grasp the full complexities of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. This Article argues how to best interpret Lujan, Summers, and Akins in determining how much authority Congress has to establish informational standing and other standing rights that have divided lower federal courts.
INTRODUCTION

In its recent decision, *Wilderness Society v. Rey*, the Ninth Circuit addressed the difficult question of when a statute may establish a right to informational standing. The D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit had previously reached different conclusions about whether environmental statutes promoting public participation or requiring environmental assessments in certain circumstances create a right to informational standing. The Ninth Circuit’s decision interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in *Summers v. Earth Island Institute*—which explicitly narrowed procedural rights standing—as implicitly narrowing standing rights in general. The *Wilderness Society* decision concluded that general notice and appeal provisions in a statute that are designed to promote public participation, but do not establish an explicit public right to information from the government, are insufficient to establish informational standing.

The decision in *Wilderness Society* indirectly raised the broader question of when Congress may modify common law injury requirements, or even Article III constitutional standing requirements for a concrete injury. That question in turn raises broader separation of powers questions. Although *Wilderness Society* relied on the implications of *Summers* to limit informational standing, the Ninth Circuit would have been better advised to examine Justice Kennedy’s concur-

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2 622 F.3d 1251, 1257–60 (9th Cir. 2010).

3 Compare infra notes 200–237 and accompanying text, with infra notes 238–299 and accompanying text.


5 See infra notes 300–354 and accompanying text.

6 622 F.3d at 1259.

7 See infra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.

ring opinions in *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife* and *Summers* as a guide to the Supreme Court’s approach to when Congress may confer standing rights. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions suggest that Congress has significant authority to expand citizen suit standing as long as it carefully defines the statutory injuries it seeks to remedy through such suits.

The Supreme Court’s standing requirements are confusing because its decisions have oscillated between relatively liberal and restrictive approaches to defining the types of injuries sufficient under Article III of the Constitution. Justice Scalia proposed a restrictive approach to standing because he believes that it is a “crucial and inseparable element” of the constitutional separation-of-powers principle, and that limiting standing rules reduces judicial interference with the democratically elected legislative and executive branches. In response, his critics argue that he is more concerned with protecting executive branch decisions from lawsuits than protecting congressional prerogatives. The *Lujan* Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, interpreted standing doctrine to require a party to show “an injury-in-fact,” which is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” In footnote seven of *Lujan*, however, the Court created an exception to its otherwise narrow approach to standing by ob-

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9 See infra notes 362–415 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 362–415 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 36–92 and accompanying text (discussing Article III standing requirements and, in particular, what is a sufficient “injury-in-fact” for standing).
13 See *Lujan*, 504 U.S. 555, 602 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal effect” of Justice Scalia’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates”); Kimberly N. Brown, *Justiciable Generalized Grievances*, 68 Md. L. Rev. 221, 283 (2008) (“If Justice Scalia is correct, and standing should strictly operate to shield the executive from judicial review notwithstanding congressional intent, laws passed by a democratically elected branch could simply go unenforced.”); Michael E. Solimine, *Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing*, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1023, 1050 (2009) (“With respect to the argument that a broad reading of Article III standing improperly limits executive power under Article II, some scholars contend that it does not give sufficient weight to the balance, as opposed to the separation, of powers.”).
14 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted); Mank, *Global Warming*, supra note 12, at 23–24.
serving that plaintiffs who may suffer a concrete injury resulting from a procedural violation by the government are entitled to a more relaxed application of both the imminent injury and the redressability standing requirements. Justice Kennedy, who has often been the swing vote in standing cases, wrote a concurring opinion in *Lujan* arguing that Congress may use its legislative authority to go beyond common law principles in defining a concrete injury, although he acknowledged that Congress did not have the authority to eliminate the concrete injury requirement of Article III.16

In *Federal Election Commission v. Akins*, Justice Breyer, joined by five other justices including Justice Kennedy, endorsed informational injuries as potentially sufficient for standing.17 The Court held that the plaintiff voters suffered a “concrete and particular” injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing because they were deprived of the statutory right to receive designated “information [which] would help them . . . to evaluate candidates for public office”—despite the fact that many other voters shared the same informational injury.18 Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by two other justices, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing because their injury was common to the public at large and did not cause them a particularized injury.19

Both before and after *Akins*, lower court decisions have been divided when plaintiffs in environmental cases seek standing based on an alleged informational injury resulting from the government or a private defendant’s failure to provide information regarding their environmental impacts.20 Before *Akins*, in *Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng*, the D.C. Circuit questioned, but did not decide, whether informational injury alone can meet the Article III injury in fact requirement.21 By contrast, citing *Akins*, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit in *American Canoe Ass’n v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Commission* concluded that environmental groups had standing to seek information


16 *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see Mank, *Global Warming*, supra note 12, at 34–35.


18 Id. at 21, 23–25; see Mank, *Global Warming*, supra note 12, at 37–38.


20 See infra notes 196–355 and accompanying text.

21 943 F.2d 79, 84–85 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also *Akins*, 524 U.S. at 11; Am. Canoe Ass’n v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm’n, 389 F.3d 536, 547–48 (6th Cir. 2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing *Lyng’s* criticism of informational standing).
about water pollution issues pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, if it would assist their members’ understanding of pollution issues and legislative proposals.\textsuperscript{22}

In *Summers*, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision written by Justice Scalia, adopted a restrictive approach to standing that requires plaintiffs to prove how they are concretely injured, or will be imminently injured, by the government’s allegedly illegal actions.\textsuperscript{23} This opinion rejected Justice Breyer’s proposed test for organizational standing based upon the statistical probability that some of an organization’s members will likely be harmed in the near future.\textsuperscript{24} The Court held that the plaintiff organizations failed to establish that they would suffer an “imminent” injury necessary for standing because they could not prove the specific places and times when their members would be harmed by the government’s allegedly illegal policy of selling fire-damaged timber without public notice and comment.\textsuperscript{25} By emphasizing that plaintiffs must demonstrate an imminent injury even for procedural rights, the *Summers* decision implicitly overruled previous decisions that had relaxed the imminence requirement for standing in procedural rights cases.\textsuperscript{26} Justice Kennedy, however, wrote a concurring opinion in *Summers* that echoed his opinion in *Lujan*—while plaintiffs had failed to prove a concrete injury, Congress could provide a broader statutory definition of what constitutes a “concrete” injury for similar plaintiffs in the future.\textsuperscript{27}

In *Wilderness Society*, the Ninth Circuit interpreted *Summers* and *Akins* to implicitly restrict the scope of informational standing to statutes that give plaintiffs an explicit right to information from the government.\textsuperscript{28} The court reasoned that *Akins*’s support for informational standing was limited to statutes that explicitly give the public the right to particular information from the government.\textsuperscript{29} Conversely, if an environmental statute only seeks to encourage public participation and does not provide a right to information about certain types of govern-

\textsuperscript{22} 389 F.3d at 544–47.

\textsuperscript{23} See 555 U.S. at 495–97. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. *Id.* at 489. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. *Id.* at 501.

\textsuperscript{24} *Id.* at 496–500 (majority opinion).

\textsuperscript{25} *Id.* at 490–96.

\textsuperscript{26} Compare infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text with infra notes 160–176 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{27} See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{28} *Wilderness Soc’y*, 622 F.3d at 1259.

\textsuperscript{29} *Id.*
ment projects, such a statute should be read narrowly in light of Summers. Otherwise, a broad doctrine of informational standing would allow plaintiffs to bypass Summers’s conclusion that procedural injury alone does not provide standing, unless it is attached to a particular project or if the procedural injury results in informational harm.

Although the Supreme Court generally tightened standing requirements in Lujan and Summers, the Akins decision nonetheless left open the possibility of broad informational standing. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilderness Society is important because it is the first court of appeals decision that attempts to reconcile Summers and Akins. The result in Wilderness Society—that Congress must explicitly establish informational standing rights—may be correct, but the Ninth Circuit failed to grasp the full complexities of the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence by focusing only on how Summers might limit Akins. Because he was the key swing vote in Lujan and Summers and was a member of the Akins majority, Justice Kennedy’s analysis of standing issues is crucial to understanding the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. This Article argues how to best interpret Lujan, Summers, and Akins in determining how much authority Congress has to establish informational standing and other standing rights issues that have divided lower federal courts.

Part I provides an introduction to standing doctrine. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s informational standing decisions in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice and Akins. Part III examines the Summers decision. Part IV explicates conflicting decisions on informational standing in the D.C. Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and most recently the Ninth Circuit decision. Part V uses Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan to propose a framework for courts to assess Congress’s authority to grant standing rights in general, and informational standing rights in particular.

30 See id. at 1259–60.
31 Id. at 1260.
32 See infra notes 119–144, 151–176 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 300–354 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.
I. STANDING DOCTRINE

A. Constitutional and Prudential Standing

Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that a plaintiff have standing to file suit in federal courts, since 1944 the Supreme Court has inferred from the Constitution’s Article III limitation of judicial decisions to “Cases” and to “Controversies” that federal courts must utilize standing requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake in a case. Federal courts only have jurisdiction over a case if a plaintiff has standing for the relief sought. If the plaintiff fails to meet constitutional standing requirements, a federal court will dismiss the case without deciding the merits.

Standing requirements derive from broad constitutional principles, and prohibit unconstitutional advisory opinions. Furthermore, standing supports separation of powers principles—defining the division of powers between the judiciary and political branches of govern-


38 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–46; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (“[W]e have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the litigation.”); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1.

39 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–42; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 673.

40 See, e.g., Gaston, supra note 37, at 219.
ment so that the “Federal Judiciary respects ‘the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’”41 There is, however, disagreement as to what extent the principle of separation of powers limits the standing of suits challenging alleged executive branch under or non-enforcement of congressional requirements mandated by statute.42 In *Lujan* for example, Justice Scalia reasoned that allowing any person to sue the U.S. government to challenge its alleged failure to enforce the law would improperly interfere with the President’s Article II constitutional authority to “‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .’”43 Some commentators have argued that Justice Scalia’s approach to standing undermines the role of Congress in using judicial review to guarantee that the executive branch obeys enacted laws.44

In addition to constitutional Article III standing requirements, federal courts may impose prudential standing requirements to restrict unreasonable demands on limited judicial resources or for other policy reasons.45 Congress may enact legislation to override prudential limitations but must “expressly negate[]” such limitations.46 The Supreme Court has been unclear regarding whether its restriction on suits alleg-

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42 See Scalia, *supra* note 12, at 881–82 (arguing for restrictive standing, thereby limiting the role of the judiciary). But see *Lujan* 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (The “principal effect” of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the Courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates.”).

43 *Lujan*, at 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting *U.S. Const.* art. II, § 3). Justice Scalia acknowledged that Congress may “elevate[] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” *Id.* at 578.

44 See Heather Elliott, *The Functions of Standing*, 61 *Stan. L. Rev.* 459, 496 (2008) (arguing courts should not use standing doctrine “as a backdoor way to limit Congress’s legislative power”); *infra* notes 365–401 and accompanying text (discussing broad standing rights as means to protect congressional authority to ensure that the executive branch enforces federal laws).

45 See, e.g., *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997) (describing the “zone of interests” standard as a prudential limitation rather than a mandatory constitutional requirement); *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements are based “in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations”); Yackle, *supra* note 12, at 318 (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based “and may be relaxed in some circumstances”).

46 *Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 163. Unlike constitutional standing, prudential limits on standing “can be modified or abrogated by Congress.” *Id.* at 162. Prudential limitations are judge-made and must be “expressly negated.” *Id.* at 163. Furthermore, citizen suit provisions abrogate the zone of interest limitation. *Id.* at 166.
ing “generalized grievances”—a term used to refer to suits involving large segments of the public, or those where a citizen lacking a personal injury seeks to force the government to obey a duly enacted law—is a prudential or constitutional limitation.

B. The Injury Requirement

In *Lujan*, the Court summarized and refined its three-part standing test. First, a plaintiff must show “an injury-in-fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Next, the plaintiff must also show “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” directly linking the injury to the challenged action of the defendant. Finally, the injury must be likely, rather than speculatively, redressable by the court. A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three parts of the standing test.

