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Not Guilty by Association: Why the Taint of Their "Blank Check" Predecessors Should Not Stunt the Growth of Modern Special Purpose Acquisition Companies

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NOT GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION: WHY THE TAINT OF THEIR “BLANK CHECK” PREDECESSORS SHOULD NOT STUNT THE GROWTH OF MODERN SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES

Abstract: During the 1980s, “blank check” companies were prominent vehicles for fraud and abuse in the penny stock market. These companies largely disappeared as a result of regulatory backlash in the 1990s, but a new type of company with a similar structure has taken their place in the securities market: the Special Purpose Acquisition Company (“SPAC”). Much like their blank check predecessors, SPACs have no operations; they merely issue securities with the intent of using the proceeds for merging with or acquiring another company. Although SPACs have enjoyed increased prominence in the market, regulators continue to view them with considerable skepticism. In addition to promulgating regulations forcing SPACs to disclose more information to potential investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission deliberately moves slowly in processing SPAC deals, with the hope of curtailing the pace of SPAC offerings. This Note argues that continuing to treat SPACs similarly to the blank check companies of the 1980s is a misguided strategy because the characteristics of the two, once one looks beyond their basic structure, differ significantly. This Note also emphasizes that SPACs may be the only method of raising capital for smaller emerging companies. It thus concludes that any efforts to thwart the SPAC structure itself reflect an erroneous attempt to protect investors, at the expense of allowing this latest Wall Street innovation to facilitate capital formation.

INTRODUCTION

On February 21, 2008, the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (“Nasdaq”) announced that it was proposing a change to Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules governing the listing of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (“SPACs”).1 Two weeks later, on March 6, the New

York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") followed suit by applying to the SEC to change its rules for SPAC listings as well. These announcements, coupled with the recent filing by Goldman Sachs for its first SPAC initial public offering ("IPO"), were perhaps the most striking endorsements of the potential for the modern-day SPAC, the arrival of which has received mixed reviews. Historically, SPACs only were allowed to trade on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board ("OTC-BB"). In 2005, however, much to the consternation of the SEC, the American Stock Exchange ("Amex") surprised the industry by beginning to list SPACs.

SPACs have been tainted in the minds of regulators because they evoke images of the "blank check" companies of the 1980s that thrived amidst a penny stock market dominated by fraudulent and manipulat-
ive trading practices. As a result of “pump and dump” schemes, investors, during one period, lost an estimated $2 billion per year on penny stocks. Perpetrators of penny stock fraud orchestrated their schemes through the marketing of public shell corporations, often referred to as “blank check” companies. These “blank checks” had no operating history, few employees, few or no discernible assets, and often no legitimate likelihood of future success. Because their only stated purpose was to merge with an unidentified private operating company, investors had little material information on which to evaluate an investment in such a company.

In the ensuing decade, Congress and the SEC responded to the widespread fraud in the penny stock market by passing laws and promulgating regulations requiring enhanced disclosure about blank check companies, reducing the recidivist criminal elements in the penny stock market, and providing specific protections for investors in blank check schemes. As a result of this regulatory backlash, the blank check company largely disappeared from the market during the late 1990s.

In the wake of the bursting of the dot-com bubble, however, blank check companies reemerged under the title of the Special Purpose Acquisition Company. SPACs present an attractive opportunity for many

\[\text{(v) exempted, in whole or in part, conditionally or unconditionally, from the definition of such term by rule, regulation, or order prescribed by the SEC.}\]


8 Robb, supra note 7. Brokers controlling large blocks of thinly traded securities manipulated the share price of those securities by trading shares back and forth between nominee accounts and touting the investments’ limitless potential to customers (the “pump”). Randolph Beatty & Padma Kadiyala, Impact of the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 on the Initial Public Offering Market, 46 J.L. & ECON. 517, 517 (2003); Thomas L. James, Use of Reverse Merger to Bypass IPOs: A New Trend for Nanotechnology Companies, 4 NANO TECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 95, 97 (2007). Brokers would then sell their large block at an artificially inflated price, resulting in a financial windfall to the brokers and a plummeting share price for investors (the “dump”). Beatty & Kadiyala, supra, at 517; James, supra, at 96.
10 Hogan, supra note 9, at 13; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13.
11 Hogan, supra note 9, at 13; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 10-13.
13 See Boehm et al., supra note 5.
private companies seeking to reap the benefits of "going public," while avoiding the costs inherent in the IPO process. Rather than face the prospect of selling itself to a new investing public, a private company can engage in a reverse merger with a SPAC, thereby accessing an already-established investor base in addition to the advantages of the capital markets. Aside from the costs of an IPO, SPACs may present the only opportunity for emerging companies to "go public" because investment banks typically favor larger private companies with high revenues and strong operating histories. With leveraged buyouts

15 Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44; Boehm et al., supra note 5. Stockholders of a public company have instant liquidity because they can sell their shares on the open market. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 ENTREPRENEURAL BUS. L.J., 753, 758 (2008). This liquidity may increase the value of the shares themselves. See id. Moreover, shares of stock in a public company may be used as currency to fund strategic acquisitions or collaborative partnering with other companies. See id.

In addition to the advantages of liquidity, public companies and their management are generally held in higher esteem by prospective investors, customers, and suppliers. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5. This prestige, in turn, enables public companies to attract top-notch management personnel. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5. A public company is also better suited to attract and retain such personnel by offering attractive stock-based compensation plans because these shares can be sold on the open market. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5.

Going public also provides a company with greater flexibility in its financing. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5. It provides access to the public markets through stock or debt offerings. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5. It also enables the company to undergo alternative financing such as a private investment in public equity ("PIPE") transaction. Finally, public companies generally have greater access to bank financing on more favorable terms. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41; Boehm et al., supra note 5.

16 Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.

17 Sjostrom, supra note 15, at 758. In a typical reverse merger, a private operating company works with a "shell promoter" to locate suitable non-operating or public shell companies. Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. The private company then either merges with the shell or a newly formed subsidiary of the shell company (a "reverse triangular merger"). Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.

Post-merger, the shell company contains the assets and liabilities of the operating company and is controlled by the former operating company shareholders. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. The shell company's name is then changed to the name of the operating company, and its shares continue to trade on the stock market that they were trading on before the merger. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. The operating company's business is generally still controlled by the same group of shareholders and managed by the same directors and officers. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44. Essentially, the private operating company succeeds to the shell's public status. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.
Why the SEC Should Promote Special Purpose Acquisition Companies

("LBOs") lagging in large part due to the subprime mortgage crisis and resulting credit crunch, SPAC deals have picked up the slack.\(^{19}\) These transactions are lightly leveraged, enabling private companies to garner large cash infusions in equity rather than debt.\(^{20}\)

Despite this ever-increasing growth and acceptance on the market, however, the SEC's ongoing distaste for SPACs "is no secret."\(^{21}\) In 2005, the SEC passed several new regulations geared toward mandating enhanced disclosure from public shell companies.\(^{22}\) By requiring private operating companies merging with public shells to provide the same level of disclosure required in a traditional IPO, the new rules effectively removed some of the incentive for "going public" through a SPAC.\(^{23}\) In addition to such formal regulations, the SEC has continued to review SPAC registration statements and proxy materials with greater scrutiny.\(^{24}\) Many bankers and lawyers have suggested that the SEC is deliberately spending considerable time vetting deals, hoping to slow down the pace of SPAC offerings.\(^{25}\)

This Note analyzes current formal and informal regulatory practices with regard to the formation of SPACs, as well as their use as a vehicle by private companies seeking to "go public."\(^{26}\) Part I of this Note discusses the history of congressional and SEC regulation of public


\(^{21}\) Barker & Hedin, *supra* note 3, at 58; see also Reingold, *supra* note 3, at 17 (identifying the enhanced scrutiny that the SEC applies in its review of SPAC offerings and proxy materials for SPAC transactions).

\(^{22}\) Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234 (July 21, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419; 239.16b; 240.12b-2; 249.308 (2008)).

\(^{23}\) See id.


\(^{25}\) Barker & Hedin, *supra* note 3, at 38; Reingold, *supra* note 3, at 17. The SEC has considerable discretion during this review process. See William B. Barker, *SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933*, Bus. L. TODAY, at 65, 73 (1996). One example of such discretion occurs at the outset of the process, when the staff "screens" registration statements to determine the appropriate level of review: deferred review, monitor, no review, or full review. Id.

