Peter Conti-Brown, Adam Levitin, and Patricia McCoy—three leading scholars of financial regulation—submitted this brief to the Supreme Court of the United States for the case Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to lend their expertise on the history and purpose of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s structure. They take no position on the question of severability, but argue that, should the Court not dismiss the case, there are two alternatives that will respect Congress’s constitutional role as the legislative designer of federal administration. First, it can acknowledge that the many accountability-enhancing mechanisms that Congress attached to the CFPB bring it well within the constitutional mainstream and affirm the circuit court’s opinion. Second, it can remand the case for further review of these accountability-enhancing mechanisms. A holistic review of the CFPB’s structure will reveal the constitutional logic of Congress’s design. That record is not currently before the Court, and a remand would permit further review of these design features. What the Court should not do is accept Petitioner’s invitation to depart from the judicial lane and usurp Congress’s constitutional authority.
Peter Conti-Brown, Adam J. Levitin, and Patricia A. McCoy. "Brief of Amici Curiae Financial Regulation Scholars in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau." (2019).