This Article will focus primarily on the injury requirement for standing. In *Lujan*, the majority concluded that the plaintiff, Defenders of Wildlife, lacked standing to challenge the failure of certain government agencies to consult with the Secretary of Interior about funding projects that might hurt endangered species in foreign countries. The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing because the two members of the organization who filed affidavits only had intentions to visit the relevant foreign countries—Egypt and Sri Lanka—at some indeterminate future date. The Court concluded, “[s]uch ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of

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47 Guilds, *supra* note 36, at 1884 (“Beyond the uncertainty about whether generalized grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations, there is also uncertainty about their precise definition.”); see *Yackle, supra* note 12, at 342 (“The ‘generalized grievance’ formulation is notoriously ambiguous.”).

48 See *Yackle, supra* note 12, at 342–49 (discussing the Supreme Court debate on whether the rule against generalized grievances is a constitutional rule or a non-constitutional policy waivable by Congress); Guilds, *supra* note 36, at 1878; Mank, *States Standing, supra* note 1, at 1710–16.

49 See 504 U.S. at 560–61.

50 *Id.*

51 *Id.* at 560.

52 *Id.* at 561 (stating that “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements”); see *DaimlerChrysler*, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must “carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III”); *Yackle, supra* note 12, at 336.

53 504 U.S. at 557–59, 578.

54 *Id.* at 562–64.
an ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”\textsuperscript{56} Similarly, in \textit{Summers}, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion concluded that the plaintiff organizations failed to demonstrate a concrete injury because they could not specify precise times and locations when their members would visit national parks where the U.S. Forest Service was allegedly engaged in illegal salvage timber sales.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{C. Relaxed Standing in Procedural Cases}

In cases involving procedural violations, such as the failure of the government to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),\textsuperscript{58} courts relax the imminence and redressability portions of the standing test.\textsuperscript{59} The \textit{Summers} decision, however, may suggest that the Court is retrenching its relaxation of the imminence requirement.\textsuperscript{60} In footnote seven of \textit{Lujan}, Justice Scalia stated that plaintiffs who may suffer a concrete injury resulting from the government’s procedural error are entitled to a more relaxed application of these standing requirements because remedying the procedural violation may not change the government’s substantive decision.\textsuperscript{61} Justice Scalia offered the prototypical example of procedural injury to a plaintiff who lives near a proposed dam who seeks an environmental assessment under NEPA to study its potential impacts.\textsuperscript{62} He stated:

There is this much truth to the assertion that “procedural rights” are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's

\begin{footnotes}
\item[56] Id. at 564.
\item[57] 555 U.S. at 493–97.
\item[59] See, e.g., \textit{Lujan}, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
\item[60] See \textit{Summers}, 555 U.S. at 498–99; \textit{Brown}, supra note 13, at 257–64 (discussing the Court’s leniency in deciding standing in cases involving procedural violations). A plaintiff must still allege that the proposed government action would have some possibility of causing a concrete harm. \textit{See \textit{Lujan}}, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. The Supreme Court has never clearly explained to what extent the immediacy or redressability portions of the standing test are relaxed in procedural rights cases. Mank, \textit{States Standing}, supra note 1, at 1719.
\item[61] See 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
\item[62] \textit{Id.}; see Mank, \textit{States Standing}, supra note 1, at 1716; Mank, \textit{Global Warming}, supra note 12, at 35–36.
\end{footnotes}
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many years.\textsuperscript{63} Justice Scalia limited standing in this example to plaintiffs with concrete injuries resulting from the government’s procedural error.\textsuperscript{64} Furthermore, “persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the country from the dam” do not have “concrete interests affected” and thus do not have standing to challenge such a violation.\textsuperscript{65}

A plaintiff normally must establish standing by showing it is likely that they will suffer a concrete injury from actions traceable to the defendant, and that injury could be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.\textsuperscript{66} A plaintiff, however, claiming government procedural error need not prove that the government’s actions will cause imminent harm, or that a judicial remedy will actually prevent the government from taking the proposed action.\textsuperscript{67} For example, a NEPA plaintiff is entitled to a remedy mandating that the government follow NEPA’s procedural requirement of conducting an EIS, even if it is uncertain that it will lead the government to change its substantive decision.\textsuperscript{68}

In \textit{Massachusetts v. EPA}, the Court arguably adopted an even more relaxed approach to redressability for procedural rights plaintiffs than that suggested in footnote seven of \textit{Lujan}.\textsuperscript{69} The decision declared that procedural rights litigants need only demonstrate “some possibility” that their requested remedy would redress a procedural injury.\textsuperscript{70} Illustrating the volatility of the Court’s position on standing, the four dissenting jus-

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Lujan}, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Mank, \textit{Global Warming}, supra note 12, at 35–36, 35 n.240 (discussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injuries); Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, “Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415, 457 (discussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injuries).

\textsuperscript{64} See \textit{Lujan}, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.

\textsuperscript{65} Id.; see \textit{id} at 573 n.8 (“We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.”); William W. Buzbee, \textit{Standing and the Statutory Universe}, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 257 (2001); Mank, \textit{States Standing}, supra note 1, at 1716.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Lujan}, 504 U.S. at 560–61.

\textsuperscript{67} See \textit{id} at 572 n.7; Mank, \textit{Global Warming}, supra note 12, at 35–36, 35 n.240, 36 n.244.

\textsuperscript{68} See \textit{Lujan}, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; Mank, \textit{Global Warming}, supra note 12, at 35–36.


\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Id} at 518 (“When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”).
tices in *Massachusetts v. EPA*—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—were in the *Summers* majority two years later, while four of the justices in the *Massachusetts v. EPA* majority—Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—dissented in *Summers*. Justice Kennedy was the only justice in the majority in both cases, thus demonstrating that he is the key vote in standing cases. In *Massachusetts v. EPA*, the Court rejected the argument by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that petitioners must prove that federal courts could remedy the global problem of climate change. Instead, the Court determined that petitioners satisfied the redressability portion of the standing test because a court order requiring the EPA to regulate emissions from new vehicles will “slow or reduce” global climate change. The decision’s “some possibility” test appears to be applicable to all procedural rights plaintiffs. The *Summers* decision did not address *Massachusetts v. EPA*’s relaxed approach to redressability for procedural rights plaintiffs, but it may have tightened the imminence requirement.

Typical of much of the Supreme Court’s imprecise standing jurisprudence, footnote seven of *Lujan* does not clearly explain the degree to which the immediacy and redressability requirements are waived or relaxed in procedural rights cases, the plaintiff’s burden of proof to establish standing in procedural rights cases, or how to define procedural rights. As a result, what plaintiffs must show regarding their like-

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72 *Compare Summers*, 555 U.S. at 488 (listing majority and dissenting members); with *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U.S. at 501 (listing majority and dissenting members).

73 *See* 549 U.S. at 525.

74 *Id.; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons*, supra note 1, at 675.

75 *See Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U.S. at 518; *Mank, States Standing*, supra note 1, at 1727 (arguing the “some possibility” standard in *Massachusetts v. EPA* applies to all procedural plaintiffs).

76 *See infra* notes 200–237 and accompanying text.

77 *See* Brian J. Gatchel, *Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 99–105 (1995) (criticizing footnote seven in *Lujan* for failing to explain to what extent immediacy and redressability standing requirements are relaxed or eliminated); *Mank, States Standing*, supra note 1, at 1718–20 (criticizing the Court’s lack of guidance on how to apply footnote seven in *Lujan*); *Mank, Global Warming*, supra note 12, at 36–37, 36 n.244 (“[F]ootnote seven does not clearly explain the extent to which redressability and immediacy requirements are waived in procedural rights cases.”); *Sunstein, supra* note 36, at 208 (“The Court acknowledged (without any real expansion) that in some cases involving procedural violations, plaintiffs need not show redressability.”); *Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 285 (1995) (“*Lujan*’s procedural injury dicta is not without its problems, however. At best, it is vague and provides little guidance for prospective plaintiffs and the lower courts . . . .”).
lihood of harm arising from the agency’s action is unclear. For example, the D.C. Circuit employs a strict “substantial probability” test, but the Ninth Circuit utilizes a more lenient “reasonable probability” test. The Supreme Court could have prevented confusion in lower courts by eliminating the immediacy requirement for procedural rights plaintiffs as they have no control over how quickly the government will act, but the *Lujan* decision does not address the issue of timing. Additionally, footnote seven does not provide clear guidance as to what extent courts can relax or eliminate the redressability requirement. Yet, the subsequent *Massachusetts v. EPA* decision appears to adopt a relaxed approach to the redressability requirement in procedural rights cases.

**D. Threatened and Imminent Injuries**

In some cases, a threatened injury may be sufficiently concrete and imminent if the harm is likely to occur in the relatively near future, although the Supreme Court has never precisely defined “imminent injury.” In *Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union*, the Court stated “[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is

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78 *Compare* Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665–72 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying a strict four-part test for standing in a procedural rights case, including requiring a procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury, that “a particularized environmental interest of theirs [] will suffer demonstrably increased risk,” and that it is “substantially probable” that the agency action will cause the demonstrable injury alleged), with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting *Florida Audubon*’s standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and stating that such plaintiffs must show “the reasonable probability of the challenged action’s threat to [their] concrete interest”) (quoting Churchill Cnty. v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998)), and Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451–52 (10th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with *Florida Audubon*’s “substantial probability” test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test requiring plaintiff to establish an “increased risk of adverse environmental consequences” from the alleged failure to follow NEPA). See generally Mank, *Global Warming, supra* note 12, at 45–63.

79 *Compare* Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 665–72 (applying a substantial probability test), with Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972 (applying a reasonable probability test).


81 See Gatchel, *supra* note 77, at 100, 108; Mank, *States Standing, supra* note 1, at 1719; Sinor, *supra* note 80, at 879 (criticizing footnote seven because it “is confusing and raises more questions than it answers”).

82 See 549 U.S. at 518.

enough."\(^{84}\) *Lujan*’s approach to “imminent injury” is similar to *Babbitt*’s approach to threatened injuries.\(^ {85}\) The imminent injury test, however, fails to define a sufficient probability of risk to a plaintiff and how quickly injury must result.\(^ {86}\) For instance, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the imminent standing test to require an increased risk of harm.\(^ {87}\) The subsequent *Summers* decision arguably overruled the Ninth Circuit’s approach to the imminence test by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate when and where they would be injured in the future.\(^ {88}\)

### E. Oscillating Standing Requirements

The Court has oscillated between relatively strict and lenient standing requirements. *Lujan* adopted a relatively strict definition of concrete injury, but footnote seven allowed a more lenient standard for plaintiffs in procedural rights cases to meet the imminence and redressability requirements for standing.\(^ {89}\) *Massachusetts v. EPA* appeared to relax the redressability standard for procedural rights plaintiffs.\(^ {90}\) Yet just two years later, *Summers* arguably narrowed procedural standing in regard to the imminence standard.\(^ {91}\) The Court’s confusing standing jurisprudence results from profound philosophical disagreements among the justices on the Court.\(^ {92}\)

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\(^{85}\) See *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560–64; *Babbitt*, 442 U.S. at 298.


\(^{87}\) See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000).

\(^{88}\) See 555 U.S. at 498–99; infra notes 160–176 and accompanying text.

\(^{89}\) See supra notes 36–57 and accompanying text.

\(^{90}\) See 549 U.S. at 518; supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text.

\(^{91}\) See 555 U.S. at 498–501; infra notes 160–176 and accompanying text.

\(^{92}\) See infra notes 119–144, 160–195 and accompanying text.
II. INFORMATIONAL STANDING: PUBLIC CITIZEN AND AKINS

A. Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice: Endorsing Pure Informational Standing

In Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Supreme Court endorsed the concept of pure informational standing but did not discuss the issue at length. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration of the case, and perhaps his absence is the reason for the lack of such discussion. For many years, the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary (ABA Committee) provided advice to the President on the nomination of federal judges. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) imposes a number of requirements on committees or similar groups that advise the President or federal agencies. The plaintiff filed suit requesting both a declaration that the Justice Department’s utilization of the ABA Committee was covered by FACA and an order mandating the Justice Department to comply with FACA’s requirements.