\(^{26}\) See infra notes 210-323 and accompanying text.
shell companies. It also summarizes the more recent wave of public shell company regulation. Part II discusses the use of SPACs as vehicles through which private companies may “go public” without undergoing the increasingly burdensome IPO process. It details the various restrictions that SPACs have imposed on themselves in order to enhance investor protection, as well as the natural evolution of SPACs.

Finally, Part III argues that the concerns underlying the regulation of public shell companies in the late 1980s are not present with SPACs. It argues further that increased regulation of SPACs, as well as the SEC’s alleged use of the review process to thwart SPAC transactions, is thus misguided for numerous reasons. First, the SEC’s disclosure requirements for public shell companies, as well as SPACs’ self-imposed restrictive measures, provide sufficient protection for investors. Second, the rapidly increasing growth of SPACs, as well as the participation of high-end investment banks acting as underwriters both undercut the notion that SPACs will devolve into the fraud-prone blank checks of the 1980s. Finally, increased competition among different SPACs, private equity funds, and hedge funds for high-profile private companies will lead to higher-quality SPAC managers and perhaps even more self-imposed measures ensuring investor quality.

Moving beyond any potential dangers to investors, SPACs provide a vehicle for “going public,” enabling potentially revolutionary emerging companies that might not be suitable IPO candidates to access the capital markets. Enabling such companies to attain rapid growth could, in turn, stimulate job growth and support the overall strength of the market. The current level of regulatory scrutiny has led several SPACs to leave the United States for the greener pastures of foreign markets, potentially diminishing the positive effects that they could have on the American economy. For all of these reasons, this Note argues that the

27 See infra notes 42–126 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 118–126 and accompanying text.
29 See infra note 127–209 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 131–154 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 210–323 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 210–323 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 215–232 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 233–298 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 299–323 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 299–323 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 299–323 and accompanying text.
38 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82–87 (explaining that more SPAC listings are on the way as the industry becomes frustrated with the regulations put in place by the SEC and legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see also Nicholas Pettifer, European SPACs Don’t Need
SEC should be working to facilitate the growth of the SPAC structure. Such a regulatory approach would not represent an abandonment of its traditional duty to protect investors from unscrupulous brokers. Rather, by working with exchanges such as Nasdaq and NYSE to help promote the growth of this investment vehicle, the SEC can fulfill its three-part mission: to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.

I. REGULATION OF PUBLIC SHELL COMPANIES

According to former SEC Chairman David Ruder, during the 1980s, penny stock fraud was "one of the most menacing problems facing investors, regulators, and the legitimate securities industry." The North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") had likewise concluded that penny stock swindles were the chief threat of fraud and abuse facing small investors. Increased regulation of public shell companies was thus initiated with the hope of curbing these widespread manipulative and fraudulent trading practices. This Part describes the fraudulent practices dominating the penny stock market in the 1980s. Then it summarizes the efforts of Congress and the SEC to protect investors from these predatory market practices. Finally, it describes the recent SEC rulemaking that mandates enhanced disclosure for public shell companies.

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Formal Regulation, IFLRLEGALWIRE, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.iflr.com/Article/1982935/European-Spas-don’t-need-formal-regulation.html (highlighting a viewpoint in Europe that SPACs "are so transparent that market forces will be enough to regulate them").

39 See infra notes 299–323 and accompanying text.

40 See infra notes 299–323 and accompanying text.


43 Id.; Robb, supra note 7.


45 See infra notes 53–97 and accompanying text.

46 See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text.

47 See infra notes 128–139 and accompanying text.
A. The 1980s: Fraud Dominates the Penny Stock Market

Until 1983, the penny stock industry was primarily regional in nature. The majority of penny stock brokerages were headquartered in Denver, Colorado; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Spokane, Washington. Although thousands of investors had already lost millions of dollars at the hands of fraudulent penny stock schemes, most regulators regarded such abuses as a mountain state problem unworthy of national concern.

During the 1980s, the nature of the penny stock market fundamentally changed as numerous brokerage firms moved away from the initial public offering of "hot issues" as the forum for market manipulation and toward the secondary markets. The growth of technology, as well as the ability to purchase phone lists enabled penny stock manipulators to operate globally. In 1988, 12.5 percent of all substantive investor complaints received by the SEC concerned brokers at penny stock firms. By 1989, penny stock firms comprised 22 percent of that total. In addition to the rising level of complaints related to penny stock brokerages, the number of penny stock brokerages increased from a total of fifty-five, headquartered in six states in 1983, to 325 with headquarters in twenty-nine states and branch offices throughout the country only six years later. Moreover, over that same time period, the estimated costs of penny stock fraud rose to approximately $2 billion dollar per year.

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49 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9; Arsteinsen, supra note 48; Nash, supra note 48.
51 Id. "Hot issues" are IPOs of small, new companies with "bright and profitable futures[,]" such as energy and mining concerns, or high tech and health-related innovations. Id. Although brokerages dealing in penny stocks were beholden to the unpredictable nature of these "hot issues," it would be difficult to develop large and diverse investor bases necessary for the creation of a large, national penny stock brokerage firm. Id. The secondary market is the market for a security after the IPO. Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9; Robb, supra note 7.
56 Doyle, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 7. A list of the complaints filed against F.D. Roberts Securities, Inc., provides another illustration of the pervasiveness of fraud in penny stock brokerages. H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 13-15. In December 1988, the SEC filed a civil injunctive action against F.D. Roberts alleging that the firm had engaged in a scheme to manipulate the price of Hughes Capital securities. Id. A second SEC action was filed in November 1989 against eight individuals for two blind
These rising numbers put Congress on notice of the problem of penny stock fraud. Congress identified two characteristics of the penny stock market that facilitated fraud: (1) an information gap in which investors were given little useful information on which to base an investment decision, thus allowing for easy manipulation by a few insiders; and (2) an extraordinary number of market participants who were either repeat offenders of state or federal securities laws, convicted felons, or persons with ties to organized crime.

The architects of penny stock schemes often sold the IPO to a collection of friendly brokerage firms in order to maintain tight control of the market. These stocks were generally thinly traded, with only one, or possibly a few brokers in the stock. This made it easier to manipulate prices than with typical listed securities with numerous buyers and sellers and an active market to set the price.

After the IPO, penny stock brokers manipulated the share price. Often, the stock was given to other insiders at a very low price and then repurchased. At this stage, nominee accounts traded the stock back and forth until the price reached a certain level. Then the stock was sold to the public at an artificially inflated value, sometimes with undisclosed excessive markups as large as 1000 percent.
Many penny stock brokers furthered their manipulative practices by implementing coercive sales tactics. Penny stock sales were often conducted out of “boiler room” operations where inexperienced sales people solicited prospective investors by cold calling them and then pressuring them into acting quickly so as to not miss out on any potential profit. In addition to lacking experience and knowledge, these salespeople would often provide false or misleading information about a stock’s performance, the company itself and its growth prospects, and the market for the securities. These cold calls generally targeted inexperienced investors who did not have the knowledge to make accurate analyses of the risks involved.

The most notorious method for committing penny stock fraud, however, was through the marketing of blank check companies. These public shells had no operating history, few employees, few or no discernible assets, and no legitimate likelihood of future success. Because their only stated business purpose was to engage in some form of business combination with an unidentified private operating company, there was little material information included in their registration statements.

Approximately 70 percent of all penny stock issues offered between the beginning of 1988 through the third quarter of 1989 were blank check companies. In the typical blank check scheme, most of
the company's stock was distributed to the underwriting broker and his business associates and friends. The brokerage would then circulate false rumors about a possible merger and the profitability of the alleged target, thereby triggering increases in stock prices. Insiders would then call potential investors, depicting the blank check as having just merged with an emerging growth company with incredible upside. The stock prices would then climb precipitously until the insiders decided to sell their shares, causing the price to plummet.

Blinder, Robinson & Co., one of the most active players in the penny stock market of the 1980s, frequently benefited from such blank check offerings. For example, on January 15, 1985, Meyer Blinder, Arnold L. Kimmes, and Michael D. Wright entered into an agreement with Blinder's securities brokerage whereby Kimmes and Wright agreed to provide substantially all of the securities for its blind pool corporations upon demand and at pre-fixed prices. Kimmes and Wright created and secretly controlled several blind pool corporations, using figurehead officers and false registration statements to disguise their actual control. Blinder, Robinson & Co. subsequently acquired 100 percent of the securities of two blank check corporations, Onnix Financial Group, Inc. and Executive Capital, Inc.