Justice Brennan’s majority opinion concluded that the ABA Committee did not constitute an “advisory committee” for purposes of FACA. FACA’s legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend to apply the term “utilize” in the statute to the advisory relationship between the Justice Department and the ABA Committee. The majority acknowledged that it avoided interpreting FACA to apply to the ABA Committee in part because such an interpretation would raise serious constitutional concerns regarding whether FACA unduly infringed on the President’s constitutional power to nominate federal judges and thus violated the doctrine of separation of powers. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, applied a “plain language” construction of the statute in reasoning that FACA included the ABA Committee’s activities

94 See id. at 442.
95 Id. at 443–45.
96 These requirements include the public availability of records consistent with the Freedom of Information Act’s public information requirements and exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
97 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 445–47.
98 Id. at 447.
99 Id. at 463–65.
100 See id. at 451–65.
101 See U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2; Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 465–67.
when advising the Justice Department on such matters. But Justice Kennedy ultimately concluded that the application of FACA to the President’s use of the ABA Committee was unconstitutional because it violated Article II’s appointments clause by interfering with the President’s ability to gather information about potential judicial nominees.

Most relevant for this Article, the ABA argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege an “injury sufficiently concrete and specific” since they “advanced a general grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens . . . .” Following its decisions relating to informational standing under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to seek information pursuant to FACA’s statutory mandates. The Court reasoned that prohibiting the appellant from studying the ABA Committee’s activities is comparable to a denial of information under FOIA. The Court’s interpretation of FOIA never required more than a showing that the information requested was denied. Thus, a refusal to grant information under FACA, like a refusal to grant information under FOIA, constitutes a distinct injury and affords standing to sue.

The Court rejected the ABA’s argument that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they alleged a generalized grievance. The Court found that it was not reason enough to deny the appellants their asserted injury solely because other citizens or groups of citizens may also claim the same injury. Similarly, FOIA is not restricted by the fact that many citizens might request the same information under its authority.

The court in Public Citizen did not attempt to reconcile its approval of standing in FACA suits with its recognition of standing in FOIA cases, or with other decisions that questioned standing in circumstances

102 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 467–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
103 Id. at 481–89; see U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
104 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 448–49 (majority opinion).
105 See id. at 449.
106 See id.
107 Id.
108 See id.
109 See id. at 449–50.
110 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50.
where a plaintiff asserted a generalized grievance. In *Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.*, for example, the Supreme Court held that a court could deny standing in a suit involving generalized harms because such a suit would raise “general prudential concerns ‘about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’” *Public Citizen*’s approach to informational standing—allowing any citizen to seek information under FACA—is arguably inconsistent with *Duke Power*’s restrictive approach to generalized grievances, but *Public Citizen* did not discuss that case. One problem typical of standing jurisprudence is that the Court has never precisely defined the term “generalized grievance” and whether its prohibition is a flexible judicial prudential doctrine or a firmer constitutional rule. As a result, it is difficult to decide whether the decisions in *Public Citizen* and *Duke Power* are merely in tension or actually contradict each other. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in *Public Citizen* did not address the issue of standing; he, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor presumptively agreed with the majority’s reasoning on that issue. If Justice Scalia had participated in this case, it is possible that he might have raised objections similar to those he raised later in *Federal Election Commission v. Akins*.

**B. Justice Breyer’s Majority Opinion in Akins**

In *Akins*, the Supreme Court concluded that an injury resulting from the government’s failure to provide required information can constitute a concrete injury sufficient for standing. *Akins* addressed

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115 See *Yackle, supra* note 12, at 342 (“The ‘generalized grievance’ formulation is notoriously ambiguous.”); Solimine, *supra* note 13, at 1027 (discussing “whether the barrier to bring [generalized grievance] cases is a constitutional or prudential one”).


117 See *Public Citizen*, 491 U.S. at 467–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).


whether voters had standing to challenge a Federal Election Commission (FEC) decision that a lobbying group was not a “political committee” within the definition of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), and accordingly, did not have to disclose its donors, funding, or expenses. FECA “imposes extensive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon groups that fall within the Act’s definition of a ‘political committee.’” The statute authorized “[a]ny party aggrieved by” a FEC order to seek judicial review in federal court.

The Court rejected the FEC’s argument that prudential standing considerations should bar the suit because “[h]istory associates the word ‘aggrieved’ with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly—beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which ‘prudential’ standing traditionally rested.” Furthermore, the Akins decision concluded that “[t]he injury of which respondents complain—their failure to obtain relevant information—is injury of a kind that FECA seeks to address.” After examining the statute’s language, the Court decided that Congress intended to protect citizens from this type of injury and that respondents, therefore, satisfied the prudential standing requirements.

Additionally, Akins concluded that Congress had “the constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this lawsuit.” The Akins decision determined that the government’s refusal to provide information to the plaintiff voters for which the Act required disclosure was a constitutionally “genuine ‘injury in fact.’” The Court concluded that such deprivation of information, which the plaintiffs could use “to evaluate candidates for public office,” constituted a “concrete and particular” injury. Furthermore, the Court observed that the Court in Public Citizen had “held that a plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be pub-
licly disclosed pursuant to a statute” and implied that the same reasoning applied to Akins.\textsuperscript{130}

The government argued that the plaintiffs should not have standing because they suffered only a generalized grievance common to all other voters.\textsuperscript{131} The Court rejected this argument because the statute specifically authorized voters to request information from the FEC, which therefore overrode any prudential standing limitations against generalized grievances.\textsuperscript{132} The Court distinguished prior cases with judicially imposed prudential norms against generalized grievances by reasoning that it would deny standing for widely shared, generalized injuries only if the harm “is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature—for example, harm to the ‘common concern for obedience to law.’”\textsuperscript{133} Akins stated that Article III standing was permissible even if many people suffered similar injuries as long as those injuries were concrete and not abstract.\textsuperscript{134} If such an interest were sufficiently concrete, then it could qualify as an injury in fact.\textsuperscript{135} Accordingly, the Akins decision recognized that a plaintiff who suffers a concrete injury may sue even though many others have suffered similar injuries.\textsuperscript{136} Although a political forum might be appropriate to address widely shared injuries, this fact alone does not exclude an interest for Article III purposes.\textsuperscript{137} “This conclusion seems particularly obvious where . . . large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury . . . or where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights conferred by law.”\textsuperscript{138} Thus, Akins makes clear that courts should not deny standing merely because large numbers of persons have the

\textsuperscript{130} Id.
\textsuperscript{131} Id. at 23.
\textsuperscript{132} Id. at 19–21; see Mank, \textit{Standing and Statistical Persons}, supra note 1, at 718; Sunstein, \textit{supra} note 119, at 634–36, 642–45 (stating that Akins concluded that the statute at issue overrode any prudential limitations against generalized grievances); see Kimberly N. Brown, \textit{What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and the Battle for Judicial Review}, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 677, 678 (2007).
\textsuperscript{133} Akins, 549 U.S. at 23. The Supreme Court has not been clear on whether generalized grievances pose a constitutional or prudential barrier to standing, and the issue has been subject to much debate. Solimine, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1027 n.14. The Akins decision implied that the rule against generalized grievances is only prudential in nature, but did not explicitly decide the issue. \textit{See} Akins, 524 U.S. at 19; accord Mank, \textit{Standing and Statistical Persons}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 718 (discussing Akins as treating generalized grievances as prudential); Sunstein, \textit{supra} note 119, at 634–36 (discussing the four-part analysis of plaintiff’s standing in Akins).
\textsuperscript{134} 524 U.S. at 24–25.
\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 24; see Mank, \textit{Standing and Statistical Persons}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 717.
\textsuperscript{136} Akins, 524 U.S. at 24.
\textsuperscript{137} Id.
\textsuperscript{138} Id.
same or similar injuries so long as those injuries are concrete.139 Furthermore, Akins implies that Congress has the authority to extend standing to the outer limits of Article III by broadly defining what constitutes a concrete statutory injury as opposed to an abstract injury.140

The Akins decision stressed that courts should strongly consider Congress’s intent in defining statutory rights when determining whether a statutory injury is concrete.141 By implying that “Congress has broad authority to define which injuries are sufficient for constitutional standing,” the Akins majority adopted a more similar approach to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence rather than Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lujan.”142 Justice Scalia emphasized that Article III prohibits Congress from granting standing to a plaintiff with merely a generalized grievance caused by the government’s failure to enforce the law.143 Akins, on the other hand, implied that a generalized grievance is usually a prudential limitation that Congress can waive by defining the circumstances in which a class of litigants may seek a remedy for a widely shared injury.144

139 Id.

140 See Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2001); Solimine, supra note 13, at 1050 (“FEC v. Akins, seem[s] to evince a more generous reading of congressional power to influence standing.”); accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719.

141 Akins, 524 U.S. at 19, 24–25; Brown, supra note 132, at 688, 690–94 (arguing that Akins recognized that Congress has significant power to define which injuries are sufficient for Article III standing); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719 (arguing that the Akins court emphasized the weight congressional intent should be given); Sunstein, supra note 119, at 616–17, 645 (arguing that Akins gives Congress the authority to waive the prudential presumption against suits involving generalized grievances, especially in suits involving informational injuries).

142 Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719 (noting that Akins looked to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan over Justice Scalia’s majority opinion on this point); see Brown, supra note 132, at 693–94 (stating that Akins “elevated Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan, in which he reiterated that Congress is empowered to define injuries that give rise to a cause of action that did not exist at common law”); Sunstein, supra note 119, at 617 (“Akins appears to vindicate the passage from Justice Kennedy’s important concurring opinion in Lujan.”).

143 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719–20; Sunstein, supra note 119, at 643 (stating that “before Akins . . . the ban on generalized grievances was moving from a prudential one to one rooted in Article III. Lujan seemed to suggest that to have standing, citizens would have to show that their injuries were ‘particular’ in the sense that they were not widely shared.”) (footnotes and citations omitted). Justice Scalia also suggested that the Constitution’s Article II, section 3 provision that the President is responsible to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” bars Congress from authorizing citizen suits as private attorneys general by those who lack a concrete injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.

144 Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719–20; see Brown, supra note 132 at 689–94 (arguing that Akins differs from Lujan by recognizing Congress’s authority to define standing in statutes); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1714–15 (arguing
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissenting Opinion in Akins

Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, argued that the plaintiffs suffered a generalized grievance common to all members of the public. Justice Scalia contended that Article III prohibits even generalized grievances involving concrete injuries because *Lujan* mandated that an injury be concrete and that the harm be “particularized”—the injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Because the *Akins* plaintiffs’ alleged informational injury was an “undifferentiated” generalized grievance that was “common to all members of the public,” the plaintiffs must resolve the injury “by political, rather than judicial, means.” More broadly, Justice Scalia dissented in *Akins* because he believed that the majority opinion inappropriately granted the judiciary the authority to decide generalized grievances that are instead the exclusive responsibility of the executive branch under both Article III and the President’s Article II authority. Thus, he returned to the broader principle that the “standing doctrine was a ‘crucial and inseparable element’ of separation of powers principles” and “that more restrictive standing rules” would limit judicial interference with the popularly elected legislative and executive branches. Perhaps surprisingly, Justice Scalia did not explicitly argue that the Court had overruled any part of *Lujan*; he may have believed that the two cases could be reconciled or perhaps he hoped to limit the scope of *Akins* in subsequent cases, as he arguably did in his *Summers* decision.

that *Akins* held generalized grievances as prudential barriers that can be waived by Congress without ruling on Congress’s constitutional power to define standing); Sunstein, supra note 119, at 635–36, 644–45, 672–75 (discussing Congress’s authority to grant standing and legal interests in light of *Akins*). *Akins* did not address or resolve whether Article III in some circumstances forbids suits that are generalized grievances. 524 U.S. at 23 (“Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.” (citations omitted)).