The firm proceeded to sell these securities to its customers without disclosing to them that the purported IPO was a sham. It further failed to provide the purchasers of the blind pool stock with prospectuses. Blinder, Robinson's secret unlimited access to the securities effectively created a rigged market. This enabled Blinder to profit through risk-free transactions featuring arbitrarily established prices. Blinder, Rob-

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74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
78 See United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993); Blinder Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at D5; Florida Moves Against Blinder, Robinson, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1989, at D17; Investors Sue Penny Broker, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1989, at 45.
79 Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471. Blind pools are arrangements by which companies sell securities, generally through an IPO, without stating specifically how the proceeds will be used. Sloane, supra note 66. Blank checks are one version of a blind pool. Id. Instead of identifying their proposed investment, blank checks assert an intention to search for promising private operating companies. Id.
80 Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471.
inson sold Onnix shares at substantial markups. Seeking to further capitalize on vulnerable investors, it allegedly sold 42,000 nonexistent shares, generating gross profits of $1,384,000 for its brokers.

B. The Solution? The Penny Stock Reform Act

On July 20, 1990, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act (the "PSRA" or the "Act") was introduced. The Act represented Congress's response to the rampant fraud and manipulation of investors incident to participation in the penny stock market. In the PSRA, Congress focused its legislative powers on three primary issues within the penny stock market: (1) an overall lack of information about companies and transactions; (2) the participation of repeat criminals as brokers and dealers; and (3) fraud and manipulation through blank check offerings. The PSRA, however, did not seek to ban blank check offerings. Rather, it sought to equip investors with the tools to make better choices and to better monitor their investment opportunities.

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87 Id. On July 2, 1992, a jury found Blinder guilty of racketeering conspiracy, racketeering, securities fraud, and unlawful distribution of securities. Blinder, 10 F.3d at 1471. He was sentenced to 46 months incarceration and fined $100,000. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Blinder's motions for dismissal as well as the denial of motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, the fine, and cost of incarceration. Id.

On August 1, 1990, Blinder, Robinson & Co., once the largest penny-stock brokerage in the world, filed for protection from its creditors under Chapter 11 of federal bankruptcy laws. Blinder Files for Bankruptcy. supra note 44. The company had shrunk to one-third of its former size during investigations by regulators and investor lawsuits. Id. It suffered losses of $14.8 million in 1988 and $11.7 million in 1989. Id. It owed its customers $4.8 million and other brokerage firms $400,000 in cash. Id. Additionally, the filing said Blinder, Robinson owed its customers and other brokerage firms $70 million in securities. Id.

89 H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 7-10; Beatty & Kadiyala, supra note 8, at 517; James, supra note 8, at 98; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 44; Kelvin G. Salwen, SEC Broadens Disclosure Rules on Small Stocks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at C14.
90 Penny Stock Reform Act §§ 506-510; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Nash, supra note 48; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 44; Sloane, supra note 66.
91 Cutting Penny Stock Fraud: SEC Proposes New Rules to Arm Unsuspecting Investors, NEWS-DAY (New York City), Apr. 12, 1991, at 47; Robb, supra note 44.
92 Cutting Penny Stock Fraud, supra note 91, at 47; Robb, supra note 44. The Act, as originally proposed by Rep. Edward J. Markey, would have prohibited blank check companies from registering with the SEC and selling their shares publicly. Henriques, supra note 44. The proposal represented a departure from the notion that adequate, truthful disclo-
The PSRA added a new paragraph to Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") that defines "penny stock," thereby determining the scope of securities covered by the new legislation.\footnote{Penny Stock Reform Act § 503; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 16-19.} In defining penny stock, Congress sought to include within the definition securities trading in the over-the-counter market that were not registered on an exchange or authorized on the Nasdaq market.\footnote{Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 26.}

The PSRA also amended Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act to expand the scope of the SEC's authority to bar individuals from the securities business.\footnote{Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44.} The amendment sought to lessen the role played in the penny stock market by former violators of federal and state securities laws, convicted felons, and persons with ties to organized crime.\footnote{Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; Henriques, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 44.} Congress thereby granted the SEC the authority to suspend, bar, or place limitations on the activities or functions of any person associated or striving to become associated with a broker or dealer or to bar such person from even participating in the distribution of penny stocks.\footnote{Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44.} Finally, the amendment prohibited any broker from participating in distribution of any penny stock without SEC consent, if the reasonably acting broker was aware of, or should have been aware of, the participation of a barred person.\footnote{Id.}

Sure was a sufficient antidote to stock fraud. Id. Rather, the bill envisioned a standard for registration and trading that suggested that some companies should not be permitted to sell shares to the public, regardless of how candid their paperwork might be. Id. Both the SEC and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), however, balked at Markey's proposal. Cutting Penny Stock Fraud, supra note 91; Henriques, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 44. The SEC thought that a flat ban of blank-check companies would have prevented legitimate capital raising by small companies. Cutting Penny Stock Fraud, supra note 91; Robb, supra note 44. Opposed to such a ban, the SEC sought the power to require increased disclosure, Robb, supra note 44. Sarah B. Ackerson, Chief of the Commission's Penny Stock Task Force, explained that the SEC's rules promulgated in response to the PSRA "really open the door for investor information .... They're very consumer oriented and hopefully will arm investors with the kind of information that they need to make better choices and to monitor their own investment opportunities." Cutting Penny Stock Fraud, supra note 91, at 47.

95 Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 28.
96 Penny Stock Reform Act § 504; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44.
97 Penny Stock Reform Act § 504. Any person subject to such an SEC order barring or suspending participation in distribution of penny stock was forbidden to associate or seek to become associated with a broker or dealer, or participate in distribution of penny stock without the SEC's consent. Id.
98 Id.
Congress also took direct aim at blank check companies in particular.99 Section 7 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") was amended to require the SEC to adopt rules restricting blank check companies from registering within one year of the law's enactment.100

C. SEC Rulemaking in Response to the PSRA

In response to the PSRA, the SEC issued Rule 419, which applies to every registration statement filed under the Securities Act relating to blank check offerings.101 The SEC defined a blank check company as "a company in its development stage, offering penny stock either (1) where the company has no specific business plan or purpose, or (2) where the company has indicated that its business purpose is to merge with an unidentified company (or companies) issuing penny stock."102 Although Rule 419 only applies to offerings registered under the Securities Act, blank check offerings have been effectively excluded from the registration exemption provided for in Regulation A and Rule 504 under Regulation D.103

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99 Id. § 508; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Robb, supra note 44.
100 Penny Stock Reform Act § 508; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 34. Several other measures were taken in the PSRA in order to combat fraud in the penny stock market. See Penny Stock Reform Act §§ 505, 508; H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 34. The PSRA added a new paragraph to Section 15 of the Exchange Act to establish a system for comprehensive disclosure in the penny stock market. Penny Stock Reform Act § 505. It required the SEC to adopt rules requiring brokers and dealers to provide customers with a specific "risk disclosure" document before effecting any penny stock transactions. Id. The amendment required that the document contain numerous statements regarding the nature of the risk involved in the penny stock market, information about the broker or dealer and her duties to the investor, information about the stock itself, and the means with which to receive additional information on broker-dealer disciplinary histories. Id.
102 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4[7], at 132.
103 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419, 230.501; 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation—Federal § 233 (2008). Regulation A provides for a conditional small issues exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263. Section 230.51 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which governs the scope of the exemption, eliminates development stage companies with no specific business plan or purpose, or whose business plan is to merge with an unidentified company or companies from the exemption. Id. § 230.251(a)(1). Rule 504 under Regulation D details an exemption for limited offerings and sales of securities not exceeding $1,000,000. Id. § 230.504. Subsection (a)(3) specifically disqualifies any "development stage company that either has no specific business plan or purpose or has indicated that its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified
In addition, Rule 419 requires that proceeds garnered in a blank check offering be deposited into an escrow account maintained by an insured depository institution or a separate bank account created by a broker or dealer acting as a trustee. This includes securities issued in connection with the offering to underwriters, promoters, or others as compensation or otherwise. Such funds, including interest or dividends, must be held for the sole benefit of purchasers during the offering.