146 *Id.* at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 504 U.S. at 560 n.1); accord Mank, *Standing and Statistical Persons*, supra note 1, at 720.
148 524 U.S. at 29–37; see Brown, supra note 132, at 702–03; Mank, *Standing and Statistical Persons*, supra note 1, at 721; Sunstein, supra note 119, at 616–17, 637, 643–47.
149 Percival, supra note 12, at 847 (quoting Scalia, supra note 2, at 881); see also Mank, *Global Warming*, supra note 12, at 29.
III. Summers Rejects Probabilistic Standing and Limits Procedural Standing

The litigation that culminated in the Summers v. Earth Island Institute decision began when the U.S. Forest Service (Service) approved the Burnt Ridge Project, which involved the salvage sale—without public notice and comment—of timber on 238 acres of fire-damaged land in the Sequoia National Forest.151 Several environmental organizations then filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent the Service from implementing new regulations.152 These regulations exempted salvage sales of less than 250 acres from the notice, comment, and appeal process that Congress required the Service to apply to “significant land management decisions.”153 The plaintiffs also challenged other Service regulations that did not apply to Burnt Ridge.154 After the court granted a preliminary injunction against the Burnt Ridge salvage-timber sale, the plaintiffs and Service settled their dispute.155 Despite the government’s argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge other salvage sales once they settled the Burnt Ridge Project case, the court decided the plaintiffs’ broader challenges to the Service’s salvage sale policies.156 The court invalidated five of the Service’s regulations and entered a nationwide injunction against their application.157 The Ninth Circuit later concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenges to regulations not at issue in the Burnt Ridge Project were not yet ripe for adjudication.158 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s conclusion that two regulations applicable to the Burnt Ridge Project were illegal and, therefore, upheld the nationwide injunction against the application of those two regulations.159

152 Summers, 555 U.S. at 489–90 (basing claims on Act that “required the Forest Service to establish a notice, comment, and appeal process for ‘proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974’”).
154 Summers, 555 U.S. at 491.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 491–92.
157 Id. at 492.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 488.
A. Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion Rejects Probabilistic Standing and Arguably Limits Procedural Standing

In *Summers*, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion determined that the plaintiffs failed to meet the injury portion of the standing test once they settled the Burnt Ridge Project dispute. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs had initially satisfied the injury requirement when they submitted an affidavit alleging that an organization member “had repeatedly visited the Burnt Ridge site, that he had imminent plans to do so again,” and that the government’s actions would harm his aesthetic interests in viewing the flora and fauna at the site. Justice Scalia concluded, however, that the settlement had resolved the member’s injury and that none of the other affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs alleged an imminent injury at a specific site. Another affiant for the plaintiffs asserted that he visited a large number of national parks during his lifetime, that he had suffered injury in the past from development on Forest Service land, and that he planned to visit several unnamed national forests in the future. The Court deemed his affidavit insufficient for standing because he could not identify any particular site and time where he was likely to be harmed by salvage timber sales or other allegedly illegal actions authorized by the challenged regulations, thereby failing to satisfy the imminent injury requirement.

Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejected the concept of probabilistic standing, which states that an organization has standing based on the probability that some members of the organization will be harmed in the future. The Sierra Club alleged in the complaint that it has more than 700,000 national members, and, accordingly, that it was probable the Service’s implementation of the challenged regulations would harm at least one of its members in the near future. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ probabilistic standing argument because it concluded that an organizational plaintiff must identify specific mem-

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160 555 U.S. at 491–92.
161 *Id.* at 494.
162 *Id.* at 493–96.
163 *Id.* at 495.
164 *Id.* at 495–97. “There may be a chance, but is hardly a likelihood, that [affiant’s] wanderings will bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the regulations.” *Id.* at 495.
165 *Id.* at 496; Mank, *Standing and Statistical Persons*, supra note 1, at 750.
166 See *Summers*, 555 U.S. at 502 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Corrected Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Appendix ¶ 12 at 34, Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (No. CIV F-03–6386 JKS)).
bers who are being injured or will be imminently injured at a particular time and location. Justice Scalia argued that although it may be possible that a member of the plaintiff organization would meet the standing criteria at some point in the future, mere statistical probability is insufficient to meet standing requirements.

Arguably, the Summers Court assigned a rigorous standing burden for procedural rights plaintiffs. The Summers decision may have retreated from the relaxation of the imminence standard for procedural rights plaintiffs found in footnote seven of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. By implicitly conceding that footnote seven in Lujan recognized that Congress has some authority to redefine the redressability requirement to enable procedural rights plaintiffs to sue, the Summers decision appeared to limit congressional authority to change standing rules by emphasizing that procedural rights plaintiffs must still meet the Article III concrete injury requirement. Congress has the power to relax the standing requirement in terms of redressability, but not the requirement of injury in fact. Instead, “the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.” Importantly, Justice Scalia stated in Summers that procedural rights plaintiffs are entitled to relaxed redressability requirements, but did not address relaxed standards for immediacy. The Summers decision, however, did not explicitly overrule the relaxed imminence test established in footnote seven of Lujan. Therefore, the impact of Summers on future procedural rights cases remains uncertain.

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167 Id. at 499 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia acknowledged that an organization has standing if all of its members are likely to suffer an injury. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958)).

168 Id.

169 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see 555 U.S. at 493.

170 See 555 U.S. at 496 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (1992)); Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963.

171 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see Summers, 555 U.S. at 496.

172 Summers, 555 U.S. at 496.

173 Id.

174 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see 555 U.S. at 496.

175 See Summers, 555 U.S. at 496.

176 Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra note 1, at 10,963; see Summers, 555 U.S. at 497.
B. Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion

In a short concurrence in *Summers*, Justice Kennedy echoed his concurring opinion in *Lujan*, and explained that he believed a plaintiff can challenge the alleged violation of a procedural right only if the plaintiff can demonstrate a separate concrete injury.\(^{177}\) Kennedy further found that the plaintiffs did not meet this standard in *Summers*.\(^{178}\) He asserted that, “[t]his case would present different considerations if Congress had sought to provide redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.’”\(^{179}\) Justice Kennedy concluded that the statute at issue did not include an express citizen suit provision, meaning that Congress did not intend the statute to bestow any right other than a procedural right.\(^{180}\) Like his concurrence in *Lujan*, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in *Summers* left open the possibility that he might have concluded that the plaintiffs met Article III standing requirements, despite Justice Scalia’s more fundamental separation of powers concerns, if Congress had enacted a more explicit statute that clearly defined when a procedural injury constitutes a concrete harm to a particular class of plaintiffs.\(^{181}\)

C. Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion

In his dissent in *Summers*, Justice Breyer proposed that the Court adopt a “realistic threat” test for determining when an injury is sufficiently imminent and concrete for standing.\(^{182}\) Although acknowledging that the Court had sometimes used the term “imminent” as a test in its standing decisions, he argued that the majority’s opinion wrongly used the term to prohibit standing.\(^{183}\) In contrast, prior decisions had used the term to reject standing only when the alleged harm “was merely ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ or otherwise speculative.”\(^{184}\) Justice Breyer contended that the majority’s use of the imminent test was

\(^{177}\) 555 U.S. at 500.

\(^{178}\) *Id.*

\(^{179}\) *Id.* (quoting *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

\(^{180}\) *Id.*

\(^{181}\) See *id.*; *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 579–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Mank, *Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra* note 1, at 10,963–64.

\(^{182}\) See 555 U.S. at 503–09.

\(^{183}\) *Id.* at 504–06.

\(^{184}\) *Id.* at 504 (quoting *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560); see also Mank, *Standing and Statistical Persons, supra* note 1, at 668.
unsuitable if a plaintiff was already injured, as was the case in *Summers*. Furthermore, standing should not be denied if “there is a realistic likelihood that the challenged future conduct will, in fact, recur and harm the plaintiff.” Justice Breyer argued that the Court’s prior standing decisions demanded only that a plaintiff establish a “realistic threat” of injury, which does not require more “than the word ‘realistic’ implies.” Although he conceded that the plaintiffs could not predict where and when their members would be harmed by the Service’s sale of salvage timber, Justice Breyer reasoned that there was a realistic threat that some of the thousands of members of the plaintiff organizations would likely be harmed in the reasonably near future. Accordingly, Justice Breyer concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied the Court’s standing requirements. If it is likely that at least one member of the plaintiff organizations will meet all standing criteria in the near future, Justice Breyer reasoned that federal courts should recognize Article III standing even if a court does not know the details of the specific harm that may occur.

Perhaps anticipating that the issue might arise in the future, Justice Breyer argued that the plaintiffs would have had standing if Congress expressly sought to give standing to groups like the plaintiffs, stating:

To understand the constitutional issue that the majority decides, it may prove helpful to imagine that Congress enacted a statutory provision that expressly permitted environmental groups like the respondents here to bring cases just like the present one, provided (1) that the group has members who have used salvage-timber parcels in the past and are likely to do so in the future, and (2) that the group’s members have opposed Forest Service timber sales in the past (using notice, comment, and appeal procedures to do so) and will likely use those procedures to oppose salvage-timber sales in the future. The majority cannot, and does not, claim that such a statute would be unconstitutional.

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185 *555 U.S. at 503–04* (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 *Id.*
187 *Id.* at 506.
188 *Id.* at 506–09.
189 *Id.*
190 See *id.* at 506–07; *Mank, Implications for Future Standing Decisions, supra* note 1, at 10,965.
191 *Summers*, 555 U.S. at 502–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
In making the claim that the “majority cannot, and does not, claim that such a statute would be unconstitutional,” Justice Breyer cited Massachusetts v. EPA for support,192 which Justice Kennedy joined and Justice Scalia and the three other members of the Summers majority dissented.193 Based on Justice Kennedy’s previous decisions in other major standing cases, Justice Breyer appeared to rely on Justice Kennedy for support in future cases if Congress were to explicitly define injury in fact as an injury similar to the one suffered by the plaintiffs in Summers.194 Thus, Summers, like Lujan, Akins and Massachusetts v. EPA, demonstrated both the importance of Justice Kennedy’s vote and his belief that Congress has significant authority under Article III to define a constitutional concrete injury.195

IV. Divided Lower Court Decisions on Informational Standing

Lower courts are divided in environmental cases where plaintiffs have sought standing based on alleged injuries resulting from the government’s, or private defendant’s, failure to provide information about their environmental impacts.196 In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, a case decided prior to FEC v. Akins, the D.C. Circuit questioned whether informational standing alone could meet the Article III injury in fact requirement.197 In contrast, citing Akins, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit in American Canoe Association, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Commission concluded that environmental groups had standing to seek information from the government about water pollution issues, pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, that would assist their members’ understanding of pollution issues and legislative proposals.198 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness Society Inc. v. Rey interpreted Summers and Akins to implicitly restrict the scope of informational standing to statutes that give plaintiffs an explicit right to information from the government.199

192 Id. at 504 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 516–518 (2007)).
193 Compare id. at 488 (majority opinion) (listing members of the Court joining the majority opinion and dissenting opinion) with Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 501 (listing members of the Court joining the majority opinion and dissenting opinion).
194 See 555 U.S. at 502–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195 See infra notes 338–401 and accompanying text.
198 389 F.3d at 545–46; see infra notes 238–300 and accompanying text.
199 See 622 F.3d 1251, 1257–58 (9th Cir. 2010); infra notes 301–355 and accompanying text.
A. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng: The D.C. Circuit Suggests Limiting Informational Standing to Informational Injuries

In *Lyng*, the D.C. Circuit expressed doubts regarding whether informational standing alone can meet the Article III injury in fact requirement, but did not actually decide the issue. The plaintiffs—including a private nonprofit organization active in issues of biotechnology and genetics engineering—sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment against officials of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The plaintiffs sought an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regarding the USDA’s “germplasm preservation program.” The USDA had undertaken a variety of actions to preserve and expand a diverse plant genetic base to assure the nation’s food supply, but there was no specific “germplasm preservation program.” “On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the plaintiffs failed to identify ‘a particular proposal for federal action’ or ‘any revisions or changes taken by the defendants in the germplasm program that would trigger the obligation to prepare an [EIS] . . . .’”

The trial court did not address standing concerns because the defendants did not challenge the issue. After the trial court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court issued its *Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation* decision. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit decided that *National Wildlife Federation* required it to first consider whether the plaintiffs had standing.