After the initial sale of the blank check company's securities, Exchange Act Rule 15g-8 prohibits any sale of deposited securities or interests until the securities are released from the Rule 419 account. A blank check company may only release funds and securities from the account if several conditions are met. First, the blank check company must enter into a business acquisition in which the fair market value of the target equals at least 80 percent of the IPO proceeds. The company must then file a post-effective amendment to its registration statement, which must disclose information concerning the acquisition pursuant to Rule 419(e).

Within five business days of the effective date of the post-effective amendment, the registrant must send each purchaser a copy of the prospectus contained in this post-effective amendment, as well as any other supplements or amendments. Next, the registrant must pro-
vide purchasers at least twenty, but no more than forty-five business days from the effective date of the post-effective amendment to notify the registrant of their desire to remain an investor. If such purchaser notification is not received within the allotted time, the purchaser's deposit must be refunded. Finally, the registrant must consummate the acquisition meeting the criteria set forth above.

Once the transaction has been consummated, and the escrow agent or trustee has received a signed representation from the registrant that the above conditions have been met, the funds may be released. When purchasers of the offering receive this post-acquisition information, they must be granted the opportunity to withdraw their deposit funds. Furthermore, if the acquisition does not occur within eighteen months of the effective date of the initial registration statement, the offering's proceeds must be returned to its purchasers.

D. The Latest Round of Public Shell Regulation

On August 22, 2005, the SEC issued new provisions intended to deter fraud and abuse in securities markets through the use of reporting shell companies. These new rules and amendments address the use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by public shell companies. In its final rule, the SEC defined a shell company as a registrant with no or nominal operations and no or nominal assets, assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents, or cash and only nominal assets, assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents, or cash and only nomi-

112 Id. § 230.419(e)(2)(ii).
113 Id.
114 Id. § 230.419(e)(2)(iii).
115 Id. § 230.419(e)(3).
116 17 C.F.R. § 230.419; HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4(7), at 132.
117 Id. § 230.419; HAZEN, supra note 101, § 3.4(7), at 132.
The rules and amendments prohibit public shell companies from using Form S-8 until they have become operating companies and until sixty days have passed from the filing of the information required for filing of a registration statement. This particular rule seeks to address the use of Form S-8 registration statements by reporting shell companies to circumvent the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of the Exchange Act.

On November 7, 2005, Section 5.06 of Form 8-K became effective. Section 5.06 requires a shell company that is reporting an event that causes it to cease being a shell company to disclose the same type of information it would be required to provide in registering a class of securities under the Exchange Act within four business days after the completion of the transaction. This forces private companies attempting to go public through a public shell reverse merger or reverse triangular merger transaction to disclose the same level of information required by a traditional IPO. The goal was to provide the requisite information useful to investors in making informed decisions about investing in a company.

II. MODERN-DAY SPACs

Modern-day SPACs present an attractive alternative to the traditional IPO. This Part begins with a discussion of several protective measures that SPACs voluntarily include within their bylaws that diminish some of the risks investors may have faced in previous blank check

120 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13. The SEC declined to define the term “nominal,” arguing that the term was not inappropriately vague or ambiguous. Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234. It reasoned that quantitative thresholds would present a serious potential problem because they could be more easily circumvented. Id.

121 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.

122 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.16b; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.


127 Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.
offerings. It continues by summarizing the relative merits of gaining access to the capital markets through a SPAC merger. Finally, this Part describes the general evolution of SPACs within the market.

A. Self-Imposed SPAC Restrictions

The restrictions of Rule 419 are generally not applicable to SPACs, which fit beneath an exception provided in Rule 3a51-1 of the Exchange Act for issuers with less than three years of operations who have a minimum of $5 million in net assets. To the extent that an issuer promptly files a Current Report on Form 8-K upon consummation of an IPO showing that net assets are in excess of $5 million, the SEC will not deem the issuer a blank check company subject to Rule 419. Accordingly, SPACs typically file such a report upon consummation of the IPO, thereby avoiding the restrictions Rule 419 would otherwise impose.

Despite the limited applicability of Rule 419, SPACs restrict their own activities in an effort to provide a certain degree of investor protection. Many of these measures mirror the recently proposed criteria for SPAC listing on the Nasdaq. The current trend is for SPACs to incorporate these provisions in their organizational documents.

Similar to the requirements of Rule 419, the proceeds generated from a SPAC IPO are deposited in escrow and are not released until

128 See infra notes 131-154 and accompanying text.
129 See infra notes 155-180 and accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
131 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1) (2005).
132 Boehm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1). For an argument against extending Rule 419 to SPACs, see generally Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: SPAC and SPAN, or Blank Check Redux?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 931 (2007). For an article discussing whether to regulate the market in the context of trading financial assets, see David E. Van Zandt, The Market as a Property Institution: Rules for the Trading of Financial Assets, 32 B.C. L. REV. 967, 1025 (1991). Van Zandt identifies the important issue as "not whether some idealized notion of a 'free market' is superior to some idealized notion of 'regulation';" but whether "a particular market structure 'economizes' most thoroughly given the nature of the assets, the demand for transacting and the available cost-reducing technology." Id. He concludes that, when market structures are faced with difficult commons problems, it may be that government regulation is the best "economizing" technology. Id.
133 Van Zandt, supra note 132, at 1025.
136 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
either a business combination occurs or the SPAC liquidates. The remaining 20 percent is used to enable management to seek out a suitable target, to conduct thorough due diligence on any potential target, to cover any other miscellaneous operating expenses, and to reimburse management for out-of-pocket expenses. Beyond such reimbursements, the SPAC’s initial stockholders receive no compensation for their services unless and until they have effected a business combination.

If a combination is not effected within the self-imposed deadline, which usually spans between twelve and eighteen months, the SPAC liquidates. Most SPACs, however, provide for an extension of the initial deadline (up to twenty-four months) if management has reached an agreement in principle with a prospective target. Upon liquidation, pro rata shares of the escrowed funds are distributed to the SPAC’s shareholders. Initial stockholders are generally excluded from receiving any distribution of escrowed funds with respect to any shares they acquired prior to the IPO.

In addition to meeting this timing requirement, the company acquired in a SPAC’s initial transaction must have a fair market value in excess of 80 percent of net assets. Further protecting its shareholders, SPAC transactions require majority approval from investors before any business combination. Even upon obtaining majority approval, SPACs may be prevented from completing a business combination if more than 20 percent of disapproving shareholders seek to convert their shares.

Some SPACs have included additional safeguards as a result of market expectations or of agreements between the initial stockholders and underwriters. SPACs often require initial stockholders to agree to lock-up provisions to ensure that those stockholders retain their

137 Id.; see also Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
138 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
139 Id.
140 Id.; see also Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
141 Town & Niederhoffner, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
142 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5. Despite this return of funds to stockholders, investors generally do not fully recover the cost of their investment upon liquidation. Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
143 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
144 Id.; see also Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
145 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
146 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
147 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
ownership interests in the company until a designated period after a business combination. 148 This period generally spans anywhere from six months to three years. 149 This may help discourage directors from making a bad investment decision because of an impending liquidation deadline, especially because the initial stockholders do not receive a pro rata share of a pre-combination liquidation distribution. 150

In order to further align the interests of the initial stockholders with investors purchasing in the IPO, a SPAC may also require that the initial stockholders purchase a fixed dollar amount of warrants in the public markets. 151 These warrants will be subject to a lock-up period until the SPAC enters into a business combination. 152 Finally, some SPACs sell their lead underwriter an option to purchase additional units at a nominal cost. 153 These units typically have comparable terms as the units issued in the IPO; however, the unit purchase price and the warrant exercise price are higher. 154

B. An Alternative Route to Going Public

SPACs, as well as other public shells, often present an attractive opportunity for private operating companies seeking the advantages of becoming a public company while avoiding the costs inherent in the IPO process. 155 This enables private companies to access the capital markets through either a reverse merger or reverse triangular merger with a public shell. 156 SPACs can be particularly attractive to private companies seeking an alternative to the traditional IPO precisely because they have not conducted any business and thus should be free of any contingent liabilities. 157

Aside from the costs of an IPO, these shells may present the only opportunity for emerging companies to gain access to the capital markets. 158 Investment banks favor larger private companies with high revenues and a strong operating history because they are more attrac-

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148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See id.
151 Id.
152 Boehm et al., supra note 5.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
156 Smith et al., supra note 1; Klaris, supra note 14, at 41, 44.
157 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
158 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 2009); Smith et al., supra note 1, at 88.
tive to investors. In 2004, there were 249 IPOs, only eleven of which raised less than $25 million.

For emerging enterprises, where the process, service, or product is new and untested, a successful IPO can be difficult even if a company successfully attracts an investment bank to underwrite its offering. In addition to "selling" itself to an investment bank, the company must "sell" itself to the investing public. A private company can never be certain how the investing public will react to its offering. This uncertainty, combined with the general instability of the market, yields the very real threat that the time and money private companies spend towards preparing an IPO could be completely wasted if the transaction is not consummated.

A reverse merger with a SPAC provides the private operating company with a large infusion of cash from the proceeds of the SPAC's IPO. Because a SPAC already has an existing trading market in its securities, the private company also enjoys immediate share liquidity. This liquidity, which may increase the value of the shares themselves, is furthered by the vested interest of the relevant underwriter(s) in supporting the market after a reverse merger. The experience of a SPAC's management team in ensuring compliance with the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") may also ease the operating company's transition into fulfilling the regulatory requirements of a public company.

In addition to their use for acquiring and going public with individual companies, SPACs are now being formed as a way to purchase asset managers. This offers managers new routes to public capital,
thereby enabling them to obtain currency to grow without the hassle and risk of an IPO.173 It further allows staff to focus on the business rather than spend a significant period of time on an IPO road show.174 Although there are currently no publicly listed venture capital vehicles on American exchanges, developments on London's Alternative Investment Market ("AIM") seem to indicate that such a development remains another plausible use for SPACs.175

Potential downsides regarding use of SPACs as a vehicle for going public include the requirement that the SPAC investors vote in favor of the merger, coupled with the concept that less than 20 percent of stockholders opposing the merger can exercise their right to convert.176 This requires considerable time and expense in order to solicit the stockholder vote and hold the stockholder meeting.177 Furthermore, a private company entering into a business combination with a SPAC will likely have to live with a much larger retained equity stake by stockholders of the SPAC.178 Private companies may, however, be able to take advantage of the small time period in which individual SPACs must en-

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173 See Arleen Jacobius, A Different Way to Fund Venture Cap; LSE Public Fund Listings Create Permanent Capital, Extend Investment Cycle by Years, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Dec. 10, 2007, at 2. According to Jacobius, a "wave of pioneers" has developed a method for funding venture capital firms by listing public funds on the AIM instead of raising money privately. Id. This provides permanent capital, thus lengthening the typical investment period for venture capital firms from the typical three to six years to eight years. Id. By lengthening the investment period, the executives of publicly listed venture capital funds gain time to hold on to their best-performing portfolio companies longer, so that they may grow to their full potential. Id. It also allows them to nurture slower-growing, promising companies. Id. As a result, this new model "has the potential of making these funds perpetual fundraising machines." Id.

174 Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134; Boehm et al., supra note 5.

175 Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91. It is important to note, however, that private company ownership generally retains more control over the general direction of their companies than if they had obtained venture or private equity funding. Broude, supra note 24, at 76-79. Private company ownership has also pointed to their ability to postpone the required "sale" of their vision to public stockholders until after the merger, as opposed to prior to the issuance of shares. Barker & Hedin, supra note 3, at 38.
ter into a business combination, using the timeline as leverage to bar-
gain for a sweeter deal. Private companies must thus balance all of
these potential upsides against the cost of compliance with SEC regula-
tions of public companies, as well as the value of the company's in-
creased vulnerability to changes in economic or market conditions.

C. The Rise of the SPAC

In the wake of the slowdown of the IPO market, there has been a
recent surge in SPAC transactions. As recently as 2005, most SPACs

179 Barker & Hedin, supra note 3, at 38. Conversely, this is one drawback of investing in
a SPAC pre-acquisition. See id.
180 James, supra note 8, at 98; Smith et al., supra note 1, 88-91; Klaris, supra note 14, at
41; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
181 Boehm et al., supra note 5. Because SPACs are merely a vehicle for pooling capital in
an effort to acquire an unidentified operating company (from any market sector, de-
spite any previously identified focus), investors who purchase shares in the IPO invest pri-
marily in the expertise of a SPAC's management team. Such teams are generally comprised
of private equity and hedge fund operators, current and former mutual fund managers
and Wall Street analysts, and various current and former politicians and corporate execu-
tives. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. Conse-
quently, in many ways, investors' hopes that management will enter into a lucrative merger,
yielding a profit for everyone, is largely "on faith." Karen Richardson & Peter Lattman,
Financiers Now Say "Trust Us"—Like the Blank-Check Offerings of Yore, SPAC Investors Are Asked

Hedge funds, venture capital firms, and other institutional investors have been a sig-
ificant factor in the surge of SPAC IPOs. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Nied-
ernhoffer, supra note 134. In fact, investment by parties not deemed to be institutional
investors is often limited to a specified number of states. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91;
Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. SPACs are attractive investment vehicles for these
sophisticated investors because they can capitalize on a SPAC's unique securities structure.
Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. SPACs are listed
through both shares and warrants, which trade at different prices until an acquisition is
announced. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. Hedge
funds often employ arbitrage strategies to profit from these price differences. Steven M.
dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/the-unseen-mergers-boom-spacs/. The approval
of SPAC transactions often occurs several months after announcement. Id. Although the
proxy statement to approve the transaction, which includes relevant financial and other
information, is not immediately filed after announcement, investors may trade the SPAC
shares in the interim in anticipation of the acquisition. Id. Such activity avoids the gun-
jumping provisions normally imposed on IPOs, thus creating short-term trading opportu-
nities for hedge funds to take advantage of information deficits. Id.

In addition to the opportunities presented by their securities structure, SPACs provide
an opportunity to participate in a private-equity style investment in a publicly traded secu-
ritv. Richardson & Lattman, supra; Kit R. Ronan, Business Buffet: When Hungry Investors
Want to Make a Meal of a Company, They Can Pool Their Millions in Something Called a SPAC,
biztech/articles/060130/30spacs.htm; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134. Experienced
underwriters were second and third tier securities firms, but larger securities firms, including Goldman Sachs Group, Deutsche Bank AG, and Citigroup, Inc., are beginning to participate. In 2007 alone, sixty-six SPAC offerings raised over $12 billion, and SPAC offerings comprised 25 percent of all IPOs and 20 percent of aggregate money raised. For the first three quarters of 2008, they amounted to 53 percent of all IPOs within the United States, and 75 percent of aggregate money raised.

Several SPAC IPOs and business combinations in the past year indicate that this growth in the SPAC market is likely to continue. Apollo Management L.P. raised $300 million for Marathon Acquisition Corp., another SPAC. Freedom Acquisition Corp.’s IPO in December, which was underwritten by Citigroup, raised $520 million. SPACs are also beginning to acquire higher-profile private companies. American Apparel, a nationwide clothing retailer, recently agreed to combine with Endeavor Acquisition Corp., a SPAC that raised $130 million in 2005. On March 13, 2006, Services Acquisition Corp., a publicly traded SPAC listed on AMEX, announced its planned acquisition of Jamba Juice for $265 million. In November 2007, the IPO of Liberty Acquisition Holdings Corp. became the first SPAC to break the $1 billion mark when it listed on AMEX.

In addition to the recent surge in deal flow and size, AMEX granted the SPAC structure some level of credibility by beginning to

financial players can thus identify private companies with great potential that could be tapped through either more effective management, large infusions of cash, or access to the capital markets. Richardson & Lattman, supra. They present an upside inherent in the deal if the management team identifies a good undervalued private company to take public. See id. They also grant institutional investors the flexibility to continue owning the shares after the initial business combination, as well as protection if those investors vote against a business combination and exercise their right to convert. Smith et al., supra note 1, at 91; Richardson & Lattman, supra; Roane, supra; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.


183 Davidoff, supra note 181.

184 Id.

185 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane; supra note 181.

186 Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181.