*Lyng* reviewed previous D.C. Circuit decisions that had discussed “informational standing” as a basis for standing and then considered whether those cases were still good law in light of *National Wildlife Federation*. In *Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. (SIPI) v. Atomic Energy Commission*, the D.C. Circuit suggested, in a footnote, that the plaintiff might have informational standing because its organizational purpose—distributing scientific information to the public—was nega-

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200 943 F.2d at 84–85; see also *Am. Canoe Ass’n*, 389 F.3d at 547–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the *Lyng* majority’s criticism of informational standing favorably).
201 *Lyng*, 943 F.2d at 80.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 80–81.
204 Id. at 82.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 *Lyng*, 943 F.2d at 80.
208 Id. at 80, 82–85.
tively affected by the Agency’s failure to provide an EIS. While a previous D.C. Circuit decision erroneously characterized SIPI as holding that standing could be based on an informational injury, Lyng correctly observed that the informational standing footnote in SIPI was not necessary to the decision in that case. In Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, the D.C. Circuit held that organizations devoted to advising senior citizens about age discrimination and other matters had standing to challenge regulations restricting the flow of public information concerning an agency’s compliance with the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 because such restrictions injured the plaintiff through the “alleged inhibition of their daily operations.”

Citing Action Alliance and SIPI, the D.C. Circuit in National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel endorsed informational standing by stating that “for affiants voicing environmental concerns . . . the elimination of the opportunity to see and use an EIS prepared under federal law does constitute a constitutionally sufficient injury on which to ground standing.” It was not clear, however, that the Department of Interior (Interior) violated NEPA when it delegated its authority to the states to approve mining plans on federal lands—a process governed by NEPA when performed by federal authorities. Furthermore, prior courts did not indicate whether NEPA provided plaintiffs with the right to demand that Interior issue EISs of new mines approved by state authorities. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs suffered an informational injury because the plaintiff could no longer request an EIS, and therefore lost the “ability to evaluate and oppose future mining.”

In Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the D.C. Circuit endorsed the plaintiffs’ informational standing theory, but concluded for other reasons that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ informational standing theory, stating “[a]llegations of injury to an organization’s

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209 See 481 F.2d at 1086–87 n.29; see also Lyng, 943 F.2d at 83 (discussing SIPI).
211 943 F.2d at 83.
212 789 F.2d 931, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Lyng, 943 F.2d at 84 (discussing Action Alliance).
213 839 F.2d 694, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Lyng, 943 F.2d at 84 (discussing Hodel).
214 See Hodel, 839 F.2d at 712.
215 See id. at 711–12; Lyng, 943 F.2d at 84 (discussing Hodel).
216 Hodel, 839 F.2d at 712.
217 901 F.2d 107, 122–23 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Lyng, 943 F.2d at 84 (discussing Competitive Enter. Inst.).
ability to disseminate information may be deemed sufficiently particular for standing purposes where that information is essential to the injured organization’s activities.”\(^{218}\) The court, however, held that the plaintiff lacked standing because they wanted information about traffic fatalities, not environmental issues, and thus were “outside the sphere of any definition of injury adopted in NEPA cases.”\(^{219}\)

Although acknowledging that \textit{Hodel} and \textit{Competitive Enterprise Institute} endorsed informational standing, the \textit{Lyng} decision held that the D.C. Circuit had “never sustained an organization’s standing in a NEPA case solely on the basis of ‘informational injury,’ that is, damage to the organization’s interest in disseminating the environmental data an impact statement could be expected to contain.”\(^{220}\) The court realized that “if the \textit{injury in fact} is the lack of information about the environmental impact of agency action, it follows that the injury is \textit{caused} by the agency’s failure to develop such information in an impact statement and can be \textit{redressed} by ordering the agency to prepare one.”\(^{221}\) The court noted, however, that adopting such an expansive approach would raise complications.\(^{222}\) For example, a court might do away with the standing requirement in NEPA cases unless the organization alleged that the information they required did not concern the environment.\(^{223}\) Additionally, “[t]he proposition that an organization’s desire to supply environmental information to its members, and the consequent ‘injury’ it suffers when the information is not forthcoming in an impact statement, establishes standing [but] \textit{without more} [it] also encounters the obstacle of \textit{Sierra Club v. Morton}.”\(^{224}\) In \textit{Morton}, the Court concluded that it did not matter how long the Sierra Club had been interested in the issue or how qualified the organization was in assessing environmental issues, interest and qualification alone were inadequate to allow standing.\(^{225}\) Accordingly, the \textit{Lyng} court reasoned that standing could not be conferred based on a mere interest.\(^{226}\)

The \textit{Lyng} court also observed that the Supreme Court in \textit{United States v. Richardson} “rejected a similar claim of informational standing

\(^{218}\) \textit{Competitive Enter. Inst.}, 901 F.2d at 122.

\(^{219}\) Id. at 123; \textit{see also Lyng}, 943 F.2d at 84 (discussing \textit{Competitive Enter. Inst}).

\(^{220}\) 943 F.2d at 84.

\(^{221}\) Id.

\(^{222}\) Id.

\(^{223}\) Id.

\(^{224}\) Id. at 84–85 (citations omitted).

\(^{225}\) Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 727, 739 (1972); \textit{see also Lyng}, 943 F.2d at 85 (discussing \textit{Morton}).

\(^{226}\) 943 F.2d at 85.
on the ground that the effect on the plaintiff there from the lack of information was undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.”227 The Lyng court thus reasoned that there was no basis to treat a request for information from an organization, such as the plaintiff’s, differently from the individual request for information rejected in Richardson.228 Additionally, the Lyng court warned that plaintiffs could use the theory of informational injury to demand information from agencies pursuant to NEPA about any of their daily operations.229 The Court suggested that if informational injury could confer standing, then a potential plaintiff could have standing anytime an agency could not create the requested information.230

The Lyng court did not decide whether the plaintiffs had standing because it concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in National Wildlife Federation precluded their case under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).231 The Lyng court interpreted National Wildlife Federation to require NEPA plaintiffs to identify a particular agency action that triggered a duty to prepare an EIS.232 The court considered NEPA suits without a triggering event to be requests for information relating to an agency’s day-to-day operations that should therefore be rejected.233 The court also concluded that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.234 This conclusion derived from the understanding that the plaintiff’s request for information about the USDA’s “germplasm preservation program” was really a request for information about daily operations similar to those made in National Wildlife Federation.235 The Lyng decision did not bar all requests for information under NEPA, but limited informational requests to cases where a particular agency action triggers an injury to the plaintiff.236 Although it did not prohibit informational standing claims under NEPA, the Lyng court suggested that standing

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227 Id. (discussing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–80 (1974)).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
232 Lyng, 943 F.2d at 85.
233 Id. at 85–86.
234 Id. at 86–87.
235 Id.
236 See id. at 87.
should be limited to those circumstances where plaintiffs may invoke informational injury.  

B. American Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Commission: A Divided Sixth Circuit Endorses Informational Standing Under the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act

1. Panel Majority Holds Plaintiffs Have Informational Standing

In a post-Akins decision, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit concluded that environmental groups had standing to seek information from the government about water pollution issues pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA) if it would assist their members in understanding pollution issues and legislative proposals. Two organizational plaintiffs filed a CWA citizen suit in federal court alleging that the defendants violated their National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit and various provisions of the CWA. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet standing requirements. The Sixth Circuit panel, however, decided that the plaintiffs had standing and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

a. Standing for Kash’s Recreational and Informational Injuries

In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC) Inc., a case analyzed by the Sixth Circuit in American Canoe, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue pursuant to the CWA citizen suit provision because they avoided swimming and recreational activities in a river due to “reasonable concerns” about pollution released by the defendant. In American Canoe the Sixth Circuit concluded that Daniel Kash, a member of the Sierra Club, also had standing to sue under the CWA citizen suit provision. The plaintiff alleged that he used the Big Sandy River for recreation in the past and hoped to in the future, but declined to do so currently because of the

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237 See id. at 85–87.
238 Am. Canoe Ass’n, 389 F.3d at 546.
239 Id. at 538.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 538–39, 546.
243 389 F.3d at 540–43.
pollution the defendants released into the river.\textsuperscript{244} The Sixth Circuit determined that such “averments are virtually indistinguishable from those that the Court found sufficient to establish an injury in fact in \textit{Laidlaw},” and, accordingly that the Sierra Club had representational standing to sue on behalf of its injured member.\textsuperscript{245}

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit panel concluded that the Sierra Club had standing to sue for such informational injuries because “[t]he averments of its member, Kash, establish that the lack of information caused an injury beyond the ‘common concern for obedience to law.’”\textsuperscript{246} Kash’s affidavit asserted that the defendants’ failure to provide the public with statutorily required information about the amount of pollution it released into the Big Sandy River deprived him of the ability to assess the river’s safety.\textsuperscript{247} According to the court, these allegations constituted “a concrete and particularized injury” and established standing.\textsuperscript{248} In a footnote, the court acknowledged that federal courts of appeals had disagreed over whether plaintiffs without standing to sue for a defendant’s discharge violations could have standing to sue for its violations of monitoring and reporting requirements.\textsuperscript{249} The Sixth Circuit determined it was unnecessary to resolve that issue because, by representing its members, the Sierra Club had standing to sue the defendants for their discharge violations.\textsuperscript{250}

Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit determined that the Sierra Club demonstrated that Kash’s injury was “fairly traceable to the . . . allegedly unlawful conduct [of the defendants] and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”\textsuperscript{251} The court reasoned that plaintiffs’ informational injury would have been redressed had the defendants met their monitoring and reporting obligations.\textsuperscript{252} Similarly, Kash’s aesthetic and recreational injury from the pollution in the Big Sandy River could be traced plausibly to defendants’ effluent discharges and would be redressed by a finding against the defendants.\textsuperscript{253} Thus, plaintiffs’ claim

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{244} \textit{Id.} at 540–42.
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Id.} at 542 (quoting L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)).
\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{249} \textit{Am. Canoe}, 389 F.3d at 542 n.1.
\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Id.} at 542 (quoting \textit{Allen v. Wright}, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
\textsuperscript{252} \textit{Id.} at 543.
\textsuperscript{253} \textit{See id.}
\end{flushright}
was sufficient to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing.254

b. Organizational Standing for the American Canoe Association and Sierra Club to Sue on Their Own Behalf for the Defendants’ Monitoring and Reporting Violations

In addition to claiming standing as representatives of their members, the American Canoe Association and the Sierra Club alleged that the defendants’ monitoring and reporting violations injured their organizations, and thus provided them with organizational standing independent of their representative capacity to sue on behalf of their members.255 The Sixth Circuit recognized Supreme Court precedent for the principle that an association may sue for its own injuries even if its members also have standing.256 The plaintiff organizations alleged an informational injury sufficient for standing because the defendants’ violations hindered their efforts to research and report on the compliance of Kentucky dischargers, and to propose and lobby for legislation to limit a facility’s discharge to protect water quality.257 The plaintiff organizations relied on Akins, where the Court found an informational injury under the Federal Election Campaign Act, and Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, where the Court recognized informational standing pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).258 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s informational injury under the CWA was analogous to both cases.259

The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Akins did not specify whether Congress can create standing by simply establishing a statutory right to information or whether there must be an additional plus factor.260 Yet, the court concluded that a plus factor existed.261 In coming to this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit compared Akins to the Court’s decision in

254 See id.
255 Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 544.
256 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 545 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25). Akins emphasized the importance of information relating to the fundamental right to vote in finding standing, 524 U.S. at 24–25 (“We conclude that . . . the informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.”).
261 See Akins, 389 F.3d at 546.
Public Citizen.262 In Public Citizen, the Court concluded that there was a low threshold for informational standing under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and plaintiffs had to show only that the Agency refused to provide specific records upon request.263 Accordingly, the Court held plaintiffs seeking information under FACA had standing.264 In light of Public Citizen, the Sixth Circuit did not interpret Akins to require any additional plus factor for standing if a statute grants a plaintiff the right to information that was denied.265

To the extent that Akins implicitly requires a plus factor for informational standing, such as an additional reason for needing the information, the Sixth Circuit concluded that this demand is satisfied in American Canoe.266 Consequently, the court observed that “it is difficult to imagine what information would not make a citizen a better-informed voter, or would not affect her ability to participate in some workings of government.”267 The Sixth Circuit therefore determined that the monitoring and reporting information sought by the plaintiffs was similar enough to the information sought in Akins and Public Citizen to grant standing and find informational injury.268