187 Id.

188 Id.

189 Id.

190 Id.

list SPACs in 2005.\textsuperscript{192} As of early 2007, it listed twenty-three SPACs.\textsuperscript{193} In perhaps the most striking sign of the growing acceptance of SPACs in the market, Nasdaq and the NYSE announced that they would propose a rule change to the SEC for the listing of SPACs in February and March 2008, respectively.\textsuperscript{194} According to Bob McCooey, senior vice president of Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., his exchange believes that "listing [SPACs] on NASDAQ, subject to . . . important investor protections, [would] benefit investors and issuers alike."\textsuperscript{195}

Beyond having to satisfy all applicable initial listing standards, the Nasdaq proposal would require SPACs to meet several more stringent listing standards.\textsuperscript{196} First, gross proceeds from the IPO of a SPAC offering must be deposited in an escrow account maintained by an insurance depository institution as defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or in a separate bank account established by a registered broker or dealer.\textsuperscript{197} Second, the company must complete one or more business combinations using an aggregate cash consideration equal to at least 80 percent of the value of the escrow account at the time of the IPO within 36 months of the effectiveness of its IPO registration statement.\textsuperscript{198} Finally, while a SPAC is in the acquisition stage, each business combination must be approved both by the company's shareholders and by a majority of the company's independent directors.\textsuperscript{199} Following each business combination, the combined company must meet all of the requirements for initial listing.\textsuperscript{200}

The response to Nasdaq's proposal thus far, as with any other SPAC-related matter, has been mixed.\textsuperscript{201} The thirty-six month deadline that Nasdaq would impose has already been pointed to as doubling the time period specified in Rule 419.\textsuperscript{202} Others have hinted that Nasdaq has only retreated from its objection to listing SPACs because

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{192} Richardson & Latman, \textit{supra} note 181.
  \item \textsuperscript{193} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{194} Cowan, \textit{supra} note 2; Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., \textit{supra} note 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{195} Cowan, \textit{supra} note 2; Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., \textit{supra} note 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{196} Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., \textit{supra} note 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{197} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{198} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{199} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{200} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{202} Davidoff, \textit{supra} note 181.
\end{itemize}
the amount of money generated from SPAC offerings has become too prominent to ignore. Another commentator has argued that trading in SPACs on stock markets before they engage in a business combination with an actual operating company is mistaken because trading in a SPAC is trading in a "phantom." On March 6, 2008, NYSE followed Nasdaq's lead with its proposal to the SEC to create an exception that would allow SPACs to list. Generally, NYSE's IPO rules require companies to have a financial history spanning up to three years. That rule has prevented SPACs, which do not have any operating history or money on their balance sheets prior to going public, from listing. The SEC could use these announcements to attempt to implement its own regulation of SPACs, potentially triggering a longer public review of SPACs. Although the SEC is expected to approve any rules Nasdaq and NYSE propose because Amex already permits these listings, such an approval would not likely represent a departure from the SEC's policy of subjecting SPAC filings to greater scrutiny.

III. THE CASE FOR MODERN-DAY SPACS

Regulation of blank check companies represented the reaction of Congress and the SEC to widespread fraud and manipulation permeating the penny stock market. As one of the most prominent vehicles for enacting such penny stock schemes, blank check companies received especially close scrutiny during this wave of lawmaking. Although this reaction was based on several legitimate concerns regarding public shell companies, many of the underlying issues that motivated this wary treatment of public shells no longer exist. This Part argues that the changing nature of SPACs warrants an attitude adjustment from the SEC during its reviews of SPAC offerings and transactions. Instead of viewing

203 Posting of Zac Bissonnette, supra note 201.
204 Posting of Douglas McIntyre, supra note 201.
205 Cowan, supra note 2.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Posting of Douglas McIntyre, supra note 201.
209 See id.
212 See id. at 22–23; Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
213 See infra notes 293–323 and accompanying text.
them merely as potential vehicles for fraud and manipulation, the SEC should recognize their potential as an alternative vehicle enabling private companies to access the capital markets.  

A. Natural Market Forces Have Been More Successful Than the PSRA and Subsequent SEC Rules

One consistent, fundamental notion of free-market governance is that expanding the powers of government over the affairs of business remains a dangerous proposition. Although the PSRA and the restrictions of Rule 419 were intended to keep fraudulent issuers out of the IPO market, at least one empirical study has indicated that some issuers have circumvented the PSRA by simply offering securities at a higher price. That is, promoters and broker-dealers have adjusted their schemes by offering securities that do not meet the technical definition of "penny stocks." As opposed to improving issuer quality, the period following the passage of the PSRA thus provides evidence that speculative issuers could have migrated to the "non-penny" range. These unintended effects of the PSRA emphasize the difficulty of crafting legislation geared toward reducing undesirable behavior in a securities market. Because the method of limiting such activity can be easily circumvented (for example, by simply offering securities at a higher price), the PSRA has proven to be largely ineffective.

Other commentators have argued that the problems of the PSRA extend beyond merely providing easy loopholes for fraudulent brokers and dealers to exploit. Although it provides investors in penny stock enhanced disclosure, the PSRA imposes substantial costs on issuers, brokers, dealers, and investors of penny stock. Liability imposed through the Act would tend to deter honest penny stock bro-

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214 See Jenny Anderson, Crave Huge Risk? This Investment May Be for You, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at 7; cf. Sjostrom, supra note 158.
215 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Modern Library 2000) (1776); see also Monte E. Wetzler, A Remedy Worse Than the Problem, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1989, at F2 (arguing against the expansion of SEC power in the wake of insider-trading scandals).
216 Beatty & Kadiyala, supra note 8, at 518.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 532.
219 Id. at 538.
220 Id.
222 Id.
kers and dealers from the market, without encouraging fraudulent brokers from doing the same. The costs of increased disclosure may also prevent some small businesses from entering the market if fewer brokers are able to trade their stock.

Similar to the requirements of the PSRA, the SEC's Rule 419 regarding blank-check offerings has been easily circumvented. The restrictions of Rule 419 are generally not applicable to SPACs, which rely on an exception provided in Rule 3a51-1 of the Exchange Act for issuers with less than three years of operations who have a minimum of $5 million in net assets. To the extent an issuer files a Current Report on Form 8-K promptly upon consummation of an IPO showing that net assets are in excess of $5 million, the SEC will not deem the issuer a blank check company subject to Rule 419. Accordingly, SPACs avoid the dictates of Rule 419 merely by filing a Current Report upon consummation of the IPO.

In spite of the apparent failures of the PSRA and subsequent SEC rulemaking, SPAC issuer quality has continued to improve due to natural market forces. As more SPACs begin flooding the market, SPACs have become forced to differentiate themselves from other SPACs, as well as other investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity funds. Because they have recognized the potential of SPACs, prominent underwriters such as Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and Citigroup are getting involved and taking financial stakes in SPAC deals. This combination of issuer quality with the increased level of competition for both investors as well as private operating companies has thus provided tangible results, whereas governmental intrusion at best has produced no results, and at worst has yielded unanticipated collateral damage.

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223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Bohm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1) (2005).
226 Bohm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1).
227 Bohm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1).
228 Bohm et al., supra note 5; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1(g)(1).
229 See supra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 181-209 and accompanying text.
232 See Wetzler, supra note 215 (arguing against the expansion of SEC power in the wake of insider-trading scandals).
B. A Far Cry from the '80s

The fact that previous legislation and SEC rulemaking have failed to achieve their desired results does not alone call for a less antagonistic SEC review of SPAC offerings. A simple qualitative comparison between current SPACs and the blank checks of yore, however, demonstrates that the legitimate concerns motivating the PSRA and subsequent rulemaking have in large part been addressed through the natural evolution of the SPAC form. The parties involved, the level of information available to investors, and the amount of disclosure required have all reduced the level of manipulation, fraud, and exploitation of the market.

1. A Changing Cast of Characters Has Reduced the Level of Manipulation, Fraud, and Exploitation in the Market

During the 1980s, the penny stock market was dominated by numerous brokerages dealing strictly in penny stocks throughout the country. These penny stock brokerages hired sales staff with almost no industry knowledge or experience, and they targeted small, unsophisticated investors with false information and intense pressure to immediately buy or sell. Because they were dealing in penny stocks, penny stock brokers were able to control the flow of information about the companies that they sold investors as well as the price investors paid for those companies. In addition to the proliferation of speculative underwriters in the penny stock market, many of the key players within penny stock brokerages, as well as blank check companies, were former violators of federal and state securities laws, former convicted felons, and persons with strong ties to organized crime.

In contrast to the blank check companies of the 1980s, modern-day SPACs involve a very different set of players. People responsible

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233 See infra notes 236–323 and accompanying text.
234 See infra notes 236–323 and accompanying text.
235 See infra notes 236–323 and accompanying text.
237 Id.; see Henriques, supra note 44; Nash, supra note 48; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Leonard Sloane, Many Dangers of Blind Offers, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1987, at 38.
239 Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44.
240 See H.R. REP. No. 101-617, at 9–12; Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra note 44; Richardson & Lautman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
for the formation of SPACs have typically been professionals involved in
the private equity and hedge fund industry. Recent prominent foun-
ders of SPACs have included three former Apple executives, a former
adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush, a former congressman, an
owner of two professional sports teams, and a former hedge fund man-
ger. These individuals have already displayed their financial acumen
through other investment vehicles, such that they have earned suffi-
cient market credibility to attract investors who invest chiefly in their
ability to choose and ultimately manage the "right" private operating
company.

Moreover, unlike blank check investors, who were selected pri-
marily due to their vulnerability to boiler room tactics, hedge funds
and various institutional investors are now the most common investors
in SPACs. These highly sophisticated parties have both the market
power and financial savvy to evaluate the unique risks of investing in
such companies. Similarly, the speculative underwriters that used to
dominate the blank check industry appear to have lost their hold on
the SPAC market. Upon initial emergence in the twenty-first cen-
tury, SPAC transactions primarily attracted second and third-tier un-
derwriters. In recent years, however, some of the world's most presti-
gious underwriters, such as Goldman Sachs, Citibank, and Deutsche
Bank have entered the SPAC market.

Finally, the target companies with which recent SPACs have
merged have very little in common with the private companies identi-

241 See Doyle, supra note 44; Henriques, supra note 44; Penny Stock Rules Asked, supra
note 44; Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
242 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87; Hester, supra note 19.
243 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note
182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 154.
244 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87; Goldstein, supra note 231.
245 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87. Like any other investment vehicle, there are sev-
eral risks attendant to investing in a SPAC. See, e.g., Endeavor Acquisition Corp., Registra-
tion Statement (Form S-1), at 9-19 (Sept. 20, 2005). Such factors include, but are not lim-
ited to, an investor's inability to evaluate management's ability to achieve its business
objective; the potential for forced liquidation; the fact that many of the SPAC's officers and
directors may have conflicts of interest in connection with business opportunities; and the
reality that, because its initial business combination must utilize at least 80 percent of its
assets, the success of the investment is likely to be solely dependent on a single business
and a limited number of products or services. See id.
246 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82-87.
247 See Cowan, supra note 3; Goldstein, supra note 231.
248 Cowan, supra note 3; Goldstein, supra note 231.
fied in the blank check schemes of the 1980s. Then, penny stock brokers were able to control the flow of information regarding the typical target company. Because of this monopoly of information, investors had little to no hope of verifying the purported “incredible upside” of these “emerging companies.” The modern SPAC market, however, has featured increasingly prominent private companies going public via SPAC transactions. SPAC managers cannot wield the same level of control when merging with nationally recognized brands such as American Apparel and Jamba Juice. Rather than being victimized by this monopoly on information, the public easily tracks the details of these private companies and their SPAC transactions, which are now closely followed in numerous news mediums throughout the country.

2. The Modern Character of the SPAC Market Has Yielded Greater Competition and Greater Quality

This new cast of characters has yielded a changing market characterized by inner competition. The architects of blank check schemes in the 1980s targeted individual investors with little experience and little to no chance of effectively evaluating the risks involved. Finding potential customers was thus as easy as opening a phone book and dialing. Furthermore, because the private companies targeted by blank check managers were often the product of their imagination, finding a suitable emerging company with “limitless potential” was no more difficult than identifying prospective investors.

249 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhofer, supra note 134.
251 Id. at 9-12.
253 See id.
257 Id. at 10-12.
258 Id.
Conversely, the SPAC market has become increasingly competitive as this investment vehicle continues gaining market credibility. Instead of picking up a phone book and instituting pressure campaigns rife with misinformation in order to manipulate inexperienced investors, today’s SPACs must attract extremely sophisticated institutional investors and hedge funds in order to generate sufficient proceeds in the initial offering. Accordingly, SPACs are forced to take measures to make themselves an attractive investment. After evaluating the SPAC during the initial offering period, stockholders are given a second chance to evaluate their investment once management has identified a target company. When investors find prospective targets unattractive, for whatever reason, they have the automatic right to convert their shares to cash.

Within this competitive market, SPACs have also had to differentiate themselves from other investment vehicles. A SPAC is often a more attractive investment opportunity than other public shell companies because it has been formed precisely for the purpose of taking a private company public. As such, it has no operating history, and likely no contingent liabilities. In addition to competing with other investment vehicles, the recent proliferation of SPACs has led to increased competition among SPACs themselves.

Furthermore, the competition does not end after the IPO. In addition to competing for investors at this initial stage, so as to garner sufficient capital to engage in a business combination, SPACs must also compete for target companies. In order to remain viable, a SPAC has to present an attractive alternative to going public through the tradi-

258 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
259 See Avery, supra note 1, at 82–87.
260 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
261 See Anderson, supra note 214.
262 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
263 See Holman, supra note 255, at 22–26; Saigol, supra note 255.
264 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
265 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
266 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
267 See Davidoff, supra note 181.
268 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
269 See Richardson & Lattman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
Once a private company has made the decision to go public through either a reverse merger or reverse triangular merger with a public shell, a SPAC must differentiate itself from other public shells and from other SPACs.271

This increased competition with other investment vehicles, other public shells, and other SPACs at both the initial offering and business combination stage has led to greater investor protection in SPAC transactions.272 As part of this effort, SPACs have voluntarily self-imposed many of the Rule 419 restrictions that technically do not apply.273 In recent deals, SPACs have even put away as much as 95 percent of funds garnered in the initial offering into an escrow account.274 In some instances, the underwriter has put a portion of its fees into the same account until an acquisition has been made.275 Unlike a private equity investment, SPAC shareholders thus have the ability to help determine whether a particular business combination takes place, and they have immediate share liquidity.276

Although Nasdaq’s current proposal would extend the typical life-span of a SPAC from eighteen to twenty-four months to a period of thirty-six months prior to liquidation, it promises greater investor protection as well.277 In addition to the regulatory scrutiny of the SEC and perhaps Congress, as SPACs begin listing on more prominent exchanges, they would have to meet the listing standards of the respective exchanges.278 Also, providing a SPAC with a longer period in which it may seek out and come to terms with a suitable target may be better for its investors.279 It may take longer for them to see the returns on their investment, but it could also reduce the bargaining leverage of targets using the deadline to strike a rather favorable deal.280 If investors lose patience, they can always take advantage of the liquidity attendant to any public company and sell their shares.281

270 See Klaris, supra note 14 at 41, 44; Boehm et al., supra note 5.
271 See Davidoff, supra note 181.
272 See Holman, supra note 255; Richardson & Latman, supra note 181; Roane, supra note 181; Saigol, supra note 255; Savitz, supra note 182, at 22; Town & Niedernhoffer, supra note 134.
274 Avery, supra note 1, at 82–87.
275 Id.
276 See Sjostrom, supra note 15, at 758.
278 See id.
279 See Broude, supra note 24, at 76–79.
280 See id.
281 See Sjostrom, supra note 15, at 758.
3. Sufficient Safeguards Exist for Investors

Section 5.06 of Form 8-K, which became effective November 7, 2005, requires a shell company reporting an event that causes it to cease being a shell company to disclose the same type of information it would be required to provide in registering a class of securities under the Exchange Act.\(^{232}\) Effectively, this means that private companies that are going public through a SPAC merger must disclose the same level of information required by an IPO.\(^{233}\) Accordingly, investors are presented with the same level of information as in any other offering when making the decision whether to purchase or sell shares in the new public operating company.\(^{234}\) Investors thus have sufficient information to evaluate the relative risks and rewards in making such a decision.\(^{235}\)

A recent trend is that hedge fund managers are forming SPACs instead of hedge funds.\(^{236}\) Assuming a limited pool of investment managers who would form any of these kinds of vehicles, this may result in enhanced disclosure within the alternative investment industry as investors in such investments are migrated to investment vehicles with disclosure requirements.\(^{237}\) Generally, hedge funds have been viewed as secretive in nature, in large part because of certain provisions in the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which have exempted the majority of hedge funds and their advisers from registering with the SEC.\(^{238}\) SPACs, however, must immediately comply with the Securities Act and Sarbanes-Oxley.\(^{239}\)

Although an investment in a SPAC, like any other investment, carries with it a potentially high degree of risk, the safeguards built into the bylaws of these corporations provide investors with considerably more protection than other investment vehicles.\(^{239}\) First, SPACs keep at least 80 percent of IPO proceeds in an escrow account, thereby protecting

\(^{232}\) See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2008); Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234 (July 21, 2005); Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.