The Sixth Circuit held that the injury alleged by the American Canoe Association and the Sierra Club was sufficient to grant informational standing.269 Distinguishing the Court’s rejection of pure ideological standing in Sierra Club v. Morton, the court in American Canoe explained that the plaintiffs did not base their claims solely on an ideological or societal belief.270 Instead, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs demonstrated an informational injury because the defendants’ failure to adequately monitor and report their discharges harmed the plaintiffs’ organizational interests.271 The court supported

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262 Id. at 545–46.
263 See 491 U.S. at 449.
264 See id.
265 See Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 545–46 (stating that plaintiff’s generalized, but not abstract, grievance does not prohibit standing because the defendant’s disobeyed the law “in failing to provide information that the plaintiff’s allegedly need,” and thus it was not the type of grievance “condemned in Akins”).
266 Id. at 546.
267 Id. (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 21; Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449).
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. (citing Morton, 405 U.S. at 739).
271 Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 546.
its decision with a detailed list of specific harms that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the defendants’ actions. 272

The Sixth Circuit also relied on the Court’s decision in *Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman*, a Fair Housing Act case, for the principle that injuries to an organization’s operations are cognizable injuries for standing. 273 The Court in *Havens* found that the plaintiff organization had standing to sue because the defendant owner of an apartment complex harmed the plaintiff by engaging in racial steering practices that injured the plaintiff’s ability to provide housing counseling and referral services to its members. 274 In *American Canoe*, the Sixth Circuit relied on the reasoning that “[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interest . . . .” 275 Thus, the *American Canoe* court recognized that the plaintiffs suffered informational injuries as a result of the defendants’ failure to provide information required by the CWA. 276 Therefore, they had organizational standing because the defendants’ withholding of information hampered their ability to provide important information to their members and engage in legislative reform initiatives. 277

2. Judge Kennedy’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy agreed with the majority that the Sierra Club had representational standing because the defendants’ actions had injured one of its members. 278 However, she disagreed with the majority’s decision that the American Canoe Association had informational standing. 279 Judge Kennedy relied on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in *Lyng* to question whether an informational injury, without

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272 Id. (discussing the importance of the requested information to both plaintiff organization’s operations and thus their fulfillment of standing requirements under *Akins*, despite their general interest that environmental laws be faithfully executed.)

273 See id. at 547 (citing 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)).

274 455 U.S. at 379.

275 389 F.3d at 547 (quoting *Havens*, 455 U.S. at 379).

276 *Am. Canoe*, 389 F.3d at 546.

277 Id. at 546–47.

278 Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

279 Id. Since the Sierra Club had representational standing on behalf of its members, Judge Kennedy saw no need to reach the issue of whether it had informational standing. Id.
more, is sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. Additionally, she interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Morton to hold that informational injuries alone are insufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.

Judge Kennedy concluded her discussion of Lyng and Morton by noting the potential contradiction in granting standing to associations injured by a lack of access to information for problems of special interest, and yet not completely eliminating standing requirements for other organizations and citizens. By this reasoning, Judge Kennedy cast doubt upon the broad adoption of an informational standing theory in American Canoe.

Judge Kennedy rejected the majority’s novel interpretation of Akins and Public Citizen in part because it was broader than that adopted by any other federal circuit court of appeals. In creating such a permissive standard, Judge Kennedy observed, the majority ignored the precedent set by Lujan and Morton, and interpreted Akins and Public Citizen far more broadly than the Court intended.

Although Judge Kennedy acknowledged that Akins and Public Citizen found specific injuries based on a lack of information, she distinguished those cases because they involved statutes conferring a specific right to information upon certain individuals and groups. By contrast, Judge Kennedy suggested that the CWA does not create a specific right to any information. Nevertheless, the CWA requires the discharger to file permit compliance information, which is then available as a public record. Judge Kennedy, however, concluded the information rights under the CWA are secondary to its environmental protection goals and are thus significantly different than the rights in Akins and Public Citizen, where the statutes at issue were explicitly created to provide the voting public with pertinent information.

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280 Id. at 547–48 (citing 943 F.2d at 84–85).
281 Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). However, Morton did not expressly use the term “informational standing” and instead explicitly rejected giving the plaintiff standing based upon its “special interest” in environmental issues. See 405 U.S. at 739.
282 Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 Id.
286 See id. at 549.
287 Id.
288 Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 549 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
289 Id.
Judge Kennedy feared that the majority’s interpretation of informational standing rights would encourage future litigation and allow “any other national organization with a passing interest in rivers or the environment [to] prosecute a claim.” Judge Kennedy characterized the plaintiff’s injury as the basic common interest of invested individuals and organizations to “uphold[] the rule of law,” and therefore too broad to allow standing. She distinguished Havens, which implicated broad societal interests because the harms were far more concentrated. Specifically, Judge Kennedy viewed the discriminatory harms to the Havens’ plaintiff organization’s work of promoting minority group access to suitable apartments as more “specific, cognizable, and particular” than the plaintiff organization’s generalized grievance in this case. Judge Kennedy dismissed the plaintiff organization’s need to access information as too general to establish standing because it would apply to any organization with a special interest in preserving the environment.

Finally, Judge Kennedy expressed doubt as to whether the inability to access this information could even be considered an injury. The American Canoe Association alleged that, without the information at issue, they could not research and report on the compliance status of pollutant emitters in Kentucky, propose legislation, or bring litigation to protect water from harmful discharges. In response, Judge Kennedy maintained that there was no evidence that the twelve alleged reporting violations impeded the plaintiff organization’s work with its members or legislative proposals, particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs’ complaint identified 405 violations. Therefore, Judge Kennedy concluded the American Canoe Association’s alleged injury was not sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.

The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Wilderness Society substantially supports Judge Kennedy’s narrow interpretation of Akins and

290 Id.
291 See id.
292 See id. at 549–50.
293 Id. at 550 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
294 Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 549–50.
295 Id. at 550.
296 Id.
297 See id. (“[I]f the organization or any of its members were directly injured by the pollution in some concrete fashion (similar to the direct injury that Sierra Club can and did claim), the organization could easily use the 405 violations to provide the basis for a lawsuit.”).
298 Id.
Public Citizen as limited to statutes granting the public an explicit right to specific information.299

C. Wilderness Society v. Rey: The Ninth Circuit Interprets Summers to Restrict Procedural Standing to Concrete Injuries

In Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s Summers decision to restrict procedural standing to only those plaintiffs who can demonstrate a concrete injury.300 The Ninth Circuit restricted the scope of informational standing to prevent plaintiffs from using it to avoid Summers’s limitation of procedural standing.301 The Ninth Circuit implicitly used a limited interpretation of Akins’s recognition of informational standing for suits brought under statutes that explicitly provide the public with the right to particular information from the government.302 The Ninth Circuit further concluded that, in light of Summers, when an environmental statute only promotes public participation and does not explicitly provide the public with a right to information about certain government projects, it should be read narrowly.303 Otherwise a broad doctrine of informational standing would allow plaintiffs to circumvent Summers’s principle that violations of a statute are not injuries in fact unless they are connected to a concrete project or result in an informational harm.304

The Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (Appeals Reform Act) requires the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service), to create notice and comment procedures for proposed actions related to “projects and activities implementing land and resource management plans.”305 Additionally, the Appeals Reform Act compels the Secretary to adjust the appeals process for decisions regarding such projects.306 In 2003, the Forest Service restricted, through its regulations, the range and accessibility of its notice, comment, and appeals procedures under the Appeals Reform Act.307 Various environmental organizations, including The Wilderness Society (TWS), filed facial challenges to three portions of the new regu-

299 See infra notes 300–354 and accompanying text.
300 622 F.3d at 1260.
301 See id.
302 See id. at 1258–60; infra notes 329–338 and accompanying text.
303 See Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259–60.
304 Id. at 1260.
306 16 U.S.C. § 1612(a); Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1253.
307 Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1253.
lations. Specifically, TWS alleged the regulations violated the Appeals Reform Act by inappropriately restricting the notice, comment, and appeals processes. In 2006, the court ruled in favor of TWS and granted it declaratory and injunctive relief.

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the government argued the plaintiffs did not have standing because of Summers. The trial court, prior to the Summers decision, found that TWS’s deprivation of right to notice and comment was an injury giving rise to procedural standing. The court also held that TWS had standing because the Forest Service’s withholding of notice regarding its actions constituted an informational injury. On appeal, the Forest Service argued the plaintiffs lacked procedural standing in light of Summers’s holding that mere denial of a procedural right without an additional harm is inadequate for standing. Moreover, the Forest Service contended that 36 C.F.R. section 215.20(b) remedied the informational injuries upon which plaintiffs claimed standing.

In response to the government’s argument that the Summers decision narrowed standing law, the plaintiffs made two separate arguments depending upon the regulation at issue. Regarding its challenge to section 215.12(f), TWS argued it had standing because it tied the challenge to a particular project at a specific location, and one of its members suffered an aesthetic or recreational injury cognizable pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Laidlaw decision. By contrast, while TWS acknowledged it did not connect its challenges to sections 215.20(b) and 215.13(a) to a particular project or application, they argued that

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308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 1253–54. Initially, because TWS failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity in its complaint, the trial court could not grant a remedy. Id. at 1254. However, the court granted declaratory and injunctive relief after allowing TWS to amend its complaint. Id.
311 Id. at 1255.
312 Id.
313 Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1255.
314 Id. (citing Summers, 555 U.S. at 496).
315 Id. Section 215.20(b) exempts decisions made by the Secretary or Under Secretary from the notice, comment, and appeals procedures and states that any decision of the Secretary or Under Secretary is final. Id. at 1253.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 1255–56. Section 215.12(f) exempts from appeal those projects that the Forest Service categorically excludes from certain NEPA filing requirements based on a finding that they do not have significant environmental impacts. Id. at 1253–54.
318 Id. at 1255–56 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
did not govern because it did not define informational injury. Additionally, TWS asserted a broader theory of informational injury from its inability to participate in the notice and comment process, as well as the Forest Service’s procedure for appeal and decision-making. The Ninth Circuit observed that if it accepted TWS’s broader approach to informational standing then the Forest Service’s standing challenge would fail for each of the three regulations.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that TWS failed to prove that its member suffered recreational and aesthetic injuries sufficient to challenge section 215.12(f). The court acknowledged that Summers did not eliminate standing for aesthetic and recreational injuries. However, the Ninth Circuit explained that proving an aesthetic or recreational injury required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that its member (Anderson) “had repeatedly visited an area affected by a project, that he had concrete plans to do so again, and that his recreational or aesthetic interests would be harmed if the project went forward without his having the opportunity to appeal.” Although Anderson demonstrated he repeatedly visited the Umpqua National Forest and even authored a hiking book about the area, the court concluded that his general intention to return to the national forest was too vague to confer standing. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found the asserted interest vague because, even if Anderson planned travel to the Umpqua National Forest in the future, he had not shown sufficient evidence that he would likely visit an area affected by the Forest Service’s projects.

Even if Anderson established sufficiently concrete plans to return to the forest, he failed to allege that his recreational interests would be harmed. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that TWS failed to demonstrate a recreational or aesthetic injury to Anderson sufficient to establish standing to challenge section 215.12(f).

Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, the Ninth Circuit determined that Summers foreclosed TWS’s broad theory of informa-

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319 Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1255.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 Id. at 1257.
323 Id. at 1256.
324 Id.
325 Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1256.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 1257.
328 Id.
tional standing. Prior to the *Summers* decision, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs suffered an informational injury because the Forest Service’s regulations foreclosed their opportunity to comment and appeal, and they “need not assert that any specific injury will occur in any specific national forest that their members visit.” TWS acknowledged that because *Summers* “expressly held that deprivation of procedural rights, alone, cannot confer Article III standing,” the trial court’s reasoning was no longer valid. On appeal, TWS relied on “the district court’s finding that it suffered informational injury resulting from the violation of the obligation to provide notice” pursuant to section 215.20(b), which exempted decisions of the Secretary and Under Secretary of Agriculture from otherwise applicable notice requirements. Furthermore, TWS argued a broader theory of informational injury based on its inability to appeal under each of the three Forest Service provisions. The Ninth Circuit rejected TWS’s informational standing arguments because it concluded that *Summers*’s “discussion of procedural injury casts serious doubt on the applicability of informational injury here,” although the Supreme Court had not expressly addressed that issue. Because the Appeals Reform Act provides a specific right to information similar to FOIA, the Ninth Circuit was “not convinced that the doctrine of informational injury can be applied to the statutory framework of the [Appeals Reform Act], regardless of the specific provision.”