\(^{233}\) See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.

\(^{234}\) See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308; Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,234; Hogan, supra note 9, at 13.


\(^{236}\) See Tiffith, supra note 19, at 509-14.

\(^{237}\) See id.

\(^{238}\) See id.

\(^{239}\) See Broude, supra note 24, at 76-79.

\(^{239}\) See Macfadyen, supra note 252, at 26-27.
against inappropriate uses of the publicly raised funds. Second, unlike investors in private equity funds or hedge funds, investors in SPACs have immediate liquidity. This enables them to sell their shares at a moment’s notice, whereas private equity and hedge fund investments are normally subjected to minimum commitment periods as long as ten years. Third, investors in a SPAC have a say over whether a business combination takes place. Unlike other investment vehicles, the board of directors of a SPAC must disclose a significant amount of information in its proxy materials, making its business decisions considerably more transparent. If shareholders harbor any doubt over a proposal, they can vote against a transaction or convert their shares to cash. Finally, if, at the end of the day, the SPAC goes south, shareholders at least get a pro rata share upon liquidation. This pro rata share generally does not equal the initial investment; however, unlike other investment vehicles, it helps to cap potential for loss.

C. SPACs Facilitate Capital Formation

In addition to the large increase in quality, modern-day SPACs could positively impact the economy. The cost of going public through an IPO has become more and more expensive, contributing to an overall slowdown in the IPO market. In addition to the costs of regulatory compliance, private companies evaluating the risks of an IPO often determine that these potential hazards outweigh the possible benefits of becoming a public company. For some emerging companies, going through the IPO-process is not even an option because they are incapable of finding an underwriter willing to conduct the offering. Although the SEC must play some sort of formal and informal gatekeeping role with regard to becoming a public company, sound
policy would promote alternative methods by which emerging companies may access the capital markets.\textsuperscript{303}

As the subprime mortgage crisis brings talk of an imminent recession, the SEC should be acting to facilitate capital formation instead of singularly fixating on the protection of investors.\textsuperscript{304} Some commentators have pointed to the incredibly high amount of leverage in the market as the basis for the current credit crunch.\textsuperscript{305} Massive levels of debt underlying the world economy system are unwinding, leading some analysts to predict an impending bear market of "epic proportions."\textsuperscript{306} As a result, leveraged buyouts ("LBOs") have "all but disappeared," as borrowing costs nearly doubled from June 2007 to December 2007.\textsuperscript{307} LBOs in the United States fell from $322.4 billion in the first six months of 2007 to $103.2 billion in the second half of the year as the subprime mortgage market collapsed.\textsuperscript{308}

SPACs present an opportunity for private companies to infuse themselves with large amounts of cash in equity as opposed to debt.\textsuperscript{309} Enabling private companies to access these infusions of cash outside of private investment could help them expand rapidly.\textsuperscript{310} Such entities have the ability to continue growing both internally and through ac-

\textsuperscript{303} See Hester, \textit{ supra} note 19.

\textsuperscript{304} The SEC's mission statement is threefold: to protect investors; to maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets; and to facilitate capital formation. \textit{Encouraging Small Business, supra} note 41. SEC chairman Christopher Cox has recognized that the securities markets and its participants have been markedly impacted from the widespread packaging and selling of residential mortgages as securities issued by special purpose trusts that qualify for off-balance sheet treatment. \textit{The State of the United States Economy and Financial Markets: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC), available at http://sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ ts021408cc.htm. As mortgage delinquencies have risen, other financial instruments tied to the value of those mortgages have declined in value. Id. Cox has acknowledged that


\textsuperscript{306} Id.

\textsuperscript{307} Hester, \textit{ supra} note 19.

\textsuperscript{308} Id.

\textsuperscript{309} See id.

\textsuperscript{310} See id.
quisitions because they will be lightly leveraged compared to LBOs. This ability to thrive in such a credit-poor environment has helped SPACs become one of Wall Street's only positive performers in an otherwise dismal year.

The immediate growth that SPACs facilitate in certain private companies may also sustain gains in employment. Several studies suggest that fast-growing companies account for a very large portion of employment growth. As much as 50 percent of employment growth may come from fast-growing new companies like Google. In addition to creating job growth, enabling more companies to access the capital markets helps support the market itself. In 2007, Wall Street earned $770 million from the sale of shares in sixty-four SPACs, and SPAC offerings accounted for 25 percent of all IPOs and 20 percent of the aggregate money raised. This helped counter the overall reduction of earnings for IPOs. The importance of maintaining potential revenue-generators for Wall Street during IPO-slowdowns has recently been illustrated rather dramatically by the "fire sale" of Bear

311 Id. The outlook for LBOs in the private equity industry is even more dismal for 2008, in large part because of the credit crunch, which has "siphoned off the fuel that makes the private equity machine run." Andrew R. Sorkin, Live From Germany: Super Return 2008, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Feb. 26, 2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/26/live-from-germany-super-return-2008/index.html?hp. The industry seems to expect an increase in equity deals with minority stakes, and few, if any, LBOs. Id.


313 Holman, supra note 255.


315 Crutsinger, supra note 314.

316 Id. Some analysts have referred to such companies as "gazelle" companies— "young enterprises with pioneering ideas that quickly grow into big companies." Id; see also Rebecca Buckman & Kara Scannell, Venture Capital: Do U.S. Regulations Drive Away Start-Ups?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2006, at C5 ("Promising young companies that can't go public could expand more slowly and create fewer jobs . . . . If large U.S. companies such as Dell Inc. or Google Inc. hadn't pursued initial public offerings, they likely wouldn't have contributed so much to the U.S. economy.").

317 See Davidoff, supra note 181.

318 Id.

319 Id.
Stearns, the demise of Lehman Brothers, the sale of Merrill Lynch & Co., and the government bailout of the U.S. financial system.320

Finally, because SPACs generally do not rely on significant amounts of leverage to finance transactions, their potential economic benefits are not offset by any considerable dangers imploding SPACs could cause to the global financial market.321 The SEC has recently emphasized the havoc that the collapse of highly leveraged hedge funds could reek on the financial community in its latest attempts to modify regulation of that industry.322 As such, the recent decisions of hedge funds to utilize SPACs to accumulate capital, as opposed to continuing to use significant levels of debt, should come as a relief.323

CONCLUSION

The PSRA and subsequent SEC regulations regarding blank-check companies came in response to a national crisis within the penny stock market. At the time, stringent regulation of such entities was appropriate to curb systemic manipulative and fraudulent practices. Modern-day SPACs, however, do not display the alarming characteristics that made the blank-check companies of the 1980s so devastating to the credibility of the U.S. markets. Rather, the recent upsurge in SPAC transactions displays a trend towards increased quality within the SPAC market.

On their own, SPAC transactions have replaced second- and third-tier underwriters with reputable international powerhouses like Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and Deutsche Bank. Such increased issuer quality was a primary goal of blank-check company regulation; however, where the market has achieved such a result, Congressional and SEC regulations have failed. Moreover, inexperienced private investors have been replaced with highly sophisticated institutional investors and hedge funds, and largely obscure targets are beginning to be replaced by rather prominent private companies.


321 See Tiffith, supra note 19, at 591.


The slowdown in both the IPO market and the economy at large suggests that alternative routes for emerging companies to access the capital markets should be promoted. Consequently, when considering regulatory issues involving public shell companies, the SEC should reconsider its apparent distaste of SPACs. Even in the wake of the penny stock fraud of the 1980s, the authors of the PSRA were careful to avoid delegitimizing the blank check structure itself, instead emphasizing the necessity of providing individual investors with sufficient information to thoroughly evaluate their investment decisions. Continuing to curb the pace of SPAC offerings thus reflects a misguided attempt to protect investors at the expense of allowing this latest Wall Street innovation to facilitate capital formation.

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