After reviewing *Akins* and other decisions supporting informational standing, the Ninth Circuit observed that the Appeals Reform Act “must grant a right to information capable of supporting a lawsuit” in order to obtain standing for an informational injury. The court then demonstrated that the notice and appeal provisions in the Appeals Reform Act did not establish a public right to information, but instead simply bestowed a right to participate in the process. Addi-

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329 See id. at 1258, 1260.
330 Id. at 1256 (quoting unpublished trial court opinion).
331 *Wilderness Soc’y*, 622 F.3d at 1257–58.
332 See id. at 1255.
333 See id. at 1258 (internal quotation omitted).
334 Id. at 1253.
335 Id. at 1258.
336 Id.
338 *Wilderness Soc’y*, 622 F.3d at 1258.
339 Id. at 1259.
340 Id.
tionally, the court clarified that “although an appeal might result in the dissemination of otherwise unavailable information, the statute does not contemplate appeals for this purpose, but to allow the public an opportunity to challenge proposals with which they disagree.” Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that although the rights to public notice and appeal inherently provide access to information, this is not the same as a right to information.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in *Bensman v. United States Forest Service*, which “declined to find an explicit right to information in the text of the [Appeals Reform Act].” *Bensman* distinguished the informational statutes at issue from the Appeals Reform Act. According to *Bensman*, FOIA and FACA are statutes with the sole goal of providing information to the public. Conversely, the goal in the Appeals Reform Act is “to increase public participation in the decision-making process” and as a result, the court found that the Appeals Reform Act does not provide the same right to information. Although the *Bensman* decision only addressed whether the appeal provisions of the Appeals Reform Act established a right to information, the Ninth Circuit in *Wilderness Society* found the Seventh Circuit’s analysis “equally applicable” in concluding that Congress did not intend to provide a right to information when it enacted the Appeals Reform Act’s notice requirement.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s *Summers* decision to implicitly bar the *Wilderness Society*’s plaintiffs’ broad theory of informational standing. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that TWS’s determination of informational injuries would effectively eliminate *Summers*’s core tenet that procedural rights plaintiffs must demonstrate a concrete injury apart from their procedural injury. One of the main difficulties the Ninth Circuit had with TWS’s argument was that it characterized all procedural deprivations as informational losses. If this argument were adopted, the Ninth Circuit be-

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341 Id.
342 See id.
343 408 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2005).
344 *Wilderness Soc’y*, 622 F.3d at 1259 (agreeing with *Bensman*, 408 F.3d at 958).
345 See 408 F.3d at 958.
346 Id.
347 See id.
349 Id. at 1260.
350 See id.
351 Id.
lied that it would render Summers’s procedural injury doctrine meaningless. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, refused to use the theory of informational injury in the framework of procedural rights as recognized in the Appeals Reform Act. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness Society limited informational standing to statutes that explicitly create a public right to information, and rejected the concept of informational injury for environmental statutes that merely encourage public participation through notice or appeal provisions.

V. Congress’s Authority to Authorize Informational Standing: A Vindication of Justice Kennedy?

Informational standing is a statutory creation, such as in the Freedom of Information Act, that establishes a public right to information. There is no common law analog to informational standing. Thus, two questions arise. First, are there any constitutional barriers to Congress creating informational standing rights? Second, assuming Congress has some authority to establish informational standing, how clearly must Congress specify whether a plaintiff has a right to particular information?

Justice Kennedy was the only justice to join the majority in Lujan, Summers, and Akins; therefore, any attempt to find a consistent line of reasoning in those cases must begin and end with Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan offers the most insight into whether Congress may, through statutory rights, recognize injuries that would not have satisfied common law requirements. This opinion may enlarge, albeit marginally, the definition of concrete injury under Article III standing requirements. One may arguably infer

352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Wilderness Society, 622 F.3d at 1257–60.
355 See supra notes 93–144, and accompanying text.
356 See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text (stating that plaintiffs have standing to seek information pursuant to statutory mandates).
359 See Solimine, supra note 13, at 1029–30. One broad interpretation of the case is that it “might suggest that Congress can recognize injuries that would not have satisfied common law requirements, at least when statutory, as opposed to constitutional, rights are at issue.” Id. at 1030.
360 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); infra notes 362–415 and accompanying text.
from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in *Lujan* and *Summers*, as well as the *Akins* decision, that the Supreme Court is likely to give some deference to Congress if it establishes an explicit public right to information along with a relevant citizen suit provision.\(^{361}\) At the same time, however, courts are less likely to interpret notice or appeal provisions like those in *Wilderness Society* to establish an implicit right to informational standing.

A. *To What Extent May Congress Affect Constitutional Standing Requirements?*

There has been considerable confusion and controversy regarding the extent to which Congress may enact statutes that recognize injuries that would not have satisfied common law requirements.\(^{362}\) This controversy extends to whether Congress may even enlarge the definition of concrete injury under Article III constitutional standing requirements.\(^{363}\) Justice Scalia has argued that Article III and broader separation of powers principles limit the authority of Congress to grant standing to plaintiffs who lack a concrete injury.\(^{364}\) This would prevent federal courts from interfering with the President’s Article II authority to enforce federal laws.\(^{365}\) Nevertheless, Justice Scalia in *Lujan* acknowledged that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, *de facto* injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”\(^{366}\) Justice Blackmun and many commentators have argued that Justice Scalia’s approach to standing, however, has the practical effect of

\(^{361}\) *See Summers*, 555 U.S. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that nothing in the statute shows an intent to convey anything more than a procedural right); *Akins*, 524 U.S. at 12 (discussing Congress’s constitutional power to authorize the right to sue in federal courts); *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing Congress’s power to define injuries).

\(^{362}\) Solimine, *supra* note 13, at 1030.

\(^{363}\) See *Yackle*, *supra* note 12, at 382–97 (discussing Congress’s authority to modify prudential standing rules and the controversy regarding whether Congress has authority to affect core constitutional standing requirements); Solimine, *supra* note 13, at 1028–31 (examining different interpretations of congressional authority to alter standing). Whether a statute grants standing is a separate question from whether a statute establishes a private right of action to sue in federal courts, although these two issues intertwine in some cases. *See Yackle*, *supra* note 12, at 386.

\(^{364}\) *See Akins*, 524 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 576–78; Scalia, *supra* note 12, at 894–97.

\(^{365}\) *See Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 577; Scalia, *supra* note 12, at 890–93; Solimine, *supra* note 13, at 1049 (arguing that Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts believe that “Congress cannot tinker with the core constitutional standing requirements, though it might relax the prudential ones”).

\(^{366}\) 504 U.S. at 578.
aggrandizing executive authority and undermining Congress’s ability to ensure that the executive branch faithfully enforces the law.\textsuperscript{367} Some commentators have sought a middle ground that respects both the executive and congressional role in making and enforcing federal law, as well as a limited but appropriate role for judicial review.\textsuperscript{368} Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in \textit{Lujan} suggests that he may take such a position with respect to Congress’s authority to modify standing requirements beyond traditional common law requirements for a concrete injury.\textsuperscript{369}

The Supreme Court’s analysis of whether Congress has the authority to transcend traditional common law injuries, or even normal constitutional standing requirements, depends in part upon the type of statute at issue.\textsuperscript{370} Based on parallels to common law traditions in England and early American federal statutes, the Court has recognized standing where a statute authorizes private persons to bring suit on behalf or as an agent of the United States.\textsuperscript{371} By contrast, the Court in \textit{Lujan} limited standing for a citizen suit statute that authorized any person to sue the government for alleged non-enforcement or under-enforcement of an environmental law, finding that Article III requires all plaintiffs in federal courts to demonstrate an injury in fact even if

\textsuperscript{367} \textit{Id.} at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the “principal effect” of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the Courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates”); see Brown, \textit{supra} note 13, at 283; Elliott, \textit{supra} note 44, at 489–90; Solimine, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1050 (“With respect to the argument that a broad reading of Article III standing improperly limits executive power under Article II, some scholars contend that it does not give sufficient weight to the balance, as opposed to the separation, of powers.”).

\textsuperscript{368} Solimine, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1052. Professor Solimine contends that liberal and conservative critiques both have persuasive arguments that can be reconciled. \textit{Id.} “The liberal critique enhances the power of the judiciary and that of private parties empowered by Congress, at the expense of representative government in general and of the executive branch in particular.” \textit{Id.} Conversely, “[t]he conservative critique enhances the power of the President and in theory encourages Congress to exercise its nondelegable oversight and appropriations functions, at the expense of giving space for the executive branch to underenforce or violate federal law.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{369} \textit{See Lujan}, 504 U.S. at 579–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

\textsuperscript{370} \textit{Id.} at 576–77 (majority opinion) (discussing whether a specific statute conveys standing); \textit{id.} at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing Congress’s power to define injuries in statutes).

\textsuperscript{371} \textit{See Vi. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens}, 529 U.S. 765, 773–78 (2000) (discussing historical background and upholding \textit{qui tam} statute that offered a bounty to a prevailing plaintiff); Solimine, \textit{supra} note 13, at 1037–41 (discussing controversy over whether early \textit{qui tam} statutes are precedent to allow standing where citizen acts as agent of government).
Congress attempts to waive that requirement. Conversely, Akins implies that Congress has the authority to broaden standing requirements, at least for statutes giving the public the right to sue to obtain information from the government. It is also important to observe that Congress frequently wants to limit standing beyond the base limits of Article III in order to prevent persons with minimal injuries from filing suit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has used the “zone of interests” test to deny standing to plaintiffs whose injuries are only marginally related to a statute’s purposes.

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan is probably the most illuminating opinion regarding the authority of Congress to modify common law injury requirements, or even constitutional standing requirements, for a concrete injury. Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury and that the affiants had failed to do so because they were uncertain as to when they would return to the project sites. He suggested, however, that “[a]s Government programs and policies become more complex and farreaching,” courts should perhaps expand the definition of a concrete injury to include new rights of action that do not correlate to rights recognized traditionally in common law. Justice Kennedy reasoned that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.” He tempered that broad pronouncement of congressional authority with the reservation that “[i]n exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”

372 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; Solimine, supra note 13, at 1028–30.
373 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 19–20; Solimine, supra note 13, at 1050 (“FEC v. Akins, seem[s] to evince a more generous reading of congressional power to influence standing.”).
374 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869–70 (2011) (concluding Title VII’s limitation of suits to a “person claiming to be aggrieved” under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(f) includes individual allegedly fired in retaliation for his fiancée’s filing employment discrimination suit, but not to stockholder who might be marginally economically affected by alleged discrimination and who would meet Article III injury requirement).
375 Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (explaining that the “zone of interests” test denies review “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit”).
376 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579.
377 See id. at 580.
378 Id.
379 Id.
While proclaiming that Congress had some discretionary authority to expand the definition of injuries beyond common law limits, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that separation of powers concerns place limits on the scope of standing. In particular, he observed that “the requirement of concrete injury confines the Judicial Branch to its proper, limited role in the constitutional framework of Government.” In *Lujan*, Justice Kennedy concluded that the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act was problematic to the extent that it purported to extend standing to “any person,” but did not define what type of injury is caused to citizen litigants by the government’s violation of the Act or explain why “any person” is entitled to sue the government to challenge a procedural violation that does not cause a concrete injury in fact to the plaintiff. Justice Kennedy believed that the concrete injury requirement is not just a formality; rather, it ensures the continuance of the adversarial process by necessitating that both parties have a stake in the outcome. Therefore, “the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”

Justice Kennedy’s argument in *Lujan* is consistent with the Court’s subsequent decision in *Akins*—that it would deny standing for generalized injuries if the harm is both widely shared and also of “an abstract and indefinite nature—for example, harm to the ‘common concern for obedience to law.’” Thus, it was arguably consistent for Justices Kennedy and Souter to concur as they did in *Lujan* and join the majority opinion in *Akins*. In his short concurring opinion in *Summers*, Justice

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380 See id. at 580–81.
381 Id. at 581.
382 *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
383 Id. at 581.
384 Id.
385 See *Akins*, 524 U.S. at 23 (quoting L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)); *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that a plaintiff must have a concrete injury to have standing, that a mere interest in the proper administration of justice is insufficient for standing, and that there is no numerical limit on how many persons may be concretely injured by a challenged action).
386 See *Akins*, 524 U.S. at 13 (listing Justices Kennedy and Souter as joining the majority opinion); *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Kennedy echoed his views from his *Lujan* concurrence and, therefore, it seems likely that his views have not significantly changed.\(^{387}\)

Justice Kennedy rejected standing in *Lujan* and *Summers* in part because Congress had not defined what constituted an injury sufficient for standing in the relevant statutes.\(^{388}\) He suggested, however, that the plaintiffs’ injuries might have been sufficient if Congress had established a statutory framework consistent with those injuries.\(^{389}\) By contrast, Justice Scalia’s majority opinions in *Lujan* and *Summers* ridiculed the plaintiffs’ injuries as constitutionally deficient because the plaintiffs could not specify when or where they would be injured.\(^{390}\) It is doubtful that a more carefully drafted statute in either case would have persuaded Justice Scalia that the plaintiffs had constitutionally cognizable injuries.\(^{391}\) In his *Akins* dissent, Justice Scalia argued that generalized injuries to a large portion of the public are inherently unsuitable for judicial resolution, and must be addressed by the political branches of government.\(^{392}\) On the other hand, Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in *Akins*, which concluded that generalized grievances to a large segment of the public are justiciable if Congress specifies that a class of individuals has the right to particular information or if a large group of individuals suffers at least a small concrete harm.\(^{393}\) In light of *Akins* and his concurring opinions in *Lujan* and *Summers*, Justice Kennedy appears to believe that Congress has some power to define or redefine what constitutes a cognizable concrete injury under Article III, although Congress may not confer universal standing without defining the requisite injury.\(^{394}\)

**B. How Clearly Must Congress Specify Whether a Plaintiff Has a Right to Particular Information?**

While many individual statutes affect standing questions, Congress rarely attempts to enact comprehensive legislation that would significantly affect standing doctrine or the jurisdiction of Article III

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387 See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
388 See *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
389 See supra notes 177–181 and accompanying text.
390 See *Summers*, 555 U.S. at 495; *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 563–64.
391 See Solimine, *supra* note 13, at 1049 (arguing that Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts believe that “Congress cannot tinker with the core constitutional standing requirements, though it might relax the prudential ones”).
393 See id. at 13, 24–25 (majority opinion).
In reaction to several restrictive standing decisions by the Supreme Court in the 1970s, some liberal Democratic members of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced legislation that would have broadly defined both who may sue and the causation requirement; however, none of the proposed legislation was enacted. Some commentators have suggested that federal courts would seriously question the constitutionality of congressional statutes that broaden standing and thereby partially overrule restrictive Supreme Court decisions. Nevertheless, federal courts frequently, if not always, give some weight to legislative intent in determining the standing of potential plaintiffs.

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in *Lujan* reveals how the Court is likely to evaluate Congress’s authority to modify the concrete injury requirement for standing. His opinion suggests that he would defer to congressional intentions if Congress carefully drafted a statute that explains which individuals are suitable plaintiffs and which types of harms constitute a sufficient injury for standing. In response to Justice Kennedy’s opinions, Professor Solimine asked a critical standing question: “How do we know a statute meets Justice Kennedy’s test?” To address this question, the statutory text, structure, and legislative history will have to be closely examined. Relying on Justice Kennedy’s approach to standing in *Lujan*, Professor Solimine argues that the Court’s decisions in *Lujan* and *Akins* “seem more reconcilable than thought by some scholars, given that the citizen suit statute in the latter

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395 See id. at 1052.
396 Id. at 1052–53; see also Larry W. Yackle, *Reclaiming the Federal Courts* 66, 82–88 (1994) (discussing the positive and negative aspects of proposed legislation to expand standing rights as well as how legislation should ideally be phrased).
397 See Heather Elliott, *Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems*, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 190–92, 226 (2011) (questioning whether the Supreme Court would allow Congress to modify standing doctrine and whether congressional efforts would improve problems with the standing doctrine).
398 See Solimine, *supra* note 13, at 1053–56 (arguing that while federal courts should give some deference to Congress in deciding standing issues, they should not abdicate judicial responsibility to limit congressional authority if necessary).
399 See supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.
400 See *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580; Solimine, *supra* note 13, at 1055 (discussing “Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in [Lujan], which suggested that carefully drawn congressional statutes addressing standing should be upheld as constitutional”).
402 Id.
case had different language and a richer jurisprudential meaning giving context to the operative language.”

Another principle that may guide the Court in interpreting the scope of statutory standing rights is that Congress may override the Court’s prudential standing rules, provided the statute does so expressly. This requirement probably does not necessitate the level of specificity required by the clear statement rule of statutory construction. The principle that express statutory language is necessary to override the Court’s prudential standing rules could be extended to suggest that Congress may enlarge Article III standing rights at the margin by, for example, expressly establishing a statutory injury not recognized at common law.

An important question for this Article is whether the environmental statutes at issue in *American Canoe* and *Wilderness Society* are more like the citizen suit statute in *Lujan* or the explicit information statute in *Akins*. The notice and appeal provisions in *Wilderness Society* and the monitoring and reporting obligations in *American Canoe* are more like the vague “any person” language in *Lujan* than the explicit public information statute at issue in *Akins*. Because the *Akins* decision found informational standing rights in a statute that clearly granted voters an

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403 See id. at 1056. In a footnote, Professor Solimine observes, “[i]t also cannot go unnoticed that Justice Kennedy concurred in both cases, and even Justice Scalia, dissenting in *Akins*, did not argue that the majority was overruling *Lujan*.” Id. at 1056 n.182. While *Lujan* and *Akins* can be reconciled to some extent in light of Justice Kennedy’s support in both cases, it is significant that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in *Lujan* expressed significant reservations with Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. See supra notes 388–394 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia clearly believed that the *Akins* majority opinion was philosophically at odds with his view of standing as an essential component of separation of powers principles that he had articulated in *Lujan* and in his 1983 law review article. See supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text.


405 See *Yackle*, supra note 12, at 386 n.489 (commenting that the Court often interprets section 702 of the APA, which gives standing to those within the zone of interests, based on precedent construing that section rather than the strict statutory text).

406 See *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

407 See *Akins*, 524 U.S. at 13 (discussing a group of voters challenging the Federal Election Campaign Act); *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 557–58 (discussing a challenge to a rule promulgated under the Endangered Species Act); *Wilderness Soc’y*, 622 F.3d at 1253 (discussing challenge to the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act); *Am. Canoe*, 389 F.3d at 538 (discussing violations of the Clean Water Act).

408 See *Akins*, 524 U.S. at 20; *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing that the Endangered Species Act does not establish an injury in “any person” when the statute is violated); *Wilderness Soc’y*, 622 F.3d at 1259; *Am. Canoe*, 389 F.3d at 539.
affirmative right to information, the Ninth Circuit in *Wilderness Society* was probably correct to conclude that Congress must be explicit in granting the public the right to certain information if it intends to create an informational injury and informational standing. While giving plaintiffs informational standing might assist Congress in enforcing notice and appeal provisions, it was not unreasonable for the Ninth Circuit to require more explicit rights conferring language when determining whether plaintiffs have Article III standing. Based on his concurring opinions in *Lujan* and *Summers*, both of which demanded that Congress more explicitly define the injuries for citizen suit standing, Justice Kennedy probably would have agreed with the *Wilderness Society* decision. The decision suggested that Congress must use explicit language to establish public informational standing rights and that general notice and appeal provisions in a statute designed to promote public participation do not create a right to informational standing. As a result, Justice Kennedy probably would have disagreed with the majority in *American Canoe*, which held that the monitoring and public information requirements in the Clean Water Act are sufficiently clear to demonstrate that Congress intended to create a public right to information establishing standing rights. Instead, Justice Kennedy would have likely agreed with Sixth Circuit Judge Kennedy’s dissenting view that only explicit congressional authorization can confer informational standing rights.

**Conclusion**

In its recent *Wilderness Society* decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed the difficult question of when a statute may establish a right to informa-
tional standing. The D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit previously reached different conclusions about whether environmental statutes promoting public participation or requiring environmental assessments create a right to informational standing. The Sixth Circuit broadly interpreted informational standing requirements by relying upon Akins, even though the rights provided in the Clean Water Act differed from the statute at issue in Akins. By contrast, in Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Summers’s narrowing of procedural rights standing as implicitly narrowing standing rights in general, and concluded that general notice and appeal provisions that do not establish an explicit informational right are insufficient to establish informational standing.

The Wilderness Society decision and the American Canoe decision indirectly raise the broader question of when Congress may modify common law injury, or even Article III constitutional standing, requirements for a concrete injury. In turn, that question raises broader separation of powers issues. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan, which he recently echoed in his concurring opinion in Summers, represents the ideological middle ground on this issue. His vote is likely to be the key vote in future cases unless the Court’s current ideological composition changes. Since both his concurring opinions in Lujan and in Summers sought explicit congressional language defining types of injuries sufficient for standing, it is also likely that Justice Kennedy would demand explicit language defining informational injuries. Thus, he would likely agree with the Ninth Circuit in Wilderness Society that general language establishing appeal and notice rights is insufficient to create a public right to information, unlike the explicit

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416 See Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259–60; supra notes 300–354 and accompanying text.
417 Compare supra notes 200–237 and accompanying text (examining the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in several standing cases), with supra notes 242–277 and accompanying text (examining the Sixth Circuit decision regarding standing in American Canoe).
418 See supra notes 238–299 and accompanying text.
419 See Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1256–58; supra notes 300–354 and accompanying text.
420 See Wilderness Soc’y, 622 F.3d at 1259; Am. Canoe, 389 F.3d at 542–46; supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.
422 See supra notes 182–186 and accompanying text.
423 See supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.
424 See supra notes 69–76, 177–181 and accompanying text.
425 See supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.
rights-conferring language at issue in *Akins*.

Because he typically demands explicit language from Congress to modify traditional common law standing requirements for a concrete injury, Justice Kennedy probably would have agreed with Judge Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in *American Canoe*.

While the decision in *Wilderness Society* relied on the implications of *Summers* to limit *Akins* and informational standing, the Ninth Circuit would have been better advised to examine Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in *Lujan* and *Summers* as a guide to the Supreme Court’s approach to when Congress may confer standing rights. According to Justice Kennedy, Congress has some discretion to establish standing rights beyond traditional common law standing requirements for a concrete injury as long as it carefully defines the injury and the class of persons entitled to sue. Justice Kennedy, however, also recognized that Article III limits Congress’s authority to grant standing to “any person” to challenge the government’s failure to observe its legal obligations.

While its decision in *Wilderness Society* was a defeat for environmental groups seeking to expand informational standing rights, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning left open the possibility that Congress could explicitly grant informational standing rights to the public, as it did in *Public Citizen* and *Akins*. The Ninth Circuit reached the right result in requiring explicit congressional authorization for informational standing, even though it should have focused on Justice Kennedy’s approach to standing rights instead of Justice Scalia’s. Despite Justice Scalia’s philosophical reservations about citizen suit statutes and congressional interference with the executive branch’s Article II authority, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in *Lujan* and *Summers* suggest that Congress has significant authority to expand citizen suit standing as long as it carefully defines the statutory injuries.

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426 See supra notes 300–415 and accompanying text.
428 See supra notes 362–415 and accompanying text.
429 See *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.
430 See *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); supra notes 362–394 and accompanying text.
431 See *Wilderness Soc’y*, 622 F.3d at 1259 (discussing that Congress chose not to confer a right to information, while leaving open the possibility that such a right could be conferred); supra notes 93–150, 300–354 and accompanying text.
432 See supra notes 304–358, 395–415 and accompanying text.
433 See supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text.
434 See supra notes 362–415 and accompanying text.